Chad Domonique Johnson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1983

Chad Domonique Johnson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 26, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Reilly, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-16-1071

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chelsie M. Willett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Presiding Chief Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant argues that he is entitled to resentencing under the new sentencing grid
created by the Drug Sentencing Reform Act (the DSRA). Because appellant is entitled to

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resentencing in accordance with the DSRA, we reverse and remand for further proceedings
in accordance with this opinion.
FACTS
In June 2016, appellant Chad Domonique Johnson sold cocaine to a confidential
informant during a series of controlled drug buys. Officers discovered over 18 grams of
cocaine in appellant’s residence, and appellant admitted to a police investigator that he sold
cocaine to the informant. The state issued a seven-count complaint charging appellant with
one count of first -degree sale; one count of second -degree possession ; one count of
controlled substance sal e—no affixed stamps ; three counts of third -degree sale; and one
count of misdemeanor impaired driving. In December 2016, appellant entered a plea of
guilty to first -degree sale , controlled substance sale —no affixed stamps, and impaired
driving, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. In exchange for appellant’s plea, the state
dismissed the remaining charges and agreed to request a sentence at “the low end of the
[sentencing range], which is 94 months” for the first-degree-sale offense. The district court
adopted the terms of the plea agreement and imposed concurrent sentences of 94 months
for first-degree sale, 45 months for controlled substance sale—no affixed stamps, and 90
days for impaired driving. The remaining charges were dismissed.
In April 2018, appellant moved to correct his sentence from 94 months to 73 months
under the new sentencing grid created by the DSRA and in light of the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. 2017). Appellant argued that
he was entitled to an automatic correction of his sentence because his conviction was not
final when the new sentencin g guidelines went into effect on May 23, 2016, and his 94-

3
month sentence was not authorized by law at the time of sentencing. The district court
denied appellant ’s motion on the ground that “[a]lthough the ‘low end of the box’ is
referenced regarding the plea, all parties believed that term to be 94 months.” This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 229 (Minn. 1995). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines limit a
district court’s sentencing discretion by prescribing a sentencing range that is presumed to
be appropriate. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 3 03, 308 (Minn. 2014). Any sentence within
that range is a presumptive sentence under the guidelines. State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426,
428 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). The presumptive sentence
“is determined by the Sentencing Guidelines in effect on the date of the conviction
offense . . . to ensure that the Guidelines abide by the federal and state Ex Post Facto
Clauses.” Kirby, 899 N.W.2d at 493 (quotation omitted). Construction of the sentencing
guidelines is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. State v. Zeimet, 696
N.W.2d 791, 793 (Minn. 2005).
In May 2016 , the legislature enacted the DSRA and reduced the presumptive
sentencing range for a number of offenses, including appellant’s first-degree-sale offense.
2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § § 1-22, at 576-592; Minn. Sent Guidelines 4.C (Supp. 2018).
In Kirby, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the DSRA applie d to any defenda nt
whose conviction was not final at the time the DSRA went into effect on May 23, 2016.
899 N.W.2d at 487. Kirby held that the “amelioration doctrine requires the resentencing

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of a person whose conviction was not yet final on the effective date of section 18(b) of the
Drug Sentencing Reform Act.” Id. at 485. A defendant is entitled to resentencing under
the DSRA-amended sentencing grid “ only if: (1) the Legislature made no statement that
clearly establishes the Legislature’s intent to abrogate the amel ioration doctrine; (2) the
amendment mitigated punishment; and (3) final judgment had not been entered as of the
date the amendment took effect.” Id. at 490.
The three-part Kirby test is satisfied in this case. First, the legislature has not made
a state ment clearly establishing its “ intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine ” with
respect to the drug crimes for which appellant was sentenced. Id. Second, the amendment
mitigated appellant’s punishment. Id. at 495-96. Prior to enactment of the DSRA, the
presumptive sentencing range for first -degree sale for an individual with appellant’s
criminal-history score was 94 to 132 months . Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.C (2016). Under
the DSRA-amended sentencing guidelines grid, the presumptive range for appellant’s first-
degree-sale offense was 73 to 103 months. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.C (Supp. 2018).
Third, because the district court did not impose sentence until December 2016, appellant’s
conviction was not yet final when th e DSRA became effective in May 2016. 1 Kirby, 899
N.W.2d at 490. We therefore determine that appellant is entitled to resentencing in light
of the DSRA and Kirby.
Appellant urges this court to reduce his sentence from 94 to 73 months to reflect his
understanding that he would receive a bottom -of-the-box sentence in exchange for his

1 We note that the DSRA became effective in May 2016 —one month before appellant’s
offense date.

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guilty plea. We decline to do so. Appellant is correct that “the sentencing guidelines serve
as the anchor for a district court’s discretion at sentencing,” and “when a [g]uidelines range
moves up or down, offenders’ sentences tend to move with it.” State v. Provost , 901
N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted). However, as we have previously
recognized, “not every defendant who receives a sentence at the top or bottom end of the
presumptive range when sentenced [incorrectly] . . . need necessarily receive a similarly
situated sentence within the presumptive range” upon resentencing. Id. Instead, the district
court is in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence, taking into account the
parties’ understanding of the plea agreement, within the presumptive range of the DSRA–
amended sentencing grid on remand. See State v. Hough , 585 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn.
1998) (noting that the district court “is in t he best position to evaluate the offender’s
conduct and weigh sentencing options”). We reverse and remand to the district court for
resentencing consistent with the DSRA-amended sentencing grid.
Reversed and remanded.