State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1939

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dale Dwayne Greer,
Appellant.

Filed December 9, 2019
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-CR-16-26204, 27-CR-17-25405

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chie f Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith, Tracy
M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
In a direct appeal from his convictions of first-degree driv ing while intoxicated
(DWI), fleeing a police officer, driving after cancellation, and fi fth-degree controlled-

2
substance possession, appellant argues that his guilty plea was not intelligent because the
district court failed to inquire whether he understood the maximum sentences he could
face, the conditional-release term for his DWI offense, and the mandatory minimum
sentence. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2016, the state charged appella nt Dale Dwayne Greer with fifth-degree
possession of cocaine. In October 2017, the state charged appellant with first-degree DWI,
fleeing a police officer, drivi ng after cancelation as inim ical to public safety, and
possession of marijuana in a motor vehicle.
To resolve both cases, appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree DWI, fleeing a police
officer, and driving after cancelation. He al so pleaded guilty to fifth-degree controlled-
substance possession. Appellant entered into straight pleas with no agreement as to
sentencing. For the first-degree-DWI case , the plea petition stated that the maximum
sentence appellant could receive was seven ye ars, the mandatory minimum sentence was
six months, and a mandatory period of cond itional release would follow any executed
prison sentence. The plea petition did not sp ecify the duration of the conditional-release
term. The plea petition for the fifth-degree- possession case stated that the maximum
sentence the court could impose was five years, and the mandatory minimum sentence was
six months. Appellant signed both plea petitions.
At the plea hearing, appellant stated that his attorney went through the plea petitions
with him “page by page” and “line by line.” Appellant acknowledged that he understood
he was pleading guilty with no agreement from the state or fro m the district court as to

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sentencing. The district court clarified with appellant, “I know that you and your attorney
have gone through many times what type of se ntence you’re facing in this presumptive
commit-type case. Do you have any questions of me right now?” Appellant replied, “No.”
When the sentencing hearing began, the state said that the first-degree DWI
conviction “will carry a five ye ar conditional release should there be a commit.” The
district court sentenced appellant to 72 mont hs with the commissioner of corrections for
first-degree DWI with a five-year term of conditional release under Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.276, subd. 1(d) (2016). The district court sentenced appellant to 21 months with
the commissioner of corrections for fifth-degr ee controlled-substance possession. Both
sentences were presumptive sentences, see Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2017), 4.C (2016),
and were consistent with the recommendation in the presentence investigation report (PSI).
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, State v. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010), but a defendan t may challenge the va lidity of a guilty plea
for the first time in a direct appeal, Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989).
We review de novo the validity of a guilty plea. Dikken v. State , 896 N.W.2d 873, 876
(Minn. 2017). We must allow withdrawal of a guilty plea if necessary to correct a manifest
injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice occurs if a plea is invalid
because it was inaccurate, involuntary, or unintelligent. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
“The intelligence requiremen t ensures that a defendant understands the charges
against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Id. at 96.

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Consequences are “a plea’s direct consequences, namely the maximum sentence and fine.”
Id. It is appellant’s burden to show that his plea is invalid. Id. at 94.
Appellant argues that his plea was not inte lligent because the district court did not
comply with Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(6), which requires the district court to ensure
that “defense counsel has told the defendant and the defendant understands” 18 different
aspects of his right to a jury trial. Specifically, appellant argues that the district court did
not ask whether his attorney informed him of (1) the maximum sentences for the crimes to
which he pleaded guilty; (2) the mandatory minimum senten ces; and (3) the mandatory
period of conditional release for his first-degree DWI offense. See id., subd. 1(6)(i)-(k).
Appellant cites the Federal Rules of Crim inal Procedure and the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice for the same proposition.
Appellant’s argument assumes that a guilty plea is invalid if the district court does
not make a specific inquiry regarding the ma tters listed in Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01,
subd. 1(6). But the district c ourt’s failure to strictly comp ly with rule 15.01 procedures
does not necessarily invalidate a guilty plea. State v. Wiley, 420 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Minn.
App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 1988). If the record shows careful questioning
by the district court and that the defendant had the opportunity to consult with his attorney
before entering the plea, this court may pr esume that the defendant was adequately
informed of his rights. Shackelford v. State , 253 N.W.2d 149, 150 (Minn. 1977);
Hernandez v. State, 408 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 1987).
The plea petitions cover all of the requir ements in Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01,
subd. 1(6)(i)-(k) and list the maximum sentences that the district court could impose. “We

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presume that, prior to entry of a guilty plea, defense counsel reviews the plea petition with
the defendant and the defendant understands its terms.” State v. Byron, 683 N.W.2d 317,
323 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). At the plea hearing,
appellant testified that he reviewed the plea petition with his attorney “page by page” and
“line by line.” Moreover, the district court told appellant, “I know that you and your
attorney have gone thro ugh many times what type of se ntence you’re facing in this
presumptive commit-type case,” and asked, “Do you have any questions of me right now?”
Appellant replied, “No.”
The plea petition for the first-degree DWI offense states that a mandatory period of
conditional release will follow any executed prison sentence for any felony-DWI offense.
As appellant points out, the plea petition does not include the duration of the conditional-
release term. The PSI similarly states that appellant will be subject to a conditional-release
term but does not include the duration. Appe llant contends that this renders his plea
unintelligent. But, at the start of the sent encing hearing, the state clarified that the
conditional-release term was five years. Appe llant did not object. “When a defendant is
informed of a possible conditional-release term before sentencing, even if that term is not
in the plea agreement or sentence, the defendant has sufficient notice of the consequences
of the plea and the plea will be considered to have been voluntary and intelligent.” Thong
v. State, 892 N.W.2d 842, 847-48 (Minn. App. 2017) (citation omitted), review denied
(Minn. May 30, 2017).
The supreme court rejected an ar gument similar to appellant’s in State v. Rhodes,
675 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Minn. 2004). Rhodes argued that his plea was not intelligent

6
because he was not informed of the mandatory conditional-re lease term at the time he
entered the guilty plea. Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d at 327. But the supreme court held that
Rhodes was on notice of the conditional-rele ase term because it had been a statutory
requirement for years before he entered his plea. Id. The supreme court also stated that it
could be inferred that Rhodes understood that the conditional-release term was mandatory
when he failed to object to the PSI’s recommendation of a conditional-release term, the
state’s request at the sentencing hearing, and the district court’s imposition of the sentence.
Id.
Similarly, in Thong, this court rejected Thong’s argument that his guilty plea was
not intelligent because he was not informed that a mandato ry conditional-release term
applied to his DWI offense. 89 2 N.W.2d at 847-48. Relying on Rhodes, this court
concluded that Thong was on notice of the conditional-release period because it was
referred to in the plea petition and the PSI, a nd Thong pleaded guilty more than ten years
after a five-year conditional-release term became mandatory for felony-DWI offenses. Id.
Here, the conditional-release term has be en mandated by statute since 2002. See id .
Moreover, appellant’s plea petition and the PS I noted the conditional-release term. The
state specified, prior to appellant’s sentencing, that the conditional-release term would be
five years. Appellant did not object to the state or to the district court’s imposition of the
sentence. Under Rhodes and Thong, the imposition of the conditional-release term did not
render appellant’s plea unintelligent.
Appellant relies on James v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 2005), to argue that his
plea was not intelligent because he was not aware of the ten-year conditional-release term

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until after he pleaded guilty. But for the addition of a conditional-release term to violate a
plea agreement, the plea ag reement must contain an agreed-upon sentence length.
Oldenburg v. State, 763 N.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Minn. App. 2009). Here, appellant pleaded
guilty without an agreed-upon sentence length. His reliance on James is misguided.
The plea petition for the DWI case states th at appellant is subject to a mandatory
minimum sentence of six months. The statute provides that first-degree DWI convictions
carry a mandatory minimum sentence of 36 m onths. Minn. Stat. § 169A.276, subd. 1(a)
(2016). While the plea petition was incorrect with regard to the mandatory minimum
sentence, prior to sentencing, appellant was on notice that he would be facing a sentence
much higher than 36 months. The PSI noted that, based on appellant’s criminal-history
score and the severity level of his offense, the presumptive sentence was 72 months. Prior
to entering into the pl ea, the district court confirmed with appellant that his attorney had
“gone through many times what type of sentence [he was] facing.” And appellant does not
specifically argue that his sentence was uninte lligent based on this e rror; his argument is
premised on the district court’s failure to question him on the matters listed in rule 15.01.
Appellant’s plea was intelligent and there is no manifest injustice requiring plea
withdrawal.
Affirmed.