Kristina Greene, et al.,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-1981

Court of Appeals Hudson, J.
Took no part, Anderson, Moore, JJ.

Kristina Greene, et al.,

Respondents/Cross-Appellants,

vs. Filed: September 16, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts
Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services, et al.,

Appellants/Cross-Respondents.

________________________

Thomas R. Revnew, Peters, Revnew, Ka ppenman & Anderson, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota, for respondents/cross-appellants.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Liz Kramer, Solicitor General, Jacob Campion, Assistant
Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellants/cross-respondents.

Douglas P. Seaton, James V.F. Dickey U pper Midwest Law Center, Golden Valley,
Minnesota, for amicus curiae Center of the American Experiment.

Justin M. Page, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Disability Law
Center/Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid.

Justin D. Cummins, Cummins & Cummins, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amici curiae
SEIU Healthcare Minnesota, MAPE, and AFSCME, Council 5.

________________________

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S Y L L A B U S
1. A group of personal care assistants seeking to decertify a public union was
not entitled under Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9 (2018), to a list containing contact
information for individual personal care assistants compiled by the Department of Human
Services under Minn. Stat. § 256B.0711, subd. 4(f) (2018).
2. The Department of Human Services and Minnesota Management and Budget
did not violate the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01–.90
(2018), by declining to disclose the list to a group of personal care assistants seeking to
decertify a public union.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
In this case we consider the statutory framework governing public access to a list of
contact information for personal care assi stants who provide hom e-based services to
participants in state programs. Here, a gr oup of individual personal care assistants
requested access to the list to garner support for their attempt to decertify a public union as
their exclusive representative. These personal care assistants sued the relevant government
agencies when they were de nied access to the list under a provision of the Public
Employment Labor Relations Act, Minn. St at. § 179A.54, subd. 9 (2018) (the PELRA
provision).
The district court concluded that personal care assistants are state employees for
purposes of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01–.90

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(2018), and ordered disclosure of the list. The court of appeals concluded that the personal
care assistants were not entitle d to the list under the PELR A provision, but they were
entitled to it under the Data Practices Act. We conclude that the pe rsonal care assistants
were not entitled to the list under either the PE LRA provision or the Data Practices Act.
Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court.
FACTS
  Appellants (the agencies) include the De partment of Human Services (DHS) and
Minnesota Management and Budget (MMB). 1 Respondents are Kristina Greene and six
other individual personal care assistants (P CAs) who seek to decertify the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) as the exclusive representative for the bargaining
unit of PCAs.
PCAs provide in-home health care and daily living assistance to elderly individuals
and people with disabilities who participate in DHS-operated state programs (participants).
Participants may either hire a PCA from a traditional agency pr ovider, Minn. Stat.
§ 256B.0659, subd. 24 (2018), or hire a PCA directly under a so-called self-directed option
such as PCA Choice, id., subd. 18 (2018). Participants who choose a self-directed option
like PCA Choice may independently recruit, hi re, and train the PCAs who provide their
care. Id., subd. 19(a) (2018). This case concerns PCAs who were hired by a participant
directly under PCA Choice or another self-directed option.

1 The Bureau of Mediation Se rvices (BMS) was originally a party to the lawsuit. The
district court concluded that BMS could not be held liable and dismissed all claims against
BMS. Respondents did not appeal this conclusion.

4
According to DHS, “many of the elderly i ndividuals and persons with disabilities
who participate in DHS programs receive ca re from a relative who lives with them.”
Participants do not pay their PCAs direct ly; instead, DHS pays PCAs involved in
self-directed programs through fiscal intermediaries. Minn. Stat. § 256B.0659, subd. 18.
In-home care providers are generally excluded from collective bargaining under the
National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 15 2(3). But in 2013, the Legislature enacted
the Individual Providers of Direct Support Services Representati on Act, a section of
PELRA, Minn. Stat. §§ 179A.01–.60 (2018). Ac t of May 24, 2013, ch. 128, art. 2, § 1,
2013 Minn. Laws 2170, 2173–75 (codifi ed at Minn. Stat. § 179A.54 (2018)) . This Act
allows PCAs to organize for collective bargaining under PELRA by categorizing PCAs as
“executive branch state employees employed by the commissioner of management and
budget” for purposes of collective bargaining. Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 2. To facilitate
the collective bargaining process, DHS must, on a monthly basis, “compile and maintain a
list of the names and addresses of all individual providers who have been paid for providing
direct support services to participants with in the previous six m onths.” Minn. Stat.
§ 256B.0711, subd. 4(f) (2018) (the Medical Assistance provision). DHS compiled and
maintained a list of the names and home addr esses of PCAs pursuant to this Medical
Assistance provision. The PE LRA provision specifies when the list that DHS compiles
and maintains under the Medical Assistance provision becomes “pub licly available.”
Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9.
In 2014, SEIU gained access to the list by satisfying the PELRA provision criterion
specifically identified for employee organizations—a showing to the Bureau of Mediation

5
Services that 500 individual PCAs support such representation. See id . SEIU then
requested and won a certification election. Since the election in 2014, SEIU has been the
exclusive representative for PCAs.
On May 25, 2016, respondents requested the most recent list of PCAs as part of
their effort to decertify SEIU as their exclusive representative under PELRA. See Minn.
Stat. § 179A.12, subd. 3. PELRA effec tively allows a 60-day window to seek a
decertification election. See id. , subds. 3–4. To obtain a decertification election,
respondents had to demonstrat e that “at least 30 percent of the employees wish to be
unrepresented.” Id., subd. 3. Respondents sought the mo st recent list so that they could
contact PCAs to garner support for decertific ation. The Bureau of Mediation Services
(BMS) gave respondents the 2014 list after dete rmining that it was the only list that was
“publicly available” under the PELRA provision. Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9.
After receiving the 2014 list, respondents again requested the most recent 2016 list.
Like BMS, the agencies denied respondents’ request for an updated list after determining
that the 2016 list was not “publicly available” under the PELRA provision, id. Challenging
this denial, respondents claimed that “their efforts to collect the required number of
signatures” for their decertification effort was “significantly impaired by the inaccurate and
outdated 2014 PCA list.”
In October 2016, respondent s sued the agencies for failing to provide the 2016 list.
Respondents sought injunctive relief under the Data Practices Act. They relied on Minn.
Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 2, which states that PCAs are considered “executive branch state
employees” for purposes of PELRA, although the statute “does not require the treatment

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of individual providers as public employees for any other purpose.” Id. Respondents
argued that PCAs are state em ployees for purposes of the Data Practices Act, rendering
their “personnel data” publicly accessible. See Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 2 (providing that
specified “personnel data on current and form er employees . . . of a government entity is
public”).
The district court granted a temporary injunction, ordering disclosure of the 2016
list under the Data Practices Act, ultimately requiring the agencies to provide a current list
of names and addresses that DHS compiled under Minn. Stat. § 256B.0711, subd. 4(f), as
well as the telephone number that DHS main tained for each PCA. Following an
unsuccessful appeal, the agencies complied with the order. See Greene v. Minn. Bureau of
Mediation Servs., No. A16-1863, 2017 WL 3122343 (Minn. App. July 24, 2017) (affirming
temporary injunctive relief requiring the disclo sure of names, addr esses, and telephone
numbers of PCAs).
The parties then filed cross-motions fo r summary judgment. Respondents argued
that the agencies violated the Data Practices Act by failing to release the 2016 list and asked
the district court to make permanent the tem porary injunctive relief previously granted.
According to respondents, DHS had an obliga tion to provide access to the current list of
PCAs as public “personnel data” under the Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 2,
and as “publicly available” information under the PELRA provision, Minn. Stat.
§ 179A.54. The agencies argued that respondents were not entitled to the list because the
information in the list is not public personnel data under the Data Practices Act or publicly
available under the PELRA provision. The di strict court concluded that the agencies

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violated the Data Practices Act “by failing to provide public data as to the providers
involved, who are state employees” for purposes of the Data Practices Act. Although the
district court recognized that the home addre sses of PCAs are not public personnel data,
see Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 2, the court noted that it could order the disclosure of private
personnel data, see id., subd. 4. The district court di d not address whether the list was
publicly available under the PELRA provision.
The agencies appealed. The court of appeals held that respondents were not entitled
to the 2016 list under the P ELRA provision, Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9, because
respondents did not meet the statutory criteria to receive the list. Greene v. Minn. Bureau
of Mediation Servs. , No. A18-1981, 2019 WL 3776949, at *3 −4 (Minn. App. Aug. 12,
2019). But the court of appeals further held that respondents were entitled to the list under
the Data Practices Act . Id. at *8. The court of appeals reasoned that PCAs are public
employees for purposes of the Data Practices Act, and therefore their “personnel data” is
subject to disclosure un der Minn. Stat. § 13.43 . Id. at *6−8. Accordingly, the court of
appeals held that the agencies—including MMB, which the court of appeals treated as the
employer of PCAs—violated the Data Practices Act. Id. at *8.
The agencies sought review of the court of appeals’ decision, asking us to decide
whether respondents are entitled to the 2016 list under the Data Practices Act, and if so,
whether MMB can be held liable for a data practices violation. Respondents sought
conditional cross-review, asking us to determine whether they are entitled to the 2016 list
under the PELRA provision. We granted review on all issues.

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ANALYSIS
This case requires us to interpret the PELRA provision, the Medical Assistance
provision, and the Data Practices Act. Spec ifically, we must decide whether respondents
are entitled to the 2016 list under the PELRA provision or the Data Practices Act.
We review a district court’s gran t of summary judgment de novo. Cilek v. Off. of
Minn. Sec’y of State , 941 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Minn. 2020 ). We also review statutory
interpretation de novo. Id. We apply the plain meaning of a statute if the Legislature’s
intent “is clear from the unambig uous language of the statute.” Staab v. Diocese of
St. Cloud, 853 N.W.2d 713, 716–17 (Minn. 2014). “A statute is ambiguous only when the
statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Fleck,
810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012). We construe statutes “as a whole” so that statutory
language is understood in context. State v. Bowen , 921 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Minn. 2019).
“One of our goals in statutory interpretation is to harmonize statutes if possible.” Vill. Lofts
at St. Anthony Falls Ass’n v. Hous. Partners III-Lofts, LLC , 937 N.W.2d 430, 439 (Minn.
2020).
I.
We first consider whether respondents were entitled to the 2016 list under the
PELRA provision, Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd . 9. The Medical Assistance provision,
section 256B.0711, subdivision 4(f), requires DHS to compile and maintain a list of the
contact information for individual PCAs on a monthly basis. The PELRA provision
addresses access to these monthly lists. Th e BMS Commissioner must provide the most
recent list to an “employee organization” that seeks to become the exclusive representative

9
of individual PCAs when the organization demonstrates that “at least 500” of those PCAs
“support such representation.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9. The BMS Commissioner
also must provide th e list, upon request, to “any exclus ive representative of individual
providers.” Id. “When the list is available to an employee organization under this
subdivision, the list must be made publicly available.” Id.
The parties’ dispute centers on the meani ng of the last sentence of the PELRA
provision: “When the list is available to an employee organization under this subdivision,
the list must be made publicly available.” Id. Specifically, the parties dispute what it
means for a list to be “available” to an em ployee organization. This dispute matters
because a list is only publicly available if it is first available to an employee organization.
Thus, we must determine the meaning of the word “available” in the PELRA provision.
Section 179A.54 does not define the term “available.” The agencies argue that a
list is “available” under subdivis ion 9 only if (1) an employ ee organization requested the
list after demonstrating sufficient support, or (2) the exclusive representative requested the
list. It is undisputed that SEIU is an employee organization. But SEIU had not requested
the 2016 list when respondents first requested it in May 2016. Thus, according to the
agencies’ interpretation, the 2016 list was not publicly available.
For their part, respondents argue that a list is “available” whenever individual
providers have an exclusive re presentative; in other words, the exclusive representative
does not actually have to requ est the list for the list to be “available” to the exclusive
representative. Consequently, respondent s contend that the 2016 list was “publicly
available” because SEIU, as the exclusive representative, could have requested the list.

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The statutory context reveals the plain meaning of the term “available” in the
PELRA provision. See Bowen, 921 N.W.2d at 765. Read ing the PELRA provision in
context as a whole, it is clear that a PC A list becomes available to an exclusive
representative or employee organization upon request . Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9
(stating that the BMS Commissioner “shall provide to [a qualified employee organization]
within seven days the most recent list of i ndividual providers . . . and three subsequent
monthly lists upon request ” and that the Commissioner “shall provide lists . . . upon
request, to any exclusive representative of individual providers” (emphasis added)). Thus,
the plain language of the statute requires an actual request be made for the list to be publicly
available.
The use of the words “provide” and “req uest” in the PELRA provision further
supports our interpretation. One definitio n of “provide” is to “make available.” The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1458 (3rd ed. 1996). The PELRA
provision uses “provide” in the active voi ce to describe the actions of the BMS
Commissioner. In contrast, the “publicly available” phrase is used in the passive voice.
Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9 (“When the list is available to an employee organization
under this subdivision, the list must be made publicly available.”). Rewritten in the active
voice, the meaning of this provision beco mes clearer: When the BMS Commissioner
makes the list available to an employee organization upon request, then the Commissioner
must make this list available to a member of the public upon request. Accordingly, a list
is available to the public if (1) an employee organization requests the list after
demonstrating sufficient support, or (2) if the exclusive representative requests the list.

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Respondents argue that this interpretation cannot be what the Legislature intended
because it makes the list more difficult to ac cess, which in turn makes it effectively
impossible for respondents to seek decertification. Because PELRA explicitly provides a
process for decertification, they argue, this interpretation crea tes absurd results that are
inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent. We disagree.
First, we generally do not consider whethe r an interpretation of a statute creates
absurd results unless that statute is ambiguous. Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan N. Am.,
Inc., 875 N.W.2d 279, 288 (Minn. 2016). We consider whether an unambiguous statute
creates absurd results only in the “exceedingly rare case[s] in which the plain meaning of
the statute ‘utterly confounds’ the clear legislative purpose of the statute.” Schatz v.
Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 643, 6 51 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Weston v. McWilliams
& Assocs., Inc., 716 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. 2006)).
This is not the exceedingly rare case. Nothing about the PELRA provision suggests
that the Legislature intended to give indivi dual PCAs and their exclusive representative
equal access to the list—let alone an intentio n so clear that it overrides the plain meaning
of the provision. Indeed, the Legislature would not have created different disclosure rules
for employee organizations, exclusive representatives, and the general public if it intended
each group to have equal access under all circumstances.
Further, the PELRA provision’s plain m eaning does not create absurd results
because decertification remains a viable option. It is true that if the exclusive representative
does not request the most current PCA list, the PELRA provision makes it difficult for a
group of PCAs to seek decertification. We acknowledge that for PCAs—a decentralized

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group of employees—access to the PCA list is helpful. But the Legislature made clear
policy choices in drafting PELRA and it is not for this court to disturb them. Moreover,
respondents falsely equate difficulty with impossibility.
Our holding today does not foreclose all pa ths to decertification. To achieve a
decertification election, employees must demonstrate that 30 percent of the bargaining unit
no longer wants to be represented by their exclusive representative. Minn. Stat. § 179A.12,
subd. 3. A group of employees must theref ore know how many PCAs are in the unit to
calculate how many signatures they need to reach the 30 pe rcent threshold. They can
determine this number, as th e agencies note, through public summary data on the
bargaining unit under Minn. St at. § 13.05, subd. 7. Summary data does not identify
individual PCAs, but respon dents could use it to calculate the necessary number of
signatures to request a decertification election. See Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 19 (defining
summary data as “statistical records and re ports derived from data on individuals but in
which individuals are not identified” and clarif ying that this data is public). Further, in
October 2016, respondents themselves achiev ed 500 signatures in support of their
decertification petition without access to an updated list.
Applying the plain meaning of the PELRA provision to these facts, respondents
were not entitled to the 2016 PCA list beca use neither SEIU nor another employee
organization had requested the list at the time of respondents’ initial request. Accordingly,
we affirm the court of appeals’ holding that respondents were not entitled to the 2016 PCA
list under Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9.

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II.
Respondents also assert that they we re entitled to the 2016 list under the Data
Practices Act. Specifically, they argue that PCAs are state employees for purposes of the
Data Practices Act and therefore their “personnel data” is public under Minn. Stat. § 13.43.
The agencies, meanwhile, argue that the court of appeals e rred by applying the Data
Practices Act because (1) PCAs are not state employees for purposes of the Data Practices
Act, and (2) the PELRA provision overrides th e general presumption of public access in
the Data Practices Act. We address each argument in turn.
A.
First, we consider whether the PCAs should be treated as state employees for purposes
of the Data Practices Act. Under the Data Practices Act, certain specified “personnel data”
on state employees is public. Mi nn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 2(a). With so me exceptions, the
following personnel data on state employees is public:
(1) name; employee identification number, which must not be the employee’s
Social Security number; actual gross salary; salary range; terms and conditions
of employment relationship . . . ;
(2) job title and bargaini ng unit; job description; education and training
background; and previous work experience;
(3) date of first and last employment;
. . .
(7) work location; a work telephone number; badge number . . . .

Id. “All other personnel data is private data on individuals but may be released pursuant to a
court order.” Id., subd. 4.

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Under PELRA, PCAs are considered stat e employees for purposes of collective
bargaining:
For the purposes of the Public Empl oyment Labor Relations Act, under
chapter 179A, individual providers shall be considered . . . executive branch
state employees employed by the commissioner of management and budget
or the commissioner’s representative. This section does not require the
treatment of individual providers as public employees for any other purpose.
Individual providers are not state employees for purposes of section 3.736.

Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 2. The agenci es emphasize that PELRA “does not require
the treatment of individual providers as public employees for any other purpose.” Id. They
argue that PCAs should be treated as state employees “solely for the purposes of collective
bargaining.” Respondents counter that this provision specifically refers to PCAs as
“executive branch state employees,” and therefore, PCAs are state employees for purposes
of the Data Practices Act.
The court of appeals concluded that PC As are state employees whose “personnel
data” is public under section 13.43. Greene, 2019 WL 3776949, at *7–8. The court of
appeals reasoned that Minn. St at. § 179A.54, subd. 2, “leave s open the possibility that
PCAs may be regarded as public employees in contexts other than PELRA.” Id. at *7. The
court of appeals then observed that no legisl ation precluded holding that PCAs are state
employees under the Data Practices Act. Id.
The plain language of secti on 179A.54, subdivision 2, is permissive—stating that
PCAs are considered state employees for purposes of PELRA, but “[t]his section does not
require the treatment of individual providers as public employees for any other purpose.”
(Emphasis added.) This language means that state agencies are not required to treat PCAs

15
as state employees for any purpose othe r than collective bargaining under PELRA. 2 We
therefore consider whether PCAs should be treated as state employees for purposes of the
Data Practices Act.
To begin with, the information that respondents are seeking is not “personnel data”
under the Data Practices Act. The Data Practices Act defines “personnel data” as
“government data on individuals maintained because the individual is or was an employee”
of a government entity. Minn. Stat. § 13.43, s ubd. 1. The Individual Providers of Direct
Support Services Representation Act designated PCAs as executive branch state employees
for purposes of PELRA to pr ovide them with collective ba rgaining rights. Although
PELRA deems MMB the employer of PCAs for this purpose, Minn. Stat. § 179A.54,
subd. 2, no actual employment relationship exists between MMB a nd PCAs. For this
reason, MMB, the ostensible employer, did not maintain any “personnel data” on PCAs.
And it is undisputed that MM B did not possess the data th at respondents requested.
Consequently, the court of appeals erred by holding MMB liable for failing to provide
access to personnel data on PCAs that MMB did not maintain. Greene, 2019 WL 3776949,
at *8.
Unlike MMB, DHS must “compile and maintain a list of the names and addresses”
of PCAs. See Minn. Stat. § 256B.0711, subd. 4(f). But DHS compiles this list to facilitate
collective bargaining “under chapter 179A,” id.—not because PCAs are employees of a

2 The Eighth Circuit has concluded that PC As are state employees solely for purposes
of collective bargaining under Mi nn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 2. Bierman v. Dayton ,
900 F.3d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 2018); Greene v. Dayton, 806 F.3d 1146, 1148 (8th Cir. 2015).

16
government entity under the Data Practices Act. Despite designating PCAs as state
employees for purposes of collective bargaini ng, PELRA specifically recognizes that
participants retain the right “to select, hire, direct, supervise, and terminate the employment
of their individual providers,” Minn. Stat. § 1 79A.54, subd. 4, which are all indicia of an
employment relationship. Cf. Abel v. Abbott Nw. Hosp. , 947 N.W.2d 58, 74–75 (Minn.
2020); see also Minn. Stat. § 256B.0711, subd. 4(a) (stating that DHS “shall afford to all
participants within a covered program the option of employing” a PCA “to provide direct
support services” (emphasis added)). Consequently, PCAs are, for all practical purposes,
more accurately categorized as employees of a particular participant, not employees of
MMB or DHS. Because PCAs are not actually state employees, DHS did not maintain any
government data on them because they are state employees, Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 1.
We also decline to treat the information in the list as public personnel data under the
Data Practices Act because that would create a conflict with the PELRA provision, which
specifies that the list is “publicly available” only when “the list is available to an employee
organization,” Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9. See Erickson v. Sunset Mem’l Park Ass’n,
108 N.W.2d 434, 441 (Minn. 1961) (stating that when “reasonably possible” we interpret
a statute to avoid conflict with other statutes). And if there were an irreconcilable conflict
between the Data Practices Act and the PE LRA provision, the PELRA provision would
prevail as the more specific and more recent provision.3 See Minn. Stat. § 645.26 (2018).

3 The PELRA provision was enacted in 2013 , Act of May 24, 2013, ch. 128, art. 2,
§ 1, 2013 Minn. Laws 2170, 2173–75, while the personnel data section of the Data
Practices Act was originally enacted in 19 79, Act of June 5, 1979, ch. 328, § 17, 1979
Minn. Laws 910, 919.

17
Consequently, respondents cannot invoke the Data Practices Act to bypass the restrictions
on access in the PELRA provision.
Moreover, the contact information that DHS compiles and maintains on PCAs under
the Medical Assistance provision, Minn. Stat . § 256B.0711, subd. 4(f), is different from
the public “personnel data” that state agencies maintain on state employees under the Data
Practices Act. For example, the Data Practi ces Act provides that the work locations and
work telephone numbers of state employees ar e public, Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 2(7);
however, DHS collected and maintained the home addresses of PCAs under the Medical
Assistance provision, Minn. Stat. § 256B.07 11, subd. 4(f), which e xplicitly prohibits the
disclosure of participant data. Further, unde r the Data Practices Act, the home addresses
of state employees are “private” personnel data. See Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 4 (stating
that all personnel data not specifically designated as public is “private data on
individuals”). Accordingly, even if we were to treat PCAs as state employees for purposes
of the Data Practices Act, the home addre sses would fall outside the scope of public
“personnel data” under section 13.43.
Nor does the reference in the Medical Assistance provision to section 13.43 suggest
that PCAs are state employees for purposes of the Data Practices Act. Minn. Stat.
§ 256B.0711, subd. 4(f). The Medical Assistance provision provides that “to effectuate . . .
section 179A.54, questions of employee organization access to other relevant data on
individual providers relating to their employme nt . . . shall be gove rned by chapter 179A
and section 13.43.” Id. This language has no bearing on respondents’ request for the 2016

18
list because the language applies to employ ee organizations. As respondents’ counsel
conceded at oral argument, respondents are private parties.
These inconsistencies between the data collected by DHS under the Medical
Assistance provision and the data maintained on state employees under the Data Practices
Act demonstrate that the Legislature did no t intend for the home addresses and telephone
number of PCAs to be treated as public pers onnel data under the Data Practices Act.
Therefore, we conclude that the court of a ppeals erred by holding th at respondents were
entitled to the 2016 list as personnel data under Minn. Stat. § 13.43.
B.
In concluding that the 2016 list is not public as “personnel data,” we next consider
whether respondents were nonetheless entitled to the 2016 list because it is presumptively
public as data collected by a government agency. The Data Practices Act applies to “[a]ll
government entities” and regulates “access to government data” collected and held by those
entities. Minn. Stat. § 13.01, subds. 1, 3. Government data is pr esumed public “unless
there is a federal law, a state statute, or a temporary classification of data” that categorizes
the data as “not public.” Id., subd. 3.
Here, the general presumption is triggered because DHS is a government entity that
compiles and maintains the names and addre sses of individual PCAs pursuant to the
Medical Assistance provision. Minn. Stat. § 2 56B.0711, subd. 4(f). Respondents assert
that the general presumption of public access applies here, in part, because we previously
applied the general presumption to conclude that home addr esses of non-state employees
are public data. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 292 v. City of St. Cloud, 765 N.W.2d

19
64, 67 (Minn. 2009) (concluding that the home addresses of employees of independent
contractors hired by the state are public data under the Data Practices Act).
But International Brotherhood is distinguishable becau se no other state statute
governed access to the home addresses at the time. See id. at 67. Here, the PELRA
provision is a state statute that categorizes the data as not public by specifically restricting
access to the list and setting forth specific exceptions for when the list is “publicly
available.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9. The presumption of public access in the Data
Practices Act therefore does no t apply to the 2016 list. See Minn. Stat. § 13.03, subd. 1
(providing that all government data is public unless a statute or other law classifies the data
as not public).4 Accordingly, because the Data Pr actices Act does not make the 2016 list
public, we reverse the court of appeals’ co nclusion that respondents were entitled to the
list.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the cour t of appeals in part and reverse in part,
and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with our decision here.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

4 Our conclusion also is supported by the fact that the PCA lists that DHS complies
and maintains pursuant to the Medical Assistance provision do not exist outside of section
256B.0711. Stated otherwise, the lists are sui generis creatures of the Medical Assistance
provision—specifically designed by its terms to work in concert with the collective
bargaining process for PCAs authorized under the PELRA provision. Indeed, the
Legislature enacted the two provisions together as part of the same act. Act of May 24,
2013, ch. 128, art. 2, § 1, 2013 Minn. Laws 2170, 2173–75 (PELRA provision); id. § 2,
2013 Minn. Laws at 2175–78 (Medical Assistance provision ). This history strongly
suggests that access to the lists is designed to be governed by these specific statutes, not
the broader Data Practices Act.

20

ANDERSON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MOORE, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission, took
no part in the consideration or decision of this case.