A. L. G., Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1982

A. L. G.,
Relator,

vs.

Minnesota Department of Health,
Respondent.

Filed August 5, 2019
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Minnesota Department of Health
File No. 1426540

Alexander H. De Marco, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lindsay K. Strauss, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Relator A.L.G. challenges a decision of respondent Minnesota Department of
Health (MDH) permanently disqualifying her from providing direct -contact services for
state-licensed facilities. She argues that, because the Minnesota Board of Nursing (the

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board) agreed to reinstate her nursing license upon her completion of specified terms and
conditions, the state is estopped from disqualifying her. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2005, the St. Pe ter Police Department was notified that relator, a
registered nurse at St. Peter Regional Treatment Center, was allegedly having a sexual
relationship with a “mentally ill and dangerous” patient, R.E.V., in the facility. Officers
interviewed relator about the allegations, and she admitted to engaging in sexual acts with
R.E.V. She acknowledged that she wanted to be involved in a relationship with R.E.V.
and knew, as a professional, that it was prohibited. The state charged relator with two
counts of third -degree criminal sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(h)
(2004).
The board was notified of the criminal allegations , and, ultimately, found relator
“culpable for substantiated serious and re curring maltreatment under the Reporting of
Maltreatment of Vulnerable Adults Act.” In early 2006, relator and the board entered into
a written stipulation. 1 Pursuant to the stipulation, relator agreed to cease the practice of
nursing pending the resolution of the criminal matter.
In January 2008, relator pleaded guilty to fourth -degree criminal sexual conduct.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(h) (2004). The district court stayed imposition of
sentence and placed relator on probation for up to seven years. Conditions of probation

1 We note that, although the record contains an unsigned copy of the 2006 stipulation,
relator concedes that she entered into the stipulation with the board, and, therefore, we
consider the stipulation to be a valid agreement between the parties.

3
included completion of adult -sex-offender treatment. On December 4, 2008, the board
adopted a stipulation-and-consent order suspending relator’s license to practice nursing. 2
On July 22, 2010, relator completed sex -offender-treatment programming. After
having successfully satisfied all conditions of probation, she was discharged from
probation on September 9, 2011, and the level of the fourth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct
offense was reduced to a misdemeanor. Relator’s probation-discharge report noted that
relator had “remained law abiding and ha[d] not had any violations of her probation.”
In a letter accompanying relator’s sex -offender-treatment-completion report,
relator’s psychologist wrote to the board that relator did “NOT represent a threat to the
community,” and “recommend[ed] that her license be reinstated.” (Emphasis in original.)
Similarly, in another letter to the board, re lator’s probation officer wrote that relator had
“taken full responsibility for her c hoices and behavior .” Relator petitioned the board to
reinstate her nursing license.
In October 2012, the board rescinded the 2008 stipulation -and-consent order, and
executed a new order reinstating relator’s nursing license subject to limitations and
conditions. The 2012 stipulation-and-consent order provided:
a. [Relator] must be supervised by a registered nurse who
works the same shift during which [relator] works and who
has responsibility for overseeing [relator’s] activities.

2 While publicly available, the 2008 stipulation-and-consent order is not part of the record
nor was it submitted to or reviewed by MDH as part of relator’s request for reconsideration.
We, therefore, decline to consider it in our decision. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580,
582-83 (Minn. 1988) (“An appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the
record on appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence
below.”).

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b. [Relator] may not function as a charge nurse or perform the
administrative and supervisory tasks of a charge nurse.
c. [Relator] may not work in the home care setting, group
homes, assisted -living facilities or throug h temporary
placement agencies.

Additionally, the order provided that, “upon completion of 2000 hours of employment as
a registered or practical nurse,” the limitations upon relator’s license “shall be
administratively removed.” The order also required t he periodic submission of various
progress reports, and outlined consequences for noncompliance with the order’s terms and
conditions.
In the summer of 2018, the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS)
notified relator and relator’s employer, a state-licensed clinic, that relator was disqualified,
by statute, from holding her position at the clinic. The letter ordered relator’s immediate
removal. The letter to relator informed her that the clinic had submitted a background
study request for her, and that the results of the background study showed that r elator’s
fourth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction “disqualifie[d] [her] from any position
allowing direct contact with, or access to, persons receiving services from programs
licensed by [DHS] and [MDH].” See Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.03, subd. 1, .14, subd. 1(a), .15,
subd. 1(a) (2018). The letter to relator stated that, based on the following statutory factors,
she was considered to “pose an imminent risk of harm to persons” receiving the
aforementioned services: “(1) [t] he vulnerability of the victim involved in [the]
disqualifying characteristic;” and “(2) [relator] ha[d] a disqualifying characteristic which
may not be set aside regardless of how much time ha [d] passed.” See Minn.
Stat. § 245C.16, subd. 1 (2018).

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The letter to relator stated that, pursuant to statute, the disqualifying conviction of
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct prohibited DHS “from setting aside [her]
disqualification, regardless of how much time ha[d] passed,” and “from granting a variance
to a disqualification.” See Minn. Stat. § 245C.15, subd. 1(a). The letter explained that, “if
[relator] believe[d] that the information used to disqualify [her] [wa s] incorrect, [she]
[could] ask for reconsideration of [th e] disqualification.” See Minn. Stat. § 245C.21
(2018).
Relator submitted a request to DHS to reconsider her disqualification. In her request
for reconsideration, relator stated that “some of the information [was] incorrect,” that “the
notice of disqualification [was] untimely,” that she was “licensed with restrictions,” and
that she was not a danger to society or her patients. Relator asked that, if her
reconsideration was not granted, that she receive a hearing with an administrative judge to
rule on the matter.
In October 2018, MDH affirmed relator’s disqualification. MDH informed relator
that it “determined that the informa tion used to disqualify [her] [was ] correct,” that “the
commissioner may not set aside [the] disqualification,” and that “the commissioner ha[d]
no authority to grant a variance relating to [the] disqualification.” This certiorari appeal
follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The board’s 2012 stipulation-and-consent order did not constitute a
misrepresentation made on behalf of the state.

Relator argues that the board’s 2012 stipulation-and-consent order, reinstating her
nursing licenses, constituted a misrepresentation made on behalf of the state t hat,
consequently, equitably est ops MDH from disqualifying her under the Department of
Human Services Background Studies Act ( Background Studies Act ), Minn.
Stat. §§ 245C.01-.34 (2018).
A. Background Studies Act

The Background Studies Act requires the commissioner of human services (the
DHS-commissioner) to conduct a background study on current or prospective workers
providing direct -contact care to persons at facilities licensed by MDH or DHS. Minn.
Stat. §§ 144.057, subd. 1 (2018), 245C.03, subd . 1(a)(3). If the subject of the study has
been convicted of a crime listed in section 245C.15, the DHS -commissioner must
disqualify the individual from direct-contact work. Minn. Stat. § 245C.14, subd. 1(a)(1).
The list of disqualifying crimes includes fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct—a
crime, pursuant to section 245C.15, subd. 1(a), that constitutes a permanent
disqualification. The Background Studies Act gives the DHS-commissioner discretion to
“set aside” certain disqualifications if the commissioner finds that “the individual does not
pose a risk of harm.” Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4. However, the statute prohibits the
DHS-commissioner from setting aside the disqualification, “regardless of how much time
has passed, if the individual was d isqualified for a crime or conduct listed in section

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245C.15, subdivision 1.” Minn. Stat. § 245C.24, subd. 2(a). 3 Likewise, the DHS -
commissioner is prohibited from granting a variance for a disqualification that resulted
from a person’s commission of a p ermanently disqualifying offense. Minn.
Stat. § 245C.30, subd. 1(a).
If the individual believes that the information used by the DHS -commissioner is
incorrect, the individual may seek reconsideration. Minn. Stat. § 245C.21, subd. 3. “The
individual must submit the request for reconsideration to the commissioner in writing.”
Id., subd. 1. The commissioner of health (the MDH -commissioner) “shall review and
decide reconsideration requests.” Minn. Stat. § 144.057, subd. 3 (2018). The MDH-
commissioner’s decision is , generally, the final administrative agency action. Id. An
individual disqualified based on a conviction listed in section 245C.15, subdivision 1, is
not entitled to an agency hearing on the matter. Minn. Stat. § 245C.27, subd. 1(c). If the
individual is not satisfied with the MDH-commissioner’s final decision, the individual may
seek further review by certiorari appeal. 4 See Minn. Stat. §§ 480A.06, subd. 3, 606.06
(2018); see Rodne v. Comm’r of Human Servs., 547 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Minn. App. 1996).

3 Subdivision 2(b) provides a limited statutory exception to subdivision 2(a)—an exception
that does not apply here. See Minn. Stat. § 245C.24, subd. 2(b).
4 In her appellate brief, relator indicates some confusion over why she received
communications regarding her disqualification from both DHS and MDH. Minn.
Stat. § 144.057, subd. 1 , provides that the MDH -commissioner shall contract with the
DHS-commissioner to conduct the respective background studies. Minn. Stat. § 144.057,
subd. 2 (2018), explains that, if an individual is disqualified, DHS shall notify the facility
and the individual, and shall inform the individual of the right to request reconsideration
by submitting the request to MDH. Subdivision 3 provides that the MDH -commissioner
is responsible for reviewing and deciding reconsideration requests.

8
Because there was no contested -case hearing in this matter, relator’s certiorari
appeal is not subject to the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), Minn.
Stat. §§ 14.001-.69 (2018).5 See Rodne, 547 N.W.2d at 444. On certiorari appeal from a
quasi-judicial-agency decision not subject to MAPA:
[W]e examine the record to review questions affecting the
jurisdiction of the agency, the regularity of its proceedings,
and, as to the merits of the controversy, whether the orde r or
determination in a particular case was arbitrary, oppressive,
unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or
without any evidence to support it.

Anderson v. Comm’r of Health , 811 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2012) . An agency decision is arbitrary and
capricious if the commissioner:
(a) relied on factors not intended by the legislature; (b) entirely
failed to consider an impor tant aspect of the problem;
(c) offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence; or
(d) the decision is so implausible that it could not be explained
as a difference in view or the result of the agency’s expertise.

Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817,
832 (Minn. 2006). “Because we must afford deference to the agency’s decision, our review
of the Commission’s decision is guided by the principle that the agency’s conclusions are
not arbitrary and capricious so long as a rational connection between th e facts found and
the choice made has been articulated.” In re Review of 2005 Annual Automatic Adjustment
of Charges, 768 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). “This court reviews

5 A contested case is defined by MAPA as “a proceeding before an agency in which the
legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional
right to be determined after an agency hearing.” Minn. Stat. § 14.02, subd. 3.

9
questions of law, including interpretation of a statute, de novo.” Smith v. Minn. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 764 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. App. 2009).
B. Equitable Estoppel
A party seeking to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the government
must prove five elements: “(1) that the government made a misrepresentation of material
fact; (2) that the government knew the misrepresentation was false; (3) that the government
intended that its representation be acted upon; (4) that the other party did not kno w the
facts; and (5) that the other party relied on the government’s misrepresentation to their
detriment.” AAA Striping Servs. Co. v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp. , 681 N.W.2d 706, 720
(Minn. App. 2004).
The party seeking to invoke the doctrine has a high burd en to meet. See id.
(“Equitable estoppel should be applied sparingly against the government and only if the
wrongful conduct threatens to work a serious injustice.”). “Affirmative misconduct, rather
than simple inadvertence, mistake, or imperfect conduct is required for estoppel to be
applied against the government.” REM-Canby, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs. , 494
N.W.2d 71, 74 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 25, 1993).
Relator argues that the board’s 2012 stipulation-and-consent order “created an
equitable estoppel type circumstance whereby the [s]tate made representations to her that
it ultimately revoked despite her compliance.” Without articulating a legal basis to support
her claims, s he contends that the order with the board, a state entity, equitably estopped
MDH, another state entity, from permanently disqualifying her under section 245C.15,
subd. 1(a). We are not persuaded.

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The board’s 2012 stipulation-and-consent order did not constitute a
misrepresentation of relator’s obligations related to the reinstatement of her nursing
license. Pursuant to state law, a license issued and governed by the board is a separate and
statutorily distinct license from one issued by the DHS-commissioner.
1. Board-issued licenses
As expressly stated in relator’s 2012 stipulation-and-consent order, the board “is
authorized pursuant to Minnesota Statutes sections 148.171 to 148.285 to license and
regulate r egistered and licensed practical nurses and to take disciplinary action as
appropriate.” The order provided that relator held “licenses from the [b]oard to practice
professional and practical nursing in the State of Minnesota ,” and she was “subject to the
jurisdiction of the [b]oard with respect to the matters referred to in this [order].”
A licensed practical nurse is defined by the Minnesota Nurse Practice Act (Nurse
Practice Act), Minn. Stat. §§ 148.171-.285 (2018), as “an individual licensed by the board
to practice practical nursing.” Minn. Stat. § 148.171, subd. 8. A registered nurse is defined
as “an individual licensed by the board to practice professional nursing.” Id., subd. 20.
Definitions of the “practice of practical nursing” and the “practice of professional nursing”
are provided for in the Nurse Practice Act. See id., subds. 14, 15.
Section 148.261 of the Nurse Practice Act authorizes the board to take disciplinary
action pertaining to board -issued licenses. Subdivision 1 provides that “[t]he board may
deny, revoke, suspend, limit, or condition the license and registration of any person to
practice advanced practice, professional, or practical nursing under sections 148.171 to
148.285.” Minn. Stat. § 148.261, subd. 1. As stated in the board’s 2012 order, relator

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acknowledged that her criminal conduct “constitute[d] a violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 148.261, subdivision 1(3), (6), (9), (11), (12), and (18), and justifie[d] the
disciplinary action” taken by the board. While the board’s authority to take disciplinary
action affecting relator’s nursing licenses is governed by the Nurse Practice Act, the
authority of DHS and MDH to disqualify relator from holding certain nursing positions is
governed by the Background Studies Act.
2. DHS-issued licenses
As provided in the Background Studies Act, a license, as used in the context of the
act, is a “certificate issued by the commissioner [of human services] authorizing the license
holder6 to provide a specified program for a specified period of time and in accordance
with the terms of the license and the rules of the commissioner.” Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.02,
subds. 7, 12, 245A.02, subd. 8 (2018). The disqualification provision of the act pr ovides
that the DHS -commissioner “shall disqualify an individual who is the subject of a
background study from any position allowing direct contact with persons receiving services
from” state-licensed programs if the individual has been convicted of a disqualifying crime.

6 License holder is defined as “an individual , corporation, partnership, voluntary
association, or other organization that is legally responsible for the operation of the
program, has been granted a license by the commissioner under this chapter or chapter
245D and the rules of the commissioner, and is a controlling individual.” Minn.
Stat. § 245A.02, subd. 9 (2018).

Section 245D.02 further differentiates “license holder” from a “lic ensed health
professional.” Minn. Stat. § 245D.02, subds. 14, 15 (2018). The latter is defined as “a
person licensed in Minnesota to practice those professions described in section 214.01,
subdivision 2,” which includes professions licensed by the board. Id., subd. 14; see Minn.
Stat. § 214.01, subd. 2 (2018).

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Minn. Stat. § 245C.14, subd. 1(a)(1) (emphasis added). Relator does not dispute that she
was convicted of fourth -degree criminal sexual conduct which , pursuant to section
245C.15, constitutes a permanent disqualification. See Minn. Stat. § 245C.15, subd. 1(a).
3. Board’s 2012 stipulation-and-consent order
The board’s 2012 order reinstating relator’s licenses to practice practical and
professional nursing, and providing that the limitations and conditions on her licenses
would be administratively removed upon the completion of 2000 hours of employment as
a registered or practical nurse, is not a misrepresentation. The order does not state that,
upon the fulfillment of the specified requirements, relator “could later return to full and
unconditional license status” —as relator contends. Rather, the stipulation-and-consent
order provides that the limitations and conditions, as specified in the agreement, would be
administratively removed.
The board’s order specifically concerns relator’s board -issued licenses to practice
practical and professional nursing. The order does not concern, nor does it make any
mention of, relator’s ability to hold a direct -care positio n in a state -licensed facility.
Indeed, at oral argument before us, relator’s counsel conceded that there is no evidence in
the record that the board told relator she would be able to practice again at a state-licensed
facility.
“[R]elator is not disqualified from working in every position in [her] profession;
[she] is only disqualified from working in state -regulated facilities.” Sweet v. Comm’r of
Human Servs., 702 N.W.2d 314, 320 (Minn. App. 2005) , review denied (Minn. Nov. 15,
2005). While we acknowledge that relator’s employment options may be limited as a result

13
of her disqualifying conviction, the law governing direct -contact care in state -licensed
facilities is clear. Where, as here, the intention of the legislature is clear from the statutory
language, resolution of relator’s concerns is outside the province of the courts. See State
Campaign Fin. & Pub. Disclosure Bd. v. Minn. Democratic Farmer Labor Party , 671
N.W.2d 894, 899 (Minn. App. 2003).
Because relator has failed to establish the first element of an equitable estoppel
claim, her contention that MDH was equitably estopped from disqualifying her is without
any legal merit.7
II. MDH’s disqualification decision did not violate relator’s due-process rights.

Although somewhat difficult to decipher, the heart of relator’s certiorari appeal
appears to focus on whether the disqualification decision violates her due -process rights.
She contends that her due -process rights were violated, at least in pa rt, because she was
denied an administrative hearing following MDH’s decision affirming her

7 At oral argument before us, relator’s counsel alluded to an order for indefinite continuance
issued in 2006 by an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the DHS. Relator’s counsel alleged
that the ALJ ordered that an administrative hearing be continued until after relator’s
criminal proceedings were resolved. According to relator’s counsel, the administrative file
was never reopened and relator was never provided an administrative hearing despite her
compliance with all court and board -ordered conditions. Relator’s counsel alleged that
relator complied with all conditions under a n honest and good-faith belief that, upon
completion of the conditions, she would be able to practice again in a state-licensed facility.
Relator’s counsel argued that, following the resolution of relator’s criminal charges, the
ALJ should have revisited the order for indefinite continuance and provided relator with
the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.

Relator’s counsel conceded that the 2006 order is not part of the record, and relator did not
move to supplement the record under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.05. Consequently, we
decline to consider the order for indefinite continuance in this appeal. See Thiele, 425
N.W.2d at 582-83.

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disqualification.8 “This court reviews the procedural due process afforded a party de
novo.” Staeheli v. City of St. Paul, 732 N.W.2d 298, 304 (Minn. App. 2007).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that a person may not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. The due process afforded by the Minnesota Constitution
is identical to the due process guaranteed under the United States Constitution. Sartori v.
Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn. 1988).
“Procedural due process imposes constraints on gover nmental decisions which
deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S.
319, 332, 96 S. Ct. 893, 901 (1976). Procedural due -process protections include
“reasonable notice, a timely opportunity for a hearing, the right to be represented by
counsel, an opportunity to present evidence and argument, the right to an impartial
decisionmaker, and the right to a reasonable decision based sole ly on the record.”
Humenansky v. Minn. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs , 525 N.W.2d 559, 565 (Minn. App. 1994) ,
review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995) . However, not every protectable interest requires a
hearing. Id.

8 It appears that relator’s overarching argument on appeal is that her due -process rights
were violated because (1) the state, through the board’s 2012 reinstatement order,
“misrepresented to her, consciously or not, what she must do and can lawfully do ” and
(2) she was denied an administrative hearing following MDH’s decision affirming her
disqualification. Because we address relator’s misrepresentation argument in the
preceding section, the following analysis addresses whe ther the absence of an
administrative hearing in this matter violated her procedural due-process rights.

15
We analyze an individual’s procedural due -process cl aim by determining , first,
whether a protected interest is at stake, and, second, what process is due to that interest.
Sweet, 702 N.W.2d at 319. There is no dispute that relator has a constitutionally protected
interest in holding a direct -care position in a state -licensed facility. See Anderson, 811
N.W.2d at 167 (“[A] nurse has a protected property interest in holding direct-care positions
in state-licensed facilities.”); Obara v. Minn. Dep’t of Health, 758 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Minn.
App. 2008) (holding that relator had a protected property interest in pursuing nursing career
in MDH-licensed facility); see also Fosselman v. Comm’r of Human Servs. , 612 N.W.2d
456, 461 (Minn. App. 2000) (“[D]isqualification proceedings are subject to the
requirements of procedural due process.”).
Next, to determine what process is due to relator’s protected interest, we balance the
three factors articulated in Mathews:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguar ds; and
finally, the Government’ s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903.
Although relator’s procedural due -process argument is slim, her argument appears
to be that the lack of an administrative hearing deprived her of adequate process to protect
her interest as a direct -care nurse in a state -licensed facility. In support of her argument
that her due-process rights were violated, relator cites to our decision in Fosselman, which

16
held that the DHS-commissioner’s “failure to grant relators a state agency hearing deprived
them of due process.” 612 N.W.2d at 467.
While we hold, consistent with caselaw, that relator has a constitutionally protected
interest in pursuing employment as a direct -care nurse in a state -licensed facility, we
conclude that relator’s due-process rights in protecting that interest were not violated. With
regard to the first Mathews factor—relator’s private interest that will be affected by the
disqualification—the state concedes that it favors relator. See Sweet, 702 N.W.2d at 3 20
(“Employment in an individual’s chosen field is significant a nd weighs heavily in the
individual’s favor.”); Fosselman, 612 N.W.2d at 462 (holding that, because
disqualification precluded relators from working in their chosen field, the first Mathews
factor weighed heavily in relators’ favor). However, as this cour t has stated before, “the
concept of procedural due process is flexible” and “an individual’s interest in working in a
chosen profession is not absolute.” Sweet, 702 N.W.2d at 320.
The second factor —which “considers the procedures used by the governmental
agency, the potential risk of an erroneous decision, and the probable value of an oral
hearing”—weighs in the state’s favor. Id. at 321. Contrary to relator’s position, caselaw
establishes that she was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and the process afforded to
her was constitutionally sufficient. In Obara, for example, the relator had been disqualified
from pursuing his career as a nurse in a MDH -licensed facility after being convicted of
felony assault. 758 N.W.2d at 876-77. We held, “Because relator’s convictions required
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he was afforded due process of law incident to a
criminal proceeding.” Id. at 879. Accordingly, we concluded that “procedural due process

17
d[id] not require that DHS provide [the] relator an evidentiary hearing on his
disqualification.” Id.
In Sweet, another case involving the disqualification of an employee from a direct -
contact position in a state -licensed facility, we concluded that, because the relator’s
disqualification was b ased on convictions that were not in dispute, he had “already been
afforded the full panoply of rights in the criminal proceedings leading up to his
convictions.” 702 N.W.2d at 321. Consequently, we held that relator was not entitled to
an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 322.
Relator cites to Fosselman in support of her argument that she should have been
afforded a hearing. However, her reliance on Fosselman is misplaced. In Fosselman, we
concluded that the relators were entitled to an oral hearing because the evidence supporting
their disqualification was in dispute. 612 N.W.2d at 463. Unlike relator in this case, the
relators in Fosselman were disqualified based on alleged conduct that was never criminally
charged. Id. at 459. In both Obara and Sweet, we noted that Fosselman was
distinguishable based on these factual differences. Obara, 758 N.W.2d at 878; Sweet, 702
N.W.2d at 321. The second factor weighs in the state’s favor.
The third Mathews factor—which considers the government’s interest—also weighs
in favor of the state. As we have articulated before, “We have no difficulty in identifying
the state’s legitimate interest here —to safeguard patients in licensed health -care facilities
from assault—or in recognizing a reasonable relationship between this legitimate interest
and disqualifying those convicted of criminal sexual conduct from having direct access to
those patients.” Anderson, 811 N.W.2d at 167; see also Sweet, 702 N.W.2d at 321 (“[T]he

18
governmental interest in protecting the public, especially vulnerable individuals . . . is of
paramount importance.”).
Additionally, the government has an interest in conserving time and resources by
reconsidering disqualifications in an efficient manner. Sweet, 702 N.W.2d at 321. “If an
individual disqualified for criminal convictions were due an oral evidentiar y hearing, the
commissioner would need to hold one on the same issue every time the same individual
was hired or rehired by a state -licensed program.” Id. at 321 -22. While financial
considerations are not controlling, the government’s interest “in conser ving scarce fiscal
and administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348,
96 S. Ct. at 909. Because “the cost outweighs the limited benefit, if any, of providing an
evidentiary hearing,” the third factor weighs in the s tate’s favor. Sweet, 702 N.W.2d at
322; see also Obara, 758 N.W.2d at 879.
In sum, we conclude that MDH’s disqualification decision “was not arbitrary,
unreasonable, oppressive, fraudulent, made under an error of law, or unsupported by the
evidence.” Smith, 764 N.W.2d at 392. While we are mindful of evidence demonstrating
that relator has taken significant steps to learn from her criminal conviction and show that
she does not pose a risk of harm to patients, the law governing direct-care positions in state-
licensed facilities is clear. Minnesota law expressly provides that, based on relator’s
conviction of fourth -degree criminal sexual conduct, she is permanently disqualified ,
regardless of how much time has passed, from working in a direct -contact position with
persons receiving services from DHS or MDH-licensed facilities. Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.14,
subd. 1(a)(1), .15, subd. 1(a). Relator has failed to show that the board’s 2012 stipulation-

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and-consent order constituted a misrepresentation, or that her due-process rights were
violated by MDH’s disqualification determination.
Affirmed.