State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1971

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Joshua Jon Mugge,
Respondent.

Filed June 24, 2019
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Pine County District Court
File No. 58-CR-17-481

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Reese Frederickson, Pine County Attorney, Michelle R. Skubitz , Chief Deputy County
Attorney, Pine City, Minnesota (for appellant)

Mark D. Nyvold, Fridley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
The state challenges the district court’s suppression of evidence based on its
determination that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to support a traffic
stop. We affirm.

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FACTS
In May 2017, after finishing his regular shift, a state trooper was contacted by the
East Central Drug and Violent Offenders Task Force (the task force) and by the Minnesota
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension ( the BCA). The task force commander informed the
trooper that respondent Joshua Jon Mugge might be transporting a large amount of
methamphetamine in his vehicle and asked for the trooper’s assistance in conducting a
traffic stop based on a driving violation. The task-force commander informed the trooper
that, based on a previously obtained search warrant, they had been tailing Mugge’s vehicle
and had placed a GPS tracking device on it, but had lost visual contact and were unable to
overtake his vehicle between Pine County and St. Paul. The GPS data showed that Mugge
was traveling on I -35 through Pine County at around 67 miles per hour. The speed limit
on the interstate in that area is 70 miles per hour. The trooper was given Mugge’s name, a
description of the vehicle, and the license-plate number.
The trooper positioned his squad car in the middle of the bridge overpass on I -35
and observed a vehicle traveling faster than the others. The trooper activated his LIDAR
(light detection and ranger) and determined that the vehicle was traveling at 80 miles per
hour. The trooper merged onto I-35 in pursuit of the vehicle and was able to catch up to it
and identify the vehicle as Mugge’s. The trooper initiated a traffic stop based on speeding.
As the trooper approached the vehicle, Mugge had his driver’s license ready. The
trooper did not observe any drugs, and Mugge did not appear to be under the influe nce of
any controlled substance or alcohol. After asking for Mugge’s insurance and learning that
the vehicle was a rental, the trooper asked Mugge for the rental agreement . As Mugge

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reached across the front seat toward the glove box, his shirt lifted and the trooper saw a
firearm tucked into the waistband of Mugge’s jeans.1 The trooper drew his gun and ordered
Mugge out of the vehicle. After removing the firearm, the trooper placed Mugge under
arrest.2
Because of the BCA tip that Mugge was transporting a large quantity of
methamphetamine, the trooper conducted an external vehicle search using his drug-sniffing
K9 officer “Skippy.” When Skippy alerted to the presence of drugs , the trooper allowed
Skippy to search the interior of the vehicle through the front driver’s side window. Skippy
alerted at the front passenger area. Without obtaining a warrant, the trooper hand-searched
the vehicle and discovered drug paraphernalia. The trooper contacted a member of the task
force, who instructed him to wait so that they could request a search warrant for the rest of
the vehicle.
Mugge was charged with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person; he moved
the district court to suppress the evidence. The trooper, who was the sole witness at the
contested omnibus hearing , testified that he had not calibrated his LIDAR equipment or
checked his radar equipment before using it to determine Mugge’s speed. The trooper also
stated that he did not turn on his body microphone/camera because he believed that it was
inoperable. As a result, the district court noted that there was “no visual evidence, or

1 The trooper testified that the task force informed him that Mugge was in possession of a
firearm and kept it at the small of his back.

2 The parties stipulated that certain statements made by Mugge af ter this point are
inadmissible, and the state concedes that Mugge was in custody at this point in the
encounter.

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recorded evidence, other than the BCA’s GPS logs” to consider in making a decision
related to Mugge’s speed. The GPS tracking log, which was admitted as an exhibit, showed
that Mugge had been traveling between 6 8 and 70 miles per hour immediately before the
trooper stopped him. The district court found that the “GPS logs are credible evidence and
the Defendant’s vehicle was not speeding. The State has no t met its burden of proof, that
there existed a reasonable articulable suspicion to pull over [Mugge]’s vehicle for
speeding.” Therefore, the district court concluded that, “[t]here being no other reason for
which the vehicle was stopped, the fruits of th e search must be suppressed.” This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
When the state appeals a pretrial order suppressing evidence, the state must show
that the district court erred and that the error will have a critical impact on the state’s ability
to prosecute the case. State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. 1995). Here, Mugge
acknowledges that the critical-impact question is satisfied. We review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error, and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752
N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Generally, warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable.” Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502. The United States
Supreme Court has determ ined that “[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop
of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose,

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constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of this provision.” Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996) (citations omitted).
The principles and framework of Terry govern the “reasonableness of seizures
during traffic stops even when a minor law has been violated.” State v. Askerooth , 681
N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004). A police officer may initiate a limited, investigative stop
without a warrant if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-
22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-80 (1968)). However, the investigatory stop may not be the result
of “mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn.
1996). “Ordinarily, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant,
the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d
575, 578 (Minn. 1997).
The state asserts that the district court erred by crediting the GPS tracking logs over
the testimony of the officer without a finding that the trooper’s testimony lacked credibility.
While it is true that there is no explicit statement of credibility, the district court noted the
trooper’s testimony that he did not calibrate his radar before using it that evening to
determine Mugge’s speed or provide documentation to show that his LIDAR device had
been tested. And the district court specifically noted the trooper’s testimony that he did
not have any reason to dispute the task force’s GPS log showing Mugge’s speed as being
between 68 to 70 miles per hour immediately before the stop.
The district court found that, other than the GPS logs, there was “no visual evidence,
or recorded evidence” and that the trooper testified that “speeding was the only reason for

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the traf fic stop and there were no other observed traffic violations nor observations of
[Mugge] being under the influence of controlled substances.” Thus, the district court
concluded that the “GPS logs are credible evidence and [Mugge’s] vehicle was not
speeding.” We conclude that the district court’s determination is not clearly erroneous.
Next, the state argues that the trooper had reasonable suspicion based on his
knowledge that the task force was investigating Mugge for narcotic activity. We disagree.
First, the trooper testified that he was instructed by the task force to find an independent
legal basis to stop Mugge. Mugge correctly asserts that the state did not specifically raise
the trooper’s knowledge of the investigation at the suppression heari ng and instead relied
on the trooper’s testimony that Mugge was speeding and the LIDAR and radar readings.
Second, while an officer may have knowledge imputed to him under the collective-
knowledge rule, the officers must have some degree of communicatio n between them.
State v. Lemieux , 726 N.W.2d 783, 789 (Minn. 2007). Here, the trooper communicated
minimally with the BCA and task force and was told only that Mugge was being
investigated for drug activity and that he might have a large amount of metham phetamine
in the vehicle. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the information the
trooper had concerning the task -force investigation does not amount to reasonable,
articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the traffic stop. The district court properly granted
Mugge’s motion to suppress the evidence.
Affirmed.