State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1923

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Donald Eugene Degroat, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed December 2, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Wadena County District Court
File No. 80-CR-17-617

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kyra L. Ladd, Wadena County Attorney, Wadena, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant Donald Eugene DeGroat 1 Jr. challenges his conviction of first-degree
controlled-substance possession, arguing (1) that the district court erred by not suppressing
evidence obtained as a result of an invalid search warrant, (2) that he was denied his right
to a speedy trial, (3) the ev idence introduced at trial was insufficient to support his
conviction, and (4) the district court erred by admitting certain testimony at trial. DeGroat
also raises additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. Because we conclude that
the district court erred by failing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an invalid
search warrant, we address only that issue and reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
In June 2017, a Mahnomen County judge i ssued a warrant (the tracking warrant)
that authorized law enforcement to place a tracking device on a vehicle that the warrant
applicant claimed to be associated with appellant Donald Eugene DeGroat Jr. The affidavit
supporting the warrant application included information about the applicant, a Becker
County Sheriff’s Office investigator, and the following information specific to DeGroat:
Your Affiant and assisti ng law enforcement officers
have been informed by three cooperating individuals that,
DONALD EUGENE DEGR OAT, date of birth 7-26-1983 is
selling large quantities of Methamphetamine in the Becker,
Mahnomen, and Ottertail County Area. Your Affiant and
assisting law enforcement officers have been in contact with
cooperating individuals th at DEGROAT travels to

1 While the caption of this case uses the spelling “Degroat” to mirror the district court
caption, we use the spelling “DeGroat,” cons istent with DeGroat’s own spelling of his
name in his pro se supplemental brief.

3
Minneapolis, Minnesota Area to purchase five pounds of
Methamphetamine and then tr avels back to the Becker,
Mahnomen, and Ottertail County Areas and distributes the
methamphetamine.

The cooperating individuals informed your Affiant and
assisting Law Enforcement Officers that DEGROAT travels to
the Minneapolis, Minnesota Area every 3-4 weeks to purchase
the five pound quantities of Methamphetamine.

The affiant averred that law enforcement had seen the vehicle outside DeGroat’s residence
and his mother’s residence. The vehicle was registered to a third party but the affiant
asserted that it was driven a nd operated by DeGroat and hi s fiancée. According to the
affiant, DeGroat’s fiancée had been stopped in the vehicl e about a month before the
applicant sought the warrant. The warrant application and affidavit were the only
information provided by the applicant to the issuing judge.
After obtaining the warrant, law enforcem ent placed the tracking device on the
vehicle and monitored its movements. While monitoring the location of the tracker in
July 2017, law enforcement observed the vehicle travel to the Minneapolis-Saint Paul area.
The vehicle returned to the city of Wadena, where law enforcement intercepted the vehicle
at a gas station. DeGroat was sitting in the rear driver side of the vehicle when law
enforcement arrived at the gas station. There were three other passengers in the vehicle—
a driver, a front-seat passenger, and a rear-s eat passenger. The front-seat passenger and
the rear-seat passenger were in actual possession of methamphetamine. Based on the
circumstances, law enforcement conducted a dog sniff of the vehicle. The dog alerted to
the rear cargo area of the vehicle. Law en forcement towed the ve hicle to an impound
building and applied for a warrant to search the vehicle.

4
A judge in Wadena County issued a sear ch warrant for the vehicle (the Wadena
County warrant). The supporting affidavit described that law enforcement were previously
granted the tracking warrant and set forth the basis for the tracking warrant. It also
described how police monitored DeGroat with the vehicle tracker and recounted the
interaction at the gas station. The applicant al so stated that agents with a drug task force
had conducted a controlled purchase of methamphetamine from DeGroat using a
confidential reliable informant. But the applicant did not include any information about
the controlled purchase, such as when or where it occurred.
After receiving the Wadena County warrant, law enforcement searched the vehicle
and found a large amount of methamphetamine concealed in an opaque bag located in the
rear cargo area. The state charged DeGroat with first-degree controlled-substance crime
for possessing the methamphetamine. A Wade na County jury ultim ately found DeGroat
guilty of possessing the methamphetamine, and the district court sentenced DeGroat to
115 months in prison.
DeGroat appeals.
D E C I S I O N
DeGroat maintains that the district court erred by failing to suppress evidence of the
methamphetamine discovered in the rear cargo area of the vehicle, by denying his right to
a speedy trial, and by allowing the state to pr esent certain testimony at trial. He also
contends that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to su pport his conviction.

5
Because we conclude that the district cour t erred by failing to suppress evidence of the
methamphetamine, we address only that argument.2
DeGroat argues that the tracking warrant was invalid because it was not supported
by probable cause. He maintains that ther e was no information in the tracking-warrant
affidavit from which the issuing judge could have made a determination that the three
“cooperating individuals’” were credible, reliable, or had a basis of knowledge of the facts
that they asserted. He further conte nds that, because the discovery of the
methamphetamine was based on information obtained using the tracking device, the district
court erred by failing to suppress that ev idence under the exclusionary rule. See Wong
Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963); State v. Olson ,
634 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Dec. 11, 2001)
(“[E]vidence discovered by exploiting previ ous illegal conduct is inadmissible.”). The
state argues that the district court did not err in upholding the issuing judge’s probable
cause determination and that even if the tr acking warrant was invalid, the search was
reasonable under several exceptions to the constitutional warrant requirement.
The United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitutio n both guarantee
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures .” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
Law enforcement generally must obtain a valid search warrant before conducting a search.
State v. Yarbrough , 841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014). To be valid, a search warrant

2 DeGroat’s appellate attorney noted at oral ar gument that if we reverse the district court
based on failure to suppress evidence, we need not reach his other arguments.

6
must be supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV ; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
“Probable cause has been defined various ly as the objective facts that under the
circumstances would cause a person of ordinary care and pruden ce to entertain an honest
and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed.” State v. Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67, 70
(Minn. App. 1998) (quotations omitted). Probable cause exists where an affidavit filed
with the court demonstrates that “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found.” Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at 622 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)); see also State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 839
(Minn. App. 2008). “The law of probable cause prevents the issuance of a search warrant
on the basis of vague and uncertain information.” State v. Jannetta, 355 N.W.2d 189, 193
(Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Jan. 14, 1985).
In reviewing the issuance of a warrant, appellate courts afford great deference to an
issuing judge’s probable- cause determination. State v. Rochefort , 631 N.W.2d 802, 804
(Minn. 2001). We review an issuing judge’s decision to issue a warrant “only to consider
whether the issuing judge had a substantia l basis for concluding that probable cause
existed.” Id. Whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant is determined by
examining the “totality of the circumstances.” State v. Zanter , 535 N.W.2d 624, 633
(Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). “In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit under the
totality of the circumstances test, courts must be careful not to review each component of
the affidavit in isolation.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985). “Where a
probable cause determination is based on an informant’s tip, the informant’s veracity and

7
the basis of his or her knowledge are co nsiderations under the totality test.” Ward,
580 N.W.2d at 71.
I. The tracking warrant was invalid.
The tracking warrant was based solely on the affidavit filed by law enforcement.
And the only information included in the affidavit to support the warrant was information
provided by three informants described in the affidavit as “cooperating individuals.” An
informant’s information may pr ovide sufficient probable cause to support a warrant, but
the supporting affidavit “must provide the [j udge] with adequate information from which
he can personally assess the informant’s credibility.” State v. Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113,
114 (Minn. 1978). “The issuing judge is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the
‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of person s supplying hearsay information, there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
Zanter, 535 N.W.2d at 633 (quotation omitted). DeGroat argues that the affidavit filed
with the tracking-warrant application failed to provide any information from which the
issuing judge could assess either the veracity or the basis of knowledge of the cooperating
individuals.
A. Veracity of the Informants
This court has articulated six factors that are relevant when assessing the veracity
of an informant:
(1) a first-time citizen informant is presumably reliable; (2) an
informant who has given reliable information in the past is
likely also currently reliable; (3) an informant’s reliability can

8
be established if the police can corroborate the information;
(4) the informant is presumably more reliable if the informant
voluntarily comes forward; (5) in narcotics cases, “controlled
purchase” is a term of art that indicates reliability; and (6) an
informant is minimally more reliable if the informant makes a
statement against the informant’s interests.

State v. Ross , 676 N.W.2d 301, 3 04 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn.
June 15, 2004). There is no information in the tracking-warrant affidavit that supports the
first, second, fifth, and sixth Ross factors. The parties dispute whether there is sufficient
information to support the informants’ veracity under the third and fourth factors.
1. There is no information in the warrant affidavit to support that
law enforcement corroborated th e “cooperating individuals’”
tips.

In denying DeGroat’s suppression motion, th e district court concluded that the judge
who issued the tracking warrant could infer fro m the tracking-warrant affidavit that law
enforcement had corroborat ed information pr ovided by the three “cooperating
individuals.” The district court focused on the language in the tracking-warrant affidavit
stating that the “[a]ffiant a nd assisting law enforcement offi cers have been informed by
three cooperating individuals” that DeGroat “is selling . . . [m]ethamphetamine in the
Becker, Mahnomen, and Ottertail County [a]rea” and that he drives to the Minneapolis area
to purchase the drugs every 3 to 4 weeks. The district court concluded that this language
suggested that “other officer s had also received and corro borated the same information
[that the affiant] was given.” On appeal, the state maintains that the district court properly
concluded that the tracking-warrant affida vit established that law enforcement had
corroborated the information pr ovided by the informants ba sed on the fact that multiple

9
informants provided the same information. We disagree that the tracking-warrant affidavit
demonstrated that the information provi ded by the cooperating individuals was
corroborated.
If a second informant provides the same information as a primary informant, the
second tip may help to corroborate the first. See Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d at 115-16 (noting
that the issuing judge was perm itted to rely on tips from othe r informants in determining
whether the primary informan t was telling the truth); s ee also State v. Hochstein ,
623 N.W.2d 617, 623 (Minn. App. 2001) (indicating that an informant’s tip corroborated,
and was corroborated by, the statements of two other informants). “[T]he fact that police
can corroborate part of the in former’s tip as truthful may suggest that the entire tip is
reliable.” Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d at 115.
While a second informant’s tip may corroborate the first, we conclude that the
tracking-warrant affidavit did not provide suffi cient information to conclude that any of
the tips from the cooperating individuals were in fact corroborated by police. The affidavit
only states that “[y]our [a]ffiant and assisting law enforcement officers have been informed
by three cooperating individuals” that DeGroat was allegedly engaged in drug trafficking
activity and that law enforcement officers “have been in contact with” the individuals. The
affidavit does not provide any informati on regarding which cooperating individual
provided what information, or when they provided it. While it is possible that the
cooperating individuals provided three separate tips that each alleged the same criminal
activity, it is equally possible that the three cooperating individuals provided the
information in a single conversa tion with multiple law enforcemen t officials. It is also

10
equally likely that one cooperating individual provided the substantive information and the
others merely agreed. Based on the information contained in the tracking-warrant affidavit,
we conclude that there was no information from which the issuing judge could conclude
that law enforcement had corroborated any of the tip s and, consequently, the
tracking-warrant affidavit failed to establish the informants’ reliability under the third Ross
factor.
2. There is no information in th e tracking-warrant affidavit to
support that the “cooperating individuals’” voluntarily came
forward with information concerning DeGroat.

The district court also c oncluded that the term “cooperating individuals” suggested
that the informants “assisted officers voluntarily,” and th at the issuing judge could
reasonably conclude that the informants were reliable considering the fourth Ross factor.
Again, we disagree. The fourth Ross factor provides that an in formant is more reliable if
the informant “voluntarily comes forward.” 676 N.W.2d at 304. But a person who “assists
officers voluntarily” or “cooperat es” does not necessarily “voluntarily come forward” as
contemplated by the fourth Ross factor. An individual who cooperates may do so at the
suggestion of police. And, “c ourts remain reluctant to belie ve the typical ‘stool pigeon’
who is arrested and who, at the suggestion of the police, ag rees to cooperate and name
names in order to curry favor with the police.” Ward, 580 N.W.2d at 71-72 (quotation
omitted). Thus, the use of the term “coopera ting individuals” in the affidavit does not
support an inference that the informants in this case came forward voluntarily and arguably
provides a stronger inferen ce that the informants did not come forward voluntarily. We
conclude that there is no information in th e tracking-warrant affidavit that bolsters the

11
informants’ credibility under the fourth Ross factor because there is no information in the
affidavit to suggest that the informants in this case came forward voluntarily.
Considered in its totality, we conclude that the tracking-warrant affidavit did not
contain sufficient information to establish the cooperating individuals’ reliability under the
Ross factors.
B. There is no information in the trac king-warrant affidavit regarding the
informants’ basis of knowledge.

Next, we turn to DeGroat’s argument that the warrant affidavit provided no
information about the “cooperating individuals’” basis of knowledge. The state maintains
that the warrant affidavit supplied the informants’ basis of knowledge through the level of
detail in the informants’ tip.
The information obtained from an inform ant must show a basis of knowledge.
State v. Cook , 610 N.W.2d 664, 668 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn.
July 25, 2000). “This basis of knowledg e may be supplied directly, by first-hand
information, such as when [an informant] states that he purchased drugs from a suspect or
saw a suspect selling drugs to another; a basis of knowledge may also be supplied indirectly
through self-verifying details that allow an inference that the information was gained in a
reliable way and is not merely based on a suspect’s general reputation or on a casual rumor
circulating in the criminal underworld.” Id. “Assessment of the [informant’s] basis of
knowledge involves consideration of the quantity and quality of detail in the [informant’s]
report and whether police independently verifi ed important details of the informant’s
report.” Id. (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331-32, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2417 (1990)).

12
The state argues that the warrant affida vit supplied the informants’ basis of
knowledge through self-verifying details—including specific locations to which DeGroat
would travel, the frequency of his activity, and specific quantities of methamphetamine
that DeGroat would purchase. We agree that the information provided by the informants
contains some detail. But law enforcement did not corrobo rate any of the information
provided by the informants before seeking the tracking warrant. Because law enforcement
failed to corroborate the information, this ca se is distinguishable from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in White, relied on by the state. In White, the Supreme Court held that
“[w]hen significant aspects of the caller’s predictions were verified [by police], there was
reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at
least well enough to justify the stop.” 496 U. S. at 331-32, 110 S. Ct. at 2417 (emphasis
added). The White case is also distinguishable because White addressed whether an
anonymous tip, as corroborated by police, provided a reasonable suspicion for an
investigatory stop, not whethe r the tip met the higher probabl e cause standard necessary
for issuance of a search warrant. Id. at 329-30, 110 S. Ct. at 2416. Because law
enforcement in this case did not corroborate any information provided by the informants,
there was no way that the i ssuing judge could reasonably de termine that the information
was gained in a reliable manner and was not “merely based on a suspect’s general
reputation or on a casual rumor circulating in the criminal underworld.” Cook, 610 N.W.2d
at 668. Consequently, we conclude that the warrant affidavit did not provide information
showing the informants’ basis of knowledge.

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C. The warrant affidavit did not contai n a substantial basis to support the
issuing judge’s probable cause finding.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the warrant affidavit
did not provide a substantial basis from which the issuing judge could determine probable
cause. See Zanter, 535 N.W.2d at 633 (indicating that the issuing judge must consider the
totality of the circumstances when determining whether a s earch warrant is supported by
probable cause). The warrant affidavit was based solely on the information from the
cooperating individuals and there is no information in the warrant affidavit that establishes
either the informants’ reliability or basis of knowledge. Consequently, even affording the
issuing judge great deference, we conclude that this is one of those rare cases in which
there is insufficient information in the warrant affidavit to establish a substantial basis to
find probable cause.
Having concluded that the tracking warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause,
we turn to the state’s argument that the distri ct court did not err in failing to suppress the
evidence because the search of DeGroat’s vehicle was reasonable under one of the
exceptions to the constitutional warrant requirement.
II. The district court erred by fa iling to suppress evidence of the
methamphetamine discovered in the vehicle because it was obtained as a result
of the execution of an invalid warrant.

The state argues that, even if the trac king warrant was invalid, the search that
actually revealed the methamphetamine was valid for a number of reasons. The state
maintains that the Wadena County search warrant that authorized the search of the vehicle
after law enforcement intercepted and arrest ed DeGroat was valid even if information

14
regarding the tracking device was omitted. The state also asserts that several exceptions to
the warrant requirement allowed law enforcement to search the vehicle without a warrant—
namely, the automobile except ion, the search-incident-to -arrest exception, and the
good-faith exception. The state’s argume nts rely on the independent-source or
inevitable-discovery doctrines, suggesting that there was another source of information that
provided a legal basis to sear ch the vehicle. DeGroat argues that the discovery of the
methamphetamine cannot be severed from the execution of the invalid warrant because law
enforcement was only aware of the vehicle’s whereabouts based on their use of the tracking
device. We agree with DeGroat’s analysis.
Generally, “[e]vidence discovered by exploiting previous illegal conduct is
inadmissible.” Olson, 634 N.W.2d at 229 (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S. Ct. at
417). But evidence discovered as a result of an unconstitutiona l search or seizure is still
admissible at trial if there is an “independent source” of the evidence’s discovery that is
“untainted by the illegal evidence-gathering activity.” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S.
533, 537-38, 108 S. Ct . 2529, 2533 (1988); see also State v. Hodges , 287 N.W.2d 413,
415-16 (Minn. 1979). The purpose of the independent-source doctrine, and the derivative
inevitable-discovery doctrine, is that:
[T]he interest in society in determining unlawful police
conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all
probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting
the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would
have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.

Murray, 487 U.S. at 537, 108 S. Ct. at 2533 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443,
104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509 (1984)).

15
“The inevitable-discovery doctrine applies when officers possess lawful means of
discovery and are, in fact, pur suing those lawful means prio r to their illegal conduct.”
State v. Barajas , 817 N.W.2d 204, 219 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn.
Oct. 16, 2012) (quotation omitted). “The independent-source doc trine does not apply
absent a separate investigation that inev itably would have led police to discover the
evidence.” Id. Whether law enforcement would have discovered evidence absent an illegal
search is a factual determination “which mu st receive initial consideration by the trial
court.” State v. Lieberg, 553 N.W.2d 51, 58 (Minn. 1996).
The state’s argument that the search was reasonable and lawful despite the execution
of the invalid tracking warrant overlooks the fact that there is no evidence in the record to
support a finding that law enforcement woul d have known where the vehicle was at the
time it was intercepted absent the use of the tracking device. In fact, the Wadena County
warrant affidavit and the trial testimony of the involved law enforcement officials make it
clear that the only reason that law enforcement knew of the vehicle’s location was their use
of the tracking device. Thus, all of the information in the Wadena County warrant that was
learned by law enforcement after the vehicle was stopped—including that several
occupants were in possession of methamphetamine and that law enforcement conducted a
dog sniff that resulted in a positive alert—is not independent of the invalid tracking
warrant.
Moreover, because there is no basis to conclude that law enforcement would have
inevitably intercepted the vehi cle and searched the vehicle at the time it was searched
without the tracking warrant, there is no basis to conclude that law enforcement would have

16
inevitably discovered the methamphetamine if th e vehicle was searched at another time.
There is no information in th e record to support a conclusi on that the methamphetamine
would have remained in the vehicle indefinitely until law enforcement inevitably searched
it.
Had law enforcement not observed the vehicle’s location using the tracking device,
they would not have ob tained probable cause for the motor vehicle search or sought the
Wadena County warrant. They also would not have developed independent probable cause
based on the circumstances developed after th ey intercepted the ve hicle, and would not
have arrested DeGroat because they would not have known his whereabouts. It is for these
reasons that we conclude that there is no me rit to the state’s argument that the Wadena
County warrant was valid w ithout the information gleaned from the tracking device and
that there is no merit to the state’s argument that the search was valid under the automobile
exception or search-incident-to-arrest exception.
Finally, the state argues that we should dete rmine that the district court did not err
in admitting the methamphetamine because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applies. In United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 926, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3422 (1984),
the Supreme Court adopted an exception to th e exclusionary rule in instances where law
enforcement, in good faith, execute a facially valid warrant that is later found to be lacking
in probable cause. Th e Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted only a narrow good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule applied when “law enforcement acts in objectively
reasonable reliance on binding appellant precedent.” State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863,

17
876 (Minn. 2015). Consequently, we concl ude that the state’s argument does not have
merit under current Minnesota precedent.
The methamphetamine discovered in the vehicle was discovered only as a result of
the execution of an invalid warra nt. Nothing in the record supports a conclusion that an
independent source, untainted by the execution of the invalid warrant, supported the search
that resulted in law enforcem ent discovering the methamphetamine. And, nothing in the
record supports a conclusion that law enfo rcement would have inevitably discovered the
methamphetamine through lawful means. No exception to the warrant requirement applies
without consideration of the location information learned th rough the execution of the
invalid tracking warrant. Under these circumst ances, we conclude that the district court
erred by admitting the methamphe tamine discovered as a resu lt of the execution of the
invalid tracking warrant. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.3
Reversed and remanded.

3 At oral argument, DeGroat’s counsel expressly stated that this court need not consider the
other arguments he raised if we reverse and remand on this first issue. Consequently, we
do not address any other issues raised in this appeal.