State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2025

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Linton Ludlow Vang,
Appellant.

Filed December 30, 2019
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-18-631

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark D. Nyvold, Special Assistant Public Defender, Fridley, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
Appellant Linton Vang appeals from his conviction of possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person after police stopped a car in which Vang was a passenger and found
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a handgun in the glove compartment. Vang moved to suppress evidence of the handgun on
Fourth Amendment grounds, and the district court denied the motion, determining that
Vang lacked standing to challenge the search. Vang appeals, arguing that the district court
improperly denied his motion because the state gave no notice that he must establish a
privacy interest in the area searched. Because Vang had the burden to show standing and
the state had no duty to alert Vang of this burden, the district court did not err as a matter
of law by addressing Vang’s failure to make the requisite showing, and we affirm.
FACTS
St. Paul police officer Pheng Xiong stopped a car in January 2018 for a turn-signal
violation. Linton Vang was the front-seat passenger. Officer Xiong discovered that Vang
was the subject of three arrest warrants, and another officer placed Vang in a squad car.
Officers searched the car and found a handgun in the glove compartment. The state charged
Vang with possession of a firearm and ammunition by an ineligible person. Vang moved
to suppress the physical evidenc e and statements that he made to police after his arrest,
arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the
motion, reasoning that Vang lacked standing to challenge the search. A jury found Vang
guilty of the firearm charge, and he appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Vang appeals from his conviction, arguing that the district court improperly denied
his pretrial motion to suppress. We will review the district court’s legal determinations de
novo. See State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
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Vang raises only a legal argument concerning standing in urging us to reverse the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. A defendant cannot succeed in a motion
to suppress evidence by vicariously asserti ng the violation of someone else’s Fourth
Amendment rights. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 –34, 99 S. Ct. 421, 425 (1978).
So-called “standing” to raise a Fourth Amendment violation requires the challenger to
show a government intrusion into a place where he has a “legitimate expectation of
privacy.” See id. at 143, 99 S. Ct. at 430 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353,
88 S. Ct. 507, 512 (1967)). A mere passenger in a searched car is unsuited to contest a
search unless he shows he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas searched. Id.
at 148–49, 99 S. Ct. at 433.
Vang’s sole argument on appeal is that the state was required but failed to notify
him that he had to establish a privacy interest in the car, prohibiting the district court from
addressing whether he lacked standing. Logic and precedent defeat his theory. “The
proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.” Id. at 130, 99 S. Ct.
at 424 n.1. Having this burden required Vang to demonstrate his reasonable expectation of
privacy in the searched area, and the state had no duty to notify him of this fundamental
legal burden.
Vang points to language in Rakas for a different approach. The Rakas Court
observed that, because the prosecutor had argued previously that the petitioners lacked
standing to challenge the search of a car, “[t]he prosecutor’s argument gave petitioners
notice that they were to be put to their proof on any issue as to which they had the burden.”
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Id. The Rakas Court was not establishing a new notice rule; it was distinguishing a previous
case in which the Court remanded on the issue of standing because the government had not
challenged the defendant’s standing during the suppression hearing or trial and there was
an insufficient record to decide the issue on appeal. Id. (citing Combs v. United States ,
408 U.S. 224, 226–27, 92 S. Ct. 2284, 2286 (1972)). This distinction reveals only the
procedural infirmity resulting from the state’s raising a lack of standing on appeal when
the issue was never addressed by the district court. It does not create a constitutional right
prohibiting the district court from addressing the issue on its own when deciding a
suppression motion. Vang cites nothing in caselaw or the rules of criminal procedure that
would restrict the district court from recognizing on its own and then addressing a
defendant’s failure to support his motion to suppress with the requisite showing that he had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched.
Vang offers no challenge to the merits of the district court’s decision that he lacked
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or its glove compartment. Nor does he
point to any evidence in the record that would suggest that he had such an expectation. We
see no legal error in the district court’s decision denying Vang’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.