State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1989

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jesse William Johnson,
Appellant.

Filed October 28, 2019
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CR-17-737

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brandi Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, Jeffrey D. Albright, Assistant County
Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for driving while impaired—
test refusal, appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

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evidence because the police officer impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop
by subjecting him to field sobriety testing. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises from appellant Jesse William Johnson ’s conviction for third -
degree driving while impaired—test refusal. On August 3, 2017, a deputy with the Meeker
County Sheriff’s Office was on patrol in the city of Cosmos. The deputy observed a pickup
truck with a non-functioning tail light and initiated a traffic stop of the truck.
The deputy’s body camera recorded the events following the traffic stop. The
deputy observed appellant exhibiting erratic behaviors and acting nervous. Specifically,
appellant was making “weird movements” inside of his truck and looking away. The
deputy characterized these nervous behaviors to be beyond those expected to occur during
a routine traffic stop.
From a distance of less than five fe et, the deputy saw that appellant’s pupils were
abnormally constricted. The deputy directed his flashlight into the truck, but moved the
light away from appellant’s face and confirmed that appellant’s pupils were still constricted
when the light was absent, suggesting to the deputy that appellant was under the influence
of a controlled substance. When the deputy asked appellant if he was under the influence
of a controlled substance, appellant denied being under the influence.
Because t he deputy’s observations led him to believe appellant was under the
influence of a controlled substance , he asked appellant to exit his truck to perform field
sobriety tests. Based on appellant’s performance during the field sobriety tests, the deputy
placed appellant under arrest for probable cause to believe appellant was driving under the

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influence. The deputy obtained a search warrant for appellant’s blood and explained to
appellant that refusal to submit to a blood test authorized by a warrant was a crime.
Appellant refused to submit to a blood test, but agreed to submit to a urine test. The deputy
then obtained a search warrant for both a blood and a urine test. The deputy asked appellant
if he would take the urine test. Appellant became belligerent and made derogatory
statements toward the deputy. Appellant refused to submit to either a blood or urine test.
Appellant moved the court to dismiss the third-degree test refusal charge and the
fourth-degree controlled substanc e driving -while-impaired charge , and to suppress
evidence obtained as part of an illegally expanded traffic stop. The district c ourt denied
appellant’s motion s. The state subsequent ly withdrew the fourth -degree controlled
substance driving-while-impaired charge. Following a court trial, the district court found
appellant guilty of third-degree driving while impaired—test refusal, and of a rear tail light
violation. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant challenges the district court’s de nial of his motion to suppress. When
reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court reviews the
district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State
v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). A factual finding “is not clearly erroneous
if it is reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d
356, 366 (Minn. 2016).
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. Con st. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Warrantless searches are

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generally per se unreasonable. State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
Moreover, the “[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by
the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’
of ‘persons’ within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment].” Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996) (citations omitted).
If an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer
has an objective basis for stopping a vehicle. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn.
1997). Furthermore, an officer may expand a traffic stop if the incremental intrusion is
tied to and justified by “(1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent
probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” State v. Askerooth , 681
N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004). Reasonable, articulable suspicion requires that the officer
identify “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 1880 (1968). The reasonable, articulable sus picion standard is satisfied when an
officer observes conduct that leads him to reasonably conclude, based on his experience,
that “criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn.
2008) (quoting In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. 1997)). Evidence must
be suppressed if it is obtained as a result of a seizure without rea sonable suspicion. State
v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).
Here, the deputy stopped appellant’s vehicle because of a non-functioning tail light.
See Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 1(a) (2018) (requiring that any vehicle be equipped with at
least two stop lamps on the rear of the vehicle that emit a red or yellow light). Appellant

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does not dispute the functionality of his vehicle’s tail light and does not challenge the
lawfulness of the initial stop. Rather, appellant argue s that the deputy illegally expanded
the scope of the traffic stop . Therefore, this court must determi ne whether there was
reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the deputy’s expansion of the stop by requesting
that appellant exit his vehicle and perform field sobriety tests.
The deputy observed that appellant exhibited signs of being under the influ ence of
a controlled substance. Specifically, a ppellant exhibited erratic behaviors, acted very
nervous, moved around his vehicle, did not make eye contact, and had abnormally
constricted pupils. While nervousness alone is not sufficient to support the expansion of a
stop, nervousness coupled with othe r “particularized and objective facts” may provide
reasonable articulable suspicion. State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn. App.
2003). Moreover, signs of being under the influence of a controlled substance are
considered and may provide a police officer with specific and articulable facts to support
an expansion of the stop. See State v. Hegstrom, 543 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. App. 1996)
(considering “the observed symptoms of some type of intoxication, particularly the
severely constricted pupils” as a factor in establishing probable cause to believe driver was
under the influence of a controlled substance). Appellant’s nervousness coupled with his
constricted pupils, a recognized sign of intoxication, formed a reasonable basis for the
deputy to believe appellant was under the influence of a controlled substance, and justified
his expansion of the scope of the traffic stop.
Finally, “by virtue of the special training they receive, police officers articulating a
reasonable suspicion may make inferences and deductions that might well elude an

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untrained person.” State v. Flowers , 734 N. W.2d 239, 251 -52 (Minn. 2007) (citing
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 369)). Here, the deputy has been a licensed peace officer since
2015 and has completed multiple dru g and impaired driving courses. Additionally, the
deputy has experience being around people who are under the influence of controlled
substances. The deputy relied on his observations along with his training and experience
to deduce that appellant was under the influence of a controlled substance and he
reasonably expanded the stop on that basis. The district court did not err when it
determined that appellant’s conduct and the deputy’s observation provided a sufficient
basis to expand the scope of the stop.
Affirmed.