In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Karlowba R. Adams Powell, a Minnesota

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-1967

Origina l Jurisd ict io n Per Curiam
Concurring, Thissen, J.
Took no part, McKeig, J.

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against
Karlowba R. Adams Powell, a Minnesota Filed: May 6, 2020
Attorney, Registration No. 0327335. Office of Appellate Courts
_________________________________

Susan M. Humisto n, Director, Binh T . Tuong, Assistant Director, Office of Lawye r s
Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Bobby Joe Champio n, Minneapo lis, Minneso ta, for respondent.
_________________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. The record supports the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law that
respondent attorney violated the Minnesota Rules of Professio nal Conduct . The record
also supports the referee’s finding s of aggravating factors, except regarding lack of
remorse.
2. The appropriate discipline is an indefinite suspension from the practice of
law with no right to petition for reinstatement for 120 days.
Suspended.

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O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility filed a petitio n
for disciplinary action against respondent, Karlowba R. Adams Powell, alleging
professio na l miscond uc t warranting public discipli ne. The allega t io ns of misconduct by
Powell fell into four categories .1 First, the Director a lleged that Powell engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. Second, the Director alleged that Powell knowingly made
false statements. Third, the Director alleged that Powell misma na ged client funds. Fourth,
the Director alleged that Powell failed to cooperate with the Director’s investigatio n.
A referee held a hearing and concluded that Powell had violated the Minneso ta
Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged by the Director. The referee also found five
aggravating factors and no mitigating fact ors. The referee recommended that Powell be
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law and ineligible to petition for reinstate me nt
for a period of six months.
We conclude that the referee did not clearly err in finding and conclud ing that
Powell knowingly made false statements, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law,
violated the rules about client funds, and failed to cooperate with the Director’s
investigatio n. But t he referee err ed in the find ing on an aggravating factor : lack o f
remorse. We conclude that a minimum suspension of 120 days is appropriate.

1 The Director’s charges are in three counts. F or ease of analysis, we consider the
Director’s allegations by category.
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FACTS
Powell was admitted to practice law in Minnesota in 2003. She began her practice
at a law firm. In 2011, she started her own practice focused on criminal defense and family
law. Before this appeal, Powell was the subject of three disciplinary proceeding s.
In 2007, Powell was privately admonished for failing to act with reasonable
diligence and promptness, and failing to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. In 2016,
Powell was again privately admonished for failing to diligently pursue a client ’s
representation and failing to keep a client a dvised of the representation.
In the fall of 2015, Powell failed to appear on behalf of a client in court, and in 2016,
she failed to cooperate with the Director’s investigation . On June 14, 2017, the Director
and Powell entered into a stipulation for discipline. The stipulation recommended a 45-day
public suspensio n, effective 14 days from the date of the suspension order , and a two-year
probation period upon reinstatement. On July 19, 2017, we issued an order suspending
Powell from the practice of law for 45 days , effective immediately, to be followed by
probation. In re Powell , 901 N.W.2d 646 (Minn. 2017) (order). We did not accept the
stipulation’s proposed effective date.
Some of the relevant events in this matter took place after Powell and the Director
entered into the stipulatio n for discipline in the 2017 proceeding, but before we issued our
order. A little over one week after Powell entered into the stipulation , Powell agreed to
take on a new client, J.S. Powell met J.S., and her mother, J.H ., on June 22, 2017, and
agreed to represent J.S. in three criminal felony matters. J.S. told Powell that the case was
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urgent, with an upcoming hearing on August 12, 2017. Powell did not tell J.S. or J.H. of
her impend ing suspensio n. J.H. paid part of the retainer in cash, and Powell gave J.H. a
payment receipt. J.H. did not countersign the payment receipt.
From July 24 to 31, 2017, Powell continued working on J.S.’s case by gathering
information and providing legal advice. Powell invoiced J.S. for this work. On August 1,
2017, Powell contacted a district court clerk and a prosecutor about the possibility of a
continuance. Ultimately, J.S. terminated Powell’s representation, and J.H. had to quickly
find a replacement attorney for her daughter.
In the summer of 2017, Powell was representing B.B. in an ongoing order for
protection and child custody case. On August 1, 2017, Powell appeared on behalf of B.B.
before a family court referee. Before going on the record, Powell, opposing coun sel, and
the guardian ad litem met in chambers to discuss scheduling with the referee. During this
discussion, Powell did not mentio n her suspensio n. She said that she was unavailable until
after September 16, 2017, because of vacations and several other trials. Later, Powell told
the Director that she did not mention her suspension because she did not believe it was fo r
public consumptio n and was not something that she was in a position to disclose.
The parties then went on the record. The referee asked Powell if she had checked
her calendar for her availability for a telephone conference. Powell responded that she had
checked her calendar and was not available on August 8. She said she would try to have
someone cover the telephone conference for her. The referee set the telephone conference
for August 8.
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On August 1, Powell mailed notices dated July 28, 2017, to inform the court,
opposing counsel, and her clients of her suspension. She also called clients and told them
that she was suspended.
On August 7, Powell emailed the referee, opposing counsel, and the guardian ad
litem in the B.B. matter , and said that she wa s unable to find an attorney to attend the
August 8 telephone conference. She also included a paragraph discussing B.B.’s case and
stating his position on ongoing issues. The August 8 telephone conference was contin ued
until August 28, and Powell arrange d for other counsel to appear on behalf of B.B.
Nonetheless, in subsequent communications with the Director, Powell claimed that she
found an attorney to appear and the August 8 telephone conference was held.
On September 25, 2017, we conditionally re instated Powell to the practice of law.
In re Powell , 901 N.W.2d 915 (Minn. 2017) (order). We placed Powell on supervised
probation for two years. Her probation required supervision by a licensed Minneso ta
attorney, appointed by the Director, to monitor her compliance with the terms of her
probation. In early 2018, Powell met with the members of the probation department of the
Director’s office because she did not have a probation supervisor.
During this meeting, the Director requested the client fil es for B.B. and another
client, R.W. Powell provided these client files, which included fee agreements. The
Director reviewed those files and discovered that Powell’s fee agreements did not comply
with Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(b).
After the Director discovered the non-compliant fee agreements, the Director
reviewed Powell’s trust and business accounts. The Director learned that B.B. had paid
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Powell a flat fee and that Powell had deposited the money into her business account around
August 15, 2016. But Powell did not complete B.B.’s legal representation until December
11, 2017. R.W. paid Powell a flat fee on June 15, 2017, and Powell deposited the money
into her business account. Powell completed R.W.’s legal services on April 20, 2018.
During the Director’s investigation, the Director asked Powell where she had placed
the unearned portions of the B.B. and R.W. fees. Powell said that she had deposited the
fees in her trust account and agreed to provide documentation.
In March 2018, Powell told the Director’s office that the fees were actually p laced
into her business account. She also said that a bank employee told her that the funds were
placed into her business account due to a bank error. The Director’s office requested that
Powell provide documentation from the bank confirming the error. The Director’s office
followed up with Powell multiple times about providing the documentation. Powell did
not do so.
On December 4, 2018, the Director filed a petition against Powe ll. The Direc t o r
alleged that Powell ma de intentionally false statements, engag ed in the unauthor ized
practice of law, violated rules pertaining to client funds, and fail ed to cooperate with the
Director’s investigation. Powell denied that any of the allegations warranted discipline.
On June 23 -24, 2019, a referee conducted a discipline hearing. The referee heard
testimo ny from six witnesses: the referee and the opposing counsel present at the August
1, 2017, hearing; the bank employee who allegedly told Powell that the deposit s in the
business account were bank errors; the lawyer in the Director’s office that corresponded
with Powell about the bank errors; J.H.; and Powell.
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The referee found and concluded that Powell knowingly made fals e statements,
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, violated rules pertaining to client funds, and
failed to cooperate with the Director’s investigation. The referee also found five
aggravatin g factors: a history of prior discipline; engaging in m iscond uct while on pub lic
disciplinary probation; intentional misconduct; lack of remorse; and a lack of candor with
the court at the discipline hearing. The referee found no mitigating factors.
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The referee concluded that Powell violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(h) as
interpreted by Appendix 1, Section II (2) ,2 1.15(c)(5),3 3.4(c),4 5.5(a),5 3.3(a)(1),6 4.1,7

2 Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(h) as interpreted by Appendix 1, Section II (2) ,
provides:

An attorney or law firm must maintain at least one bank account, other than
the trust account, for funds and property received and disbursed outside the
attorney’s fiduciary capacity. The following books and records shall be
maintained for such accounts: . . . [c]opies of receipts, countersigned by the
payor, for all cash payments.

3 Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(c)(5) requires a lawyer to “deposit all fees received in
advance of the legal services being performed into a trust account and withdraw the fees
as earned.”

4 Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c) states that a lawyer shall not “knowingly disobey an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that
no valid obligat io n exists.”

5 Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(a) provides: “(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a
jurisd ictio n in violatio n of the regulatio n of the legal professio n in that jurisdictio n, or assist
another in doing so . . . .”

6 Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1) states that a lawyer shall not knowingly “ make a
false statement of fact or law to a tribunal, or fail to correct a false statement of material
fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”

7 Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 4.1 provides: “In the course of representing a client a lawyer
shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law. ”

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8.1(a),8 8.4(c) and (d), 9 and the suspension order. The referee recommended that Powell
be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
I.
The referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are not conclusive because
Powell ordered a transcript. See Rule 14(e), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility
(RLPR); In re Wentzell, 656 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Minn. 2003). But we give great def erence
to a referee’s findings and will not reverse those findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
Wentzell, 656 N.W.2d at 405. To conclude that a referee’s findings are clearly erroneous,
we must be left “ ‘with the definit e and firm convict io n that a mistake has been made.” In
re Lieber, 939 N.W.2d 284, 291 (Minn. 2020) (quoting In re Strid, 551 N.W.2d 212, 215
(Minn.1996)).
Powell disputes all of the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
argues that the referee did not present clear and convincing evidence that Powell committed
ethical violations. The Director responds that the record supports the referee’s find ings.
A.
The referee found that Powell knowingly made four false statements.

8 Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.1(a) provides: “An applicant for admission to the bar, or
a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary
matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact .”

9 Minn. R. Prof. Conduc t 8.4(c)–(d) provide that it is professio na l miscond uc t to
“engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit , or misrepresentation” or “ engage
in conduct that is prejudicial t o the adminis tra t io n of justice. ”
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First, the referee found that Powell made a knowingly false statement when she said,
at a proceeding before a referee, that she was unavailable because of vacations and trials.
Powell argues that the statement was not false. The Director responds that the referee did
not err because of Powell’s failure to disclose her suspensio n.
We agree with t he referee that Powell made a knowingly false statement about her
unavailability. Powell was only able to produce documentation that she was on vacation
from August 9 to 13. And Powell knew at the time she made the statement that pending
trials would have to be postponed because she had been suspended.
Second, the referee found that Powell’s reason for not disclosing her suspensio n at
the August 1 hearing was knowingly false. Powell said she did not inform anyone about
her suspensio n at the August 1 hearing because her suspensio n was not for pub lic
consumptio n and was something she was not in a position to disclose. The Director argues
that, even by Powell’s own analysis, Rule 26, RLPR,10 required Powell to provide notice
of her suspensio n on July 31, the day before the hearing. The Director also argues that
Powell knew she had to disclose her suspension before the hearing because she listed the
date on her Rule 26 notices as July 28.
We agree with the referee that Powell knowingly made a false statement about why
she did not reveal her suspensio n at the August 1 hearing. On the same day that Powell

10 Rule 26, RLPR, requires suspended lawyers to notify “each client, opposing counsel
. . . and the tribunal involved in pendin g litiga t io n . . . as of the date of the resignation or
the order imposing discipline . . . of the l awyer’s disbarment, suspensio n, resignat io n,
revocation of conditional admission, or disability . . . within ten (10) days of the Court’s
order.”
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claims she thought that her suspensio n was not for public consumptio n and she was not in
a positio n to disclose it, she called her clients and mailed her Rule 26 notices.
Third, the referee found that Powell’s statement s that the August 8 telephone
conference occurred were knowingly false. Powell argues that she merely misspoke when
she stated the August 8 telephone conference occurred, and meant to say that the telephone
conference was on August 28. In two different letters to the Director, Powell said that the
August 8 telephone conference was not continued and occurred as planned. She also
testified—under oath at a deposition—that the telephone conference was not continued. It
was not clearly erroneous for the referee to conclude that Powell made knowingly false
statements on this subject.
Finally, the referee found that Powell’s statements abo ut the deposits of funds into
her business account due to bank errors were knowingly false. Powell argues that a bank
employee told her a bank error may have caused the deposit s of client fees into the wrong
account.
It is well-settled that this court gives “great deference to a referee’s findings and
will not reverse those find ings unless they are clearly erroneous, especially in cases where
the referee’s findings rest on disputed testimony or in part on respondent’s credibility,
demeanor, or sincerity.” Wentzell, 656 N.W.2d at 405. The bank employee testified at the
hearing and said he was certain he never told Powell that the money had been placed in her
account because of a bank error. The referee was able to obs erve the bank teller’s
demeanor and credibility. The referee’s finding that Powell knowingly made a false
statement about her conversation with the bank employee was not clearly erroneous.
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Accordingly, because Powell knowingly made false statements, the referee did not
err in concluding that Powell violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a), 4.1, and 8.4(c)–(d).
B.
The referee found and concluded that Powell engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law. Powell argues that , based on the stipulation for dis cipline, she had a good faith
belief that she could practice until August 2 .
Our order suspended Powell for 45 days effective July 19, 2017. Thereafter, she
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law three times. First, Powell engaged in
unautho rized practice when she appeared on behalf of a client at the hearing on August 1.
Second, Powell engaged in unauthorized practice when she sent an email discussing her
client ’s positio n on August 7. Third, Powell engaged in unauthorized practice in the J.H.
matter by working for a week after she was suspended. The referee’s finding that Powell
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law was not clearly erroneous.
Powell’s argument that she did not “knowingly” violate our order is unavailing.
There is no “knowing” element in Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(a), and Powell’s purported
failure to read her own discipline order is no excuse. Cf. In re Rudawski, 710 N.W.2d 264,
270 (Minn. 2006) (explaining that disciplined attorneys are responsible for being aware of
orders issued regarding their discipline). The referee did not err in concluding that Powell
violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(a) and 3.4(c).
C.
The referee found and concluded that Powell violated the rules pertaining to the
management of client funds.
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The referee found that Powell failed to have her client countersign a receipt for a
cash payment. She thus violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(h) as interpreted by
Appendix 1, Section II (2).
Powell argues that she was not aware of th is rule. Ignorance of the rule is not a
defense. As a licensed attorney, Powell is charged with knowing the rules regarding client
funds. See In re Panel Case No. 44387, 932 N.W.2d 310, 315–16 (Minn. 2019); In re
Klotz, 909 N.W.2d 327, 337 (Minn. 2018); In re Copeland, 505 N.W.2d 606, 608–09
(Minn. 1993).
The referee also found that Powell’s fee agreements did not comply with Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 1.5(b)(3), and Powell did not place her u nearned fees in her trust account.
Powell admits that her fee agreements did not comply with the rules, and says that she has
revised her fee agreements to ensure that they do. Powell also admits that the fees were
placed into her business account, but, as already discussed, mainta i ns that was due to bank
error. The referee’s finding that there was no ba nk error is not clearly erroneous. In any
event, “misuse of the [trust] account, whether negligent or intentio nal, violates the rule. ”
In re Varriano, 755 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. 2008). The referee did not err in his findin gs
and conclusio ns regarding Powell’s fee agreements and deposits in her business account.
D.
The referee found that Powell did not cooperate with the Director in her
investigatio n. Powell argues that she provided the Director with all of the informat io n
requested despite extenuating circumstances. The Director argues that the referee did not
find Powell’s explanatio ns credible.
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We agree with the Director. The Director’s office made several requests for
information and set several deadlines that Powell missed. See Klotz, 909 N.W.2d at 332,
336 (holding that a disciplined attorney failed to cooperate when he did not timely respond,
did not send all the requested documents, and sent heavily redacted documents).
E.
We turn last to the referee’s findings and conclusio ns about aggravating and
mitigating factors. The referee found five aggravating factors: Powell ha s a history o f
prior discipline; she engaged in misconduct while she was on public disciplinary probation;
her miscond uct was intentio nal; she showed a lack of remorse; and she showed a lack of
candor with the referee at her discipline hearing. The referee found no mitigating factors.
We agree with the referee, except in one respect. We agree that t he record
demonstrates that Powell was discipli ned three times previously and engaged in
miscond uc t while on disciplinary probation, both aggravating factors. We agree, with a
caveat to be discussed, that Powell’s conduct was intentional. We also agree that Powell’s
lack of candor with the referee at her discipline hear ing—co nd uct not charged by the
Director—was an aggravating factor .
We cannot agree, however, with the referee’s finding and conclusio n that lack of
remorse was an aggravating factor. The referee opined that Powell refused to acknowled ge
her misconduct, exhibited no remorse for it , and failed to offer any evidence or assurance
that she will not engage in similar future misconduct.
In our view, Powell did show remorse at her discipline hearing. She acknowled ged
that “there were things that I could have done differently and that I should have done
15
differe ntly.” She also said she learned from her mistakes and made changes in her practice.
At one point in the hearing, Powell said she “absolutely” saw that “things should have been
handled differently.” She “could have told the judge that I was suspended” at the August
1, 2017, hearing. She also said that she “could have . . . should have [said she was
suspended]” in the August 7 email. She also addressed her fee agreements and trust fund
account and said that she had made corrections to her fee agreements and reformed how
she handled client funds and bookkeeping. She also said that she now obtains a
countersignature when her clients pay in cash. The aggravating factor of no remorse was
not proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Finally, Powell argues that the referee erred in fi nding no mitigating factors. The
Director argues that Powell did not claim , nor offer evidence of , any legally recognized
mitigat i ng factors.11 We agree with the Director and the referee.
II.
We turn now to the appropriate discipline in this case. The referee recomme nded
that Powell be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law and ineligible to apply for
reinstatement for a minim um of six months. Powell argues that the appropriate discipline
is a 60-day suspensio n. The Director is satisfied with the referee’s recommendation.
The purpose of discipline is not to punish the attorney, but rather “to protect the
courts, the public, and the profession and to guard the adminis tra t io n of justice. ” In re

11 At oral argument, Powell’s counsel said that Powell testified at her discipline
hearing about her family challenges as a possible mitigating factor. At her discip l i ne
hearing, Powell d iscussed her family challenges, but only in terms of the miscond uct tha t
led to her suspensio n on July 19, 2017, not the misconduct alleged here.
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Westby, 639 N.W.2d 358, 370 (Minn. 2002) (quoting In re Flanery, 431 N.W.2d 115, 118
(Minn. 1988)). T he discipline recommended by the referee carries great weight, but we
have the final responsibility for determining the appropriate discipline. In re Jagiela, 517
N.W.2d 333, 335 (Minn. 1994).
To dete rmine the appropriate discipline we consider : (1) the nature of the
miscond uct; (2) the cumulative weight of the discip linary violatio n; (3) the harm to the
public; and (4) the harm to the legal profession. See, e.g., In re Nathanson, 812 N.W.2d
70, 79 (Minn. 2012). We also take into account any mitigating or aggravat i n g
circumstances. See In re Perez, 688 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Minn. 2004).
A.
We first address the nature of the misconduct. Powell violated a variety of rules.
First, Powell knowingly made mult ip le false statements. “We take issues of
attorney dishonesty seriously.” In re Sea, 932 N.W.2d 28, 36 (Minn. 2019). “Honesty and
integrity are chief among the virtues the public has a right to expect of lawyers. Any breach
of that trust is miscond uct of the highest order a nd warrants severe discipline.” In re
Ruffenach, 486 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992). We pay special attention to dishonesty in
statements to a tribunal. See In re Nwaneri, 896 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Minn. 2017). Powell’s
miscond uct is significant and warrants discipline.
Second, Powell engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Practicing law in
violatio n of a suspensio n order “not only constitutes unauthorized practice of law, it also
constitutes contempt of court.” In re Grigsby, 815 N.W.2d 836, 845 (Minn. 2012) (citatio n
omitted) (interna l quotatio n marks omitted ).
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Third, Powell mism anaged client funds. Powell’s violat io n of the rules was mor e
akin to clerical errors than intentional theft. See Panel Case No. 44387, 932 N.W.2d at
315.
Finally, Powell failed to cooperate with the Director’s investigation. Persi stent
failure to cooperate with the Director’s investigation is “serious misconduct that constitutes
separate grounds for discipline” and “increase[s] the severi ty of the discip linary sanctio n
when connected with other professional misconduct.” In re Rhodes , 740 N.W.2d 574,
579–80 (Minn. 2007). Powell’s non-cooperation was serious.
B.
We now turn to the cumulative weight of Powell’s miscond uc t. When assessing the
cumulative weight of violat io ns, we distinguish a “brief lapse in judgment” or “ a si ngle,
isolated incident” of misconduct from “multiple instances [] occurri ng over a substantial
amount of time.” In re Murrin , 821 N.W.2d 195, 208 (Minn. 2012) (citatio n omit t e d )
(internal quotations omitted). “The cumulative weight and severity of mult ip le discip li na r y
rule violations may compel severe discipline even when a sing le act standing alone would
not have warranted such di scipline.” In re Oberhauser , 679 N.W.2d 153, 160 (Minn.
2004). Powell engaged in serious miscond uct and the cumula tive weight of her
discipli na r y violat io ns is signif ica nt.
C.
The final two factors require us to consider the harm to t he public and legal
profession. In considering harm, we consider the number of clients harmed an d the extent
of their injuries. In re Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 308 (Minn. 2011). Here, Powell harmed
18
two clients : J.S., who had to quickly find a replacement attorney and paid that attorney a
significant amount for the quick representation, and B.B., because his case was delayed.
In addition to the harm to her clients, we also consider Powell’s harm to the
profession. We place great weight on the reputation of the legal community as honest and
truthful and have noted that “making false statements to a court harms the public and the
legal professio n. ” Nwaneri, 896 N.W.2d at 526; see also In re Jensen , 542 N.W.2d 627,
634 (Minn. 1996). Powell’s dishonesty harmed the practice of law.
D.
After considering the factors discussed, we “consider and weigh any aggravatin g or
mitigating factors to deter mine the appropriate sanction.” In re Ulanowski , 834 N.W.2d
697, 703 (Minn. 2013). Here, we consider four aggravating factors and no mitiga t i n g
factors.
As to the first and second aggravating factors, there is no dispute that Powell was
disciplined three times previously and was on disciplinary probation when the miscond uct
occurred.
As to the third aggravating factor, intent iona l miscond uct, we are cautious not to
“double count” behavior as both a violatio n and an aggravating factor. Sea, 932 N.W.2d
at 37 (quoting In re Tayari-Garrett, 866 N.W.2d 513, 520 n.4 (Minn. 2015)). Here, we
give litt le weight to this factor because we have accounted for most of Powell’s miscond uc t
already.
As to the fourth aggravating factor, we have recognized that miscond uct in the
referee hearing may be an aggravating factor. See, e.g., In re Winter, 770 N.W.2d 463, 469
19
(Minn. 2009). In this case, we give this factor little weight. We have already accounted
for Powell’s misrepresentations, and the referee’s findings about conduct during the
hearing are conclusory.
E.
Finally, we look to similar cases for guidance in determin ing the appropriate
discipline. In other cases, we have imposed significant discipline for making false
statements. Among all of the relevant discipline cases, the most similar are Sea and
Tayari-Garret. Sea, 932 N.W.2d at 39; Tayari-Garrett, 866 N.W.2d at 522. In Sea, an
attorney made multiple false statements to the court about the reason why he was late to
court. Sea, 932 N.W.2d at 35. In Tayari-Garrett, an attorney lied and said that she was
not at a hearing because of medica l problems. 866 N.W.2d at 518. In each case, mult ip l e
false statements to the court about the reason for the attorney’s unavailability warranted a
120-day suspensio n. Sea, 932 N.W.2d at 39; Tayari-Garrett, 866 N.W.2d at 522.
A similar suspension is appropriate here. True, Powell engaged in miscond uc t
besides false statements. But taking everything into account, we are convinced that the
public will be protected with a suspensio n for a minimum of 120 days , followed by a
reinstatement proceeding at which Powell will be required to demonstrate moral change .
Accordingly, we order that:
1. Respondent Karlowba R. Adams Powell is indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law, effective 14 days from the date of this opinion, with no right to petition for
reinstatement for 120 days.
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2. Respondent shall pay $900 in costs, pursuant to Rule 24(a), RLPR, and
comply with the requirements of Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice of suspension to clients,
opposing counsel, and tribunals).
3. If respondent seeks reinstatement, she must comply with the requirements o f
Rule 18(a) –(d), RLPR. Reinstatement is conditioned on successful completion of the
written examination required for admission to the practice of law by the State Board of
Law Examiners on the subject of professional responsibility, and satisfaction of continuing
legal education requirements. See Rule 18(e)–(f), RLPR.
Suspended.

MCKEIG, J. took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

C-1
C O N C U R R E N C E
THISSEN, Justice (concurring).
I agree with the court that an indefinite suspension from the practice of law with no
right to petition for reinstatement for 120 days is the appropriate discipline for respondent
Karlowba Adams Powell. I agree with the court’s analysis with one exception. I write
separately to register my concern with the court’s reliance on Powell’s conduct at the
disciplinary hearing as an aggravati ng factor. See In re Nelson , 933 N.W.2d 73, 76–77
(Minn. 2019) (Thissen, J., concurring).