Joshua John Leary, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2009

Joshua John Leary, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed July 15, 2019
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-CV-18-1319

Steven K. Budke, Leverson Budke, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Natasha Townes Robinson, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant Joshua John Leary appeals the district court’s order sustaining the
revocation of his driving privileges. He argues that, because the district court erred in
finding that law enforcement had reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop,
this court must reverse the district court’s order. We affirm.

2
FACTS
On May 25, 2018, at approximately 1:50 a.m., Officer Jacob Johnson of the Inver
Grove Heights Police Department was on routine patrol traveling westward at the
intersection of 66 th and Concord Boulevard. The intersection is located in “a saturated
area of alcohol -providing establishments.” As the vehicle directly in front of Officer
Johnson approached the intersection and stopped at the stop sign, the officer observed that
the vehicle’s rear brake light “was not functioning.” Officer Johnson pursued the vehicle
as it turned right, traveling northbound.
While following the vehicle, Officer Johnson radioed dispatch, notifying his
department of his intention to initiate a traffic stop. As part of standard procedure, Officer
Johnson was required to radio dispatch prior to stopping a vehicle in order to verify whether
the vehicle had been reported stolen, whether the vehicle’s registered owner had any
outstanding warrants, and other matters to maintain officer safety.
At the 5900 block of Concord Boulevard, Officer Johnson activated his squad car’s
emergency lights, initiating a traffic stop. The activation of the emergency lights caused
the squad car’s dashboard camera to turn on. As the suspect vehicle came to a stop, Officer
Johnson observed, again, that its rear brake light was nonoperable. Officer Johnson
approached the vehicle, identified the driver as appellant, and observed indicia of
intoxication. Appellant was arrested and, consequently, his driver’s license was revoked.
Appellant challenged Officer Johnson’s grounds for initiating the traffic stop and
petitioned the district court for an implied-consent hearing. In September 2018, an implied-

3
consent hearing was held. The sole issue before the district court was whether the initial
stop of appellant’s vehicle was lawful. Officer Johnson was the only witness to testify.
Officer Johnson testified about his experience, training, and duties as an officer,
including his training in the enforcement of traffic and driving-while-impaired laws. He
testified that, by law, a motor vehicle must have two functioning brake lights. He testified
that, at the time he initially observed appellant’s nonfunctioning brake light at the
intersection of 66th Street and Concord Boulevard, the camera on his squad car was not
yet on, but that the camera captured “the brake light when [he] stopped [appellant’s] vehicle
at the intersection of 59th and Concord.” He explained that, on the night in question, the
weather included “some precipitation, but not an amount that would prohibit [him] from
being able to clearly see.”
At the hearing, appellant’s counsel played a portion of the dashboard camera’s video
recording of the stop. The parties stipu lated to the showing of the video “for visual
purposes” only (as the portion of the video did not contain any sound), and appellant’s
counsel explained to the district court that the video would not be offered into the record.
Rather, the parties agreed that the video was to be used at the hearing as “a demonstrative
exhibit” only.
Officer Johnson conceded that the video did not show, prior to the moment he
activated his squad car’s emergency lights, that appellant was driving a motor vehicle with
a nonfunctioning brake light. He conceded that the video showed that appellant’s vehicle
was “a good distance away” from his squad car, and that approximately 30 seconds elapsed

4
from the time the video started to the time the officer activated his emergency light s.1 He
conceded that he did not observe any other traffic violations while pursuing appellant’s
vehicle. Officer Johnson also conceded that he did not include in his police report his
initial observation of the nonfunctioning brake light.
The parties stipulated “that [appellant’s] brake light was not functioning” at the time
he pulled over in response to the officer’s emergency lights. Appellant’s counsel stated,
“[W]e can stipulate that[,] at that moment after [Officer Johnson] had already initiated the
traffic stop, we can stipulate that the evidence show[ed] that the brake light was out.”
Appellant’s counsel explained, however, “When it went out, I can’t stipulate to that. And
whether or not there was an observation that the light was out prior to the video, we cannot
stipulate to that.”
The district court sustained the revocation of appellant’s driver’s license. The
district court found that, despite Officer Johnson’s failure to include in his police report his
initial observation of appellant’s nonfunctioning brake light, the officer’s testimony was
credible. The court found that “[t]he squad video showed that w hen [appellant’s vehicle]
was stopping in response to Officer Johnson’s emergency lights near 59[th] Street, the right
rear brake light was not working.” The district court concluded: “Officer Johnson had a

1 We note an inconsistency between Officer Johnson’s testimony and the district court’s
finding. While the district court found that Officer Johnson’s activation of the emergency
lights caused the squad dashboard camera to turn on, Officer Johns on testified that “when
the video starts, there’s a good 30 to 35 seconds of driving observation before [he]
activate[d] [the] squad lights.” Neither party challenges this inconsistency. While not
germane to our decision, we presume that the officer’s sq uad car was equipped with a
camera that recorded the 30 seconds prior to its activation.

5
particularized and objective basis to suspect [a ppellant] of criminal activity when he saw
[appellant] operating a motor vehicle on a public highway which did not have two
functioning brake lights.” This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court erred in finding that Off icer Johnson had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. We review de novo a district
court’s legal determination that an officer had reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. State
v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012). “But in that review, we accept the district
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. Appellate courts give “due
weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the district court,” State v. Britton, 604
N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted), and defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations. State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012); see also Wilkes
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 777 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Minn. App. 20 10) (“[C]redibility
determinations are the province of the district court.”).
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect individuals from
“unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 10. 2 “The touchstone of the Fourth Am endment is reasonableness.” State
v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). “Generally, warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable.” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).

2 Although a civil proceeding, Fourth Amendment protection applies to a judicial challenge
to the administrative revocation of a driver’s license. See, e.g., Olson v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552, 553-56 (Minn. 1985) (applying Fourth Amendment protection to
license-revocation proceeding).

6
However, a law-enforcement officer may, without a warrant, initiate a limited investigatory
stop if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v.
Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct.
1868 (1968)); see also State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the
officer to be able to articulate that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499, 502
(Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted). The officer’s suspicion must be more than the product
of “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” State v. Harris, 572 N.W.2d 333, 337 (Mi nn.
App. 1997) (quotation omitted), aff’d on other grounds, 590 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1999).
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a stop, Minnesota
courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law
enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be
beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson , 622 N.W.2d 823,
825 (Minn. 2001); see also Klamar , 823 N.W.2d at 691 (“The court may consider the
officer’s experience, general knowledge, and observations; background information,
including the nature of the offense suspected and the time and location of the seizure; and
anything else that is relevant.”).
“It should be emphasized that the factual basis requir ed to support a stop for a
‘routine traffic check’ is minimal.” Marben v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699
(Minn. 1980) (quotation omitted). “Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic
law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite

7
particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Beall, 771 N.W.2d
41, 44 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). And, “searches based on honest, reasonable
mistakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Licari, 659
N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003).
Operating a motor vehicle with a nonfunctioning brake light is a traffic violation
warranting an officer to conduct a traffic stop. Minnesota Statute section 169.57,
subdivision 1(a) (2016), provides that a motor vehicle “shall be equipped with at least two
stop lamps on the rear.” Subdivision 3(a) provides: “When a vehicle is equipped with stop
lamps or signal lamps, such lamps shall at all times be maintained in good working
condition.” Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) (2016).
As this court has stated previously, subdivision 3(a) “ unambiguously applies to all
lamps with which a vehicle is equipped.” Beall, 771 N.W.2d at 45. In Beall, the defendant
was operating a motor vehicle with an inoperable center brake light. Id. at 43. On the
state’s appeal of the district court’s order f inding that the traffic stop was not based on
reasonable, articulable suspicion of a violation of the law, this court reversed and stated,
because subdivision 3(a) “imposes the duty at all times to maintain in good working
condition such stop lamps (brake lights) with which a vehicle is equipped, an inoperable
center brake light constitutes a specific, articulable, and objective basis justifying a traffic
stop.” Id. at 42 (quotation omitted). In the present matter, the parties do not dispute that
operating a motor vehicle with a nonfunctioning brake light is a traffic violation.
The parties also do not dispute that, after Officer Johnson activated his emergency
lights to initiate a traffic stop, the video footage shows that appellant was operating a motor

8
vehicle with a nonfunctioning brake light. At the implied -consent hearing, appellant’s
counsel stated, “[A]t that moment after [the officer] had already initiated the traffic stop,
we can stipulate that the evidence shows that the brake light was out.” Rather, the parties
dispute whether the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant was
operating a motor vehicle with a nonfunctioning brake light before the traffic stop was
initiated.
Appellant argues that Officer Johnson’s testimony t hat he first observed a
nonfunctioning brake light on appellant’s vehicle at the intersection of 66th Street and
Concord Boulevard was not credible, and, consequently, that the stop of his vehicle was
not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. Undermining Officer Johnson’s
credibility, appellant argues that the officer’s concession at the implied-consent hearing—
that “his report only mentions the observation of a nonfunctioning brake light on the 5900
block”—contradicts the officer’s testimony t hat “all the conduct [he] observed [was]
written in the narrative.” Appellant characterizes this apparent contradiction as “Johnson’s
implicit concession—that no violation was observed at the 6600 block.”
Further, appellant contends that Officer Johnson’ s “observation of a supposed
equipment violation on the 5900 block of Concord Boulevard was only disclosed at the
implied consent hearing.” He argues, “To find this sort of moving target credible would
be to render the entire implied consent judicial revi ew process meaningless.” While we
can sympathize with appellant’s frustration regarding the timing of Officer Johnson’s
disclosure of his observations, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining
that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.

9
The district court is afforded discretion to weigh testimony with seemingly
conflicting evidence, and we defer to its credibility determinations and findings of fact.
See State v. Shellito, 594 N.W.2d 182, 186 ( Minn. App. 1999) (holding “the district court
has the discretion to draw its own conclusions and make factual findings from its
independent review of a video recording of a traffic stop,” and, in cases of conflicting
evidence, “the district court must make findings of fact”); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01
(“[D]ue regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses.”).
Indeed, Officer Johnson’s recording of the incident does not show any traffic
violations before he had already initiated a stop. 3 However, the district court found that
Officer Johnson testified credibly on the issue . The district co urt found that (1) Officer
Johnson observed appellant operating a motor vehicle with a nonfunctioning brake light
before he initiated the stop and (2) the video showed that, when appellant’s vehicle “was
stopping in response to Officer Johnson’s emergency lights near 59th Street, the right rear
brake light was not working.” The court expressly stated that it found the officer’s account
of the incident to be credible, “even though his report did not mention this first observation

3 We note that, as shown in the transcript of the hearing, the parties agreed to employ the
video as “a demonstrative exhibit,” with the understanding that , while it would be shown
to the factfinder “for purposes of impeaching the officer,” the video would not be received
by the district court. Consequently, because the video recording is not part of the record,
it is not possible to review the officer’s camera footage of the incident. Officer Johnson
conceded, however, that the video did not show any traffic violations prior to the initiation
of the traffic stop, and the parties do not dispute this testimony.

10
of the non -functioning brak e light.” 4 The district court considered Officer Johnson’s
testimony, the officer’s report and the footage available on the dashboard camera, and it
ultimately concluded that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of a traffic
violation to wa rrant a traffic stop. The district court was in the best position to evaluate
Officer Johnson’s credibility, and the court’s finding that the officer observed appellant
driving a vehicle with a nonfunctioning brake light was not clearly erroneous. See Klamar,
823 N.W.2d at 691.
Furthermore, even if Officer Johnson made a mistake of fact as to whether
appellant’s brake light was, indeed, nonfunctioning at the intersection of the 6600 block of
Concord Boulevard, there is no indication that his mistake was u nreasonable—after all,
appellant’s brake light was found to be nonfunctioning just a few blocks later. As such,
the officer’s traffic stop is “unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment.” Licari, 659
N.W.2d at 254.
Affirmed.

4 Like the video recording, the officer’s report is also not part of the record. However,
Officer Johnson conceded that the report did not include his first observation, and the
parties do not dispute this testimony.