In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. D. K.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2053

In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. D. K.

Filed July 8, 2019
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-18-4078

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Subia Beg, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
A.D.K. is charged with second -degree murder and second -degree assault with a
dangerous weapon. The state has alleged that, when he was 17 years old, he shot two men,
killing one and seriously injuring the other. The juvenile court granted the state’s motion
to certify A.D.K. for prosecution as an adult. We affirm.

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FACTS
The juvenile-delinquency petition alleges the following facts, which we assume to
be true for purposes of the state’s motion for certification. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on
January 7, 2018, A.D.K. went to a house party in southeast Minneapolis with a friend, C.O.
C.O. previously had been the victim of an attempted robbery by D.D., during which D.D.
shot C.O. and injured him. A.D.K. and C.O. knew that D.D. was a guest at the house party.
After arriving at the party, A.D.K. went to the back of the house , where a group of people
had gathered. A.D.K. confronted D.D. and argued with him about the attempted robbery
of C.O. A.D.K. pulled out a handgun and fired six or s even shots at D.D. before fleeing.
D.D. died at the scene . A bystander, C.S., was struck in his right thigh and survived.
A.D.K. was 17 years old on the day of the incident. He became an adult 22 days later.
In September 2018, the state charged A.D.K. with second -degree murder, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2016), and second -degree assault with a
dangerous weapon, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2016). At the same time,
the state moved to certify A.D.K. for prosecution as an adult.
The juvenile court conducted a certification hearing on two days in October and
November 2018. The state called two witnesses. Kimberly Johnson, a juvenile probation
officer, testified about the certification report she had prepare d. She recommended
certification, in part because of the inadequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile system and in part because of the seriousness of the offense s.
Roger Baburam, a p rogram director at MCF-Stillwater, testified about the educational,
vocational, mental -health, and chemical -dependency programs generally available in

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Minnesota correctional facilities for adult offenders . The state offered two exhibits,
including the certification study prepared by Johnson.
A.D.K. also called two witnesses. Jessica Miles, a licensed psychologist, testified
that A.D.K. had “various substance abuse disorders” and that, left untreated, “his substance
use is a significant factor in his risk to commit future acts of violence.” Miles
recommended a setting “where structure and supervision can be more consistent, and
monitoring can be more effective .” She conceded that her treatment recommendations
could take place in an adult setting. Eric Meier, a correctional lieutenant at MCF-Red
Wing, testified about the chemical-dependency, mental -health, and cognitive-behavior-
restructuring programs offered at MFC -Red Wing for juvenile offenders. Meier testified
that MFC-Red Wing has had approximately five juveniles in the past 20 years who have
been found guilty of murder or manslaughter . A.D.K. offered nine exhibits, including
Miles’s psychological evaluation.
The juvenile court granted the state’s motion in an 11-page order. A.D.K. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A.D.K. argues that the juvenile court erred by granting the state’s motion to certify
him for prosecution as an adult.
As a general rule, juveniles accused of criminal conduct are tried in the juvenile
division of the district courts. Minn. Stat. § 260B.101, subd. 1 (2016). But a juvenile who
is 14 years old or older , who commits an offense that would be a felony if committed by
an adult, may be certified for prosecution as an adult in district court. Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.125, subd. 1 (2016). If a juvenile is alleged to have committed an offense that

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would result in a presumptive commitment to prison if the juvenile were an adult, and if
the juvenile was 16 or 17 years of age at the time of the alleged offense, adult certification
is presumed. Id., subd. 3. “In presumptive-certification proceedings, the state bears the
burden of showing that (1) the juvenile was 16 or 17 years old, and (2) the alleged offense
carries a presumptive prison sentence or that it is a felony offense involving a firearm.” In
re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Feb.
19, 2013). If the state satisfies that burden and the district court determines that probable
cause exists to believe the juvenile committed the alleged offense , the juvenile bears the
burden of proving “by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the
juvenile court serves public safety.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3; see also Minn. R.
Juv. Delinq. P. 18.06, subd. 1. If the juvenile does not satisfy that burden, “the court shall
certify the proceeding. ” Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3 . If the juvenile satisfies that
burden, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction in an extended -jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ)
prosecution. Minn. Stat. §§ 260B.125, subd. 8(b) , 260B.130, subd. 1(1) (2016) ; In re
Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d 28, 35 (Minn. 2014).
In determining whether public safety is served by certification, a juvenile court must
consider the following six factors:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;

(2) the culpability of the child in committing the
alleged offense, including the level of the child’s participation
in planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of

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any mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing
Guidelines;

(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;

(4) the child’ s programming history, including the
child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available
programming;

(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system; and

(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4. A juvenile court must give greater weight to the first and
third factors. Id. A juvenile court is “not required to specifically address each of the six
statutory factors in its written order” but must demonstrate that it “carefully considered its
decision.” J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 37 (quotation omitted).
A juvenile court “has considerable latitude in deciding whether to certify a case for
adult prosecution.” P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d at 681 (quotation omitted). This court applies a
clear-error standar d of review to a juvenile court’s findings of fact concerning the six
statutory public -safety factors . J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 34 -35. We apply an abuse -of-
discretion standard of review to a juvenile court’s balancing of the factors and its ultimate
decision on a certification motion. In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 710-11 (Minn.
2008); In re Welfare of U.S., 612 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Minn. App. 2000).
In this case, the juvenile court reviewed the evidence submitted by the parties and
made numerous findings of fact. The juvenile court also discussed each of the six statutory
public-safety factors. The juvenile court determined that the first, second, fifth, and sixth

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factors weighed i n favor of certification and that the third and fourth factors weighed
against certification. The juvenile court concluded its analysis by stating:
While the Court recognizes some mitigating factors, the
overall circumstances weigh in favor of certification. The
offense is serious, resulting in grave repercussions. The facts
indicate an intentional shooting that result ed in [the] death of
one person and injury to another. [A.D.K.] could have injured
more. He had time to consider his actions, despite any
potential outside influence. With an EJJ designation, the Court
would retain jurisdiction for a little over two years —a grossly
disproportionate time to the gravity of the offense. This
amount of time would unlikely provide enough time for
rehabilitation for such dangerous behavior, and thus would not
ensure public safety.

The Court finds that certification is appropriate
considering the six public safety factors outlined above.

On appeal, A.D.K. contends that he rebutted the presumption of certification by
proving by clear and convincing evidence “ that public safety would not be at risk if EJJ
was ordered.” He contends further that “a suitable treatment plan could be administered
and that [he] would likely be successful.” He relies on M iles’s report and testimony that
A.D.K. will be less susceptible to peer pressure as he matures and that MCF -Red Wing or
the Woodland Hills juvenile facility are “able to offer [ him] the needed chemical
dependency programming.” He also relies on Meier’s t estimony about the juvenile
programming available at MCF-Red Wing.
The juvenile court considered the evidence that A .D.K. highlights in his brief but
determined that the fifth and sixth factors weighed in favor of certification. With respect
to the fifth factor, the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile
system, the juvenile court noted the significant difference between a sentence of 306

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months of imprisonment, which would be the shortest presumptive sentence if A.D.K. were
certified as an adult and found guilty, and a period of approximately two years, which
would be the time available for programming if A .D.K.’s case was designated an EJJ
prosecution. The juvenile court then reasoned as follows:
This discrepancy is significant. [A.D.K.’s] actions resulted in
the death of one person, and the serious injury of another. The
juvenile justice system cannot provide an adequate punishment
for the crime. The Court is also not convinced that this limited
amount of time would provide adequate time for rehabilitation
for such dangerous behavior.

With respect to the sixth factor, the dispositional options available for the child, the juvenile
court reasoned that, if it were to designate A.D.K.’s case as an EJJ prosecution, “placement
at MCF-Red Wing would be the most appropriate facility as [A.D.K.] requires a structured
and secure environment considering the substantial consequences of his behavior. ” But
the juvenile court noted the evidence that MCF-Red Wing has , in the pas t, provided
programming to only approximately five juveniles who were convicted of murder or
manslaughter, two of whom were only 14 years old, which allowed considerably more time
for programming than would be possible for A.D.K. The juvenile court reasoned that two
years “is inadequate time for rehabilitation considering the gravity of the offense, and as
such does not ensure public safety.”
The juvenile court’s findings and conclusions with respect to the fifth and sixth
factors are supported by the evidence in the record of the certification hearing. Johnson
recommended certification based on all of the statutorily enumerated factors and A.D.K.’s
history. Baburam testified that the adult correctional system had a range of chemical -

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dependency treatment programs available as well as educational and vocational programs.
The state elicited testimony from Meier on cross -examination that MFC-Red Wing had
limited experience with juveniles found guilty of the crimes that have been alleged against
A.D.K.
In addition, A.D.K.’s contentions are in tension with the certification statute, which
requires a juvenile court to put greater emphasis on the first and third factors. See Minn.
Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4. Even if the fifth and sixth factors weigh against certification,
A.D.K. still must overcome the first factor, “the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms
of community protection, including . . . the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim.”
Id., subd. 4(1). The first factor is the dominant factor in this case, and the juvenile court
found that it weighs “heavily” in favor of certification. Indeed, second-degree murder is a
very serious offense with a serious impact , and A .D.K. used a firearm to commit the
offense. In such a case, the risk of an unsuccessful rehabilitation necessarily plays a
significant role in the determination of whether certification serves the interest of public
safety. See P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d at 686 (reversing denial of certification of juvenile charged
with aiding and abetting attempted second -degree murder) . And, as the state argues, a
limited time period in which to provide rehabilitation programming is relevant to the
prospects for successful rehabilitation. See In re Welfare of L.J.S., 539 N.W.2d 408, 412-
13 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Jan. 25, 1996); In re Welfare of K.C. , 513
N.W.2d 18, 23 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. May 17, 1994).
In sum, the juvenile court carefully reviewed the six statutory factors concerning
public safety, did not clearly err in its findings of fact, and did not abuse its discretion in

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balancing the factors and making conclusions of law. Thus, the juvenile court did not err
by granting the state’s motion to certify A.D.K. for prosecution as an adult.
Affirmed.