State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2073

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bruce Everett Boyd,
Appellant.

Filed May 4, 2020
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-CR-18-690

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brian J. Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
Morrison County deputies su specting that Bruce Boyd was keeping a stolen trailer
in his driveway obtained and executed a warrant to search Boyd’s property and found the

2
stolen trailer. After a jury found him guilty of receiving stolen prope rty and the district
court entered a judgment of conviction, Boyd unsuccessfully petitioned the district court
for postconviction relief. He argu ed to the district court a nd now argues on appeal that
his trial counsel’s failure to challenge th e search warrant’s constitutionality constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. We affi rm because the omitted constitutional challenge
would have failed.
FACTS
The Morrison County Sheriff’s Office received a stolen-trailer report in April 2018.
The trailer’s owner, whom we will call Sam Victim, alleged that his gray 2017 utility
trailer had disappeared from outside his Little Falls home. Victim gave officers a detailed
description of the stolen trailer, and his wife posted a picture of the trailer on Facebook.
Victim soon received a response from a ma n we will call Joe Observer. Observer
told Victim that he “thinks [Victim’s] stolen trailer is sitting at Bruce Boyd’s residence off
Lake Camile Drive” in Randall, which is about ten miles from Little Falls. Victim relayed
that information to the sheriff’s office.
Deputy Mark Dzieweczynski investigated. He drove by Boyd’s property, saw Boyd
standing outside his home, and noticed a gray trailer sitting near the house. The deputy
turned around and drove back to Boyd’s house, but Boyd wa s nowhere in sight. Deputy
Dzieweczynski could see from the road that someone had begun spray-painting the trailer
green and partially covered it w ith a tarp. He went to Boyd’s front door to discuss the
trailer. The door sat wide open, but Boyd di d not come to speak w ith the deputy. Deputy
Dzieweczynski reported what he saw to his supervisor, who knew that Boyd had a history

3
of keeping stolen property at his home and had previously been arrested for it. The
supervisor drafted an affidavit detailing the circumstances just outlined and applied for a
search warrant.
The district court issued the search warrant, and deputies executed it. They
approached and closely examined the trailer. They saw that it matched the description of
Victim’s trailer, including customizing details (D-rings installed in the corners of the bed
to secure items) and damage details (a missing rivet, damaged clamps, and a defect in the
wood near one of the D-rings). The state charged Boyd with receiving stolen property, and
a jury found him guilty, disbe lieving Boyd’s claim that he had bought the trailer from a
friend. The district court sentenced Boyd to 60 months in prison. Boyd appealed, and we
stayed the appeal at Boyd’s request so he could pursue postconviction relief. Boyd’s
postconviction petition questioned the quality of his trial counsel’s assistance. The district
court denied Boyd’s petition.
D E C I S I O N
Boyd challenges the district court’s de nial of his postcon viction petition. We
ordinarily review a district court’s decision denying a petition for postconviction relief for
an abuse of discretion. Reed v. State , 925 N.W.2d 11, 18 (M inn. 2019). But when a
convicted defendant first files a direct appeal that is stayed to allow him to file a
petition for postconviction relief, we will apply the standard of review for direct appeals.
See State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn. 2012). Boyd’s postconviction petition
claimed that he suffered constitutionally defici ent assistance of trial counsel. The federal
and state constitutions provide a criminal defendant the right to the assistance of counsel.

4
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. Whether a defendant received ineffective
assistance of counsel involves mixed questions of law and fact, which we review de novo.
State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assi stance of counsel, a convicted defendant
must demonstrate that his counsel’s represen tation fell below an ob jective standard of
reasonableness and that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance. Gates
v. State , 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987). The alleged deficiency here was Boyd’s
attorney’s failure to challe nge the validity of the search warrant on Fourth Amendment
grounds. A defendant claiming ineffective as sistance of counsel based on his counsel’s
failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim must establis h that the constitutional claim
has merit such that it would have affected the outcome of his case. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 2583 (1986). This Boyd has failed to establish.
Boyd contends specifically that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed
to challenge the search warrant leading to the discovery of the stolen trailer in his yard. The
contention rests on the alleged lack of probable cause in the warrant affidavit. We limit our
review to assessing whether the judge who i ssued the warrant had a “substantial basis for
concluding that probable cau se existed” based on the to tality of the circumstances,
deferring to the issuing judge. State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 384 (Minn. 2016). The
answer depends on whether the warrant app lication and supporting affidavit would allow
a reasonable person to c onclude that there is a fair pr obability that police would find
evidence of a crime in a particular place. State v. Ruoho , 685 N.W.2d 451, 456 (Minn.
App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004). Factor s bearing on this probability

5
include the nature of the items sought, th e extent of a suspect’s opportunity for
concealment, inferences about where a defendant would keep such items, and information
linking the crime to the place searched. State v. Pierce, 358 N.W.2d 672, 673 (Minn. 1984);
State v. Souto , 578 N.W.2d 744, 747–748 (Minn. 1988 ). Our review satisf ies us that the
totality of the circumstances presented in the warrant affidavit gave the district court a
substantial basis to conclude that there was probable cause that deputies would find
Victim’s stolen trailer in Boyd’s driveway.
First, the information in the affidavit obviously linke d Boyd’s driv eway to the
stolen trailer. The deputy’s corr oborating, direct observation of the trailer, standing on
Victim’s description of the trailer, meant that Victim’s stolen trailer was likely sitting in
Boyd’s driveway. The affidav it drew this connection and described the basis for the
deputy’s knowledge.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Boyd’s suggestion that the information linking
the stolen trailer to his residence was unre liable because the affidavit never established
Observer’s credibility. The suggestion does have some basis, because the affidavit merely
implies that Observer’s knowledge arose fro m his personal observations; Boyd correctly
notices that the affidavit does not expressly de scribe Observer’s basis of knowledge. To
the extent the district court had a justifiable basis to infer that Observer’s knowledge arose
from his personal observations, its reliance on his obs ervations is sound because district
courts can presume that information from a civilian witness is credible. State v. Harris ,
589 N.W.2d 782, 789 (Minn. 1999 ). This is especially so when the witness is apparently
merely a concerned citizen. See State v. McGrath, 706 N.W.2d 532, 540 (Minn. App. 2005)

6
(recognizing that a concerned citizen “acts with an intent to aid law enforcement out of
concern for society or for personal safety” and is generally reliable), review denied (Minn.
Feb. 22, 2006). But we can assu me for the purposes of this opi nion that the district court
could not properly rest its decision on the infe rence. This is because the affidavit plainly
provides the deputy’s basis of knowledge. And we are not moved by Boyd’s effort to
discredit Deputy Dzieweczynski’s corroborati on of the Victim’s report based on the
deputy’s identifying only the type of trailer and its color. Even minimal corroboration of a
witness’s information may be sufficient. State v. Wiley , 366 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn.
1985). And in this case, the deputy’s observa tions are more than corroborative; they
represent his own details linking Boyd’s driv eway and the reported stolen trailer. The
affidavit’s description of the deputy’s observations was enough to allow the issuing judge
to issue the warrant.
Second, not only did Boyd have the opportunity to conceal the stolen trailer, the
deputy’s observations also strongly suggested that Boyd in fact had taken steps to conceal
it. Facts supporting this suspicion include the partial spray-painting and the partial covering
of the trailer with a tarp. The conduct implies guilt, and this factor supports the warrant.
Third, the district court could infer th at Boyd would keep stolen items on the
property. Although a de fendant’s arrest record cannot alone support a probable-cause
determination, an issuing judge may consider a suspect’s criminal history as part of the
totality of the circumstances. See State v. Holiday , 749 N.W.2d 833, 844 (Minn. App.
2008). That the affiant knew th at Boyd had a history of re ceiving and concealing stolen
property at his home supports the probable-cause decision.

7
Fourth, the district court could infer that Boyd intentionally avoided contact with
the deputy immediately after the deputy saw Boyd near the trailer. Boyd reasonably argues
that his conduct “cannot support a sole inference of flight from apprehension.” (Emphasis
added.) That Boyd’s conduct mi ght support some inference other than his fleeing or
avoiding contact with police is immaterial to the fact that it can also support the inference
of his fleeing or avoiding contact with police. And this in turn implies guilt.
On balance, the circumstances embodied in the affidavit readily support the issuing
judge’s probable-cause decision underlying the warrant. Because the affidavit supports the
decision to issue the warrant, challenging the warrant as unconstitutional would have been
a losing proposition. That Boyd’s trial c ounsel did not make th e proposition on Boyd’s
behalf therefore did not constitute ineffec tive assistance. The district court properly
rejected Boyd’s postconvictio n petition. Boyd also submitte d a separate, supplemental
brief with his appellate counsel’s brief, but we will not consider the separate brief because
it includes no discernable argument on any point of law.
Affirmed.