State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1934

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Yusuf Abdirahman Yusuf,
Appellant.

Filed June 10, 2019
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-16-4891

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Steven P. Groschen, Kohlmeyer Hagen Law Office Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
In this appeal following a district court’s restitution order, appellant claims that
following his conviction for burglary , the district court abused its discretion in awarding
restitution for certain costs that arose from the crime. We affirm.
FACTS
This case begins with a brutal burglary and assault by appellant Yusuf Abdirahman
Yusuf and h is brother. They broke into A.A.’s apartment while he was home, beat him
with their fists and with a pistol, and took personal property from his apartment. 1 As a
result of the assault, A.A. suffered bodily harm including a swollen bloody eye, a bloody
lip, and damage to his teeth. The medical bills totaled $22,044.26 and the dental bills
totaled $4,067.22. The apartment and furniture were also damaged during the burglary and
needed cle aning and repair. The cleaning cost $412.42 and A.A.’s mattress had to be
replaced at a cost of $200. After being assaulted and robbed in his apartment, A.A. was
also afraid to return and stayed with a friend until he got a new apartment. He did not take
any actions to cancel his lease. The total cost of accumulated rent and late fees from the
time between when A.A. was assaulted and when his former landlord terminated his lease
is $5,403.65. A.A. testified that he did not pay this rent because he had rented a new
apartment, and he could not pay both rents.

1 Specifically, they stole A.A.’s laptop, phone, and firearm.

3
Following his arrest, appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2016). At the time of sentencing, the district court
awarded restitution in the amount of $32,127.55, accountin g for the costs noted above.
Appellant timely requested a restitution hearing. Before the hearing, the parties agreed the
amount of restitution accounting for medical bills should be reduced from $22,044.26 to
$13,226.56.
At the restitution hearing, A.A. testified about his losses, and the district court
ordered appellant to pay a total of $23,309.85 in restitutio n. This included the medical
expenses, dental expenses, cost of the mattress, cleaning fees, and accumu lated rent and
late fees from the apartment. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court erred in awarding restitution for the rent and
late fees from the apartment where he assaulted A.A. and for the dental expenses associated
with the assault.
A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution that “include[s], but is not
limited to, any out -of-pocket losses resulting from the crime. ” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04,
subd. 1(a) (2018). “A district court has broad discretion to award restitution, and the district
court’s order will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. ” State v. Andersen,
871 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). “[F]actual findings will not be disturbed unless they
are clearly erroneous.” Id. But questions of law are subject to de novo review. Id.

4
Costs from vacating the apartment
Appellant first argues that the district court erred in ordering him to pay for some
portion of A.A.’s rent and associated late fees. Appellant claims that he should not be
responsible for A.A.’s late fees and rent because after some period of time, those costs were
not a foreseeable consequence of appellant’s burglary and assault.2 But appellant does not
cite to any authority which requires that the damages resulting from a crime need to be
foreseeable to the criminal at the time he commits the crime.
In support of his argument, appellant cites State v. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d 849 (Minn.
App. 2011) , review denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2011) . But that case only m entions
foreseeability in dicta; it never holds or even assumes that foreseeability is necessary. Id.
at 853. The real issue in the case was whether Maxwell’s illegal use of the victim’s identity
directly caused the victim’s credit issues, such that Maxwell should have to pay restitution
for the victim’s engagement of subsequent “credit -shield and repair-protection services.”
Id. The court resolved the issue by holding, “ There is a direct causal link between
appellant’s identity theft and the victim ’s inability to refinance his home mortgage and
subsequent purchase of credit consulting and protection. ” Id. at 852. While the court did
opine that the damages were also foreseeable, it did not purport to create a requirement of
foreseeability of damages for restitution. See id. at 853.

2 Appellant specifically notes that he “is not contesting that [A.A.] was afraid to live in the
apartment after the assault. Nor is he contesting that [A.A.] deserved a reasonable period
following the assault to determine how to address the apartment damage and the lease.”

5
And appellant has failed to cite to any authority requiring that damages were
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the moment that he or she committed their crime.
The only requirement is that the victim’s losses be “directly caused” by the crime. State v.
Latimer, 604 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn. App. 1999) (quotation omitted). We therefore reject
appellant’s argument that we should impose a new rule requiring that restitution may only
be imposed when the damages were foreseeable at the time of the crime.
Arguably, another claim that appellant raises in this section is that the rent and late
fees are too attenuated from the attack to hold him responsible for those costs . Appellant
cites to State v. Palubicki for this proposition, but does not explain how or why it should
apply. See 727 N.W.2d 662, 667 (Minn. 2007) (noting in di cta that “ the potential exists
for a restitution claim to become so attenuated in its cause that it cannot be said to result
from the defendant’s criminal act”). That case involved a similar claim to appellant’s, in
that Palubicki claimed that the expenses of the victim’s children 3 that arose from their
decision to attend his trial for murder and the victim’s funeral were not directly caused by
his crime. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the
crime directly caused these expenses, and it was supported by the testimony of one of the
victim’s two children that she “felt a strong obligation” to attend the trial. Id. While the
court noted that there could potentially be a case where damages were too attenuated to
assign them to a defendant, it held that Palubicki’s was not that case. Id. (“We conclude,

3 The expenses were “lost wages, the cost of meals, and travel expenses.” Palubicki, 727
N.W.2d at 664.

6
however, that this case does not present a claim where the claimed loss is too attenuated
from the criminal act.”).
This reliance on testimony of the need of the victim’s children to attend the trial is
similar to the dis trict court here relying on A.A.’s feeling that he could not return to the
apartment after appellant brutally assaulted him there. Just like in Palubicki, the district
court did not base its restitution order on the minimum amount of damages that A.A. could
have endured as a result of the crime; rather, it correctly based its decision on the damages
to A.A. that appellant directly cause d. We therefore also reject appellant’s assertion that
the rent and late fees are too attenuated from his assault and robbery of A.A.
Appellant’s argument could also be construed to raise a claim that A.A. is not
entitled to restitution because he failed to mitigate damages by not terminating his lease
earlier once he knew that he was not going to return to the apartment. But this is not a
situation where a duty to mitigate arises. Cf. Bass v. Equity Residential Holdings, LLC ,
849 N.W.2d 87, 92 (Minn. App. 2014) (“Generally, the party alleging a loss because of a
tort or breach of contract has a duty to mitigate damages.”). Appellant and his brother
brutally beat A.A. as part of a home invasion and robbery. Following such a traumatic
event, it logically follows that the victim might not act rationally for some time after. And
crucially, appellant cites no authority requiring crime victims to mitigate damages in order
to receive restitution. Therefore, assuming that appellant has raised a claim that he is not
liable for costs that A.A. failed to mitigate, that claim also fails.

7
Cost of dental care
Appellant next argues that the district court erred by concluding that the state had
met its burden to establish the cost of A.A.’s dental care. While the issue is framed in a
manner that would avoid the correct standard of review, this is a challenge to the district
court’s implicit4 factual finding that appellant received $4 ,067.22 worth of dental work to
fix the damage from appellant’s assault. And as stated above, “factual findings will not be
disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.” Andersen, 871 N.W.2d at 913.
Here, there is support in the record for the district court’s finding. A.A. submitted
an affidavit declaring the cost of his dental work and also testified about the cost. T he
record contains nothing to contradict this evidence, and the district court found A.A.’s
testimony to be credible. While appellant takes issue with the absence of receipts or bank
documents showing what the dental work cost, appellant does not submit any authority that
would impose a requirement for such documents when there is other supporting evidence
in the record.

4 In its findings of fact, the district court noted that A.A. submitted an affidavit and testified
as to the amount of the dental work (submitting that the work cost $4,067.21 and $4,067.22
respectively), but did not make an explicit factual finding about how much the dental work
cost. The district court did credit this number in its calculation of what restitution appellant
owed. The total a mount awarded was $23,309.85. Subtracting out the amounts for rent,
late fees, cleaning the apartment, medical bills, and the cost of the ruined mattress, the
district court must have relied on A.A.’s testimony about the cost of his dental work when
it awarded him $4,067.22 in restitution for it.

8
We therefore reject appellant’s argument and affirm the district court’s finding that
the dental work cost $4,067.22 as not clearly erroneous.5
Affirmed.

5 If appellant really does intend to claim that the state had a burden to submit dental bills
or documents purporting to show that A.A. paid for his dental care, this claim would also
fail. Appellant did not submit any legal authority requiring such evidence, and so his claim
would have to be dismissed as undeveloped and not properly before the court. See State v.
Bursch, 905 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Minn. App. 2017).