James R. Waclawik, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2071

James R. Waclawik,
Relator,

vs.

Viking Coca-Cola Bottling Company,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed September 30, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 36661734-3

James R. Waclawik, Moorhead, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Anthony Domenic Todero, Baird Holm LLP, Omaha, Nebraska (for re spondent Viking
Coca-Cola Bottling Company)

Katherine Conlin, Anne B. Froelic h, Department of Employment an d Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Department of Employment and
Economic Development)

Considered and decided by Larki n, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by app ointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Relator James Waclawik appeals from the determination of an un employment-law
judge (ULJ) that relator is ine ligible for unemployment benefit s because no statutory
exception applies entitling relato r to benefits notwithstanding his having quit his
employment. Relator argues that he was compelled to quit by a medical condition or,
alternatively, by a good reason caused by his employer. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator was employed with Viki ng Coca-Cola Bottling Company as an account
manager from 1989 until July 13, 2018, when relator quit his employment.1 Relator applied
for unemployment benefits, claiming that a medical condition required that he quit after he
informed Viking of the condition and no accommodation was made. T h e M i n n e s o t a
Department of Employment and Economic Development determined th at relator was
eligible for benefits. Viking appealed the determination, and an evidentiary hearing was
held before a ULJ. Relator tes tified. Lisa Zolin, Viking’s di rector of human resources,
and Mark Jeffers, Viking’s on-premise director, also testified.
Relator testified that he quit because Mr. Jeffers told relator in June of 2018 that he
would need to move out of his first-floor office to an office t hey were going to make
upstairs. Relator testified that Viking wanted to have all of the sales managers on the first
floor and “apparently I was considered non-management.” He testified that everybody was

1 Relator informed Viking that he quit on July 2, 2018, but was employed with Viking
through July 13, 2018 by way of vacation time.

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well aware that he suffered from a medical condition since 2005 when he was diagnosed
with silicosis, a lung disease. Relator added that his lung disease had a lot to do with him
not wanting to move to an office upstairs because the office building had no elevator.
Relator testified that, after be ing asked to move offices, he d id not explain to
Mr. Jeffers that his medical condition would make it difficult for him to office upstairs.
Rather, relator explained that h e did not think he should have to move because he felt he
was part of management and had been with Viking a long time. R elator stated that
Ms. Zolin came to the office a m onth later and told him he had to move out of his office
because they wanted all management to be on the same floor. Relater testified that he did
not tell Ms. Zolin about his lung condition at that time because he “was just so upset about
the other facts of everything else.” Relator’s wife later sent Ms. Zolin a letter explaining
relator’s lung condition. Ms. Zolin told relator that she want ed to speak to him directly
about the concerns his wife had raised.
Relator testified that he had a phone conversation with Ms. Zolin and Mr. Jeffers a
few days later and, while he was not sure what was said, he remembered being “very, very
upset and very hurt.” When the ULJ asked relator if he explained that his medical condition
made it hard for him to work on the third floor, relator replied that “I never brought that up
at that time.” When asked why he never made it clear that he could not work out of a third-
floor office because of his medical condition, relator replied, “Um, I guess I don’t know.”
Relator testified that he did not provide any reason for quitting, but “just put in my notice.”
Ms. Zolin testified that she and another manager at the office met with relator for
over an hour on June 20. Relator acknowledged that he never di scussed his medical

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condition at that meeting and felt it was unfair that he had to change offices. Relator also
acknowledged that management may not have been aware of his medical condition because
they commenced employm ent with Viking after relator had notifie d the company of his
medical condition in 2005.
On May 31, 2017, relator provided a letter from his doctor that mentions relator’s
silicosis. Relator testified that he provided this letter to Viking as a refresher to understand
his condition. The letter notes that relator “gets short of br eath with bending” and
recommends that relator should only be required to bend over on rare occasions. The letter
does not mention any difficulties relator may have concerning stairs. Relator testified that
he reviewed his employee file with Ms. Zolin on the last day he worked at Viking.
Relator’s file contained no further documentation concerning hi s medical condition and
relator testified that he did no t inform Ms. Zolin that any doc uments were missing. On
July 20, 2018—after relator had quit—he provided Viking with a medical record from May
2016; that record indicates that relator has difficulty using stairs because it makes him short
of breath.
Ms. Zolin testified that she did not become aware that relator’s lung condition was
part of the reason why he did not want to move offices until relator’s wife left a voicemail
with Viking on June 26. Ms. Zolin claimed that, in all prior conversations with relator, he
said only that he felt he had been treated unfairly, and that h e deserved to remain in his
office because of his long tenur e with Viking. Ms. Zolin testi fied that on June 28, when
relator said he was contemplating quitting, she informed him that Viking could find another

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location on the first floor of the building if the issue is really with climbing stairs. Relator
denied at the hearing that he was ever informed that he could stay on the first floor.
Mr. Jeffers testified that he has been aware of relator’s medic al condition since
2005, but that he did not know that walking up and down stairs would be problematic.
Mr. Jeffers testified that Ms. Z olin informed relator on June 2 8 that they would make
accommodations if an upstairs office would not work, but that r elator was very upset and
“stated that he’s probably just gonna to have to quit.”
The ULJ found that relator quit his employment because he was a ngry that Viking
planned to move his office to the third floor. The ULJ found t hat, at the time relator quit,
Viking had offered to permit him to remain officed on the first floor.2 The ULJ also found
that the testimony of Viking’s w itnesses and its written submis sions were more credible
than relator’s evidence. The U LJ explained that the testimony o f Viking’s witnesses was
more logical overall, and therefore more credible. The ULJ not ed that both parties agree
that Viking made employment accommodations in the past concerni ng relator’s medical
condition. Given that history, the ULJ explained that it does not make sense that Viking
would refuse to provide a works pace on the first floor once it understood that relator’s

2 In the section of ULJ’s order providing the “Reasons for Decis ion,” the ULJ wrote that
Viking “offered to allow [relator] to have his office on the second floor.” The record does
not support this statement. But given that the remainder of th e order consistently states
that Viking offered to allow relator to maintain his office on the first floor, including in the
“Findings of Fact,” we are convinced the erroneous statement wa s a typographical error.
Relator’s argument is that he should have remained on the first floor, not that there was a
difference between moving his office to the second floor and moving it to the third floor.

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medical condition made it difficult for him to walk up the stairs. The ULJ determined that
relator is ineligible for unemployment benefits because he quit.
Relator requested reconsiderati on. The ULJ determined that rel ator’s request for
reconsideration repeated argumen ts made during the evidentiary hearing and primarily
argued that the ULJ erred by finding Viking’s witnesses’ testim ony and written
submissions more credible than relator’s. Additionally, the ULJ determined that relator’s
arguments failed to show that the evidence submitted at the hea ring was likely false and
that the likely false evidence had an effect on the outcome of the decision. The ULJ
explained that it had “fully considered [relator’s] request and determined that the decision
of September 27, 2018, is factually and legally correct.”3
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
We may only “reverse or modify the [ULJ’s] decision if the substantial rights of the
[relator] may have been prejudiced because the findings, infere nces, conclusion, or
decision” violate constitutional provisions, exceed the departm ent’s statutory authority,
were made after an unlawful proc edure, are based on an error of law, are unsupported by

3 Notwithstanding this statement, the ULJ’s order denying the re quest for reconsideration
also provides that its initial order and findings are “not correct and are modified as follows.”
(Emphasis added.) But the order then made no significant correction to or modification of
the initial order. The order denying the request for reconsideration is identical to the initial
order except for changing one word: “determination” was modifi ed to “decision.” The
discrepancy is likely the result of using an incorrect template . In any event, relator does
not provide any argument concer ning this inconsistency in the o rder on reconsideration.
The ULJ certainly should have been more careful in drafting the reconsideration order, but
there is no doubt that the ULJ was affirming the earlier order.

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the record evidence, or are arbitrary or capricious. Minn. Sta t. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)
(2018). We review factual findings “in the light most favorabl e to the decision and will
not disturb those findings as long as there is evidence in the record that reasonably tends
to sustain them.” Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc. , 888 N.W.2d 452, 461 (Minn. 2016)
(quotations omitted). “Credibility determinations are the excl usive province of the ULJ
and will not be disturbed on appeal.” Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc. , 721 N.W.2d 340, 345
(Minn. App. 2006). “The determination that an app licant is ineligible for unemployment
benefits based on the facts of the case is reviewed de novo.” Posey v. Securitas Sec. Servs.
USA, Inc., 879 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App. 2016).
“A quit from employment occurs when the decision to end the employment was, at
the time the employment ended, the employee’s.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a) (2018).
Relator concedes that he quit his employment. An applicant who has quit his employment
is ineligible for unemployment benefits unless one of ten excep tions applies. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 1 (2018). Relator argues that there are two exceptions applicable here—
one is that he quit for good reasons caused by the employer and the other is that it was
medically necessary for him to quit.
An applicant who quits employment because of a good reason caus ed by the
employer may be eligible for unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat . § 268.095, subd. 1(1).
A good reason caused by the employer for quitting is defined as a reason: “(1) directly
related to the employment and for which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to
the worker; and (3) that would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become
unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.” Minn. Sta t. § 268.095, subd. 3

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(2018). The good reason exception requires that an applicant “ complain to the employer
and give the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the adverse working conditions
before that may be a good reason caused by the employer for quitting.” Id., subd. 3(c).
Relator asserts that “any reas onable person would choose to qui t rather than deal
with inability to do stairs and jeopardize my limited lung capacity.” Relator maintains that,
contrary to the ULJ’s findings and other witness testimony, Vik ing did not provide any
accommodations after being inform ed of his limitations. But th e ULJ, having heard the
testimony, resolved these discre pancies by making explicit cred ibility determinations.
Wilson, 888 N.W.2d at 460. And we defer to those credibility determi nations. Skarhus,
721 N.W.2d at 344. The ULJ found as a fact that Viking offered to correct the condition
about which relator complained b efore he quit, and the record s upports this finding.
Relator does not meet the exception for quitting for a good reason caused by the employer.
An applicant who quits employment “because the applicant’s ser ious illness or
injury made it medically necessa ry that the applicant quit” may be entitled to
unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(7). “Th is exception only applies
if the applicant informs the employer of the medical problem and requests accommodation
and no reasonable accommodation is made available.” Id.
Relator argues that the ULJ disregarded evidence of his seriou s medical condition.
To the contrary, the ULJ found as a fact that relator’s “medica l condition causes him to
experience difficulty breathing when he engages in any type of physical activity.” The
ULJ also noted that relator’s “lungs only work at a 50 percent capacity,” and that “Viking

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was aware of [his] general medic al condition and had offered [h im] several
accommodations in the past.” The record supports these factual findings.
Relator also argues that he presented evidence that he informed his employer of his
medical condition, requested acc ommodation for his condition, a nd no reasonable
accommodations were made available. Relator explains that he had no choice but to leave
his job because it posed a risk to his health and safety, and t hat he no longer was able to
perform an essential part of his job because he did not have access to office space that was
reasonably accessible to him. Relator’s own testimony demonstrates that he did not inform
Viking until June 28—at the ear liest—that his medical condition was the reason he was
unable to work on the third floor. Before then, Viking was awa re of relator’s medical
condition but only generally and only to the extent that a 2017 letter from relator’s doctor
revealed concerns with bending too much. After Viking became aware of relator’s medical
limitations with stairs, the credible witness testimony as foun d by the ULJ demonstrates
that Viking was willing to accommodate relator’s request. We d o not disturb the ULJ’s
record-supported determinations. T h e t h r u s t o f r e l a t o r ’ s t e s t imony supports the ULJ’s
reasoning that relator quit because of his frustration that he was not included in the
reorganization of management on the first floor of the building , and not because Viking
was unwilling to accommodate his health problems.
Relator does not meet any of the statutory criteria that would entitle him to
unemployment benefits notwithstanding his having quit. The ULJ’s decision is supported
by the record.
Affirmed.