Deondre Lashawn Bishop, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1998

Deondre Lashawn Bishop, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 26, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-32746

Bradford Colbert, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin Coun ty Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, A ssistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Coc hran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, J udge; and Kirk,
Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by app ointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant Deondre Lashawn Bishop challenges the postconviction court’s
conclusion that there was suffici ent evidence to sustain his co nvictions for aiding and
abetting first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC). Because t he stipulated facts and
evidence support the postconviction court’s conclusion that Bis hop aided and abetted
first-degree CSC, we affirm.
FACTS
The state charged Bishop with first-degree burglary, and two co unts of aiding and
abetting first-degree CSC. Bishop and the state agreed to submit the matter to the district
court based on stipulated facts and evidence. We begin by reviewing the relevant stipulated
facts.
In July 2015, officers from the Minneapolis Police Department w ere dispatched to
a residence on the report of a burglary and sexual assaults. The officers found a 14-year-old
female (Victim 1) and her mother (Victim 2). Victim 1 and Victim 2 reported that around
11:00 p.m. that evening, three masked men, armed with guns, had e n t e r e d t h e h o m e .
Victim 1 was grabbed by her throat and led upstairs at gunpoint . The three masked men
put pillowcases over the victims’ heads, bound them, and led th em around the residence
demanding money.
The three masked men threatened to burn the victims and to rape them in order to
find out where money was located in the home. One of the men v aginally penetrated
Victim 1 while holding her at gun point. She suffered genital i njuries as a result of the

3
sexual penetration. Another man kissed Victim 1 over the pillow case and rubbed her inner
thighs and vagina while he possessed a firearm.
One of the masked men placed his penis into Victim 2’s mouth. Victim 2 tried to
resist, but the man was able to physically force his penis into her mouth and overcome her
with his superior size and strength. One of the masked men digitally penetrated Victim 2’s
vagina. The penetration was accomplished through the use of force and coercion.
The three masked men placed the victims into the shower and tur ned on the hot
water in an attempt to burn them, but the water did not get hot enough. The three masked
men also threatened to burn the victims with an iron, but could not find an iron in the
residence. After approximately one-and-one-half hours, the three masked gunmen left the
home, taking with them televisions, a cell phone, cash, and various other items. The three
masked gunmen were subsequently identified and included Bishop.
In addition to the above stipulated facts, the parties stipulat ed to the admission of
certain evidence, including the grand jury transcript. Victim 2 testified before the grand
jury that two of the masked men were taller, and one was shorter. A police officer testified
that Bishop is shorter than the other two masked men.
Victim 1 testified that one of the taller men penetrated her an d demanded that she
tell him where the money was hidden. She further testified tha t the man told her “he
wouldn’t have to do that if [she] would just tell him where the money was.” She stated
that the shorter man, who was standing outside the room, at some point told the taller man
“that was enough,” at which point the taller man stopped penetr ating her and left to look

4
for money. Victim 1 further testified that the shorter man stayed in the room with her and
touched her vagina and inner thighs with his fingers but did not penetrate her vagina.
The stipulated evidence also includes reports prepared by a sex ual-assault nurse
examiner, who interviewed each of the victims as part of the ex amination process. Each
report refers to the assailants by numbers 1, 2, and 3, but it is not clear whether the
numbering is consistent between reports. The report for Victim 1 lists assailant 2 as 5’8”
tall, which appears to correspond to Bishop, the shortest of the three men. The report also
includes a description of assailant 2 touching her vagina, whic h is consistent with
Victim 1’s testimony that the shorter man touched her vagina after telling her first assailant
that it was enough. Victim 1’s report notes that assailant 3 d id not have any physical
contact with her.
In contrast, Victim 2’s report refers to the shortest individual as assailant 3 and notes
that “[h]e was the one with a little compassion.” In considering this conflicting evidence,
the district court found that it was impossible to know whether or not assailant 3 refers to
the same person in both reports.
The district court concluded that the evidence was not clear as to whether Bishop
directly sexually assaulted the victims but that Bishop aided a nd abetted the crimes of
first-degree CSC against each victim. The district court convicted Bishop of two counts of
aiding and abetting first-degree CSC, one count for each victim . The district court also
convicted Bishop of first-degree burglary. Bishop filed a post conviction petition arguing
that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions f or aiding and abetting
first-degree CSC. The postconviction court affirmed the convictions. This appeal follows.

5
D E C I S I O N
Bishop argues that the postconviction court erred in determinin g that there was
sufficient evidence to support hi s convictions. On appeal from a postconviction court’s
denial of relief, “we address questions of law de novo, review the postconviction court’s
factual findings for clear error, and evaluate the postconviction court’s ultimate decision to
deny relief for an abuse of discretion.” Lussier v. State , 853 N.W.2d 149, 153
(Minn. 2014). In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we undertake a “painstaking
analysis of the record to determ ine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient” to support the con viction. State v. Ortega ,
813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012 ) (quotation omitted). We assume that the fact-finder
“believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”
State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). “[W]e will not
disturb the verdict if the [fact-finder], acting with due regar d for the presumption of
innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doub t, could reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at
100. In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we apply the same standard to both
jury and bench trials. State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
Bishop admits that he was present during the burglary and that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain his conviction for first-degree burglary. Bishop does not deny that his
codefendants sexually assaulted Victim 1 and Victim 2 and that the evidence is sufficient
to show that his codefendants are guilty of committing first-de gree CSC. But he argues

6
that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he aided and a betted his codefendants in
committing first-degree CSC.
The statute defining aiding and abetting, Minn. Stat. § 609.05 subd. 1 (2014),
provides that “[a] person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person
intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the
other to commit the crime.” To prove that Bishop was guilty of intentionally aiding or
abetting a crime, the state was required to prove beyond a reas onable doubt that Bishop
“(1) knew his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime, and (2) intended his
presence to further the commission of that crime.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 806
(Minn. 2012). “Mere presence at the crime scene does not alone prove that a person aided
or abetted, because inaction, knowledge, or passive acquiescence do not rise to the level of
criminal culpability.” State v. Crow , 730 N.W.2d 272, 280 (Minn. 2007). “However,
active participation in the overt act that constitutes the substantive offense is not required,
and a defendant’s presence, com panionship, and conduct before a nd after an offense is
committed are relevant circumstances from which the jury may infer criminal intent.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Here, the stipulated facts state that “[t]he three masked men threatened to burn
Victim 1 and Victim 2 with hot water, an iron, and to rape them in order to find out where
the money was.” (Emphasis added.) The stipulated facts also i ndicate that the “ three
masked men” bound the victims, put pillow cases over their head s, and led them around
the residence demanding money. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the st ipulated facts indicate

7
that all three men participated i n the threats to rape and burn the victims, in binding the
victims, and in putting pillowcases over the victims’ heads.
Bishop asserts that he was the shorter man who told the taller man raping Victim 1
that it was “enough.” Bishop argues that this action demonstrates his lack of intent to aid
and abet his accomplices in committing first-degree CSC.1 We are not persuaded. As the
postconviction court noted, this comment could be interpreted as an attempt to redirect the
group’s attention to locating money rather than a lack of inten t to aid and abet in the
commission of first-degree CSC. We note that Bishop only told his accomplice that it was
“enough” after Victim 1 failed to provide useful information about the location of money
during the sexual assault. Although Bishop’s purpose in breaki ng into the residence may
have been to steal money, the stipulated facts demonstrate that Bishop participated in
threatening the victims with rape in order to coerce them into telling him where money was
hidden.
Bishop’s actions go beyond “passive acquiescence” to his accomplices’ actions. See
Crow, 730 N.W.2d at 280. The stipulated facts and evidence demonstrate that Bishop knew
his accomplices intended to commit first-degree CSC against bot h victims and that he
facilitated that crime by threatening the victims and aiding in the binding and blindfolding

1 We note that although Bishop asse rts that he was the individua l who told the taller man
that the sexual assault on Victim 1 was “enough,” he also asserts that he was the individual
who had no sexual contact with Victim 1, described in Victim 1’ s nursing report as
assailant 3. But Victim 1 testified that the same person who told the taller man that it was
“enough” then touched her inner thighs and vagina. Thus, Bisho p’s assertion that he was
both the man who had no physical contact with Victim 1 and the person who told the taller
man that it was “enough” is inconsistent with the evidence.

8
of the victims. As the district court correctly determined, “all three of the men contributed
to creating the environment that allowed the sexual assaults to happen.” The evidence
demonstrates that Bishop intended his presence to further the c ommission of the CSC in
order to further his ultimate goal of stealing money from the residence. Thus, the evidence
is sufficient to support Bishop’s convictions for aiding and abetting first-degree CSC, and
the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denyin g his petition for
postconviction relief. See Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 806 (stating that a defendant is guilty of
aiding and abetting when he “(1) knew his alleged accomplices w ere going to commit a
crime, and (2) intended his presence to further the commission of that crime”).
Affirmed.