State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1993

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bradly James Haddock,
Appellant.

Filed January 6, 2020
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CR-17-1050

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joseph M. Sanow, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from his conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct,
appellant challenges the accuracy and intelligence of his Norgaard plea. Because
appellant’s plea was accurate and intelligent, we affirm.
FACTS
On November 2 9, 2017, the state charged appellant Bradly James Haddock with
three counts of second -degree criminal sexual conduct related to an 11-year-old victim.
On July 2, 2018, appellant agreed to plead guilty to count 1 of the complaint. In exchange,
the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and forego an aggravated sentence.
The district court held a plea hearing on July 18, 2018. The district court questioned
appellant about his trial rights; appellant stated he understood and waived those rights. The
district court also asked appellant if he “ma[d]e any claim that [he is] innocent.” Appellant
answered, “No, Your Honor.” The state then questioned appellant to obtain a factual basis
for his guilty plea . As appellant answer ed the questions, he stated, “Well, look, I really
don’t know what happened. . . . It’s – could be accidental. I don’t know what – where it’s
coming from. That’s why I can’t explain anything about it.” The district court recessed to
allow appellant to talk with his attorney.
Approximately five minutes later, the plea hearing resumed and the state laid the
factual basis for the plea. The district court then questioned app ellant about his lack of
memory and the basis for a Norgaard plea.

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DISTRICT COURT: Why is it that you don’t remember?
APPELLANT: I was — I was drinking and it was a while ago
and I — I don’t remember. I guess I blocked it out.
DISTRICT COURT: Have you read the, uh, complaint and
the police reports, um —
APPELLANT: Yes.
DISTRICT COURT: — provided to your attorney?
APPELLANT: Yes, I have.
DISTRICT COURT: Okay. And do you have any recollection
at all of the events referenced in those reports?
APPELLANT: No, I do not.
DISTRICT COURT: Were you intoxicated at the time the
events referred to in those reports occurred?
APPELLANT: Yes, Your Honor.
DISTRICT COURT: Do you have any reason to doubt the
accuracy of those reports?
APPELLANT: No, Your Honor.
DISTRICT COURT: Do you understand that if you went to
trial the State’s witnesses, and, uh, specifically the juvenile
here, would testify that on two separate occasions, uh, you,
uh, touched her breasts with sexual intent?
APPELLANT: Yes, Your Honor.
DISTRICT COURT: And do you believe the evidence the
State would likely offer in that regard, uh, would be sufficient
for a jury to find you guilty of Count One beyond a
reasonable doubt?
APPELLANT: Yes, Your Honor.
DISTRICT COURT: And are you entering this plea of guilty
to obtain the benefit of the plea bargain that I, uh, read when
we first began?
APPELLANT: Yes, Your Honor.
DISTRICT COURT: And are you making any claim that you
are innocent?
APPELLANT: No, Your Honor.

The district court found a sufficient basis for a Norgaard plea but deferred accepting the
plea pending the presentence investigation report.

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On September 12, 2018, the district court accepted the Norgaard plea, adjudicated
appellant guilty, and sentenced appellant to a presumptive 90 months’ imprisonment. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant challenges the validity of his Norgaard plea on direct appeal. A
defendant may seek plea withdrawal in a direct appeal from final judgment provided that
the record is sufficient to review the issue. See State v. Newcombe, 412 N.W.2d 427, 430
(Minn. 1987), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13 1987); see also State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d
712, 717 Minn. 1994 (suggesting the same standard in reviewing pleas under Norgaard).
“Assessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law that [ appellate courts] review
de novo.” See State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).
“It is well established that one who has entered a plea of guilty to a criminal
complaint does not have the absolute right to withdraw it.” State v. Knight, 192 N.W.2d
829, 832 (Minn. 1971). A defendant is allowed to withdraw a guilty plea at any time “ to
correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists
if a guilty plea is not valid.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. To be valid, a “guilty plea must
be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983).
Appellant argues that his plea was inaccurate and unintelligent. We address each
argument in turn.
Accuracy
To be accurate, a guilty plea must be established on a proper factual basis. Ecker,
524 N.W.2d at 716. This “is to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious

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offense than he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” Trott,
338 N.W.2d at 251.
Generally, a factual basis is laid by “questioning the defendant and asking the
defendant to explain in his or her own words the circumstances surrounding the crime.”
Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716. When a defendant enters a Norgaard plea, however, “the record
must establish that the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade the
defendant and his or her counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of the
crime charged.” Id. “[A]n adequate factual basis” requires “two related components: [1] a
strong factual basis, and [2] the defendant’s acknowledgment that the evidence would be
sufficient for a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williams v.
State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12-13 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). “The
strong factual basis and the defendant’s agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support
his conviction provide the court with a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong
probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded
guilty . . . .” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007).
Appellant plead guilty to second -degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2016). Under this subdivision, a person is guilty of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct when that person: (1) “intentionally touched [the
victim’s] intimate parts,” (2) “with sexual or aggressive intent,” (3) “the defendant . . . is
[the victim’s] parent, stepparent, or guardian,” (4) “[the victim] was under” the age of
16 at the time of the act, and (5) “the sexual abuse involved multiple acts committed over
an extended period of time.” 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 12.17 (2015).

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The record shows a strong factual basis for appellant’s guilty plea. First, “[t]he
complaint may provide a factual basis for a defendant’s plea, and we are permitted to
examine the complaint to assess whether a defendant’s plea was accurate.” Sanchez v.
State, 868 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d, 890 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2017). The
probable-cause portion of the complaint alleges that appellant touched the 11-year-old
victim’s breasts on two occasions and referenced text messages between appellant and the
victim in which appellant appears to admit that sexual contact occurred.
Second, the record also supports the accuracy of the factual basis . It contains an
interview with appellant in which he admits to sexual contact with the victim , and an
interview with the victim in which she describes the sexual contact. There is thus a “strong
factual basis” for appellant’s plea. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649.
The record from the plea hearing also shows that appellant acknowledged that the
state’s evidence was sufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant
testified expressly that he understood that the state must prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that the evidence showed he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
DISTRICT COURT: Do you understand that if you did go to
trial you would be presumed innocent unti l your guilt were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
APPELLANT: Yes, Your Honor.
. . . .
DISTRICT COURT: Do you understand that if you went to
trial, the State’s witnesses, and, why, specifically the juvenile
here, would testify that on two separate occasions, uh, you, uh,
touched her breasts with sexual intent?
APPELLANT: Yes, Your Honor.
DISTRICT COURT: And do you believe the evidence the
State would likely offer in that regard, uh, would be sufficient

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for a jury to find you guilty of Count One beyond a reasonable
doubt?
APPELLANT: Yes, Your Honor.

The record shows that appellant entered the guilty plea based on his awareness that a jury
would convict him. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717.
There is a strong factual basis for appellant’s plea, and appellant acknowledged that
the evidence was sufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant’s
plea therefore satisfies the Norgaard requirements, and his plea was accurate.
Intelligence
“The intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant understands the charges
against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea. ‘Consequences’
refers to a plea’s direct consequences, namely the maximum sentence and fine.” Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 96 (citation and quotation omitted).
The district court questioned appellant about the charges against him, his trial rights,
and the presumptive prison sentence. Appellant waived his trial rights and acknowledged
in his plea petition that he understood the charges against him and the presumptive prison
sentence he faced.
Appellant argues that his plea was not intelligent because he did not understand that
he was entering a Norgaard plea. The supreme court has said that “it is important for either
counsel or the trial court to indicate explicitly on the record that the defendant is entering
an Alford-type guilty plea,” and, consistent with that directive, the district court did so here.
Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717. After questioning appellant about his lack of memory, the
district court stated it was “satisfied that there exists . . . a basis for a Norgaard plea.”

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In sum, appellant’s plea was accurate and intelligent. We therefore affirm
appellant’s conviction.
Affirmed.