State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2080

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Massoud Amin,
Appellant.

Filed May 4, 2020
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-14532

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Max A. Keller, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant argues that this court must reverse his three convictions for the following
reasons: (1) the record contains insufficient evidence to support the three convictions;
(2) the district court mischaracterized his defense strategy as an alternative -perpetrator

2
defense; (3) the district court made four evidentiary rulings adverse to appellant ; (4) the
district court failed to instruct the jury regarding the defense of impossibility and
incorrectly instructed the jury regarding the definition of marital property ; (5) the district
court sustained respondent’s objections to appellant’s closing argume nt; ( 6) respondent
committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument; and (7) the cumulative
impact of these errors denied appellant a fair trial. None of these arguments has merit, and
we affirm appellant’s three convictions.
FACTS
Appellant Dr. Massoud Amin and Dr. Elizabeth Ambrose married in 1994 . Both
were professors at the University of Minnesota. Dr. Amin has a Ph.D. in system science
and mathematics and worked as the Director of the Technological Leadership Institute. Dr.
Ambrose has a Ph.D. in chemistry and a second in dramatic languages and literatures. She
is an associate professor of medicinal chemistry. Dr. Amin and Dr. Ambrose divorced in
2016. During the informal discovery process in the dissolution matter, Dr. Ambrose and
her attorney learned that two documents produced by Dr. Amin regarding Dr. Amin’s
retirement accounts included false information. After the divorce, respondent State of
Minnesota charged Dr. Amin with one count of attempted theft by swindle and two counts
of aggravated forgery related to the disclosure of these false documents. The charges did
not include an allegation that Dr. Amin forged or altered the documents, only that he uttered
the altered documents. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned guilty verdicts on
all three counts. The district court stayed imposition of sentence, placed Dr. Amin on four

3
years’ probation, and required Dr. Amin to serve 120 days of local incarceration. Dr. Amin
appeals the three convictions.
A. Motion in Limine Regarding Alternative Perpetrator Defense
Prior to trial, the state made a motion to prohibit evidence of an alternative
perpetrator unless Dr. Amin satisfied the procedural requirements for as serting an
affirmative defense:
[T]he State will mov e the Court for an order granting the
following relief:

. . . .

7. Prohibiting testimony or argument tending to suggest that
the person who committed any of the charged offenses was any
person other than Defendant, in the absence of notice by
defense of an affirmative alternative-perpetrator defense and a
sufficient showing that Defendant meets the foundational
requirements to raise such a defense.

During the oral argument regarding this motion, Dr. Amin’s counsel argued that at
trial he would introduce evidence that someone other than Dr. Amin forged the documents
and passed those to Dr. Amin. Dr. Amin’s attorney also acknowledged that in the divorce
trial, Dr. Amin testified that he obtained the documents and then turned them over to his
divorce attorney. The district court granted the motion , ruling that it would “prohibit
testimony or argument that the person who committed any of the charged offenses was
somebody else in the absence of a notice by Defense by affirmative alternative-perpetrator
defense.” Dr. Amin made the requisite disclosures to support his theory that someone other
than Dr. Amin forged the two documents and gave the documents to him.

4
B. Evidence Admitted at Trial Regarding Utterance of Forged Documents
At trial, the parties introduced documentary and testimonial evidence regarding the
dissolution matter and the disclosure of the two forged documents. According to trial
testimony of Dr. Ambrose ’s divorce counsel and other witnesses, a t the time of their
separation, Dr. Amin had a non marital interest in the portion of his retirement assets
acquired prior to the marriage. He al so shared a marital interest in the portion of his
retirement assets acquired after the marriage to Dr. Ambrose. Dr. Ambrose testified that
Dr. Amin was aware of how his retirement investments performed, regularly reviewing his
statement each quarter and sometimes calculating how much retirement income he would
have. According to Dr. Ambrose, she and Dr. Amin regularly discussed the performance
of their retirement accounts, and whether to change their investments.
During the divorce litigation, Dr. Amin’s divorce attorney disclosed two financial
documents: (1) a quarterly ret irement statement dated December 31, 2014 (admitted as
exhibit 15) ; and (2) a letter purportedly written by Steve Cotner dated August 5, 2014
(admitted as exhibit 26) . The December 31, 2014 retirement statement showed that the
marital value of Dr. Amin’s retirement accounts was $745,012.36. The August 5, 2014
letter showed that the premarital value of Dr. Amin’s retirement assets was $361,944.98.
Dr. Amin claimed that he received both exhibits 15 and 26 and then provided them
to his attorney for disclosure to Dr. Ambrose and her divorce attorney.1 Multiple witnesses

1 Dr. Amin did not testify at the criminal trial. Dr. Ambrose’s divorce attorney testified at
the criminal trial and recounted Dr. Amin’s dissolution testimony for the jury. At one
point, Dr. Ambrose’s divorce attorney referred to the dissolution trial transcripts to refresh
her recollection of Dr. Amin’s testimony regarding his receipt and transfer of exhibits 15

5
testified that exhibit 15 was inaccurate and had been altered . One described how the
barcode and the watermark on exhibit 15 had been used prior to 2014, but were no longer
in use when the investment company would have prepared the statement. In addition, the
amounts listed did not add up to the sums represented. The district court received the
correct December 2014 statement into evidence at exhibit 22. The correct statement
reflected a balance of $891,116.44. The actual amount of the marital portion of Dr. Amin’s
retirement assets was $146,104.08 more than the amount reflected in the version of the
December 2014 statement that Dr. Amin disclosed in the dissolution proceeding.
The August 5, 2014 Cotner letter had also been altered . It lacked Mr. Cotner’ s
license number and contact information, had formatting and font differences, and lacked
disclosures and labeling nomenclature required for regulatory compliance. The district
court received the correct version of the letter at exhibit 28. T he correct letter reflected a
balance of $127,557.93. The actual amount of the premarital portion of Dr. Amin’s
retirement assets was $ 234,387.05 lower than the amount reflected in the version o f the
Cotner letter that Dr. Amin disclosed in the dissolution proceedings.
C. Contested Evidentiary Rulings
Dr. Amin challenges four evidentiary rulings that the district court made. First, the
district court prevented Dr. Amin from impeaching a law enforcement witness with
reference to previous versions of the criminal complaint. Prior to the commencement of

and 26. Dr. Amin does not challenge the introduction of his dissolution testimony in this
way. Dr. Amin does not dispute that he gave exhibits 15 and 26 to Dr. Ambrose and her
divorce attorney. Nor does Dr. Amin contest the fact that exhibits 15 and 26 included false
information.

6
trial, the state moved to prohibit Dr. Amin from referring to prior versions of the complaint.
The state argued that th e previous versions of the complaint lacked relevance and would
confuse the jury. Dr. Amin opposed this motion, arguing that previous “different iterations
of inaccurate Complaints” would cast doubt on the integrity of the investigation. The
district court granted the state’s motion, noting that the state could add or subtract charges
during trial and ruling that previous versions of the complaint were irrelevant. After the
direct testimony of law enforcement officer Sergeant Christopher Abbas, Dr. Amin sought
to cross-examine Sergeant Abbas by reference to previous versions of the complaint. The
state objected. Dr. Amin’s counsel argued that t he purpose of this confrontation was to
impugn Sergeant Abbas’s credibility by inquiring about previous versions of the complaint,
which alleged that Dr. Amin violated different statutory provisions and committed different
crimes than those in the final amended complaint . The district court denied this request,
ruling that previous versions of the complaint could not be used to impeach Sergeant Abbas
because the county attorney decided what charges to bring, not Sergeant Abbas.
Second, the district court prohibited Dr. Amin from us ing a document to impeach
an expert witness. David Kiwus testified in the state’s case-in-chief regarding his physical
examination of the December 2014 statement disclosed during the dissolution proceedings.
By physically comparing the different versions of the document, he concluded that the
document had been altered before its disclosure to Dr. Ambrose and her counsel. Mr.
Kiwus testified that he did not determine who altered the false documents . On cross -
examination, Mr. Kiwus agreed that he could not provide any opinion on who altered the
documents, how the document s were altered, or when they were altered. On appeal, Dr.

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Amin argues that the despite this testimony, Mr. Kiwus’s conclusion that the documents
were altered created an inference that Dr. Amin himself forged or altered the documents.
To rebut this inference, Dr. Amin intended to impeach Mr. Kiwus using a document
regarding industry standards for certified fraud examiners like Mr. Kiwus. The standard
practices included determination of the origin of forged documents. The state objected and
the district court sustained the objection.
Third, the district court prevented Dr. Amin from impeaching Dr. Ambrose’s
divorce attorney, Laura Fretland, who testified on behalf of the state. Ms. Fretland testified
that, in her experience, attorneys make requests for attorney fees with some frequency.
However, they do not usually use the threat of conduct-based attorney fees to discourage a
party from pursuing a certain course of litigation conduct. When asked on direct
examination whether “that kind of threat [was] common in divorce litigation,” Ms. Fretland
answered, “Oh, not really, no.” On cross -examination, Ms. Fretland was asked whether
she “testified on direct examination that threats to seek attorney’s fees are not common in
divorce litigation,” and she again said that such requests were not commonly made in that
manner:
Oh, you know, I don’t know. Threats. They’re frequently
requests made for people to pay legal fees, but not i n the
manner that was in that letter, which is designed to discourage
a certain course of conduct versus my lawyer, my client needs
legal fees. That is typical, but going to the statement of if you
pursue something, we are going to seek legal fees, I find that a
lot less common at least in my practice.

Dr. Amin argues that in this testimony, Ms. Fretland characterized Dr. Amin’s request for
attorney fees as “highly unusual” and “extraordinary misconduct.” Dr. Amin then sought

8
to show that requests for attorney fees were not highly unusual or extraordinary by asking
Ms. Fretland about specific occasions in which she had threatened conduct-based attorney
fees during the course of litigating other dissolutions. The state objected and the district
court sustained the objection.
Fourth, the district court precluded Dr. Amin from introducing a letter showing that
he listed Dr. Ambrose as a beneficiary of his retirement plan. The letter stated, “The
University does not maintain beneficiary designations. Therefore I obtained both the TIAA
and Vanguard information via my online access with those two vendors. If you have
specific questions regarding the designations, it would be most efficient to speak directly
with the vendor in question.” The state objected on hearsay and relevancy grounds, and
Dr. Amin argued that the document was a business record. The district court sustained the
objection, finding that the letter contained hearsay within hearsay and rejecting Dr. Amin’s
contention that the letter satisfied the requirements of the business-records exception to the
hearsay rule.
D. Jury Instructions
Dr. Amin also challenges two jury instructions. First, the district court denied Dr.
Amin’s request to instruct the jury regarding the defense of impossibility relating to the
charge of attempted theft by swindle. Dr. Amin requested the following instruction,
modified from model criminal jury instruction 5.03:
Mr. Amin cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit theft
by swindle if, because of the circumstances of the act that the
State calls an attempt, or the means used to perform the act that
the State calls an attempt, commission of the crime was not

9
possible and the impossibility would have been clearly evident
to a person of normal understanding.

The district court found that the facts submitted did not support gi ving an instruction on
the defense of impossibility.
Second, the district court instruct ed the jury regarding the definition of marital
property. Dr. Amin requested that the jury instructions include a sentence from Minnesota
Statutes, section 518.003, subdivision 3(b) (2018), which states, “The extent of the vested
interest shall be determined and made final by the court pursuant to section 518.58.” The
district court concluded that the jury would be confused by the term “vested interest” and
the citation to the division of marital property statute, section 518.58. The district court
gave the following instruction:
Under Minnesota law, upon a dissolution of marriage, the
family court shall make a just and equitable division of the
marital property of the parties; at which time, the extent of the
ownership interests of the parties will be determined and made
final. It shall be conclusively presumed that each spouse made
a substantial contribution to the acquisition of income and
property while they were living together as husband and wife.

The district court also instructed the jury that to convict Dr. Amin of attempted theft by
swindle, the state must show that the “defendant acted with the intention of obtaining for
himself, sole possession of or title to property which Dr. Ambrose was legally entitled.”
E. Closing Arguments
During D r. Amin ’s closing argument, Dr. Amin’s counsel made statements
regarding the state’s failure to prove who made the forged documents . The state objected

10
on the grounds that this misstated the elements of the offense. The district court sustained
the objection.
During the state’s closing argument, the state claimed that Dr. Amin “confessed
under oath” at the dissolution trial that he obtained the forged documents and gave them to
his attorney. The defense approached the bench to pursue an additional rebuttal under
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 26.03, subdivision 12(k), on the basis that the
state’s use of the word “confess” was severe and inflammatory. At the bench, the
prosecutor told the judge that he meant “admitted under oath” rather than “confessed under
oath.” The judge did not permit a rebuttal argument but did give the following instruction
to the jury: “ If the attorneys have said anything in their closings that differ from your
recollection of the evidence, then you should disregard that statement and just p roceed on
your collective recollection of the evidence.” The judge regarded this statement as a
curative instruction and regarded this action as sustaining Dr. Amin’s objection. No further
action was taken before the jury returned its verdict.
D E C I S I O N
Dr. Amin requests reversal of his convictions for the follow ing reasons : (1) the
record contains insufficient evidence to support the three convictions; (2) the district court
mischaracterized his defense as an a lternative-perpetrator defense; (3 ) the district court
made four evidentiary rulings adverse to Dr. Amin; ( 4) the district court failed to instruct
the jury regarding the defense of impossibility and incorrectly instructed the jury regarding
the definition of marital property; ( 5) the district court sustained respondent’s objections
to Dr. Amin’s closing argument; ( 6) the state committed prosecutorial misconduct during

11
its closing argument; and (7) the cumulative impact of these errors denied Dr. Amin a fair
trial.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Dr. Amin argues that the circumstantial evidence of knowledge and intent was
insufficient to support his c onvictions for aggravated forgery and attempted theft by
swindle. We conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence.
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to prove an element of the offense
by circumstantial evidence, we apply the rational hypothesis standard of review . State v.
Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013). The rational hypothesis standard requires
a “review [of] the sufficiency of the evidence using a two-step analysis.” State v. Barshaw,
879 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Minn. 2016). The first step is to “identify the circumstances proved,
deferring to the fact-finder’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection
of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Under the second step, we “independently examine the
reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved . . . to
determin[e] whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt .” Id. (alteration in original) ( quotation
omitted). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the
evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a
reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d
190, 206 (Minn. 2002) . In this second step, no deference is given to the jury’s verdict,
Loving v. State , 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017), although we will not overturn a

12
verdict based on mere conjecture or speculation, State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 480
(Minn. 2010).
Here, the state proved the following circumstances at trial: (1) Dr. Amin has
advanced degrees and is a professor at the University of Minnesota; (2) Dr. Amin was
aware of how his re tirement investments performed, regularly reviewing the statements
each quarter; (3) Dr. Amin and Dr. Ambrose regularly discussed how their retirement
accounts were performing and whether to make investment changes; (4) Dr. Amin had a
nonmarital interest i n a portion of his retirement assets acquired prior to the marriage;
(5) Dr. Amin also shared a marital interest in the portion of his retirement assets acquired
after the marriage; (6) Dr. Amin received exhibits 15 and 26 and then provided them to his
attorney for disclosure to Dr. Ambrose and her divorce attorney; ( 7) exhibit 15 reflected a
value of $745,012.36 for Dr. Amin ’s marital retirement assets; ( 8) exhibit 15 was
inaccurate and had been altered; (9) the correct version of exhibit 15, received into evidence
at exhibit 22, reflected an actual value of $891,116. 44; (10) exhibit 15 understated the
correct value of Dr. Amin’s marital retirement assets by $146,104.08; ( 11) exhibit 26
reflected a value of $361,944.98 for Dr. Amin’s premarital retiremen t assets; (12) exhibit
26 was inaccurate and had been altered; (13) the correct version of exhibit 26, received into
evidence at exhibit 28, reflected a n actual value of $127,557.93; and ( 14) exhibit 26
overstated the correct value of Dr. Amin’s premarital retirement assets by $234,387.05.
Dr. Amin argues that “without any evidence connecting Dr. Amin to the actual
forgeries, it is equally likely that the complainant, Dr. Ambrose, created the altered
documents.” This is not a reasonable inference to draw f rom the circumstances proved.

13
The circumstances proved show that the altered documents would have reduced the value
of the marital estate, thereby significantly reducing Dr. Ambrose’s property award in the
dissolution matter. The suggested inference requ ires a belief that Dr. Ambrose acted
against her own financial interest. In addition, the suggested inference conflicts with Dr.
Ambrose’s testimony that Dr. Amin was aware of how t he investments were performing,
that he regularly reviewed the quarterly s tatements, and that he regularly discussed with
Dr. Ambrose how the retirement accounts were performing and whether to make
investment changes. The reasonable inferences that one can draw from the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except guilt.
II. Alternative-Perpetrator Defense
Dr. Amin argues that the district court incorrectly characterized his “not guilty”
defense as an alternative -perpetrator defense, requiring premature disclosure of defense
strategy and evidence. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in classifying
the defense as an alternative -perpetrator defense, we conclude that the disclosure
requirements for affirmative defenses applied in this case.
We review the district court’s decision to grant the state’s motion in limine for an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Jenkins , 782 N.W.2d 211, 224 (Minn. 2010) ; State v.
Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 20 09). Dr. Amin has the burden of establishing
both an abuse of discretion and prejudice as a result of the erroneous ruling. State v. Amos,
658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003) . A defendant has a constitutional right to present a
complete defens e, Jenkins, 7 82 N.W.2d at 224 , but that right is not absolute, State v.
Hannon, 703 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 2005). Courts may limit the scope of a defendant's

14
arguments to ensure that the defendant does not confuse the jury with misleading
inferences. State v. Davidso n, 351 N.W.2d 8, 13 (Minn. 1984) . In addition, the rules
balance a defendant’s right to present a complete defense with the need to avoid trial by
surprise:
All defense witnesses in a criminal case must be disclosed
pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02. Discovery rules are based
on the proposition that the ends of justice will best be served
by a system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the
maximum possible amount of information with which to
prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibi lity of
surprise at trial and are designed to enhance the search for truth.

State v. Patterson , 587 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Minn. 1998) (quotations omitted). Rule 9.02
requires that any defense that is not a “not guilty” defense must be disclosed in writing
prior to trial. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02, subd. 1(5). 2 “Alternative perpetrator evidence is
admissible if it has an inherent tendency to connect [an] alternative party with the
commission of the crime.” State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Minn. 2004).
In this case, Dr. Amin argues that the district court incorrectly classified his “not
guilty” defense as an alternative perpetrator defense. We agree with the district court. At
the hearing on the state’s motion to require disclosures of affirmative defenses, Dr. Amin’s
counsel argued that, at trial, he would introduce evidence that someone other than Dr. Amin
forged the documents . Dr. Amin’s counsel also acknowledged that they intended to
introduce evidence that someone passed the forged documents to Dr. Amin. Such evidence

2 Although the alternative perpetrator defense is not specifically listed in the rule, it is a
defense “other than that of not guilty” and is similar to the alibi defense. State v. Sailee,
792 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. App. 2010) review denied (Minn. March 15, 2011).

15
would have an “inherent tendency to connect an alternate party with the commission of”
aggravated forgery relating to the December 2014 statement and the August 5, 2014 Cotner
letter. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion characterizing this evidence
as alternative-perpetrator evidence and serving the “ends of justice” by requiring Dr. Amin
to satisfy the procedural requirements that apply to affirmative defenses.3
III. Contested Evidentiary Rulings
Dr. Amin challenges four e videntiary rulings that the district court made. We
conclude that the district did not abuse its discretion in preventing Dr. Amin from
impeaching Sergeant Abbas, Mr. Kiwus, or Ms. Fretland, and that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in excl uding the University of Minnesota letter regarding the
beneficiary of the retirement assets.
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not
be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn.
2003). “On appeal, the appellant has the burden of establishing that the trial court abused
its discretion and that appellant was thereby prejudiced.” Id. Even if the court’s error is
prejudicial, it will not warrant reversal if the erro r was harmless. State v. Blasus , 445
N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 1989) . Whether an error in excluding defense evidence was

3 Defense counsel argues that the anticipated evidence does not constitute alternative -
perpetrator evidence because multiple people can be guilty of uttering the same forged
document at the same time. Dr. Amin cites no legal authority in support of this argument.
Accordingly, we decline to adopt Dr. Amin’s proposed rule, which would restrict the
application of the alternative-perpetrator defense to only a small number of offenses and
which conflicts with our case law protecting a defendant’s right to introduce evidence that
has “an inherent tendency to connect [an] alternative party with the commission of the
crime.” Jones, 678 N.W.2d at 16.

16
harmless depends on whether there is any reasonable doubt the result would have been
different if the evidence had been allowed to be admitted. See id.; see also, e.g., State v.
Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 407 -10 (Minn. 2006) ( affirming as harmless error the
admission of evidence under an improper hearsay exception because the evidence was
admissible under a different exception not mentioned by the district court); State v. Ortlepp,
363 N.W.2d 39, 43 -44 (Minn. 1985) (affirming where a statement was inappropriately
admitted under an impeachment exception but was admissible under the residual
exception); State v. Hogetvedt, 623 N.W.2d 909, 913-14 (Minn. App. 2001) (upholding the
district court’s admission of out-of-court statements because, contrary to the district court’s
ruling, the evidence was not hearsay, and thus admissible), review denied (Minn. May 29,
2001).
First, Dr. Amin argues that the district court erred by preventing him from
impeaching a law enforcement witness by reference to previous versions of the criminal
complaint. Dr. Amin hoped to impeach Sergeant Abbas’s credibility with these documents.
The state objected and moved to prohibit Dr. Amin from referring to previous versions of
the complaint, arguing that the previous versions of the complaint lacked relevance and
would confuse the jury. The district court granted the state’s motion, noting tha t the state
could add or subtract charges during trial and ruling that previous versions of the complaint
were irrelevant. Later the district court sustained the state’s objections to the cross -
examination of Sergeant Abbas on the same grounds. While “credibility evidence is almost
always relevant,” see State v. Blasus , 445 N.W.2d 535, 545 (Minn. 1989) (Kelley, J.,
dissenting), Dr. Amin cannot establish an abuse of discretion because he has not shown

17
that the discrepancies between the final amended compla int and the previous versions
resulted from or included changes to the substance of Sergeant Abbas’s statement. The
county attorney ultimately decides what charges to bring, and the differences between
versions of the complaint could relate to the exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion and not
to changes in Sergeant Abbas’s statement.4
Second, Dr. Amin argues that the district court erred by prohibiting him from using
a document to impeach a n expert witness on fraud. Dr. Amin claims that the direct
examination and Mr. Kiwus’s conclusion that the documents were altered created an
inference that Dr. Amin himself forged or altered the documents. The line of impeachment
inquiry would have addressed this inference. Dr. Amin cannot establish an abuse of
discretion, however, because the testimony did not create an inference that Dr. Amin
created the forged documents. Instead, on both direct and cross -examination, Mr. Kiwus
made clear that he could not provide any opinion on who altered the documents, how the
documents were altered , or when they were altered. The district court acted within its
discretion to exclude impeachment based on the standard practices to investigate the origin
of an altered document.
Third, Dr. Amin also argues that the district court erred by prev enting him from
impeaching the Dr. Ambrose’s divorce attorney who testified on behalf of the state. Dr.
Amin claims that Ms. Fretland characterized his legal strategy and litigation action during

4 Even assuming that the district court did commit error, we conclude that it was harmless
error because the evidence was properly excluded on a separate ground: it w ould likely
confuse the jury. See, e.g., Robinson, 718 N.W.2d at 407-10.

18
the dissolution matter as “highly unusual” and “extraordinary misconduct.” Dr. Amin
hoped to impeach this witness by referring to examples in which she herself had engaged
in similar legal strategy and threatened to seek attorney fees. Dr. Amin cannot establish an
abuse of discretion regarding this witness because his argument mischaracterizes her
testimony. When asked on direct examination whether “that kind of threat [was] common
in divorce litigation,” Ms. Fretland answered, “Oh, not really, no.” On cross-examination,
Ms. Fretland was asked whether she “testified on direct examination that threats to seek
attorney’s fees are not common in divorce litigation,” and she again said that such requests
were not commonly made in that manner. Ms. Fretland did not characterize Dr. Amin’s
litigation conduct as “highly unusual” or as “extraordinary misconduct.” The district court
acted within its discretion in preventing Dr. Amin from impeaching Ms. Fretland.
Fourth, Dr. Amin argues that the district court erred by precluding him from
introducing a letter showing that Dr. Amin listed Dr. Ambrose as a beneficiary of his
retirement plan. Dr. Amin argued that the letter, written by an employee of the University
of Minnesota , satisfied the business -records exception to the hearsay rule. The district
court rul ed that the letter contained double hearsay and excluded it. Dr. Amin cannot
establish an abuse of discretion regarding the district court’s decision to exclude the letter
because the text of the letter itself shows it does not satisfy the requirements of the business-
records exception. For the business-records exception to apply, “a qualified witness must
testify that the records were kept in the course of a regularly -conducted business activity,
and that it was the normal practice of that business to keep such records.” In re Welfare of
Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 95 (Minn. App. 2012). In this case, the letter stated, “The

19
University does not maintain beneficiary designations. Therefore I obtained both the TIAA
and Vanguard information via my onli ne access with those two vendors. If you have
specific questions regarding the designations, it would be most efficient to speak directly
with the vendor in question.” The district court did not abuse its discretion because the
letter itself indicated that the University of Minnesota did not keep records of the
beneficiary information.
IV. Jury Instructions
Dr. Amin argues that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding
the defense of impossibility and incorrectly instructed the jury regarding the definition of
marital property. We conclude that the district court did not exceed its broad discretion
and properly instructed the jury.
“The district court has broad discretion in determining jury instructions and we will
not reverse in the absence of abuse of discretion.” Hilligoss v. Cargill, Inc., 649 N.W.2d
142, 147 (Minn. 2002). “District courts are allowed considerable latitude in selecting
language used in the jury charge and determining the propriety of a specific instruction.”
Morlock v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 650 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Minn. 2002).
In this case, Dr. Amin initially argues that the district court should have instructed
the jury as to the defense of impossibility relating to the attempted theft by swindle charge.
The district court correctly denied the requested instruction because the defense of
impossibility does not apply to an attempt. Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 2 (2018); see also
State v. Bird, 285 N.W.2d 481, 482-83 (Minn. 1979) (recognizing that neither fa ctual nor
legal impossibility is a defense to an attempt charge).

20
Dr. Amin also argues that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury regarding
the definition of marital property. Dr. Amin requested that the jury instructions include the
following quoted sentence from Minnesota Statutes, section 518.003, subdivision 3(b) :
“The extent of the vested interest shall be determined and made final by the court pursuant
to section 518.58.” The district court concluded that the jury would be confused by the
term “vested interest” and the citation to the divis ion of marital property statute . The
district court gave the following instruction instead:
Under Minnesota law, upon a dissolution of marriage, the
family court shall make a just and equitable divisi on of the
marital property of the parties; at which time, the extent of the
ownership interests of the parties will be determined and made
final. It shall be conclusively presumed that each spouse made
a substantial contribution to the acquisition of inco me and
property while they were living together as husband and wife.

The district court acted within its broad discretion and considerable latitude when it
instructed the jury that the family court will determine the ownership interests of the parties
upon a dissolution of marriage. We conclude that the instruction accurately stated the law.
V. Objection to Dr. Amin’s Closing Arguments
Dr. Amin argues that the district court erred in sustaining objections to his closing
argument. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the
state’s objection.
“We review a district court’s restricting the scope of a closing argument for an abuse
of discretion.” State v. Caldwell, 815 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied
(Minn. June 27, 2012). “Courts may limit the scope of a defendant’s arguments to ensure

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that the defendant does not confuse the jury with misleading inferences.” Atkinson, 774
N.W.2d at 589.
In this case, counsel for Dr. Amin argued in closing that the s tate failed to prove
who made the forged documents. The state objected on the grounds that this misstated the
elements of the offense. The elements of the offense of uttering a forged document do not
require the state to prove who made the forged documen t or that the person uttering the
document also forged the document. Minn. Stat. § 609.625, subd. 3 (2014). It was not
abuse of discretion for the district court to determine that Dr. Amin’s suggestion to the
contrary would confuse the jury regarding the elements of the offense.
VI. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Dr. Amin argues that the state committed prosecutorial misconduct during its
closing summation. Because any error was harmless, we do not reverse the convictions.
This court will reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct “only when the
misconduct, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, was so serious and prejudicial
that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired.” State v. Johnson, 616
N.W.2d 720, 727-28 (Minn. 2000). Objected-to prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed for
harmless error. State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2000).
In this case, the state claimed that Dr. Amin “confessed under oath” at the
dissolution trial that he obtained the forged documents and gave them to his attorney. Dr.
Amin objected and requested a rebuttal argument because the state used the word
“confessed” instead of a more neutral verb, such as “testified.” The evidence presented at
trial showed that Dr. Amin did, in fact, testify that he obtained the forged documents and

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gave them to his attorney. The judge did not permi t a rebuttal argument but did gi ve the
following instruction: “If the attorneys have said anything in their closings that differ from
your recollection of the evidence, then you should disregard that statement and just proceed
on your collective recollection of the evidence.” We conclude that give n this instruction,
and the evidence showing that Dr. Amin testified that he obtained the forged documents
and gave them to his attorney, any error in the prosecutor’s statement was harmless.
VII. Cumulative Impact
Dr. Amin argues that the cumulative imp act of the above alleged errors deprived
him of a fair trial and warrants reversal of his convictions and remand for a new trial. While
appellate courts generally review each independent alleged error, we have recognized that
the cumulative effect of multiple errors can require reversal. See, e.g., State v. Peterson,
530 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. App. 1995) (quoting State v. Post , 512 N.W.2d 99, 104
(Minn. 1994)). In this case, however, Dr. Amin has failed to establish any trial errors that
warrant reversal.
Affirmed.