Kristina Greene, et al., Respondents,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1981

Kristina Greene, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed August 12, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-16-5981

Douglas P. Seaton, Thomas R. Revnew, Seaton, Peters & Revnew, P .A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Liz Kramer, Solicitor General, Jacob Campion, Assistant
Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman , Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant-agencies Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS ) and
Minnesota Management and Budget (MMB) appeal from the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of respondents. We affirm.

2
FACTS
Respondents are a group of indi vidual personal care attendants (PCAs) who are
hired by, and provide direct care to, participants in state pro grams that subsidize the cost
of home-based services for individuals with disabilities. 1 Respondents seek to decertify
Service Employees International Union Healthcare Minnesota (SEIU) as the representative
of their bargaining unit. This is the fourth appeal related to respondents’ effort to decertify
SEIU.2 The factual background is summ arized in our earlier opinions, so we limit our
recitation of the facts here to those directly relevant to this summary-judgment appeal.
In May 2016, to gather support for their decertification petit ion, respondents
submitted requests to DHS and BMS , seeking the most-recent list of all PCAs compiled

1 DHS operates numerous programs for elderly individuals or persons with disabilities that
allow individuals to receive in- home care from individual provi ders. See Minn. Stat.
§ 256B.0711 (2018). The persons receiving the assistance are “ [p]articipant[s]” and the
services they receive are “[d]irect support services.” Id., subd. 1(c), (e). Participants may
employ “[i]ndividual provider[s]” to provide assistance with daily living needs. Id., subd.
1(d). Individual providers are commonly referred to as either personal care attendants
(PCAs) or personal care providers. Those terms appear to be interchangeable. We refer to
individual providers as PCAs for purposes of this opinion.

2 See Greene v. Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. , No. A16-1863, 2017 WL 3122343, at
*1 (Minn. App. July 24, 2017) (affirming district court’s grant of temporary injunctive
relief requiring appellants to disclose requested names, addresses, and telephone numbers
o f P C A s ) . R e s p o n d e n t s h a v e s e p a r a t e l y p u r s u e d e f f o r t s t o s e e k decertification with
Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services (BMS) through the admini strative process. See
In re Petition for Decertification of an Exclusive Representative, No. A18-0661, 2019 WL
661660, at *1 (Minn. App. Feb. 19, 2019) (affirming BMS’s dismi ssal of respondents’
untimely decertification petition); In re Petition for Decertific ation of an Exclusive
Representative for Certain Employees of the State, No. A17-0798, 2018 WL 414363, at *1
(Minn. App. Jan. 16, 2018) (affi rming BMS’s denial of responden ts’ decertification
petition on grounds that responden ts had not made a sufficient showing of interest in
decertification), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018).

3
under Minn. Stat. § 256B.0711, subd. 4(f), which directs the co mmissioner to maintain a
list of the names and addresses of all PCAs who have been paid for providing direct support
services to participants within the previous six months.3 Respondents’ first request to DHS
identified the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA) and Minn. Stat.
§ 179A.54, subd. 9 (2018), as authorizing the requested disclos ure. DHS responded by
informing respondents that they must direct their request to BM S because the BMS
commissioner “is the official responsible for providing access to the list.” Respondents
did so. In May 2016, BMS provided respondents with a 2014 list of PCAs compiled
pursuant to section 256B.0711, subd. 4(f).
In August 2016, respondents bega n gathering signatures for thei r decertification
effort, but encountered difficulties. The 2014 list was no lon ger accurate. Respondents
claim that 30% to 40% of the information on the list was inaccurate, which frustrated their
efforts to obtain the number of signatures required for a decer tification petition.
Respondents explained that some addresses included on the list did not exist, that some
listed individuals had not been PCAs for some time, that some addresses were incomplete,
and that some listed PCAs no longer resided at listed addresses.
Respondents made additional requests under the MGDPA for an updated list. DHS
informed respondents that the information could not be released because it was private data

3 BMS was a defendant in the district court proceedings. The district court concluded that,
because BMS did not receive the required list from DHS, BMS was not liable for its failure
to provide the relevant data. Appellants do not challenge this part of the district court’s
order on appeal.

4
under provisions of the MGDPA a nd instructed that respondents’ request for information
be directed to BMS under Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9.
Respondents submitted another re quest to BMS and DHS in Octobe r 2016, again
asking BMS to provide, or to direct DHS to provide, an updated list of names and contact
information of PCAs represented by SEIU. BMS replied, again providing the 2014 list and
informing respondents that they were not entitled to a more-rec ent list because section
179A.54, subdivision 9, “does not apply to decertification petitions” and respondents were
not an employee organization currently representing PCAs or see king to represent PCAs.
Respondents also contacted SEIU directly, but SEIU denied respo ndents’ request and a
separate request from respondent Greene.
On October 20, 2016, respondent s sued appellants, alleging tha t DHS, BMS, and
MMB violated the MGDPA. Respondents requested injunctive relie f under Minn. Stat.
§ 13.08, subd. 2 (2018), and Minn. R. Civ. P. 65, as well as statutory damages under Minn.
Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1 (2018), a declaratory judgment, and mandamus relief. Respondents
also moved for a temporary restraining order under Minn. Stat. § 13.08 (2018) and Minn.
R. Civ. P. 65.
The district court granted, in part, respondents’ motion for t emporary injunctive
relief. It ordered DHS to disclose to respondents, within seven days, the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of PCAs who had been paid by DHS for prov iding direct support
s e r v i c e s i n t h e p r e v i o u s s i x m o n t h s . A t D H S ’ s r e q u e s t , t h e d i strict court issued two
clarifying orders. The first ordered that the addresses and te lephone numbers to be
disclosed were the work location and work telephone number of all individual PCAs in the

5
bargaining unit (and not all PCAs). The second clarifying order required DHS to provide,
under Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 4 (2018), a current list of na mes and addresses compiled
under section 256B.0711, subd. 4(f), and the telephone number t hat DHS maintains for
each individual PCA.
Appellants unsuccessfully moved th e district court to stay its orders and then
unsuccessfully requested a stay from this court. Appellants then provided respondents with
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of individual PCAs who were paid for direct
support services in the six-month period from April through September 2016.
Appellants appealed the district court’s grant of a temporary injunction, and we
affirmed. See Greene, 2017 WL 3122343, at *1. The parties then filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgme nt in favor of
respondents. It determined tha t appellants violated the MGDPA, because PCAs are state
employees under Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 1 (2018), and theref ore, under Minn. Stat.
§ 13.43, subd. 2 (2018), each PCA’s name, work telephone number, and work location are
public personnel data subject to disclosure.
The district court determined that the requested information sh ould have been
promptly provided to respondent s on their request to either MMB or DHS. It concluded
that, because BMS did not receive the information from DHS, BMS was not liable for its
failure to provide the relevant data. The district court enter ed judgment for respondents,
granting declaratory relief. It denied respondents’ request fo r mandamus relief and
respondents’ request for a permanent injunction, and it stayed respondents’ motion for fees
and costs, pending the resolution of any appeal.

6
This appeal followed, and respondents noted a related appeal.
D E C I S I O N
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to jud gment as a matter of law.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. “We review a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo.
In doing so, we determine whether the district court properly applied the law and whether
there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Riverview Muir
Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC , 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010) (citation
omitted).
Here, whether the district court correctly granted summary judg ment turns on
statutory interpretation. Statuto ry interpretation is a questi on of law that we review de
novo. Cilek v. Office of Minn. Sec’y of State , 927 N.W.2d 327, 330 (Minn. App. 2019),
review granted (Minn. June 18, 2019). The object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the legislative body. Minn. St at. § 645.16 (2018). When
interpreting a statute, the first step is to examine its langua ge to determine whether the
words are clear and free from ambiguity. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68,
72 (Minn. 2012). We construe technical words and phrases accor ding to their “special
meaning,” and other words and phrases according to their “common and approved usage.”
Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2018). When the language of a statute is clear, we apply the plain
language and do not explore the spirit or purpose of the law. Caldas v. Affordable Granite
& Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn. 2012).

7
I. Respondents do not meet the statutory criteria under the Pub lic Employment
Labor Relations Act (PELRA) to r eceive the Minn. Stat. § 256B.0 711, subd.
4(f) list.

We first address respondents’ cont ention, raised by cross-appea l, that they were
entitled to access the section-256B.0711 list under section 179A.54, subdivision 9, because
the list being available to a union requires that it also be av ailable to the general public.
The district court did not resolve this question. Instead, it determined that PCAs are
executive branch employees under section 179A.54, subdivision 2 (2018), and therefore
their information is subject to disclosure under the MGDPA.
4
PELRA, Minn. Stat. §§ 179A.01-. 60 (2018), requires BMS to discl ose the list of
individual PCAs compiled under Minn. Stat. § 256B.0711, subd. 4 (f), in two instances
before the list becomes publicly available. First, upon a show ing made to the BMS
commissioner by an employee orga nization wishing to represent t he appropriate unit of
individual PCAs that at least 500 individual PCAs support such representation, the BMS
commissioner “shall provide to such organization within seven days the most recent list of
individual providers compiled under section 256B.0711, subdivision 4, paragraph (f), and
three subsequent monthly lists upon request.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9.
Second, and upon request, the BMS commissioner must also provid e the list, “to
any exclusive representative of individual providers.” Id. The statute further provides that,
“[t]o facilitate operation of this section, the commissioner of human services shall provide

4 We recognize that respondents’ cross-appeal is alternative in nature, but we nevertheless
address it because, if respondents are correct, the entire discussion that follows concerning
appellants’ appeal would be unnecessary and the suggested inter pretation of section
179A.54, subdivision 9, would have far-reaching policy consequences.

8
all lists to the commissioner of the Bureau of Mediation Servic es, upon the request of the
commissioner of the Bureau of Mediation Services.” Id. When the list is available to an
employee organization under this subdivision, the list must be made publicly available. Id.
The definitions in Minn. Stat. § 179A.03 apply to all sections of PELRA.
“Employee organization” is defined in subdivision 6, and means “any union or organization
of public employees whose purpos e is, in whole or part, to deal with public employers
concerning grievances and terms and conditions of employment.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.03,
subd. 6. “Exclusive representa tive” is defined in subdivision 8 and means “an employee
organization which has been certified by the commissioner under section 179A.12 to meet
and negotiate with the employer on behalf of all employees in t he appropriate unit.” Id.,
subd. 8.
Respondents argue that, because the list was “available” to SEI U or any other
organization seeking to represent PCAs, the list was public as soon as the required
information was compiled. Therefore, respondents argue, the most-recent list should have
been disclosed upon their request.
Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9, requires BMS to provide the section-256B.0711 list
in two circumstances—upon a showing made to the commissioner of BMS by an employee
organization wishing to represent the appropriate unit of PCAs that at least 500 PCAs
support representation or when the list is requested by the PCAs’ exclusive representative.
Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9. Respondents are not an employe e organization, nor are
they an employee organization seeking to represent PCAs. They seek to decertify SEIU as
their exclusive representative. Therefore, respondents are not entitled to the list under

9
section 179A.54, subdivision 9. 5 Respondents are e ntitled to the 2014 list, which was
already provided (but is no long er current). Because they are neither an exclusive
representative nor seeking to represent the unit, they are not entitled to a current list under
the last sentence of subdivision 9.
II. Section 179A.54 (2018) relates t o the certification process and does not apply
to decertification petitions.

Respondents further argue that di sclosure of the list is warran ted under section
179A.54, subdivision 9, because Minn. Stat. § 179A.12 directs that the DHS commissioner
share the lists with others as needed for the state to meet its obligations under chapter 179A
and to facilitate the representational processes under section 179A.54.
Section 179A.12 provides that “[a]n individual employee or group of employees in
a unit may obtain a decertification election upon petition to t he commissioner stating the
certified representative no longer represents the majority of the employees in an established
unit and that at least 30 percent of the employees wish to be u nrepresented.” Minn. Stat.
§ 179A.12, subd. 3. While section 179A.12 provides guidance co ncerning the
decertification process, section 179A.54 is specific to “indivi dual providers of direct

5 Appellants also argue that disclosure of the list is prohibite d under Minn. Stat.
§ 256B.0711, subd. 4(f), because the list “shall not include the name of any participant, or
indicate that an individual provider is a relative of a participant or has the same address as
a participant” and access to provider information “shall not include access to private data
on participants or participants’ representatives.” But respond ents did not request
participant information—they requested the names and addresses of PCAs, which does not
necessarily reveal information relating to participants. We do not resolve the question of
prohibition under section 256B.0711, subdivision 4(f), because, as discussed, respondents
are not entitled to the list under the plain language of PELRA.

10
support services” and explains the requirements for representat ion and election. The
requirements in section 179A.12 apply generally to decertification, but nothing in section
179A.54 indicates that the list requirements are the same for b oth certification and
decertification.
Respondents also argue that, because BMS regulations and procedures do not make
a distinction between petitions f or certification, representati on, or decertification, PCAs
seeking to decertify a union should be given the same access to the list as an exclusive
representative. But section 179A .54 makes no mention of the BM S regulations and
procedures for decertification. T he “representational processe s” language applies to the
processes in Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subds. 9, 10. Neither of those provisions are applicable
to respondents because, as discu ssed, respondents are not an em ployee organization. By
its plain language, Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 9, applies onl y to a certification petition
filed by an employee organization, i.e., a union. It is not for us to add language to a statute
that the legislature did not include in it. See Ullom v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 112, 515 N.W.2d
615, 617 (Minn. App. 1994) (stating that courts cannot add to a statute what the legislature
purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks).
Respondents also argue in summary fashion that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Minnesota Constitution dictates t hat PCAs in the bargaining uni t should have the same
access to the list as any other employee organization or exclus ive representative.
Respondents made no such claim in their complaint. We therefore do not address the equal-
protection argument. See Roberge v. Cambridge Co-op Creamery Co. , 67 N.W.2d 400,
403 (Minn. 1954) (stating that a party is bound by that party’s pleadings unless other issues

11
are litigated by consent and that “relief cannot be based on is sues that are neither pleaded
nor voluntarily litigated”).
III. Because PCAs are designated, by the unambiguous language o f Minn. Stat.
§ 179A.54, subd. 2, as public employees, their personnel data i s subject to
disclosure and should have been provided to respondents upon request under
Minn. Stat. § 13.43.

The district court concluded that PCAs are public employees und er the MGDPA.
Appellants argue that this is error because PCAs are not public employees for purposes of
Minn. Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 2, and because section 13.43 “cann ot be used to circumvent
the directly applicable provisions of section 179A.54, subdivision 9.”
Section 179A.54, subd. 2, provides that, for purposes of PELRA, “individual
providers shall be considered . . . executive branch state empl oyees employed by the
commissioner of management and budget or the commissioner’s rep resentative.” Minn.
Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 2. The statute expressly provides that “[t]his section does not
require the treatment of individual pr oviders as public employees for any other purpose”
and that providers “are not state employees for purposes of section 3.736,” relating to tort
claims. Id. (emphasis added); see Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 1 (2018) (providing that the
state will pay compensation for injury to or loss of property o r personal injury or death
caused by an act or omission of an employee of the state while acting within the scope of
office or employment or a peace officer who is not acting on behalf of a private employee
and who is acting in good faith).
Section 179A.54, subdivision 2, unambiguously provides that PCA s are executive
branch employees under PELRA, but “does not require” the treatment of individual PCAs

12
as public employees for any other purpose. The statute express ly prohibits treatment of
PCAs as public employees in the context of tort claims.6
The MGDPA applies to all govern ment entities and “regulates the collection,
creation, storage, maintenance, dissemination, and access to go vernment data in
government entities.” Minn. Stat. § 13.01, subds. 1, 3 (2018). A government entity is “a
state agency, statewide system , or political subdivision.” Min n. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 7a
(2018). There is no dispute that DHS, MMB, and BMS are state a gencies. The MGDPA
“establishes a presumption that government data are public and are accessible by the public
for both inspection and copying unless there is federal law, a state statute, or a temporary
classification of data that provi des that certain data are not public.” Minn. Stat. § 13.01,
subd. 3. The purpose of the MGDPA is to balance the rights of data subjects from having
information indiscriminately disclosed with the right of the pu blic to know what the
government is doing. Demers v. City of Minneapolis, 468 N.W.2d 71, 72 (Minn. 1991).
The MGDPA differentiates between “data on individuals” and “dat a not on
individuals.” Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subds. 4, 5 (2018). An “individual” under the MGDPA
is “a natural person.” Id., subd. 8 (2018). Here, PCAs are “individuals” as defined in t he
statute.

6 The statute also provides that “[n]otwithstanding section 179A .03, subdivision 14,
paragraph (a), clause (5), chapter 179A shall apply to individu al providers regardless of
part-time or full-time employmen t status.” Minn. Stat. § 179A. 54, subd. 2. Section
179A.03, subd. 14(a)(5), provides that public employees are per sons appointed or
employed by a public employer except part-time employees whose service does not exceed
the lesser of 14 hours per week or 35 percent of the normal wor k week in the employee’s
appropriate unit. Minn. Stat. § 179A.03, subd. 14(a)(5).

13
“After the initial classificati on as either data on individuals or not on individuals,
the data is categorized as either public, private, or confident ial.” Int’l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local No. 292 v. City of St. Cloud, 765 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Minn. 2009). Public data
on individuals is generally accessible to the public. Id. “Private data is data which is made
not public by statute or federal law, but is accessible to the subject of the data.” Id. (citing
Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 12).7 “All data is presumed to be public unless it is classified as
private or confidential.” Id.
Under the MGDPA, personnel data on employees is public. Section 13.43 broadly
allows for the release of pers onnel data of employees, independ ent contractors, and
volunteers. Minn. Stat. § 13.43, s ubd. 2(a). Personnel data i s “government data on
individuals maintained because th e individual is or was an empl oyee or an applicant for
employment by, performs services on a voluntary basis for, or a cts as an independent
contractor with a government entity.” Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 1. With some exceptions
not relevant here, the following personnel data on current and former employees,
volunteers, and independent contractors of a government entity is public:
(1) name; employee identification number, which
must not be the employee’s Social Security number; actual
gross salary; salary range; terms and conditions of employment
relationship; contract fees; actual gross pension; the value and
nature of employer paid fringe benefits; and the basis for and
the amount of any added remuneration, including expense
reimbursement, in addition to salary;

7 “Confidential data is data made not public by statute or federal law applicable to the data
and is not accessible to the indi vidual subject of that data.” Id. (quotation omitted); see
Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 3 (2018).

14
(2) job title and bargaining unit; job description;
education and training background; and previous work
experience;
(3) date of first and last employment; . . .
(7) work location; a work telephone number; badge
number; work-related continui ng education; and honors and
awards received.

Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 2(a). “All other personnel data is private data on individuals but
may be released pursuant to a court order.” Id., subd. 4.
The “does not require” language in section 179A.54, subd. 2, le aves open the
possibility that PCAs may be regarded as public employees in contexts other than PELRA.
The statute expressly excludes the treatment of PCAs as public employees in some
contexts, but it did not do so for purposes of the MGDPA. See Nelson v. Schlener , 859
N.W.2d 288, 294 (Minn. 2015) (explaining that when the legislat ure uses different words
in a statute, we normally presume that those words have differe nt meanings); see also In
re Stadsvold , 754 N.W.2d 323, 328-29 (Minn. 2 008) (“[D]istinctions in [stat utory]
language in the same context are presumed to be intentional, an d we apply the language
consistent with that intent.”). The language used by the legis lature concerning section
3.736 evidences the legislature’s ability to specifically identify contexts in which PCAs are
not to be considered state employees. It used no such language concerning the MGDPA.
Minn. Stat. § 179A.54 and the MGDPA provisions are not irreconc ilable concerning
whether PCAs are public employees.
Here, PCAs—who are paid workers statutorily defined as employee s o f a s t a t e
agency for certain purposes—are public employees under the MGDPA. We agree with the
district court that, “there is no legislation limiting what type of employee is covered by the

15
MGDPA.” Accordingly, we also agree with the district court’s c onclusion that “[t]he
legislature specifically made [P CAs] public employees” and ther efore, “the PCAs in the
bargaining unit are state employees as contemplated by the MGDP A and . . . the PCAs’
contact information is public data.”
Appellants argue that individual PCAs cannot be public employees because the data
at issue is DHS data and DHS is not the employer of PCAs even f or the limited purposes
of collective bargaining. But the data is maintained by DHS because PCAs are employees
of a government entity. PCAs are subject to PELRA, and data is collected under Minn.
Stat. § 256B.0711, subd. 4(f), pr ecisely because PCAs are publi c employees. See Minn.
Stat. § 179A.54, subd. 2 (stating “[f]or the purposes of [PELRA], . . . individual providers
shall be considered . . . executiv e branch state employees”). Because we conclude that
PCAs are public employees for purposes of the MGDPA, their personnel data is subject to
disclosure.
It is undisputed that DHS has an obligation to maintain a curre nt list of PCAs
covered under the current collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) with SEIU under section
256B.0711, subdivision 4(f). That list contains the “names and addresses of all individual
providers who have been paid for providing direct support servi ces to participants within
the previous six months.” Minn. Stat. § 256B.0711, subd. 4(f). Reading section
256B.0711 and section 179A.54, s ubd. 2, together, it is apparen t that the section-
256B.0711 list is maintained b ecause, under Minn. Stat. § 179A. 54, subd. 2, PCAs, “for
the purposes of [PELRA],” are c onsidered “executive branch stat e employees employed
by the commissioner of management and budget or the commissioner’s representative.” It

16
seems to us that DHS, MMB, and BMS obtained the data on PCAs be cause PCAs are
public employees.
Therefore, the data that respondents requested is subject to di sclosure under the
MGDPA, specifically Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 2. That the data may have been combined
with other data not subject to disclosure should not preclude r espondents from obtaining
the data that is public under section 13.43, subd. 2(a). We ex plained in a related decision
that “DHS was and is the entity w ithin state government with th e statutory obligation to
‘compile and maintain’ a list of eligible voters,” and that mistakes made with respect to the
list “impeded [respondents’] atte mpts to garner support for the ir decertification effort
before the applicable s tatutory deadline.” In re Decertification of an Exclusive
Representative for Certain Employees of the State, 2018 WL 414363, at *7. We also noted
there, “[w]e trust that, now that a list has been compiled, DHS will continue to maintain it
in a manner that ensures that any future requests will be satisfied promptly.” Id.
Appellants also argue that they were not required to provide th e list under section
179A.54, because “disclosure of th e participants’ names and add resses was expressly
prohibited.” But Minn. Stat. § 256B.0711, subd. 4(f), clearly provides that the list “shall
not include access to private data on participants or participa nts’ representatives.”
Although some PCAs provide servi ces in their home to participan ts who are family
members, it does not appear from the record that this is true for all PCAs. And we see no
statutory basis for withholding the publicly available data concerning this group of public
employees based on the fact that some of those public employees reside with recipients of

17
PCA services. The data at issue here included names, addresses , and telephone numbers
of PCAs—nothing about that data identifies a participant.
We agree with the district court that “the accurate data relating to the PCAs as state
employees should have been promptly provided to [respondents] u pon request to either
MMB or DHS.” Appellants failed to provide the current public data respondents requested
in a timely manner, and therefore violated the MGDPA.
IV. The district court did not err by entering judgment against M M B b e c a u s e
PCAs are considered MMB employees under section 179A.54.

Appellants also argue that the district court erred by entering judgment against
MMB because MMB does not “possess” the requested data. But as discussed, PCAs are
considered employees of the commissioner of MMB, or the commissioner’s representative,
“[f]or the purposes of [PELRA] under chapter 179A.” Minn. Stat . § 179A.54, subd. 2.
And here, MMB had the data respondents sought, because the PCAs are public employees
and MMB is the state agency charged with managing Minnesota’s state finances, payroll,
and human resources and provides systems for business operations and information access
and analysis, including negotia tions and administration of coll ective bargaining
agreements with unions represent ing state employee bargaining u nits. The district court
did not err by entering judgment against MMB.
V. Respondents were not require d to join all PCAs and SEIU in this action.
Finally, appellants argue that the district court erred by ente ring judgment against
appellants under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Minn. S tat. §§ 555.01-.16
(2018), declaring that respondent s are entitled to the name, ho me address, and personal

18
telephone number of a pproximately 27,000 personal care PCAs rep resented by SEIU.
Appellants argue that respondent s should first have joined all of the PCAs and SEIU as
parties.
As discussed, we review the interpretation of statutes and procedural rules de novo.
Cruz-Guzman v. State , 916 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn. 2018) (citing Contractors Edge Inc. v.
City of Mankato , 863 N.W.2d 765, 768 (Minn. 2015)). A declaratory judgment is a
procedural device through which a party’s existing legal rights may be vindicated so long
as a justiciable controversy exists. Id. The Minnesota Declaratory Judgment Act further
provides that “no declaration shall prejudice the rights of per s o n s n o t p a r t i e s t o t h e
proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 555.11. The Act authorizes courts to declare rights, status, and
other legal relations that are affected by a statute, ordinance, contract or franchise. Minn.
Stat. §§ 555.01, .02; Conseco Loan Fin. Co. v. Boswell, 687 N.W.2d 646, 651 (Minn. App.
2004), review denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2005).
The rules of civil procedure supplement the language of Minn. Stat. § 555.11, which
provides that when declaratory relief is sought, “all persons shall be made parties who have
or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaratio n.” Minn. Stat. § 555.11;
Unbank Co. v. Merwin Drug Co., 677 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Minn. App. 2004). This joinder
requirement under section 555.11 is broader than the joinder requirement in Minn. R. Civ.
P. 19.01, which requires a person shall be joined as a party in the action if:
(a) in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (b) the person claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situat ed
that the disposition of the action in the person’s absence may
(1) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability

19
to protect that interest or (2) leave any one already a party
subject to that substantial risk or incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obliga tions by reason of the person’s
claimed interest.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01; Unbank Co., 677 N.W.2d at 108.
Although appellants assert that individual PCAs have an interest in their information
and that SEIU also has an interest in how information about the individuals they represent
is treated, appellants provided t he district court with no spec ific information concerning
how those rights will be affected by making available to respon dents information that is
publicly available concerning pub l i c e m p l o y e e s . R e s p o n d e n t s o nly sought relief from
appellants. And the requested data was subject to the MGDPA, was data the agencies held,
and was public data under the plain language of the MGDPA. Leaving aside the question
of how respondents could possibly have joined as parties PCAs w hose identity was
unknown to them, appellants provide no authority for the notion that a MGDPA request
for data must include notificati on—much less afford party statu s—to the subject of the
publicly available information. We are aware of no such authority.
It may well be, as appellants suggest, that the precise questio n posed by this
protracted litigation was not specifically contemplated by the legislature when it enacted
section 179A.54, making PCAs pub lic employees. But when it ena cted the law, the
legislature did not exempt PCAs from the MGDPA provision genera lly providing that
certain data about public employees is public information. We apply here the plain
language of the statutes.

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In sum, the district court correctly determined that the data s ought by respondents
is subject to disclosure under Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 2. P CAs are public employees.
Therefore, the MGDPA applies to them. We see no error in the d istrict court’s entry of
judgment against MMB, and we agree with the district court that respondents were not
required to join all PCAs and SEIU in this action.
Affirmed.