In the Matter of the Application of Russell Vincent Winbush for a Change of Name.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2043

In the Matter of the Application of Russell Vincent Winbush for a Change of Name.

Filed November 25, 2019
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CV-17-5371

Russell Vincent Winbush, Rochester, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Reese Frederickson, Pine County Attorney, Pine City, Minnesota (for respondent Pine
County)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Self-represented appellant challenges a district court order denying his petition to
change his name to Rule All-Matter Born-Omnipotent, arguing that the district court erred
by determining that denying his request did not violate his constitutional rights. We affirm.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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FACTS
In December 2017, appellant Russell Vincent Winbush filed an application to
legally change his name to Rule All -Matter Born-Omnipotent. Winbush asserted that the
reason for the name change was religious. Because Winbush has several prior felony
convictions, he served notice of the name-change petition on Pine County, the prosecuting
authority, as required by Minn. Stat. § 259.13, subd. 1 (2018 ). Pine County objected to
Winbush’s name-change application on the basis that it aimed to “defraud or mislead, was
not made in good faith. . . or [would] compromise public safety.” Minn. Stat. § 259.13,
subd. 2 (2016). Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 259.13, subd. 3, Winbush contested the objection.
The district court heard Winbush’s name-change request in November 2018 and
issued an order later that month denying it. The district court determined that Winbush
“ha[d] not met his burden of clear and convincing evidence on showing the Application for
Name Change was made without the intent to defraud or mislead,” and that public safety
would be compromised if the court granted the application. The district court employed
the compelling -state-interest balancing test to concl ude that denying Winbush’s
application would not infringe his constitutional right to religious freedom. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
This court reviews an order denying a name-change application for abuse of
discretion. In re Welfare of C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Minn. App. 1994). A district
court abuses its discretion if its findings of fact are unsupported by the record, if it
improperly applies the law, or if it resolves the matter in a way that is “against logic and

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the facts on record.” Foster v. Foster, 802 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation
omitted). But as the county points out, our review in this case is “limited to determining
whether the trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law” because Winbush
did not provide a transcript of the hearing. Am. Family Life Ins. v. Noruk, 528 N.W.2d
921, 925 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 1995). Winbush bears the
burden of providing an adequate record for review. Mesenbourg v. Mesenbourg , 538
N.W.2d 489, 494 (Minn. App. 1995).
Minn. Stat. § 259.13 (2016) outlines the process by which a person with a felony
conviction can apply to change his or her name. When an individual convicted of a felony
applies for a name change, the statute a ffords the prosecuting authority the right to file an
objection. Id., subd. 2. If the prosecuting authority does so, the district court cannot grant
the applicant’s request unless the applicant files a motion for an order permitting the
requested name change. Id., subd. 3. The applicant bears the burden of proving by clear
and co nvincing evidence that the name -change request “is not based upon an intent to
defraud or mislead, is made in good faith, will not cause injury to a person, and will not
compromise public safety.” Id. The statute separately requires the district court to grant
the name change if failure to allow it would infringe on the applicant’s constitutional rights.
Id., subd. 4.
Here, Pine County filed an objection to Winbush’s name-change application, citing
his nine felony convictions dating back to 2002, including a conviction for criminal
vehicular homicide. Pine Co unty also noted that Winbush had filed several documents ,
including some that claim the “sovereign citizen” theory to frustrate the court system, and

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argued that allowing the name change would allow Winbush to further attempt to mislead
or defraud the court system.
Because the prosecuting authority filed an objection, Winbush is may not change
his name unless he proves, by cle ar and convincing evidence that his application was not
made with the intent to defraud or mislead. Minn. Stat. § 259.13, subd. 3. Here, the district
court found that Winbush did not meet his burden . The district court also found that
granting the name-change application would compromise public safety. The district court
noted that Winbush agreed “that the Court could take judicial notice of his criminal
history,” and that, after reviewing Winbush’s convictions, “the public has an interest in
[him] keeping the same name in the public record as [that] which he was convicted under.”
Based on our review of the record, we agree with the district court’s finding that Winbush
did not meet his burden.
Winbush argues that denial of his name -change application would infringe on his
constitutional right to religious freedom. We review the denial of a name -change
application for abuse of discretion, but we review de novo the distinct question of whether
denying a name -change application infringes on a constitutio nal right. See State v.
Pedersen, 679 N.W.2d 368, 372 -73 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Aug. 17,
2004) (stating that we review de novo whether a statute is unconstitutional as applied).
The Minnesota Supreme C ourt employs a heightened “compelling state interest
balancing test” when determining whether a challenged law infringes on or interferes with
religious practices. Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d
857, 865 ( Minn. 1992). The test has four prongs: (1) whether the objector’s beliefs are

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sincerely held; (2) whether the state regulation burdens the exe rcise of religious beliefs;
(3) whether the state interest in the regulation is overriding or compelling; and (4) whether
the state regulation uses the least restrictive means. Id.
When applying the four -prong test, the district court stated that it had “no
information as to whether [Winbush’s] beliefs are sincerely held” but even “assuming they
are sincerely held, [Winbush] has failed to pass the balancing test.” The district court noted
that Winbush had “stated only in a [conclusory manner] that the reason for requesting this
name change is for religious purposes,” that Winbush “has not made an assertion that the
name change is required to practice his religion,” and that Winbush “failed to give the court
any reasoning as to how denial would infringe upon his rights.” The district court noted
that the state “has an interest in public safety and protecting the court system from fraud.”
The district court also stated that the fourth prong of the test “weighs in [favor of] denial
of the Application for a Name Change.” Finally, the district court stated that it asked
Winbush “to expand on the balancing test and gave him an opportunity to m ake an
argument on why it should be viewed in his favor” and that he failed to provide any such
reasoning.
Without the hearing transcript, our review is limited to the record, which includes
Winbush’s application for a name change. Winbush’s application asserts that the name
change is “for religious purpose[s]” and “a form [and] mode of worship of God according
to the dictates of my own conscious.” Winbush also asserts that his religious beliefs are
part of the “5% Nation of Gods & Earths” and “are prote cted as Religious under
[R.I.U.I.P.A.].”

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Based on our review of the record, the district court’s findings are supported by the
district court’s findings of fact . Accordingly, the district court was well within its
discretion in denying Winbush’s application.
Affirmed.