In re the Estate of: Pauline Mary Serpico, Deceased.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1946

In re the Estate of: Pauline Mary Serpico, Deceased.

Filed November 12, 2019
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-PR-12-751

Raymond Manning, South St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

James LaBarre, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Smith, Tracy
M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motions to, inter alia, remove
respondent as personal representative of his mother’s esta te and find that r espondent has
no legitimate possessory interest in the homestead. We affirm.
FACTS
Pauline L aBarre (Pauline), a ppellant Raymond Manning’s (Manning) mother,
passed away intestate in 2012. She was survived by her spouse, respondent James LaBarre
(LaBarre); Manning; and her daughter, Alisa Stromberg -Serpico. Ten months after

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Pauline’s death, LaBarre filed a petition for formal adjudication of intestacy, determination
of heirs, and appointment of personal representative for Pauline’s estate (the e state).
LaBarre was appointed personal representative of the estate in January of 2013.
Five years later, Manning, acting pro se, filed with the district court what was
construed to be an objection to LaBarre’s appointment. 1 Prior to the hearing on this
objection, Manning filed four additional documents with the district court, from which the
court distilled the following issues to be addressed at the hearing: (1) whether LaBarre had
an interest in the marital homestead; (2) whether LaBarre was liable to Manning for any
damage to, or waste of, the homestead; and (3) whether any of La Barre’s official actions
as administrator of the estate should be invalidated.
Manning arg ued, among other things, that La Barre’s marriage to Pauline was
annulled, but he did not provide any evidence to support this claim. He also alleged that a
2009 deed transferred title of the property from LaBarre and Pauline to Pauline alone, and
that this precludes any interest LaBarre may have otherwise had . The district court held
that regardless of the deed, LaBarre possessed a life estate in the property as a surviving
spouse under Minn. Stat. § 524.2-402(a)(2). With respect to the issue of damage or waste
to the property, the district court found that Manning did not meet his burden of
demonstrating that LaBarre has acted improperly in his role as personal re presentative or
caused waste or damage to the property.

1 Alisa Stromberg-Serpico joined Manning as a plaintiff in the earlier proceedings in this
matter, but unfortunately passed away in 2018.

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After the district court’s order, Manning filed five more documents of various
natures and descriptions with the district court in less than one month. The district court
issued an order in July of 2018 stating,
A variety of written requests have been made by Mr. Manning
and filed with this court since the issuance of the Order filed
May 30, 2018. These requests are difficult to decipher. . . . In
the interests of due process, these requests are d eemed: a) a
letter request seeking reconsideration under Minn. Gen. R.
Prac. 115.11; and b) a petition for successor personal
representative under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-613.

The district court denied Manning’s request for reconsideration. However, after observing
that there was no indication that LaBarre had conducted any administrative activities with
respect to the estate since his appointment over five years prior, the district court scheduled
an evidentiary hearing on Manning’s petition for a successor personal representative.
After the evidentiary hearing, but before the district court’s decision, Manning filed
thirteen additional sweepingly broad and ambiguous documents, which the court
deciphered as follows:
Mr. Manning argues nothing has been do ne to administer or
benefit this estate since Mr. LaBarre was appointed personal
representative. However, the vast majority of Mr. Manning’s
presentation consisted of attempting to explain how Mr.
LaBarre should be removed from decedent’s homestead and
that he (Mr. Manning) should be allowed to live there instead,
because he is an owner.

The district court denied the motion to remove LaBarre as personal representative and
reiterated that LaBarre has a life estate in the property, subject to a remainder in terest in
Manning and his sister. This appeal followed.

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D E C I S I O N
Our analysis of this appeal requires recitation of several fundamental principles. We
begin with a reminder that the function of the court of appeals is to identify errors and
correct them—not to perform the role of the district court. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d
203, 210 (Minn. 1988). For this reason, this court generally does not consider matters not
brought before, or addressed by, the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988) . For those matters properly before this court and amenable to appellate
review, we never presume that an error was made. Loth v. Loth , 35 N.W.2d 542, 546
(Minn. 1949). “[T]he burden of showing error rests upon the one who re lies upon it.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Turning now to the rights and responsibilities of parties before the court of appeals:
bare assertions of error are not enough. State v. Modern Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 770,
772 (Minn. App. 1997). Assertions unsupported by authority or argument, and issues that
are otherwise inadequately briefed, are deemed forfeited. Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d
19, 20 (Minn. 1982). Generally, we hold pro se litigants to the same standard as attorneys
and do not overlook their non-compliance with court rules. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629
N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). However, in the interest of fairness , courts also
afford pro se litigants some leeway and accommodation, so long as doing so does not result
in prejudice. Liptak v. State ex rel. City of New Hope , 340 N.W.2d 366, 367 (Minn. App.
1983); see Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc. , 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987) (“While an
appellant acting pro se is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court

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rules, he is still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the
court what it is he wants accomplished and by whom.”).
Regarding Manning’s appeal, we first note that we agree with the district court that
Manning’s abundant filings are difficult to decipher. Manning’s determined efforts to learn
the body of estate and property law are admirable, but ultimately unavailing. At various
points below and on appeal, Manning alleges that the district court erred in interpreting his
arguments or failed to address them altogether. While it is possible that the district court
did not address the arguments or points Manning intended or believed to have made, to the
extent that this is so, this would be through no fault or error—much less reversible error—
on the part of the district court. Carpenter, 400 N.W.2d at 729 (pro se parties must
adequately communicate their positions to the court). Manning uses and misuses enough
terminology to potentially implicate dozens of legal claims and arguments—most of which
would lack any practical relevance to the present matter. We believe that the district court
correctly identified the primary purposes of Manning’s filings. 2 Therefore, our review is
necessarily limited to the issue s adequately submitted to and considered by the district
court.
Manning argues that the district court erred in denying his request to evict LaBarre
from the homestead. The district court correctly observed that the demands of Minn. Stat.
§ 524.2-402(a)(2) (2018) are clear: the homestead passes first to the su rviving spouse, if

2 We note that some of the district court ’s framing of Manning’s arguments was
charitable—to say the least. But this was in appropriate conformity to the court’s duty to
accommodate pro se litigants in the pursuit of fairness. See Haugen, 410 N.W.2d at 395.

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any; and if there are descendants , they hold remainder interests subject to what then
becomes a life estate in the surviving spouse. Manning argues that this result is erroneous
for many reasons; however, the function of this court does not require us to demonstrate to
the litigants “through a detailed statement of the evidence that [our] decision is right. If
the length of judicial opinions is to be kept within reasonable bounds, appellate courts must
more closely adhere to the purpose for which they exist.” Engquist v. Wirtjes, 68 N.W.2d
412, 414 (Minn. 1955).
Our duty is performed when we consider all of the evidence and determine that it
reasonably supports the district court’s findings . Wilson v. Moline , 47 N.W.2d 865, 870
(1951). We have done so here. To individually address every argument and auth ority
Manning offers would be to extend this opinion beyond all reasonable length. State v.
Bolsinger, 21 N.W.2d 480, 488 (1946). To the extent that Manning, on appeal, intended
to raise other issues or arguments, and to the extent that those could be considered properly
before this court, “[i]t is sufficient to say that none of them are [on] point.” Id.
In arriving at its decision, th e district court straight forwardly applied a well -
established and statutorily codified legal principle. The district court correctly determined
that Manning has only a remainder interest in the property, subject to LaBarre’s life estate.
In light of the foregoing, we affirm.
Affirmed.