State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1984

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Monroe Leshawn Harrell,
Appellant.

Filed October 21, 2019
Affirmed
Stauber, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-6256

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica M. Surges, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Stauber, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
STAUBER, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, appellant argues that the
district court erred by sentencing him to 78 months’ imprisonment because, although the
court intended to sentence him at the bottom of the sentencing-guidelines range (77
months), it imposed 78 months due to the simplicity of dividing that number by three.
Because the district court reviewed the sentencing information and considered other
factors, in addition to divisibility, in sentencing appellant within the presumptive range, we
affirm.
FACTS
In March 2018, the state charged appellant Monroe Leshawn Harrell with promoting
the prostitution of a person under 18 years of age in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.322,
subd. 1(a)(2) (2016) . At that time, app ellant had another pending charge for aggravated
robbery. The state offered appellant a plea deal, a 60 -month executed sentence and
dismissal of the robbery charge. He chose to enter a “straight plea,” and in August 2018,
he pleaded guilty to the promoting-prostitution charge.
The presumptive sentencing range for the offense was 77 to 108 months. The state
requested a 90-month sentence. Appellant requested probation, which was a dispositional
departure.
At sentencing, the victim gave a detailed statement on how appellant had negatively
impacted her life. The district court sentenced appellant to 78 months’ imprisonment. In
denying appellant’s request for a dispositional departure, the court discussed appellant’s

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juvenile record and treatment histor y, and concluded that appellant was not amenable to
probation. The court then stated as follows:
The presumptive range is 77 to [108] . . . months with
90 being sort of a presumptive number. I actually considered
going down to the [prior] offer in this c ase, and I may have
been able to justify that before I heard the victim impact today.
And before I found out about how young your first child [’s]
mother was when she got pregnant. And when I read how
involved your—even in your version of what happened wi th
this young girl.
And so . . . you are convicted of promoting prostitution
of an individual under the age of l8 years. You are
sentenced . . . for a period of 78 months. I go toward the
bottom not out of any disrespect to anyone, but because you
took responsibility and this young lady did not have to testify
in front of jurors who she didn’t know, and you did —and so
I’ve taken a year off of your commitment from the presumptive
down to the near bottom. And I picked that number because
it’s the first one divisible by three.

(Emphasis added.) This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N
Appellant challenges his sentence. He asserts that the district court abused its
discretion by sentencing him to 78 months, rather than 77 months, because the district
court’s justification that 78 is divisible by three is arbitrary. He requests a 77 -month
sentence. The state contends that the district court relied “upon several considerations,”
not just the divisibility of 78. The state argues that, in sentencing appellant near the bottom
of the presumptive range, the district court also considered that appellant took
responsibility for his actions, which relieved the need for the victim to testify.
We review a sentence imposed by the district court for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 229 (Minn. 1995). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines limit

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a district court’s sentencing discretion by prescribing a sentencing range that is presumed
to be appropriate. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014). Any number within
that range is a presumptive sentence under the guidelines. State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426,
428 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). Presumptive sentences are
seldom overturned, and we will reverse the imposition of a presumptive sentence only in
“rare” cases. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981); see also Delk, 781 N.W.2d
at 428 (“This court will generally not exercise its authority to modify a sentence within the
presumptive range absent compelling circumstances.” (quotation omitted)).
This court has previously stated that a district court is not required to explain its
reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence so long as it considers the proposed reasons
for departure, and we may not interfere wit h the district court ’s exercise of discretion so
long as “the record shows the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and
information presented before making a determination.” State v. Van Ruler , 378 N.W.2d
77, 80-81 (Minn. App. 1985); see State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App.
2013) (“[T]he district court is not required to explain its reasons for imposing a
presumptive sentence.”), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
Appellant fails to cite any caselaw indicating that ease of divisibility cannot be
considered in sentencing a defendant within the presumptive range. He points to the
nonexhaustive list of sentencing factors in the sentencing guidelines, such as the
defendant’s amenability to probation and the seriousness of th e crime, but these factors
relate to departures, not presumptive sentences. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3 (Supp.
2017).

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The record indicates that the district court carefully considered the information
available when sentencing appellant near the bottom of the presumptive sentencing range.
While the district court relied on the divisibility of the number 78, divisibility was not the
sole factor relied upon. The district court also considered the fact that appellant “ took
responsibility.”
The district court could have sentenced appellant to as few as 77 months, and as
many as 108 months, without the need to provide any justification. See Johnson, 831
N.W.2d at 925. Because the district court carefully considered the sentencing information
and r elied on factors, in addition to divisibility, in imposing a sentence within the
presumptive range, the court’s reliance on the divisibility of the sentencing number is not
an abuse of discretion or compelling circumstance requiring interference with the sentence
imposed. See Delk, 781 N.W.2d at 428
Affirmed.