In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: H. R. S. and Z. J. L., Sr., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1968

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
H. R. S. and Z. J. L., Sr., Parents.

Filed April 22, 2019
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-18-593

Mary J. Baskfield, Baskfield Law Office, PLLC, Anoka, Minnesota (for mother H.R.S.)

Z.J.L., Sr., St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Lee Ryan Martie,
Assistant County Attorneys, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent Anoka County Human
Services)

Sarah Boyd, Andover, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge;
and Klaphake, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s termination of her parental rights,
arguing that respondent-county did not make reasonable efforts to reunite the family and
that the record does not establish that a statutory basis for termination exists. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother H.R.S. and respondent-father Z.J.L., Sr. met in Florida in 2011.
They are the parents of Z.J.L., Jr. and Z.J.L., born in 2015 (the twins), and Za.J.L., born in
the fall of 2017 (the baby). In February 2017, H.R.S., Z.J.L., Sr., and the twins moved to
Michigan. While living in Michigan, the police responded to several reports of domestic
disputes. Following one incident, H.R.S. was arrested for domestic assault and a domestic-
abuse no-contact order (DANCO) was put in place that prevented H.R.S. from contacting
Z.J.L., Sr. and the twins . She subsequently violated the DANCO and was placed on
probation.
In April 2017, Michigan Child Protection (MCP) opened a case file relate d to the
twins. A social worker from MCP met with H.R.S., who was living in a women’s shelter
at the time. H.R.S. admitted that she had been placed on probation for six months and was
required to complete anger-management programming. MCP offered her assistance with
finding housing, employment, and arrang ing visits with her children. After this ini tial
meeting and despite repeated attempts, MCP was unable to make contact with H.R.S. MCP
continued to work with Z.J.L., Sr. and the twins.

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In May 2017, H.R.S. left Michigan. She was still on probation at the time and failed
to notify her probation officer or get permission to leave the state. As a result, there is a
warrant for her arrest in Michigan. Afte r spending two days in Indiana, she moved to
Minnesota. In September 2017, Z.J.L., Sr. and the twins left Michigan and moved to
Minnesota to be with H.R.S., who was then pregnant with the baby. On October 18, 2017,
MCP contacted respondent Anoka County Human Services (the county) to inform them
that H.R.S. was currently living in Anoka County and that MCP had an open case file
regarding the twins. After receiving the report, the county contacted the Columbia Heights
Police Depart ment and requested a welfare check. Officers reported that the twins
appeared fine and that H.R.S. had a cesarean section scheduled for later that day. The
county contacted the hospital and asked to be notified when H.R.S. delivered the baby.
On October 23, the hospital contacted the county and in formed them that H.R.S.
delivered the baby on October 18. H.R.S. was expected to be discharged on October 23,
and the baby was expected to be discharged the following day. Katey Zeleny, the county
social worker , met with Abbie Gilgenbach , the hospital social worker. Gilgenbach
informed Zeleny that on October 22 the hospital had received an anonymous report that
H.R.S. had used methamphetamine during the pregnancy. Z.J.L., Sr. later made the same
report. Becau se the reports were not received until several days after H.R.S. had given
birth, the hospital was unable to conduct any drug testing screens.
Zeleny met with H.R.S. and determined that she could be discharged fro m the
hospital with the baby. Following the discharge, the hospital contacted Zeleny and
informed her that H.R.S. was still at the hospital and had indicated that she could not go

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home. She did not have a ride because Z.L.J., Sr. was not returning her calls, and when
the hospital offered her a cab voucher she responded that she would not be able to get into
the apartment. The hospital agreed to readmit the baby, and H.R.S. spent the night in the
hospital.
On October 24, the baby was placed on a 72 -hour hold and the county requested
that a welfare check be conducted on the twins. When officers arrived at the apartment, it
appeared that Z.J.L., Sr. and the twins had moved out. Zeleny spoke with Z.J.L., Sr. the
following day. He informed her that he had left because he could not live with H.R.S. any
longer due to her anger issues. He described his relationship with H.R.S. as “toxic.”
On October 27, the county filed a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS)
petition for all three children. All three children have remained in foster care since. On
November 27, H.R.S. met with the assigned case worker, Sarah Waland er, to develop a
case plan. They established an out-of-home-placement plan for each of the children. The
plans required H.R.S. to participate in mental- and chemical-health assessments and follow
through with services, maintain stable, safe, and sober behaviors, and consistently maintain
a living environment that is free of safety concerns.
H.R.S. struggled to establ ish stable housing. She returned to her apartment in
Columbia Heights for a short time but left after the landlord threatened to file a n eviction
action. She then stayed at the Alexander House Shelter for a few weeks, followed by the
Stepping Stones shelter. She was removed from that shelter due to behavior al concerns,
after which she became homeless. While homeless, she was “bouncing around shelter to
shelter, couch hopping.” Some nights she did not have a place to go, so she “sat up at the

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store.” On April 24, 2018, she obtained a residential placement at House of Charity, where
she resided until June 26. She was then homeless again for approximately two weeks. She
received assistance through the county to obtain placement at the Simpson House shelter,
followed by entering inpatient treatment at RS Eden. She entered treatment on July 18 but
was discharged on July 30 as a result of rule violations and behavioral concerns.
H.R.S. was inconsistent in addressing h er mental- and chemical-health concerns.
Elizabeth J. Caven, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, diagnosed H.R.S. with alcohol abuse,
cannabis abuse, opioid dependence, borderline personality disorder, post -traumatic stress
disorder, and in somnia. Dr. Caven opined that H.R.S. was experiencing a psychotic
disorder as well as anxiety. On May 9, 2018, H.R.S. completed a rule 25 assessment, which
recommended intensive outpatient programming with lodging at House of Charity. H.R.S.
was discharged from the program on June 26.
H.R.S.’s discharge summary indicates that the staff referred her for a more intensive
level of programming at a different treatment center, but that she declined the referral and
was discharged as a result. H.R.S. had continued to use chemicals during her time at House
of Charity. The discharge summary gave her a poor prognosis and stated that she
“displayed a lack of emotional regulation and coping skills” and “lack[ed] insight into her
mental illness as well as her overall dependenc e on substances.” The summary further
stated that H.R.S. did not accept her mental-health diagnosis.
On July 16, H.R.S. entere d treatment at RS Eden. She was discharged on July 30
for “repeated behavioral issues and noncompliance with her behavio ral agreement.” The
discharge summary states that H.R.S. broke several program rules and exhibited angry and

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agitated behavior toward others when she was dysregulated, including stating that she was
going to kill herself on multiple occasions. Following her discharge from RS Eden, H.R.S.
started treatment at Avivo. She was still in treatment at Avivo at the time of the termination
of parental rights ( TPR) trial and estimated that treatment would last another four or five
months.
The county petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both H.R.S. and Z.J.L., Sr.
The petition alleged that their parental rights should be terminated on the grounds that
(1) they had substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with
the duties imposed upon them by the parent-child relationship, (2) they were palpably unfit
to be parents, and (3) reasonable efforts had failed to correct the conditions leading to the
children’s out-of-home placement. On August 31, 2018, Z.J.L., Sr. consented to adoption
and did not participate in the TPR trial. The district court held a TPR trial on three days in
September and October 2018 . Following the trial, the district court terminated H.R.S.’s
parental rights. The district court determined that (1) the county had made reasonable
efforts to reunite the family, (2) the county had established all three alleged statutory
grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) termination is in the best
interests of the children. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal from a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights, we review
“the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review
its determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily te rminating
parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. ,

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805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). We must
“closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine w hether it was clear and
convincing.” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O. , 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). “The child’s be st interests, however,
remain the paramount consideration in every termination case.” Id. The petitioner must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground exists for terminating
parental rights. In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996).
I.
The termination statute requires the district court to make specific findings “that
reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent were
made.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2018). Th e district court must make
“individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts made by the
social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id.
“When determining whether reasonable efforts have been made,” the district court
must consider “whether services to the child and family were: (1) relevant to the safety
and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family;
(3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessibl e; (5) consistent and timely; and
(6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2018). “Reasonable
efforts at rehabilitation are services that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include
real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn.
App. 2007) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). The county’s

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efforts must “be aimed at alleviating the c onditions that ga ve rise to out -of-home
placement, and they must conform to the pr oblems presented.” In re Welfare of Child of
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App. 2012). Determining whether the county provided
reasonable efforts requires consideration of the length of the county’s involvement, the
nature of the problems presented, and the quality of the effort given. Id.
H.R.S. argues that the district court’s finding that the county made reasonable efforts
to rehabilitate H.R.S. and to reunite the family is unsupported by substantial eviden ce in
the record. She contends that the county did not provide sufficient assistance to help her
obtain housing, failed to provide her with ade quate assistance to find appropriate anger-
management programming, and refused to allow her visits with her children while she was
at RS Eden and Avivo.
The county responds that it did assist H.R.S. in obtaining housing, but that she was
unable to maintain stable housing because she was repeatedly discharged from shelters and
treatment programs based on her behavior. The district court found that the c ounty had
contacted housing resources, and at trial , the case worker, Walander, testified about the
county’s efforts to assist H.R.S. in obtaining housing. Walander attempted to assist H.R.S.
in obtaining a voucher through the Family Unification Program, but H.R.S. was ineligible
based on a prior felony conviction. Walander contacted the St. Paul Housing Authority
and assisted H.R.S. in applying for the waitlist and contacted Anoka County to obtain
information about possible housing options for H.R.S. Walander testified that she had
provided H.R.S. with a brochure detailing housing resources available and referred her to
a website for an organization that listed “hundred s of different subsidized housing and

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different programs.” Finally, Walander testified that she coordinated with H.R.S.’s case
manager while H.R.S. was at House of Charity to discuss housing resources for H.R.S.
The record also indicates that the county facilitated housing for H.R.S. by obtaining
placement in various shelters during her periods of homelessness. And the record supports
the district court’s finding that H.R.S. was r emoved from multiple shelters and residential
treatment programs based on her behavior.
The record also supports the district court’s determina tion that, while the county
made reasonable efforts to assist H.R.S. in addressing her anger and mental- and chemical-
health concerns, H.R.S.’s lack of insight into her own problems impeded her ability to
meaningfully engage in those services. As part of her mental-health assessment, Dr. Caven
determined that H.R.S. was experiencing a psychotic disorder and anxiety and diagnosed
her with borderline personality disorder. H.R.S. was unable to make progress in addressing
her mental-health needs because she did not agree with the diagnoses. She was discharged
from programming at House of Charity for refusing to attend a more intensive progr am.
Her discharge summary also indicates that her anger outburst occurred when she became
emotionally dysregulated. The county assisted her in meeting with several psychiatrists to
address her mental -health concerns, but she became angry and hostile when the doctors
refused to prescribe specific medications for her because of her drug-seeking behavior. At
trial, H.R.S. maintai ned that these things were not her fault and testified that “[n]obody
else ever gets in trouble, just me.” And when asked about being discharged from RS Eden
for rule violations and behavioral concerns, H.R.S. testified that the rules at RS Eden “were

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very much too strict” and “unreasonable” because if she did not believe what she was doing
was “morally wrong” she did not think she should “get[] in trouble for it.”
Finally, the record supports the district court’s determination that the county made
reasonable efforts to coordinate visitation between H.R.S. and the children. H.R.S. argues
that the county should have arranged for the children to visit her at Avivo rather than having
supervised visitation at a different location. But the record reflects that th e county made
consistent efforts to arrange for visitation and to improve H.R.S.’s parenting. The county
arranged for her to have weekly visitation sessions with the children and Sue Haugen, a
parenting skills educator. Haugen had her final session with H.R.S. on April 19, 2018. At
that point, the county arranged for H.R.S. to have visitation with the children at the Early
Childhood Family Education (ECFE) facility. Visitation stopped briefly while H.R.S.
attended programming at RS Eden. Following her discharge from RS Eden on July 30, the
county was unable to contact H.R.S. for approximately two weeks and therefore could not
arrange visitation. The county then arranged for her to continue with weekly supervised
visits, which were still occurring at th e time of trial. We conclude that the county made
reasonable efforts to arrange visitation. While H.R.S. may have wanted a different
visitation arrangement, the record supports the district court’s determination that the county
made reasonable and consistent efforts based on the circumstances.
II.
We will affirm a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights if at least one
statutory ground for termination is proven by clear and convincing evidence and if
termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d

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656, 661 (Minn. 2008). “We give considerable deference to the district court’s decision to
terminate parental rights. But we closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to
determine whether it was clear and convincing.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385 (citation
omitted).
H.R.S. argues that the record does not support the district court’s termination of
parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2018). We focus our analysis
on the district court ’s termination of parental rights on this statuto ry ground. Under
subdivision 1(b)(5), the district court may terminate parental rights if it determines that
“following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction
of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement.” H.R.S.
argues that termination is not supported under subdivision 1(b)(5) because the conditions
that led to out-of-home placement had been corrected.
The conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home placement and CHIPS petition
were H.R.S.’s lack of stable and safe housing and H.R.S.’s anger issues, chemical
dependency, and mental -health concerns. The district court determined that reasonable
efforts failed to correct these conditions. H.R.S. contends that, at the time of trial, she had
made “significant progress” on her case plan. She asserts she was sober and in treatment,
participating in individualized therapy, treating her mental-health concerns, had completed
anger-management programming, and was expected to be approved for family housing in
the foreseeable future.
The county argues that the record supports the district court’s determination that the
conditions that led to out -of-home placement had not been corrected. Walander testified

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that H.R.S. had made minimal progress in her case plan, had not alleviated the safety
concerns of the children, and had not demonstrated a recognition of the children’s needs.
The record reflects that, des pite completing anger -management programming in April
2018, H.R.S. continued to have anger issues at the time of trial. She had to be removed
from the courtroom multiple times for becoming angry, interrupting witnesses, and cussing
at them; and the record is replete with reports of H.R.S. becoming hostile while meeting
with county workers, doctors, and those involved with her treatment programs. And the
record indicates her anger issues impeded her ability to engage in the programming offered
to her.
H.R.S. argues that the record does not support the determination that she failed to
address her chemical-dependency concerns. At the time of trial, H.R.S. had been sober for
approximately one month. She argues that this, coupled with her participation in treatment,
establishes that she had corrected her chemical dependency. But as the district court noted,
throughout the case H.R.S. had “not sustained sobriety for any significant amount of time.”
She was discharged from two treatment programs and discharge d from the shelter at
Simpson House because she was using drugs. She continued to use drugs during the first
month of treatment at Avivo. Notably, short periods of sobriety are consistent with
H.R.S.’s pattern of behavior. When testifying about her chem ical use, she indicated that
she was not using constantly, but rather would “slip up” every now and then and use “for
a couple days” before stopping again. Accordingly, her one month of sobriety does not
belie the district court’s finding that she had not sustained sobriety for any significant
period of time.

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H.R.S. argues that the record does not support the determination that she failed to
adequately address her mental -health concerns. The district court found that H.R.S. had
not gained any insight into how her mental health and behaviors affected her ability to be
a parent. At the time of trial, she had only recently started individualized therapy and was
still unwilling to fully accept her mental-health diagnoses. Walander testified that H.R.S.
had not demonstrated that she fully understood how her mental health impacted her ability
to parent her children safely. Walander ultimately opined that H.R.S. had not met the case-
plan requirement of maintaining stable mental health. The guardian ad litem sim ilarly
testified that she had “not observed [H.R.S.] to have stable mental health for a consistent
period of time.” We conclude that the record supports the district court’s finding that
H.R.S. failed to adequately address her mental-health concerns.
Finally, the record supports the district court’s determination that H.R.S. had failed
to obtain stable housing. By the time of trial , she had left her apartment after a threat of
eviction, lived at three different shelters, three different treatment progr ams, stayed with
friends, and experienced periods of homelessness. H.R.S. asserts that she was going to be
placed in family housing at Avivo in the foreseeable future, but the record does not
establish any firm timeline for that possibility. H.R.S. testified that she was on the waitlist
but did not provide an estimate of when she would get off the waitlist. And she indicated
that there was an additional requirement that the children spend more significant time in
her apartment before she could even be approv ed for family housing. This supports the
determination that H.R.S. failed to establish stable housing for herself and the children.

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On this record, clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s
determination that reasonable efforts have fai led to correct the conditions that led to the
children’s out-of-home placement. Because there is a statutory basis for termination, and
H.R.S. does not challenge the district court’s determination that termination is in the best
interests of the children, t he district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating
H.R.S.’s parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
Affirmed.