A18-2070

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2069
A18-2070

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
J. K. and T. C. S., Parents.

Filed May 28, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-JV-18-1563

Brian R. Geis, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for appellant J.K.)

Matthew D. Jorud, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for appellant T.C.S.)

Michelle M. Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Benjamin G. A. Olson, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Otter Tail County Department of Human
Services)

Deanne Raitz, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Smith, T racy M., Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In these consolidated appeals, a ppellant-parents challenge the termination of their
parental rights to their child T.S. Appellants argue that the district court erred in
determining that the statutory c riteria for termination were me t and in determining that

2
termination is in the best interests of the child. Because the re is clear and convincing
evidence in the record to support a statutory basis for termina tion of both parents’ rights
and because the record supports the district court’s determination that termination of each
parent’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child, we affirm.
FACTS
J.K. (mother) and T.C.S. (father) are the parents of T.S., who was born in May 2018.
J.K. and T.C.S. both have other children from prior relationships with other individuals.
T.C.S. is the father of five other children besides T.S. In J anuary 2018, a district
court in Becker County involuntarily terminated T.C.S.’s parent al rights to his fifth child
(born in September 2017) based on a prior conviction for second -degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC). The Becker County District Court terminated his parental rights under
what is now Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(9) (2018), which provides that a district
court may involuntarily terminate a parent’s parental rights if the parent has been convicted
of certain listed crimes incl uding second-degree CSC. The reco rd does not reflect that
T.C.S.’s parental rights were terminated for any of his other children.
J.K. is the mother of four other children besides T.S. Prior to this proceeding, J.K.’s
parental rights to all four of her other children were terminated. She voluntarily terminated
her parental rights to her first child in 2013. Her parental rights to her other children were
involuntarily terminated.
In 2014, a Crow Wing County District Court terminated J.K.’s parental rights to her
second child. The Crow Wing County District Court relied, in part, on two reports written

3
by a psychologist. 1 Among other findings, the psychologist noted that J.K. had an
unrealistic view of her own strengths and limitations, that J.K. showed significant cognitive
limitations that impair her learning ability and judgment, and that J.K. scored poorly on a
test that measures empathy towards children and reversal of par ent-child roles. The
psychologist explained that J.K.’s attitude in these areas was harmful to both the child and
J.K. The psychologist noted that J.K. “continue[d] to reject s erious intervention and
opportunity to learn and change.” The second report specifical ly noted the services that
were provided by the county to J.K. and found that J.K. had not made progress in her mental
health or ability to parent. The psychologist opined in the second report that J.K. was either
incapable of, or unwilling to, take sufficient steps to become a competent parent and that
J.K. was incapable of providing adequate care for the child into the foreseeable future.
The Crow Wing County District Court also found that “[d]ue to [ J.K.’s] low
cognitive functioning a nd psychological disor ders, [J.K.] will not, in the reasonably
foreseeable future, develop the skills necessary to care for th e minor child.” The Crow
Wing County District Court concl uded that clear and convincing evidence supported
several statutory grounds to in voluntarily terminate J.K.’s par ental rights, including that
J.K. was palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child r elationship pursuant to what
is now Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018).
In January 2014, J.K. had a third child in Todd County while the Crow Wing County
termination was pending. Todd County provided services to J.K. By July 2014, about four

1 The reports were drafted by the same psychologist. The first report was written in 2012.
The second report was written in 2013, approximately one year after the first.

4
months after Crow Wing County ter minated her parental rights to the second child, J.K.
was “at best, minimally complying with the case plan.” Consequ ently, Todd County
brought a petition to terminate J.K.’s parental rights to her third child.
J . K . d i d n o t a p p e a r f o r t r i a l i n t h e T o d d C o u n t y m a t t e r . A T o dd County case
manager testified that J.K. failed to appear at meetings or appointments with her. The case
manager also testified that J.K. did not participate in regular or consistent therapy. Another
case manager testified that J.K. could not be coached on proper parenting skills, including
understanding the child’s cues, feeding the child appropriately , understanding the
developmental stages of the child, and showing empathy for the child. The Todd County
District Court found that J.K. ha d a “lack of insight due to me ntal health and perhaps
chemical dependency issues or a combination of and has not been participating in the case
really at all.” In its findings, the Todd County District Cour t also referenced the
psychologist’s reports from the Crow Wing County proceedings. The Todd County
District Court concluded that clear and convincing evidence sup ported several statutory
grounds to involuntarily terminate J.K.’s parental rights to her third child, again including
that J.K. was palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and ch ild relationship pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4).
J.K. became pregnant with a fourth child while the Todd County termination
proceedings were ongoing. The child was born in April 2015. In July 2017, the Manitowoc
County Circuit Court in Wisconsin terminated J.K.’s parental ri ghts to her fourth child.
The Wisconsin court found that J.K. was “unfit.” The court noted that a Wisconsin social
services agency had provided a wi de range of parenting and othe r supportive services to

5
J.K. Even with these efforts to assist J.K., the circuit court concluded that it would be
contrary to the child’s welfare to return to J.K.’s home.
In December 2017, approximately fi ve months after J.K.’s parent a l r i ght s t o he r
fourth child were terminated, respondent Otter Tail County Department of Human Services
(the agency) learned that J.K. wa s pregnant with her fifth chil d, T.S. Due to J.K.’s four
previous parental-rights terminations, the agency opened a child welfare assessment while
J.K. was pregnant. The assessment was voluntary, and both J.K. and T.C.S. were interested
in participating in services offered by the agency. After the initial assessment, the agency
assigned a case manager to J.K. and T.C.S.
The case manager met with J.K. and T.C.S. and developed a servi ce plan in
February 2018. At that time, J.K. was attending pregnancy supp ort classes. The service
plan recommended that J.K. (1) continue attending the classes, (2) complete a diagnostic
assessment relating to her mental health, and (3) receive publi c health nursing services
through Healthy Families of America. J.K. complied with only the first part of her service
plan. She continued to attend pregnancy support classes, but s he never provided a
diagnostic assessment to the case manager. And although she was scheduled to meet with
Healthy Families of America several times, the program stopped providing services to J.K.
because of her lack of participation.
For T.C.S., the service plan recommended that he continue menta l-health therapy
and chemical-dependency treatment and that he complete sex-offe nder treatment. T.C.S.
complied with the first two recommendations but never completed sex-offender treatment.

6
T.S. was born on May 31, 2018. On June 1, the agency filed a p etition with the
Otter Tail County District Court to terminate both parents’ par ental rights to T.S. under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). 2 The petition alleged that both parents were
palpably unfit. The agency also requested immediate custody of T.S., which the district
court granted.
Following a June 5, 2018 emergenc y care hearing, the district c ourt relieved the
agency of its duty to provide services for J.K. and T.C.S. The reafter, the agency did not
provide any formal reunification services, but did facilitate s upervised parenting time for
both parents. Until August 2018, J.K. was allowed two supervised parenting sessions per
week. After J.K. missed several parenting sessions and cancell ed other sessions on short
notice, the district court author ized the agency to reduce J.K. ’s parenting time to one
session per week. T.C.S. was also allowed parenting time. T.C.S. participated in parenting
time the week after T.S. was born but stopped scheduling parent ing time until
mid-September 2018. After he resumed parenting time, he also m issed sessions or
cancelled sessions late. Consequ ently, the agency also reduced his allowed parenting
sessions to once per week.
The district court found that J.K. and T.C.S. were “generally” appropriate during
their parenting sessions. The case manager and the child’s gua rdian ad litem, however,
noted some concerns over the parents’ parenting during the sess ions. The case manager
described that J.K. once attempted to unilaterally change T.S.’s formula despite knowledge

2 The agency later orally amende d their petition to seek termina tion of T.C.S.’s parental
rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(9) based on T.C.S.’s CSC conviction.

7
that T.S. was suffering from stomach issues. The guardian ad litem recounted an incident
in which J.K. attempted to calm T.S. by bouncing him. As T.S. continued to fuss, J.K.
bounced him faster, ultimately causing T.S. to become so upset that he started crying. The
case manager also discussed that T.C.S. appeared to be overwhel med at times during the
parenting sessions.
The trial on the termination petition was held in October 2018. The agency called
a therapist to testify about par ental-capacity evaluations that she and two other
professionals conducted with J.K . and T.C.S. The parental-capa city-evaluation reports
were thorough and contained a significant amount of information about each parent’s
mental health, chemical-use history, relationship history, othe r children, and previous
parental-rights terminations, am ong other categories of informa tion. The reports
concluded that neither J.K. nor T.C.S. were presently able to independently parent in a safe
way.
The parental-capacity-evaluation report regarding J.K. raised c oncerns that were
similar to those raised in the psychologist’s reports from the Crow Wing County
proceedings. Interpreting a series of psychometric tests, the report opined that J.K. “lacks
insight into her own behavior and was trying to create an unusu ally favorable impression
of herself [when taking a test].” J.K. “showed a tendency to d eny personal problems,
symptoms, and negative feelings, and responded to test items defensively.” Multiple tests
suggested that J.K. was likely not being honest in answering qu estions during her
assessment. In a test that measured J.K.’s risk level for violence, J.K. scored in the “severe
problem or violent range” on the “violence scale.” Another tes t measured J.K.’s “Full

8
Scale IQ.” The test results suggested that J.K.’s abilities to p l a n , s t r a t e g i z e , a n d s e t
priorities were “impaired.” The t ests also suggested that J.K. had difficulty perceiving
social cues and that J.K. needed support with “complex daily living tasks.”
The report included a section de voted to diagnostic impressions . T h e r e p o r t
identified that J.K. struggled with several mental-health diagnoses. J.K. told the therapist
that she was participating in i ndividual therapy, but she could not describe what progress
she was making, and moreover she stated that she had only begun therapy the week before
the therapist interviewed her. T he report also summarized J.K. ’s criminal history, which
spanned from 2008 to 2017. J.K. discussed with the therapist t wo incidents that occurred
in February 2017 and June 2017 in which J.K. hit her then-boyfr iend in the head with a
cowboy boot and a telephone, respectively. J.K., however, denied to the therapist that she
struggled to manage her anger.
Though a parental-capacity evalu ation would typically include a parent-child
interaction observation, J.K. did not work with the therapist t o schedule an observation
session.
The report concluded that J.K. was not “appropriate to parent a ny children, at this
time.” The therapist wrote that J.K. was “struggling with Seve re and Persistent Mental
Illness (SPMI) which must be addressed and managed before she c ould be considered
appropriate to parent any children, including any born to her in the future.”3 The therapist
made several recommendations about how J.K. could work towards being able to parent

3 The therapist noted in the report that J.K. had expressed to others that she was attempting
to conceive a sixth child while this case was pending.

9
independently. One of those recommendations was that J.K. be a ppointed a guardian as
soon as possible. The therapist testified that, among other pr oblems, J.K.’s difficulty
managing impulsivity, regulating emotion, and making mature judgments were significant
concerns for parenting.
The therapist also prepared a pa rental-capacity-evaluation report for T.C.S. The
report discussed T.C.S.’s crimina l history, which included a 19 98 conviction for
second-degree CSC. T.C.S. was reincarcerated in 2013 for faili ng to register as a sex
offender. T.C.S. told the thera pist that he tried to complete sex-offender treatment while
in prison for his CSC conviction, but that he was “kicked out” of the program. At the time
of the parental-capacity evaluation, T.C.S. did not believe tha t he needed sex-offender
treatment and refused to participate in such programming.
T.C.S. discussed his history of c hemical abuse with the therapi st. He said that he
last used marijuana and methamphetamine in December 2017 and th at he “used to love
meth.” After he used drugs in December 2017, he completed chem ical-dependency
treatment in July 2018. He claimed that he had been sober since December 2017.
T.C.S. had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, but he did not believe that this
diagnosis was accurate. Neverthel ess, T.C.S. took his medicati ons as prescribed. He
received therapy from February 2 018 to June 2018, but his thera py file was closed in
September 2018 because T.C.S. did not consistently appear for appointments.
T.C.S.’s evaluation included a p arenting-observation component, w h i c h T . C . S .
completed. No significant concerns about T.C.S.’s parenting ab ility arose during the
observation. But the report concluded that T.C.S. was not able to appropriately parent T.S.

10
The primary concern regarding T. C.S.’s ability to parent was hi s “history of unhealthy
choices and lifestyle.” The report also noted that T.C.S.’s chemical-dependency prognosis
was “guarded,” due to his history of relapse. The report identified T.C.S.’s lack of stable
housing as a concern. Finally, the report recommended that T.C.S. complete sex-offender
treatment and resume individual therapy to address his mental-health issues. The therapist
opined that if T.C.S. genuinely followed the recommendations, T.C.S. could become able
to appropriately parent.
The only other witness that the a gency called was the parents’ case manager. The
case manager testified that she did not believe that J.K. had improved in any of the concerns
that led to the prior terminations. She further testified that she did not believe that J.K. or
T.C.S. were, at the time of trial, able to provide for T.S.’s p hysical, mental, or emotional
needs. The case manager was “hesitant to believe” that T.C.S. would follow through with
the recommendations in the report, and expressed concern over T .C.S.’s sobriety, his job
security, and his housing stability. The case manager was even less optimistic about J.K.’s
ability to parent, opining that J.K. could not become fit to parent. She believed that there
was no “combination of services that [the agency] would provide that would allow [J.K.]
to appropriately parent at any time in the near future.” The c ase manager testified that if
J.K. and T.C.S. retained their parental rights, T.S.’s “safety and wellbeing would be at
risk.”
The child’s guardian ad litem submitted a written filing after trial. The guardian
supported the petition to terminate the parents’ parental rights. She opined that it is in the
child’s best interests to terminate J.K. and T.C.S.’s parental rights based on the information

11
in the parental-capacity assessments, the trial testimony, and the guardian’s interactions
and observations with both parents.
J.K. called several witnesses to testify that she is fit to par ent. Her boyfriend
testified that she is a great mother and that she regularly cares for her friends’ children. He
said that J.K. did not use drugs or alcohol, but admitted that he had recently been convicted
of a drug crime. He had only known J.K. for about eight months , since February 2018.
J.K.’s mother testified that J.K. is appropriate in her interac tions with other peoples’
children and that she had seen J. K. feed children and change di apers. J.K.’s neighbor
testified that she sometimes lea ves her children in J.K.’s care . She said that J.K. is good
with her children and that her children enjoy spending time with J.K.
J.K. testified that she had been drug-free for seven years and alcohol-free for five
years. She said that she had been attending therapy with two d ifferent therapists. She
claimed that she completed an independent diagnostic assessment that did not recommend
any additional health services but she did not provide a copy of the assessment to the court
or her case worker. She testified that she has a demanding wor k schedule and that T.S.
would go to daycare or stay with her mother while she is at wor k. She explained that she
was unable to make parenting-time appointments because of her demanding work schedule
and, on one occasion, because she was ill. She also testified that she had no issues taking
care of others’ children and that she made meals for the childr en, took them to the park,
and got them clothes. She also stated that she knows how to change diapers and feed, burp,
and bathe a baby. She expressed that she would be willing to follow any recommendation
made by the agency, but that she did not believe she needed a guardian. She did not believe

12
that she had any intellectual disability, and thought that she had “come a long way” since
the prior termination cases. J.K . did not present any testimon y from a therapist or other
professional regarding the concerns that were raised in her pri or termination proceedings
or her progress addressing those concerns.
T.C.S. did not present any evidence or testimony. After trial, T.C.S. was involved
in a car accident. The accident occurred on the same day as tr ial. T.C.S. tested positive
for methamphetamine and was taken into custody for violating probation.4
The district court found that th e agency’s witnesses and the pa rental-
capacity-evaluation reports were highly credible, and relied he avily on the information
contained in the reports in maki ng findings in its post-trial o rder. The district court
assigned “very little weight” to J.K.’s witnesses’ testimony. The district court concluded
that J.K. is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship and that termination
of her parental rights is appropriate under Minn. Stat. § 260C. 301, subd. 1(b)(4). The
district court concluded that T.C.S. is also palpably unfit, and moreover found that T.C.S.
had been convicted of a crime listed in Minn. Stat. § 260.012(g)(5) (2018). Consequently,
the district court concluded that termination of his parental rights is appropriate under both
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b )(4) and Minn. Stat. § 260C.30 1, subd. 1(b)(9). The
district court determined that it is in the best interests of T .S. that both parents’ parental
rights be terminated in light of T.S.’s need for a safe and per manent living arrangement

4 T.C.S. does not challenge the district court’s decision to tak e judicial notice of the
probation violation file indicating that he tested positive for methamphetamine. According
to the district court’s order, T.C.S. admitted to a probation violation and was sentenced to
120 days in jail.

13
and the fact that T.S. was placed out of home when he was only two days old. The district
court issued a written order terminating J.K.’s and T.C.S.’s parental rights.
Both parents challenge the district court’s termination order i n these consolidated
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
J.K. and T.C.S. both argue that the district court abused its discretion in terminating
their parental rights to T.S. Both maintain that the evidence is not sufficient to support the
district court’s determination (1) that a statutory ground for termination exists and (2) that
termination of their parental rights is in T.S.’s best interests. We first address the parents’
arguments regarding the statutory grounds for termination. We then turn to the district
court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interests.
Involuntary termination of paren tal rights is only appropriate if there is clear and
convincing evidence that a statutory ground for termination exists and termination is in the
child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014).
We review a district court’s “termination of parental rights to determine whether the district
court’s findings address the stat utory criteria and whether the district court’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of Children
of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
“[W]e review the factual findings for clear error and the statutory basis for abuse of
discretion.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012). “A
finding is clearly erroneous if it is manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We defer to

14
the district court’s findings, but exercise great caution in proceedings to terminate parental
rights and examine the evidence to determine whether it is clea r and convincing.” In re
Welfare of Child of A.S. , 698 N.W.2d 190, 194 (Minn. App. 2005) (quotation omitted),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 20, 2005). “Considerable deference is due to the district court’s
decision because a district cour t is in a superior position to assess the credibility of
witnesses.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“We review a district court’s ultimate determination that termination is in a child’s
best interest for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d
895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
I. Clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s determination that
J.K. is palpably unfit to parent under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4).

The legislature has identified ni ne separate bases for involunt ary termination of
parental rights. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1)-(9) (2018). One statutory basis for
involuntary termination is if
[the] parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and
child relationship because of a c onsistent pattern of specific
conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly
relating to the parent and child relationship either of which are
determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable, fo r the reasonably foreseeable
future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental,
or emotional needs of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4).
Before a court may terminate parental rights under this provisi on, the petitioner
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is
palpably unfit. In re Welfare of J.W. , 807 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Minn. App. 2011), review

15
denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). Ordinarily, a natural parent is presume d to be “fit to be
entrusted with the care of their children.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 87. But “[i]t is presumed
that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship upon a
showing that the parent’s parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily
terminated.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (emphasis a dded). The presumption
of unfitness imposes a burden of production on the parent to produce evidence to rebut the
presumption. In re Welfare of Child of J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d 241, 245-46 (Minn. App. 2018).
“If the statutory presumption ha s been rebutted, the district c ourt shall find the existence
or nonexistence of the alleged palpable unfitness upon all the evidence exactly as if there
never had been a presumption at all.” Id. at 246 (quotations omitted).
Because of J.K.’s three prior i nvoluntary terminations, the district court determined
that J.K. faced the statutory p resumption of unfitness. The di strict court concluded that
J.K. failed to rebut the presump tion based on the evidence pres ented. The district court
also concluded that clear and convincing evidence exists to terminate J.K.’s parental rights
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). J.K. argues that the district court erred when
it concluded that she failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.
Because the agency presented cl ear and convincing evidence tha t J.K. is in fact
palpably unfit and because the record as a whole supports the d istrict court’s decision to
terminate J.K.’s parental rights on that basis, we need not decide whether J.K. successfully
rebutted the presumption. S e e J . W ., 807 N.W.2d at 447 (noting that once a party has
successfully rebutted the presumption of unfitness, the burden of persuasion shifts back to
the county to prove palpable unfitness by clear and convincing evidence). In concluding

16
that clear and convincing eviden ce supports termination of J.K. ’s parental rights, the
district court made credibility determinations, weighed the evi dence presented by both
parties, and ultimately conclude d that J.K.’s “unaddressed ment al illness, cognitive
deficits, lack of insight, poor decision making, and impulsivity exist as specific conditions
that render her unable, for the r easonably foreseeable future, to appropriately care for
[T.S.’s] ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs.” The district court also found that
[J.K.] continues to suffer from several severe and persistent
untreated mental illnesses. When coupled with [J.K.’s]
cognitive deficits and poor decision making, her poor mental
health puts herself and others around her at risk of harm. This
conclusion is supported by [J.K.’s] parental capacity
evaluation, which . . . recommends that she be assigned a
guardian as soon as possible and that she reside in an adult
foster or group home.

The agency’s evidence, credited by the district court, clearly and convincingly establishes
that specific conditions exist that render J.K. unable to appropriately care for T.S.’s needs,
and that those conditions will exist for the reasonably foreseeable future.
More specifically, the parental-capacity-evaluation report and the testimony of the
therapist who drafted the report clearly and convincingly demon strated that J.K. suffers
from the specific conditions that the court identified—namely, severe and persistent mental
illness, cognitive deficits, lack of insight, poor decision mak ing, and impulsivity. The
report also indicated that J.K. had “demonstrated a history of assaultive behaviors,” which
she attempted to minimize. The r eport thoroughly discussed the se conditions and the
district court found the report to be credible.

17
There is also clear and convincing evidence to support the dist rict court’s
determination that these conditio ns rendered J.K. unable to app ropriately care for T.S.’s
ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs. For example, J.K . repeatedly missed and
cancelled parenting sessions on short notice, failed to schedul e a parent-child observation
session, failed to provide her independent diagnostic assessment to the court and to the case
manager, and failed to consistently meet with the public-health nurse. Her inability to
cooperate with the parental-capacity evaluation and failure to consistently appear for
appointments is consistent with t he report’s indication that J. K.’s ability to plan and
prioritize is “impaired.” The report also noted that J.K. has a demonstrated history of
irritability and aggressiveness, and that she showed a “reckles s disregard for the safety of
her children.” The report went on to recommend that J.K. be as signed a guardian. These
significant concerns and J.K.’s behavior supported the district court’s determination that
her mental-health issues, cogniti ve deficits, lack of insight, poor decision making, and
impulsivity rendered her unable to appropriately care for T.S.
Finally, clear and convincing evidence supports the district co urt’s conclusion that
these conditions will exist for the reasonably foreseeable future. The report noted that J.K.
made only minimal efforts to manage her mental health since her first child was removed
from her care. The report also i ndicated that even though J.K. has subsequently lost her
parental rights to her other children, “she still has not demon strated any insight into her
functioning.” Though J.K. repor ted that she was attending ther apy and that she would
follow the agency’s recommendations in obtaining treatment, she had only recently begun
therapy and there was no evidence that therapy was effective. The case manager testified

18
that she did not believe that J.K. would ever become fit to par ent. J.K.’s history of
non-cooperation, her failure t o improve on these conditions, an d the information in the
parental-capacity evaluation report provide clear and convincin g evidence to support the
district court’s determination that the conditions that rendered J.K. palpably unfit will exist
for the reasonably foreseeable future.
J.K. argues that evidence of her sobriety, stable employment, a dequate housing,
reliable transportation, care for others’ children, and ongoing mental-health treatment
undermines the district court’s finding of palpable unfitness, and therefore that clear and
convincing evidence does not support the district court’s determination. The district court
acknowledged that J.K. participat ed in parenting classes while pregnant and attended
therapy, but found that there was no evidence that J.K.’s participation in therapy and other
services were helping to improve her ability to appropriately parent. The finding is not
clearly erroneous. The district court also accepted that J.K. was sober, employed, had
housing, and sometimes cared for others’ children. Even consid ering this evidence, the
district court concluded that t he other conditions that it iden tified rendered J.K. palpably
unfit to parent. The district court also noted that the fact t hat J.K. has cared for others’
children on occasion is not evidence that it is appropriate for her to do so. Considering the
evidence in totality, we conclude that clear and convincing evi dence supports the district
court’s determination that J.K. is palpably unfit to parent. Consequently, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in d etermining that a statutory ba sis exists to involuntarily
terminate J.K.’s parental rights to T.S.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concludi ng that a statutory
basis exists to involuntarily terminate T.C.S.’s parental rights to T.S.

The district court found that two separate statutory grounds e xist to involuntarily
terminate T.C.S.’s parental rights to T.S. The district court found that T.C.S. is palpably
unfit under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). The distric t court also found that
grounds exist to terminate T.C. S.’s parental rights under Minn. S t a t . § 2 6 0 C . 3 0 1 ,
subd. 1(b)(9). T.C.S. challenges both of these conclusions, but because we will affirm the
district court’s decision if just one statutory ground exists, we address only the second
basis. See In re Children of T.A.A. , 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005) (“In reviewing a
decision to terminate parental rights, the appellate court dete rmines whether there is clear
and convincing evidence to support at least one statutory ground for termination.”).
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(9) provides that involuntar y termination is
appropriate if the parent has been convicted of a crime listed in Minn.
Stat. § 260.012(g)(1)-(5) (2018). Minn. Stat. § 260.012(g)(5) identifies offenses that
require “registration as a predatory offender under section 243 .166, subdivision 1b,
paragraph (a) or (b).” Second-d egree CSC is an offense that re quires registration as a
predatory offender under that se ction. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii) (2018)
(listing offenses that require registration as a predatory offender, including second-degree
CSC).
T.C.S. does not dispute that he h as been convicted of a crime l isted in Minn.
Stat. § 260.012(g)(1)-(5). Instead, T.C.S. argues that the district court erred in terminating

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his rights based on Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(9) becau se the district court failed
to consider the facts underlying the conviction.
T.C.S.’s argument lacks merit. T he statute only requires the d istrict court to find
that the parent has been convicted of a listed offense. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(9). Because T .C.S. does not dispute the fact that h e has been convicted of
second-degree CSC, a listed offense, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing
to consider the facts underlying the offense in determining that the conviction served as a
statutory basis to involuntarily terminate his parental rights.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in conclud ing that it is in T.S.’s
best interests to terminate both parents’ parental rights.

Both parents argue that the district court abused its discretio n in ordering
termination of their parental rights because the evidence is insufficient to support its finding
that termination of parental rights is in T.S.’s best interests.
J.K. argues that her participation in classes and therapy, stab le employment,
housing, access to transportation, sobriety, care for others’ children, and ability to manage
money undermine the district court’s finding regarding the child’s best interests.
T.C.S. argues that the evidence at trial showed that he was not struggling with sexual
issues that would affect his ab ility to parent, that he was tak ing prescribed medication to
address his mental health, that he had recently completed chemical-dependency treatment,
and that he acted appropriately in parenting sessions with T.S. T.C.S. also argues that the
district court’s findings regarding T.S.’s best interests are not sufficiently specific.

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Involuntary termination is only proper when “at least one statu tory ground for
termination is supported by cl ear and convincing evidence and the termination is in the
child’s best interest.” R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137. “[T]he best interests of the child must
be the paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301. subd. 7 (2018). In determining
whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best i nterests, “the court must
balance three factors: (1) the c hild’s interest in preserving t he parent-child relationship;
(2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent child relationship; and (3) any competing
interest of the child.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (quotation omitted). “Competing interests
include such things as a stable environment, health considerati ons and the child’s
preferences.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Where the interests of the parent and child conflict,
the interests of the child are paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. “We review a
district court’s ultimate deter mination that termination is in a child’s best interest for an
abuse of discretion.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
Here, the district court specifically found that it “is in the best interests of [T.S.] to
terminate the parental rights of [J.K.] and [T.C.S.].” In reac hing this determination, the
district court considered T.S.’s need for a safe and permanent living arrangement. The
district court noted that the record demonstrated that the circ umstances that led to T.S.’s
out-of-home placement were likely to continue for a prolonged, indefinite time. The
district court also considered t hat T.S. was placed with foster parents when he was only
two days old. The district cour t found that T.S. had only limi ted contact with his parents
and even less contact with other biological family members. The district court concluded
that under these circumstances, the benefits to T.S. from terminating the parents’ parental

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rights outweigh the parents’ and child’s interests in preservin g the parent-child
relationship.
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that it is in T.S.’s
best interests to terminate the parental rights of both parents . With regard to J.K., the
district court recognized J.K.’s interest in parenting T.S. but found that J.K.’s unaddressed
mental illness, cognitive deficits, lack of insight, poor decis ion making, and impulsivity
put herself and others around he r at risk. The district court’ s findings and conclusions
demonstrate that it balanced the c h i l d ’ s i n t e r e s t s , J . K . ’ s i n t erests, and any competing
interests before ultimately concluding that “the benefits to the child that will result from a
termination of parental rights will outweigh the parent or chil d’s interests in preserving
their parent-child relationship.” Clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s
findings. The district court’s conclusion that terminating J.K .’s parental rights is in the
child’s best interests was well within its discretion.
The district court also acted within its discretion in determi ning that it is in T.S.’s
best interests to terminate T.C.S.’s parental rights. The dist rict court considered T.C.S.’s
chemical-dependency issues and lack of stable housing, specifically noting that T.C.S. had
used methamphetamine immediately after trial. Moreover, the di strict court expressly
noted that T.C.S.’s appropriate behavior at observed parenting sessions was not sufficient
to overcome the other concerns that it identified about T.C.S.’s ability to parent. Clear and
convincing evidence supports the district court’s findings. Ag ain, the district court’s
factual findings relating to T.C .S. addressed the three factors relevant to a child’s best
interests. Considering these f acts and circumstances, we concl ude that the district court

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also acted within its discretion in determining that terminatio n of T.C.S.’s parental rights
is in T.S.’s best interests.
In sum, clear and convincing evidence supports the district co urt’s determination
that statutory grounds exist t o involuntarily terminate both J. K.’s and T.C.S.’s parental
rights. The record also supports the district court’s finding that termination of parental
rights is in the child’s best interests. Accordingly, we concl ude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in ordering termination of both J.K. and T.C.S.’s parental rights.
Affirmed.