State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2023

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Pierre Davonne Ramsey,
Appellant.

Filed November 25, 2019
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-7398

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of attempted second -degree murder and
first-degree assault, arguing that the district court violated his right to a speedy trial. We
affirm.
FACTS
On October 2, 2017, appellant Pierre Davonne Ramsey repeatedly stabbed his sister
with a knife. On October 3, 2017, the state charged Ramsey with attempted second-degree
murder and first-degree assault.
At Ramsey’s first appearance on October 4, 2017, his public defender requested that
the district court order a rule 20 evaluation and that it be conducted in conjunction with
Ramsey’s pending rule 20 evaluation for an unrelated unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm
charge. The district court ordered Ramsey to undergo an in-custody rule 20 evaluation,
which was completed on December 6, 2017. T he evaluat or found him competent.
Ramsey’s attorney filed an objection to the r ule 20 evaluator’s opinion on December 8,
2017.
At a status hearing on December 11, 2017, Ramsey’s attorney requested a contested
rule 20 hearing. The district court scheduled a contested hearing and then allowed Ramsey
to voice his concerns. Ramsey told the district court that he was “getting ineffective
counsel” and that he had requested a speedy trial for his unrelated firearm -possession
charge. The district court informed Ramsey that his case was being reassigned to a
3
different public defender who would decide whether to request a new mental-health
evaluation.
At a contested hearing on March 13, 2018, Ramsey was represented by a different
public def ender who withdrew the motion challenging the competen cy opinion. The
prosecutor requested that the district court schedule a pretrial hearing for Ramsey’s
attempted-murder and assault charges. The district court scheduled the pretrial hearing on
May 14, 2018, and again allowed Ramsey to voice his concerns. Ramsey expressed his
belief that he “put in a speedy trial” for his firearm-possession charge and that the district
court was violating his right to a speedy trial because it kept pushing his court dates back.
The prosecutor noted that Ramsey had not ma de a speedy -trial demand for his
attempted-murder and assault charges. The district court clarified that Ramsey had
requested a speedy trial for his unlawful firearm-possession charge, but that it had released
him after 120 days.
Ramsey then claimed that he had made a speedy -trial request for his
attempted-murder and assault charges at his first appearance on October 4 and again at the
December 11 hearing. The district court noted that Ramsey’s concern about a speedy-trial
violation was correct with respect to his firearm-possession charge, but that because his
attorney had moved to contest the findings of the rule 20 evaluation, all proceedings against
him were suspended. Ramsey then stated that he had demanded a speedy trial for his
firearm-possession charge in April. The district court informed Ramsey that while he was
correct, it was not going to accept his speedy-trial demand because of the hold on his cases
due to the rule 20 proceedings. After this discussion, the district court accepted the
4
competency findings of the rule 20 evaluator, found probable cause for attempted second-
degree murder and first-degree assault, and entered pleas of not guilty on Ramsey’s behalf.
At his pretrial hearing on May 14, 2018, the district court scheduled Ramsey’s jury
trial for June 25, 2018. The district court then allowed Ramsey to voice his concerns. Once
again, Ramsey raised his concern that the district court was violating his right to a speedy
trial. He asserted that he had requested a speedy trial on October 4, 2017, and again on
December 11, 2017.
The district court explained to Ramsey that he had requested a speedy trial for his
firearm-possession charge. Ramsey then told the district court that it had violated his right
to a speedy trial because he had made his demand at the March 13 hearing. The district
court informed Ramsey that his trial would occur on June 25, 2018. When Ramsey
continued to express his belief that the district court was ignoring his speedy-trial demand,
the district court noted that Ramsey had clearly made a speedy -trial demand on May 14,
2018.
Ramsey’s jury trial began on June 25, 2018. The jury found him guilty of attempted
second-degree murder and first-degree assault. The district court sentenced Ramsey to 240
months in prison. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Ramsey contends that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. See
U.S. Const. amend. VI (guaranteeing criminal defendant right to speedy trial); Minn.
Const. art. I, § 6 (same). This court reviews de novo whether a defendant has been denied
5
his constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn.
2017).
To determine whether a delay deprived a defendant of his right to a speedy trial,
Minnesota has adopted the four-factor test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Barker v. Wingo. Id. at 627. These factors are: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason
for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and
(4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315
(Minn. 1999) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972)) .
None of these factors is either necessary or sufficient to find a constitutional speedy -trial
violation; they are related, however, and must be considered with all of the relevant
circumstances. Id. The remedy for the denial of the right to a speedy trial is dismissal of
the case. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 627.
Length of delay
The first factor is the length of the delay. The length of the delay functions as both
a fa ctor and a triggering mechanism —a “presumptively prejudicial” delay is required
before consideration of the remaining factors is necessary. Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315.
The right to a speedy trial attaches either when a defendant is formally charged or arrested.
Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 627. Delay is usually calculated from the point of attachment and
a six- month delay is presumptively prejudicial. Id. at 628. However, if a defendant
demands a speedy trial pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09, a delay of more than 60 days
from the demand is presumed prejudicial. Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315-16.
6
Here, our review of the record shows that Ramsey demanded a speedy trial no earlier
than May 14, 2018. Ramsey’s trial occurred on June 25, 2018. This was 42 days after his
speedy-trial demand. Therefore, we conclude that the delay was not presumptively
prejudicial and insufficient to trigger inquiry into the remaining Barker factors.
Affirmed.