State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1974

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Derrick Deshawn Henderson,
Appellant.

Filed January 21, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Jesson, Judge
Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-16623

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judg e; Connolly, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
A teenager reported to her therapist that she had been sexually assaulted by the
father of her half siblings. During a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the teenager’s
mental-health case manager told the district court that the teenager previously admitted that
she was untruthful when she accused another woman of sexually assaulting her. Appellant
Derrick Deshawn Henderson argues that the district court erred by excluding this evidence
of the teenager’s prior false accusation at trial. We agree. As a result, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
During a therapy session in May 2017, then 17-year-old A.R. reported that appellant
Derrick Deshawn Henderson had sexually assaulted her in her family’s Minneapolis home.
A.R. is a young woman with developmental disabilities,1 and Henderson is the father of
her half siblings. A.R.’s therapist, in he r role as a mandatory reporter, relayed those
allegations to the proper authorities. Law enfo rcement officers then investigated A.R.’s
allegations by interviewing Henderson and A.R.’s half-sister, mother, and therapist.
As part of their investigation, officers took A.R. to Corner House for a forensic
interview.2 A.R. told the interviewer that Henderson sexually assaulted her on two
occasions when her family lived at their Minneapolis residence.

1 A.R. was born with a diaphragmatic hernia and underdeveloped lungs and has cognitive
delays.
2 CornerHouse is a private inde pendent agency that intervie ws victims of alleged child
abuse who are referred from child protection and law enforcement.

3

According to A.R., the first assault occurred when she was a teenager. She told the
CornerHouse interviewer that she had been sleeping in her bed when Henderson came into
her room and woke her up. Henderson led her into her mother’s bedroom where the lights
were off, the shades were drawn, and ther e was a movie playing on the television that
showed naked people. Then Henderson locked the door. A.R. recounted that Henderson
rubbed his penis on her vagina and had A.R. lie on her mother’s bed while he masturbated
until he ejaculated onto her leg. A.R. told the in terviewer that the second assault also
occurred when her mother was gone from the Minneapolis residence and that Henderson
had touched her with his penis.
The state charged Henderson with fourth- and fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct,
alleging that Henderson sexually assau lted A.R. twice between 2012 and 2014.3 Prior to
trial, Henderson moved the district court to conduct an in camera review of A.R.’s
treatment records, school materials, and Henn epin County Human Serv ices records. He
alleged that those documents contained evidence that A.R. previously made several false
allegations of sexual misconduct. The dist rict court granted Henderson’s motion and
released some of the request ed documents to the defense. Based on those documents,
Henderson then moved to adm it evidence that A.R. had a predisposition to fabricate
allegations that she had been victimized by sexual predator s. As part of Henderson’s
proffer, he included allegations that A.R. had falsely accused a schoolmate of touching her

3 The state alleged that Henderson committed fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct
between August 2012 and April 2014 and fi fth-degree criminal sexual conduct between
April 2012 and April 2014.

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breasts after dragging her into a school bathroom and that A.R. had threatened to accuse
her father of sexually abusing her.4 The district court ruled that only the bathroom incident
was admissible.
During trial, A.R., her half-sister, A.R.’s mother, A.R.’s therapist, law enforcement
officers, A.R.’s former teacher, and Henderson testified.
A.R.’s testimony recounted the two alleged sexual assaults as described above, in
addition to a third alleged assault. The prosecutor also asked A.R. whether she remembered
the incident involving a schoolmate touching her in a manner that she did not like, and A.R.
indicated that she did not. Henderson did not question her about this incident or any other
incident involving a prior false allegation. Later during trial, the state introduced the video
of her CornerHouse interview into evidence.
The testimony of A.R.’s half-sister rec ounted two instances where Henderson was
allegedly alone with A.R. A.R.’s half-siste r testified that she re membered one occasion
where Henderson took A.R. into their mother’s bedroom to wa tch a movie. She testified
about a second instan ce where she recalled Henderson bein g alone with A.R. in their
mother’s locked bedroom. When A.R.’s half-sister kn ocked on the bedroom door,
Henderson became angry and told her to go to sleep. A.R.’s mother testified about, among
other topics, the extent of A.R.’s disabilitie s and what A.R. told her about the alleged

4 Henderson’s proffer and amended proffer in cluded multiple examples of prior alleged
instances where A.R. falsely accused or thr eatened to falsely accuse others of sexual
misconduct. Because Henderson only makes specific arguments about two of the incidents
included in his proffer and one in cident that he raised during trial, we do not discuss the
other alleged instances of A.R.’s purported false accusations.

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assaults.5 Following the testimony of A.R.’s half-sister and mother, A.R.’s therapist
recounted A.R.’s report of the alleged assaults during the therapy session.
As trial unfolded, Henderson sought to in troduce evidence of prior false allegations
of sexual misconduct made by A.R. Specifica lly, the incidents that Henderson sought to
introduce included that A.R. had falsely ac cused her mother’s goddaughter of sexually
assaulting her;6 that A.R. had falsely accused a schoolmate of dragging her into a bathroom
and grabbing her breasts; and that A.R. had threatened to falsely accuse her father of sexual
abuse.
The district court excluded the evidence of all three purported instances of false
accusations by A.R. With respec t to the incident involving the goddaughter, the district
court excluded this testimony because it concl uded that there was no clear evidence that
A.R. made a false report about this alleged incident. And although the district court initially
ruled the schoolmate incident admissible before trial, after hearing testimony during trial,
the court excluded evid ence of this incident given that no school records or surveillance
video supported the allegation. Finally, regard ing A.R.’s alleged threat to falsely accuse
her father of sexual abuse, the district court found that the information about this alleged
incident was not sufficiently supported by the evidence.

5 During the testimony of A.R.’s mother, Hende rson tried to cross-examine her about the
incident with the schoolmate in the bathroom. The district court did not allow this line of
questioning.
6 We note that the record indicates that at times the parties and the district court referred to
the mother’s goddaughter as A.R.’s babysitte r, a family friend, and a personal care
attendant. For purposes of clarity, we refer to her as “the goddaughter.”

6

In addition to A.R.’s alleged false accusations, Henderson sought to introduce
evidence that A.R. had used her school-issued iPad to access sexual materials. Henderson
intended to use this evidence to show that A.R. had an alternative source of knowledge
about sexual matters. The district court denied the admission of this evidence.
After the district court resolved these evidentiary issues, Henderson presented his
case-in-chief. A.R.’s former special-education teacher testified that she considered A.R.
to be untruthful. And Henderson testified that he considered A.R. to be one of his children.
He explained that he was in prison during so me of the time when the assaults allegedly
occurred and denied sexually assaulting A.R.
During closing arguments, A.R.’s credibility as a witness was front and center. The
state depicted A.R. as an unsophisticated teenager with disabilities. The prosecutor urged
the jury to consider whether A.R. was someone who appeared to be capable of maintaining
a lie about Henderson’s alleged abuse for such a long period of time and that to disbelieve
her would be to characterize her as a “man ipulative little sociopath.” In contrast,
Henderson assailed A.R.’s credibility and highlighted the teacher’s characterization of her
as “untruthful.”
After deliberating for three days, the jury found Henderson guilty of fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct. 7 But the jury acquitted him of fifth-degree criminal sexual

7 A person is guilty of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct if they engage in sexual
contact with another person where the acto r has a significant relationship to the
complainant and the complainant was at least 16 but under 18 years of age at the time of
the sexual contact. Neither mistake as to th e complainant’s age nor consent to the act by
the complainant is a defense. Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(f) (2012).

7

conduct.8 The district court sentenced Henderson to 96 months in pr ison. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
Henderson argues that he is entitled to a new trial for tw o central reasons. First,
Henderson contends he was denied his right to present a complete defense when the district
court excluded evidence of A.R.’s alleged prior false accusations. Second, he claims that
the district court erred by excluding evidence that A.R.’s source of sexual knowledge came
from her use of her school-issued iPad rather than him. Finally, Henderson makes several
pro se arguments as to why he is entitled to relief. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court erred by excluding evidence about A.R.’s false allegation of
sexual abuse against the goddaughter, wh ich denied Henderson his right to
present a complete defense.

Henderson argues that the district court de nied him the right to present a complete
defense by excluding evidence of the three previous inst ances where A.R. purportedly
falsely accused others of sexual abuse. These incidents involved the goddaughter, a
schoolmate, and her father. We begin by addressing the standard of review, and then apply
it to each allegation.
A criminal defendant has a constitutional ri ght to “a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528,
2532 (1984). That right encomp asses “the right to present th e defendant’s version of the
facts . . . to the jury so it ma y decide where the truth lies.” Washington v. Texas ,

8 A person is guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct if they engage in nonconsensual
sexual contact. Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1(1) (2010).

8

388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 19 20, 1923 (1967). Bu t in presenting a defense, a defendant
must comply with established rules of evidence. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049 (1 973). And evidentiary rulings—w hich rest within the sound
discretion of the district court—will not be re versed absent a clear abuse of discretion.
State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 906-07 (Minn. 1997).9 But even if the district court abuses
its discretion, “we reverse only if the exclusion of eviden ce was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017).
To examine these three evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, we turn to the
rules of evidence. Admission of evidence of prior sexual conduct of the victim in a
criminal-sexual-conduct case is governed by Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412, commonly
known as the rape-shield rule. Under this rule, “evidence of the victim’s prior sexual
conduct shall not be admitted nor shall any reference to su ch conduct be made in the
presence of the jury, except by court order” under the rule’s procedure. Minn. R.
Evid. 412(1); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3 (2010). Prior sexual conduct includes
making prior allegations of sexual abuse. State v. Kobow, 466 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn.
App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 1991) (emphasis added).
But a defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense creates an
exception to the rape-shield rule. State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 341 (Minn. App.
1993), review denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 1993). As we explained in Goldenstein, a case

9 This court applies the abuse- of-discretion standard even if a defendant claims that
exclusion of evidence deprived him of “his constitutional right to present a complete
defense.” State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 201 (Minn. 2006).

9

involving allegations of sexual abuse of minor children, evidence of a prior false accusation
by an alleged victim of sexual abuse is admissible both to attack the credibility of the
complainant and as substantive evidence tending to prove that the current offense did not
occur. Id. at 340 (emphasis added). However, admi ssion of a prior false accusation is
predicated upon the district cour t’s threshold determination that a reasonable probability
of falsity exists.10 Id. (emphasis added). With this standard in mind, we address each piece
of challenged evidence.
Goddaughter Incident
Henderson contends that the district court erred in excluding evidence that A.R.
falsely accused the goddaughter of sexual assault. Because th is alleged incident was not
part of Henderson’s proffer, he requested to voir dire A.R.’s ment al-health case manager
outside the presence of the jury to allow the district court to rule on the admissibility of her
testimony about this alleged false accusation.
During the voir dire, A.R.’s case manager explained that she learned of this alleged
prior false accusation from A.R.’s mother. This occurred during a session with both A.R.
and her mother when they were discussing A.R.’s sexually inappropriate behavior around
peers. A.R.’s mother, according to the case manager, described a false allegation made by
A.R. against the goddaughter. The case mana ger then turned to A.R., who admitted the

10 The district court must make this determination outside the presence of the jury. Id.

10

allegation was false. After hearing about the false allegation against the goddaughter, the
following exchange took place:
[THE COURT]: Where did that come from if you
put that in your reports?

[CASE MANAGER]: Okay.

[THE COURT]: How did that get its genesis?

[CASE MANAGER]: Sure. We ll, the false accusations,
I mean, she made false accusations
towards it was a [g]oddaughter to
the family that st ayed with them
and that’s -- that’s where the false
accusations and the reason why I
put that in the reports.

[THE COURT]: Was it the --

[CASE MANAGER]: Because --

[THE COURT]: -- one time?

[CASE MANAGER]: That accusation, yes.

[THE COURT]: Okay. And how did you learn of
that accusation?

[CASE MANAGER]: Mom in formed me of that.

[THE COURT]: Okay. A nd how -- So it was mom
determining that it was false?

[CASE MANAGER]: Mom was determining it was false,
yes.

[THE COURT]: Okay. Di d you ever talk with
[A.R.] about that?

[CASE MANAGER]: Yes.

11

[THE COURT]: Okay. An d did [A.R.] say it was
false.

[CASE MANAGER]: A.R. admitted it was false, yes.

. . .

[THE COURT]: Okay. Was it one time that you
talked with [A.R.] about that or
was that revisited, do you know?

[CASE MANAGER]: It was pr obably just one time.

[THE COURT]: Okay. Do you -- Do you recall
how you raised it with [A.R.]?

[CASE MANAGER]: How I br ought it up with her?

[THE COURT]: Yeah.

[CASE MANAGER]: Mom and I were having a
conversation about just her
inappropriate behavior, sexually
inappropriate behavior with peers
and obsessive behavior with peers
and that’s -- and then it just came
up, mom brought it up.

[THE COURT]: So was [A.R .] sitting in the room
with mom and you --

[CASE MANAGER]: Yes.

[THE COURT]: -- and mom said she made this
false accusation against the God --

[CASE MANAGER] Yes.

[THE COURT]: -- mother’s daughter or
something?

[CASE MANAGER] Right.

12

[THE COURT]: And then did you just turn to
[A.R.] and say did you or like --

[CASE MANAGER]: Yes.

[THE COURT]: Okay. Was there any private
discussion with [A.R.] about this?

[CASE MANAGER]: I didn’t have a private
conversation, I did have
communication with the therapist
about what was br ought up so the
therapist was made aware to
follow up with her on it.

[THE COURT]: Okay. And this would be a
therapist at Kenwood?

[CASE MANAGER]: No, this was probably Claire at the
time because Kenwood wasn’t in
place yet, I don’t believe.

[THE COURT]: Okay. And now the reports say her
tendency, I think, were to make
false accusations in the plural --

[CASE MANAGER]: Um-hum.

[THE COURT]: -- were there other ones that you
were aware of?

[CASE MANAGER]: I’m trying to jog my memory.

[THE COURT]: Sure, right.

[CASE MANAGER]: You know, I mean, I know there’s
been inappropriate interactions
with peers.

[THE COURT]: And are you -- you’re treating that
as a separate issue, that deals with
her inappropriate sexual
boundaries perhaps --

13

[CASE MANAGER]: Right.

[THE COURT]: -- or somethin g but dealing with --

[CASE MANAGER]: Accusations.

[THE COURT]: -- accusations of sexual
misconduct against her I think is
how it’s worded in the document.

[CASE MANAGER]: Right. I mean, that’s the one that
pops out.

[THE COURT]: Okay.

[CASE MANAGER]: With the [g]oddaughter.

[THE COURT]: And is it your understanding
that—What was your
understanding of the accusation
that was made? Like do you even
know what the accusation was that
[A.R.] said happened initially?

[CASE MANAGER]: Yes.

[THE COURT]: Okay. What was that?

[CASE MANAGER]: So [A.R .] reported to her mom
initially that he r [g]oddaughter
was the one that was perpetrating
on her, and then when mom asked
[g]oddaughter further the
[g]oddaughter said no, absolutely
not, [A.R.] was standing over me
masturbating while watching me
sleep. And [A.R.] initially
reported that it was her sleeping
and not the [g]oddaughter.

14

[THE COURT]: Okay. And so this would have
happened one time, is your
understanding?

[CASE MANAGER]: Yes.

[THE COURT]: Was there any—and so that was—
Was that the extent of what you
understood the situation
involving?

[CASE MANAGER]: Yes.

[THE COURT]: Fair to say you never talked to the
[g]oddaughter?

[CASE MANAGER]: Right, no.

Later, the goddaughter incide nt came up in voir dire ques tioning by defense counsel as
follows:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do you recall if the [g]oddaughter
was also a PCA for a period of time
with -- for [A.R.]?

[CASE MANAGER]: I’m not sure.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you’re -- the redacted records
that I received have numerous
notations in 2013 and 2014, and I
can go through th e very specific
dates that [A.R.] shouldn’t be left
alone with an adult due to past
sexual allegations, false
allegations, do you know what
that’s about, past false
accusations?

[CASE MANAGER]: Um-hum. Yeah, I mean, like I
said, when I first started working
with her mom made that -- or told
me about the incident between her

15

and [g]odmom and so -- or the
[g]odchild and so myself and other
professionals decided it would be
in our best interests not to meet
with [A.R.] individually or alone
and always have mom present or
another adult present or out in the
community.

Finally, the prosecutor asked A.R.’s case ma nager about the alleged incident and the
following exchange occurred:
[PROSECUTOR]: Now, if I’m understanding you
correctly the inclusion in the
reports referencing this false
accusation about the
[g]oddaughter about inappropriate
touching, that came to be from a
conversation you had with her
mother, [Q.R.]; is that right?

[CASE MANAGER]: That’s correct.

[PROSECUTOR]: And did this conversation take
place in their home or in the
office?

[CASE MANAGER]: In their home.

[PROSECUTOR]: And what specific touching did
[A.R.] report?

[CASE MANAGER]: [A.R.] admitted to --

[THE COURT]: Well, okay, just -- I want to be
careful, is it you’re asking what
[A.R.] reported to mom, or what
mom reported [A.R.] said, or what
[A.R.] said to this witness?

[PROSECUTOR]: I want to know what [A.R.] told
[case manager].

16

[THE COURT]: Okay.

[PROSECUTOR]: About the sexual touching.

[CASE MANAGER]: That she di d it to herself, it wasn’t
her Godmom [sic].

[PROSECUTOR]: That [A.R.] had masturbated?

[CASE MANAGER]: Yes.

[PROSECUTOR]: And what did mom -- Did [A.R.]
admit to you that she had lied?

[CASE MANAGER]: Yes.

[PROSECUTOR]: What did she say?

[CASE MANAGER]: That she actually did it.

[PROSECUTOR]: And she had told mom that her
[g]oddaughter had masturbated in
front of her?

[CASE MANAGER]: Right.

[PROSECUTOR]: And she said, actually no, it was
me who was masturbating?

[CASE MANAGER]: That’s correct.

[PROSECUTOR]: And any -- Any inclination or any
indication that these reports were
made to law enforcement?

[CASE MANAGER]: Yes, I believe they were.

[PROSECUTOR]: Do you have any record of that?

[CASE MANAGER]: I don’t have a record, though --

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. So --

17

[CASE MANAGER]: -- no.

[PROSECUTOR]: -- this is where it’s getting --

[THE COURT]: We really ju st need you to testify
from your knowledge, ma’am.

[PROSECUTOR]: If you know.

[CASE MANAGER]: Okay.

[PROSECUTOR]: And what --

[CASE MANAGER]: No.

[PROSECUTOR]: -- I’m worried is happening is that
you’re hearing questions and
you’re assuming there’s facts to
support these questions.

[CASE MANAGER]: Um-hum.

[PROSECUTOR]: And please don’t assume that.

[CASE MANAGER]: Okay.

[PROSECUTOR]: [Defense counsel] can ask you
whatever she wants, I can ask you
whatever I want, all you have to
do on this witness stand is tell the
truth.

[CASE MANAGER]: Okay.

[PROSECUTOR]: If you don’t know if the police
were called the answer is I don’t
know.

[CASE MANAGER]: Okay.

18

[PROSECUTOR]: If you know the police were
called the answer is yes, the police
were called.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objectio n, Your Honor, this is --

[THE COURT]: This is to tally fine, I would be
saying it if she weren’t. I mean, I
-- I want to be accurate here.

[CASE MANAGER]: Um-hum.

[THE COURT]: And we’re not asking for
supposition. We’re not asking for
guessing. We’re asking for your
knowledge of th ings. Do you
know if the police were contacted
as a result of any statement that
[A.R.] made to her mom about the
PCA, [the goddaughter]?

[CASE MANAGER]: I do not know.

[THE COURT]: Okay.

[PROSECUTOR]: Other than mom saying it was
false did you have any other
information regarding that
instance?

[CASE MANAGER]: No.

[PROSECUTOR]: So you don’t know if [the
goddaughter] did talk to her -- or
did touch her and [A.R.]
recanted?

[CASE MANAGER]: Right, I do not know.

[PROSECUTOR]: You neve r talked to [the
goddaughter]?

19

[CASE MANAGER]: I neve r spoke w ith [the
goddaughter].

Following the voir dire of A.R.’s case manager, the district court excluded the
goddaughter incident because it determined that there was “ no clear evidence that there
was a false report by [A.R].” The district court also stated that A.R.’s case manager would
be an inappropriate witness given that any potential false allegation was hearsay within
hearsay.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Hender son established that
A.R.’s allegation against the goddaughter met the Goldenstein reasonable-probability-of-
falsity standard. First, we observe that the district court’s determination that there was no
clear evidence of a prior false accusation is not the proper application of Goldenstein.
Goldenstein sets forth a reasonable-probability-of-falsity standard, which requires less than
“clear evidence.” And when we apply the correct legal standard, we conclude that A.R.’s
admission to her case manager—that her accu sation against the goddaughter was false—
meets this Goldenstein threshold.
We acknowledge that after the case manager testified that A.R. admitted to the false
allegation, she explained that she only learned of the false accusation from the mother. But
she never retreated from her testimony that after the mother (in a room with both A.R. and
the case manager) laid out the false allegation, A.R. admitted it was just that: false.
Certainly, had this evidence been admitted, the prosecutor could have cross-examined
A.R.’s case manager about her knowledge of th is incident which would have allowed the
jury to make a determination about the case manager’s credibility. But that determination,

20

in light of a defendant’s right to present a complete defense, should be left to the jury. The
district court erred in excluding evidence of the goddaughter incident when A.R. admitted
it was false.
This error is not rectified by the district court’s premature conclusion that the case
manager’s proposed testimony was “hearsay within hearsay.” We first note that when the
district court conducted its he arsay analysis, it attributed th e statement to A.R.’s mother,
while the record reflects an admission by A. R. herself. But more fundamentally, as
Henderson correctly notes, an important dis tinction exists between a district court’s
threshold determination of whether the falsity requirement has been met and a subsequent
decision regarding the admissibility of the proffered evidence. This appeal deals with the
threshold Goldenstein issue. The separate question of the evidence’s admissibility is
hypothetical and not before us in this appeal.11
Because the district court’s evidentiary ruling resulted in the erroneous exclusion of
Henderson’s evidence in violation of his constitutional rights, the verdict must be reversed
unless the error was harmless be yond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d
99, 102 (Minn. 1994). To meet this high standard, we must conclude “that if the evidence
had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, [a reasonable]
jury . . . would have reach ed the same verdict.” Id. But, if there is even a reasonable

11 We further note that the state did not make an appellate argument on this “hearsay within
hearsay” basis. See State v. Stockwell, 770 N.W.2d 533, 541 (Mi nn. App. 2009) (stating
that “arguments not made in appellant’s principal brief will be deemed waived”), review
denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009).

21

possibility that the verdict might have been different, the error is prejudicial and a new trial
is necessary. Id. The strength of the evidence is one factor we consider in this assessment.
State v. Carlson, 268 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Minn. 1978).
The state argues that even if th e district court’s ruling under Goldenstein was
erroneous, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the strength of the state’s case.
Specifically, the state argues that any error was harmless because A.R. described how
Henderson sexually assaulted her and that A. R.’s half-sister had no motive to testify
untruthfully about her father when she corroborated certain details of A.R.’s testimony.
We disagree. Had evidence of A.R.’s false accusation against the goddaughter been
admitted and its damaging pote ntial fully realized, it woul d have discredited A.R.’s
testimony. And the bulk of the other state witnesses—A.R.’s therapist, the CornerHouse
interviewer, and law enforcement—would have added little value in proving Henderson’s
guilt, given that this testimony largely summarize d what A.R. told others. As a result, if
the jury had found A.R. not credible, the state’s case w ould have relied on the testimony
of A.R.’s half-sister. Yet A.R.’s half-sister only partially corroborated A.R.’s account. She
testified about suspicious circumstances where Henderson was allegedly alone with A.R.
But A.R.’s sister did not witness Henderson sexually abusing A.R.
We are particularly concerned about the prejudicial impact of this admissibility error
given the testimony of A.R.’s teacher. This special-education teacher, who had A.R. in
class for three to six hours a day, every school day in 2013-14, testified that she considered
A.R. untruthful.

22

Because we are not satisfied beyond a re asonable doubt that a jury would have
convicted Henderson had it heard evidence of A.R.’s prior false accusation against the
goddaughter, we determine that the district court’s error prejud iced Henderson by not
allowing him to present a complete defense. Without this evidence, Henderson was unable
to prove that A.R. fabricated the allegations against him. Therefore, because the district
court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence, we reverse and grant Henderson a
new trial.12
Schoolmate Incident and Threat to Accuse Father of Sexual Abuse
Although we are granting Henderson a new trial, we choose to address Henderson’s
Goldenstein arguments with respect to the alleged schoolmate incident and A.R.’s alleged
threat to accuse her father of sexual abuse in the interest of judicial economy as these issues
may arise again on remand. 13 See, e.g., State v. Hunter , 857 N.W.2d 537, 543 (Minn.
App. 2014). As with the exclusion of eviden ce relating to the goddaughter incident, we
review the district court’s exclusion of the challenged evidence for an abuse of discretion.
Nunn, 561 N.W.2d at 906-07.

12 The dissent also accords weight to Henderson’s decision not to cross-examine A.R. about
the goddaughter incident . But, pursuant to Goldenstein, evidence of a prior false
accusation by an alleged victim can be admissible either to a ttack the credib ility of the
individual or as substantive evidence te nding to prove the offense did not occur.
505 N.W.2d at 340. As a result, Henderson’s decision to pursue the latter approach is
consistent with Goldenstein.
13 In his brief, Henderson contends, in general, that the district court erroneously excluded
“all the evidence” that A.R. ma de multiple prior false allega tions of sexual abuse. But
Henderson only makes specific arguments regarding the three allegations discussed above.
Accordingly, we limit our analysis here to Henderson’s fully developed arguments.

23

Henderson argues that the district court erred by excluding evidence of an incident
where A.R. purportedly falsely accused a schoolmate of dragging her into a school
bathroom and touching her breasts. While Henderson’s initial offer of proof indicated that
the schoolmate incident was false based on an investigation that had been conducted by the
school—including a review of surveillance video—Henderson did no t investigate this
incident until he requested school records duri ng trial. Following hi s request, the school
responded that it had neither records nor surveillance video relating to this incident. While
the district court had initially ruled that th ere was a reasonable probability that A.R. had
made a false accusation about this incident, it reversed its pr ior ruling, determining that
Henderson had not presented sufficien t evidence to meet his burden under Goldenstein.
Based on our review of the record, we agree. There was insufficient evidence with respect
to this alleged incident to show there was a reasonable probability of falsity. Therefore,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the
schoolmate incident.
Finally, Henderson argues that the district court erred by excluding evidence that
A.R. allegedly threatened to falsely accuse her father of sexual abuse. This incident was
included in Henderson’s proffer, and he also sought to bring in this evidence through A.R.’s
case manager at trial. Notably, rather th an being a false accusati on, this evidence was
offered as an instance where A.R. threatened to falsely accuse her father of sexual abuse
rather than as an actual false accusation. 14 Because this alleged threat to make a false

14 The record is not clear as to whether A.R. was referring to her biological father or
Henderson.

24

allegation does not meet the Goldenstein standard—which requires an actual accusation—
the district court did not err in excluding evidence that A.R. threatened to accuse her father
of sexual abuse.
In sum, we affirm the district court’s ru lings with respect to the alleged incident
involving A.R.’s schoolmate and her alleged th reat to falsely accuse her father of sexual
abuse. Neither meets the probability -of-falsity standard set forth in Goldenstein.
Therefore, Henderson was not deprived of his right to present a complete defense based on
these evidentiary rulings.
II. The district court did not err by excluding evidence of A.R.’s alleged source of
sexual knowledge.

Henderson also contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying the
admission of evidence that A.R. accessed sexual materials on her school-issued iPad, which
he intended to use to show her alternative source of knowledge regarding sexual matters.15
He argues that this eviden ce was admissible under the sour ce-of-knowledge exception to
rule 412—the rape-shield rule—of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. “[A] trial court has
discretion to admit evidence te nding to establish a source of knowledge of or familiarity
with sexual matters in circumstances where th e jury otherwise would likely infer that the
defendant was the source of the knowledge.” State v. Benedict , 397 N.W.2d 337, 341
(Minn. 1986). In making this determination, the district court must “balance the probative
value of the evidence against its potential for causing unfair prejudice.” Id.

15 While Henderson argues that A.R. accessed pornography, the record does not reflect that
this characterization is accurate. As such, we refer to the materials allegedly accessed by
A.R. as “sexual materials.”

25

Based on our review of the record, this case did not have circumstances from which
the jury would otherwise likel y infer that Henderson was the source of A.R.’s sexual
knowledge. There was no testimony or evidence relating to A.R.’s sexual knowledge being
unusual for her age or her deve lopmental delays. In addition, the state did not argue that
Henderson was A.R.’s source of sexual knowledge. The record also indicates that A.R.’s
use of her iPad to search for information about body parts was different from the abuse she
claimed that she suffered from Henderson. Theref ore, we conclude that the district court
did not err in excluding evidence relating to A.R.’s use of her iPad to access sexual
materials.16
III. Henderson is not entitled to relief based on his pro se claims.
In his pro se brief, Henderson asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because he was
denied a defense as the jury only “got a chance to see and hear a picture perfect model of
the alleged victim; along with a mountain [of] fabricated claims executed by the
prosecutor.” In making these assertions, Henderson points to inconsistencies in the police
reports and A.R.’s testimony as demonstrati ng that he has been wrongly convicted and
imprisoned. However, because Henderson’s assertions are not supported by legal

16 Even if the district court erroneously ex cluded the iPad evidence, the exclusion was
harmless. See Post, 512 N.W.2d at 102. Through his cross-examination of A.R. and his
closing argument, Henderson advanced his theo ry to the jury that A.R. had alternative
sources of sexual knowledge. For example, Henderson questioned A.R. about watching
R-rated movies and television shows about adu lt and criminal topics. And in his closing
argument, Henderson argued that A.R. had access to sources of information—through the
internet, television, or movies—where she c ould have learned about sexual scenarios.
These examples served the same purpose that the iPad evidence w ould have served in
demonstrating alternative sources of A.R.’s sexual knowledge. Accordingly, any error in
excluding the iPad evidence was harmless.

26

arguments, we decline to consider them. See State v. Bartylla , 755 N.W.2d 8, 22-23
(Minn. 2008). Henderson also refers to a recorded jail call between him and his daughter,
A.R.’s half-sister, where he claims they discussed her memory of the incidents she testified
to, and she said she did not remember. Bu t we decline to address Henderson’s above
assertions because they are ou tside the appellate record. See State v. Maidi ,
520 N.W.2d 414, 419-20 (Minn. App. 1994), aff’d (Minn. Sept. 15, 19 95). Therefore,
Henderson is not entitled to relief based on his pro se claims.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

C/D-1

WORKE, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part)
I concur in the majority opinion affirm ing the district court’s rulings on the
exclusion of purported evidence relating to A.R. falsely accusing a schoolmate of touching
her breasts in a school bathroom, A.R. threat ening to falsely accuse her father of sexual
abuse, and A.R. accessing sexual materials on her iPad. But I do part comp any with the
majority and would also affirm the district court’s like-minded dete rmination that there
was insufficient reliable eviden ce from A.R.’s case manage r to support the purported
allegation that A.R. fabricated a claim that the goddaughter sexually assaulted her.
The majority concludes that the district court erred in its determination that
Henderson failed to show clear evidence that A.R. fals ely reported the goddaughter
sexually assaulted her. 1 But the district court’ s ruling conformed to the Goldenstein
reasonable-probability-of-falsity standard that is required prior to the admission of a
victim’s prior false accusation of sexual misconduct. See State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d
332, 340 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 1993).
While the majority is correct that A.R.’s case manager, during her voir dire, stated
that A.R. had admitted that her accusation ag ainst the goddaughter was false, this narrow
reading of the voir dire distorts the record. Read in its entirety, a review of the case

1 The majority claims that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard when it
determined that there was no cl ear evidence of a false report by A.R. In my view, the
district court was not using a “clear-evidence” standard, as the district court had made
earlier rulings citing the Goldenstein reasonable-probability-of-falsity standard. Rather,
the district court viewed the testimony as a whole in light of the case manager’s responses
on direct and cross-examination; it determined that there was no clear evidence of the
alleged incident that demonstrated a reasonable probability of falsity.

C/D-2

manager’s voir dire shows that she did not remember what happened, she was unsure about
whether A.R. or A.R.’s mother stated that the allegations were false, and she did not
investigate by speaking with either the goddau ghter or A.R. In addition, Henderson did
not attempt to cross-examine A.R. about this alleged incident.2
“Evidentiary rulings genera lly rest within the district court’s discretion and will not
be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Johnson , 568 N.W.2d 426,
432 (Minn. 1997). This court “will not lightly overturn a [district] court’s evidentiary
ruling,” and “[a]bsent a clear abuse of discretion, the ruling will stand.” State v. Kelly, 435
N.W.2d 807, 813 (Minn. 1989).
During the voir dire of A.R.’s case manager, the district court not only observed and
heard her, but also made pointed inquiries to attempt to clar ify her statements about this
alleged incident. During the prosecutor’s cr oss-examination of A.R.’s case manager, the
district court purposefully interjected itself into the following exch ange to clarify her
knowledge of the genesis of the possible false allegation:
[THE] COURT: And we’re not asking for supposition. We’re
not asking for guessing. We’re asking for your knowledge of
things. Do you know if the police were contacted as a result of
any statement that [A.R.] made to her mom about the
[goddaughter]?
[CASE MANAGER]: I do not know.
[THE] COURT: Okay.
[PROSECUTOR]: Other than [A.R.’s] mom saying it was
false did you have any other information regarding that
instance?

2 While Henderson did not attempt to cross- examine A.R. about this alleged incident—
presumably for strategic reasons due to her cognitive limitations—the majority’s holding
essentially grants Henderson a new trial be cause of his strategic decision to limit the
manner in which he presented his defense.

C/D-3

[CASE MANAGER]: No.
[PROSECUTOR]: So you don’t know if [the goddaughter] did
. . . touch her and [A.R.] recanted?
[CASE MANAGER]: Right, I do not know.
[PROSECUTOR]: You never talked to [the goddaughter]?
[CASE MANAGER]: I never spoke with [the goddaughter].

We afford great discretion to the district court in its determination as to what
evidence is proper and admissible. As a revi ewing court, it is difficult to measure the
certainty and weight of testimony from a written transcript. Under the Goldenstein
reasonable-probability-of-falsity standard, a district court is implicitly directed to evaluate
the relevancy, credibility, and the weight of such evidence in determining whether it is
admissible. 505 N.W.2d at 340. This is so because the district court is directed to act as
the trier of fact on the thres hold determination as to whet her a reasonable probability of
falsity exists with respect to the victim’s previous reports of a lleged sexual assault. See
State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (recognizing that trier of fact is in
best position to determine credibility and weight of evidence). Based on my review of the
record, the district court did just that.
In my view, the record show s that A.R.’s case manager presented as an unreliable
witness who was enormously confused give n the inconsistencies in her vague and
contradictory statements about this incident. After considering the voir dire testimony and
arguments from the parties, the district court determined that “[t]here is no clear evidence
that there was a false report by [A.R].” It appears that the only aspect about the incident
that the case manager was certain of was that she did not investigate the incident, as she
stated she did not follow-up with those allegedly involved. Based on a reading of the record

C/D-4

in its entirety, there was never any clear indication of a false allegation by A.R. against the
goddaughter and thus the district court did not err in excluding such evidence.
Henderson failed to establish that there was a reasonable probability of falsity, as
required by Goldenstein, that A.R. falsely accused the go ddaughter of sexual assault.
A.R.’s case manager was an unreliable witness and her testimony about this incident, had
it been deemed admissible, would have confused the jury. See Minn. R. Evid. 403 (stating
that even relevant evidence may be exclud ed “if its probative va lue is substantially
outweighed by the danger of . . . confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury”).
In addition, as noted by the district court, this evidence was in admissible hearsay.
See Minn. R. Evid. 802. In State v. Pass, our supreme court recognized that “a defendant’s
due process right to present a complete defense yields to the application of an evidentiary
rule unless the rule ‘infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the accused and [is] arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes [the rule is] designed to serve[,]’” or unless the rules of
evidence “‘serve no legitimate purpose or . . . ar e disproportionate to the ends that they
asserted to promote.’” 832 N.W. 2d 836, 841-42 (Minn. 2013) (quoting Holmes v. South
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324-25, 32 6, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731, 1732 (2006)). The United
States Supreme Court has held that the const itutional right to present a complete defense
does not alter a state district court’s “ord inary evidentiary rulings” so long as the
application of the rules of ev idence “serve[s] the interests of fairness and reliability.”
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689-90, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146 (1986). Therefore, the
district court did not clearly abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of this incident.

C/D-5

Because in my view there was no error in the district court’s exclusion of evidence
of the alleged incident involving the goddaughter, a prejudice analysis is not warranted in
this case. I would also note that because the Goldenstein standard is vague, there is a strong
probability that a case involving confusio n about the reasonable-probability-of-falsity
standard will arise in the future.3 See 505 N.W.2d at 340 (stating only that before evidence
of prior false accusation is admissible, district court must make a threshold determination
that “a reasonable probability of falsity exists” without further explanation on how a district
court is to go about arriving at this conclusion).
I commend the district court for its painstak ing analysis and the care with which it
reviewed all of the evidence in this difficult case. Because the district court did not clearly
abuse its discretion by exclud ing evidence that A.R. a llegedly falsely accused the
goddaughter of sexual assault, I would affirm. Therefore, in my opinion, the district court
did not violate Henderson’s right to present a complete defense and he is not entitled to a
new trial.

3 Not only does this vague standard make it difficult for the district court to make a
determination about the admissibility of a vic tim’s alleged prior fals e accusation, but the
lack of a clear standard make s it difficult for an appellate court to determine whether the
district court clearly abused its discretion in ruling on such evidence.