State of Minnesota,

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-2086

Court of Appeals Hudson, J.

State of Minnesota,

R e s p o n d e n t ,

vs. Filed: July 29, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts
Kristin Ann Altepeter,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Gregory A. Widseth, Polk County Attorney , Scott A. Buhler, A ssistant Polk County
Attorney, Crookston, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
Minnesota Statutes § 609.377 (2018), does not require the State to prove that a
defendant’s use of unreasonable force o ccurred in the course of punishment.
Affirmed.

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O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
The question presented in this case is whether the “malicious punishment of a child”
statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.377 (2018), requires the State to prove not only that a defendant
used unreasonable force but that the defendant did so in the course of punishment. The
court of appeals held that it does not. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Kristin Altepeter ran an in-hom e day care business in Crookston. On
June 15, 2018, Altepeter had several children at her home for day care, including 4-year
old J.V.R. Altepeter’s property included a fenced-in yard with a set of monkey bars and a
wooden picnic table. Normally, Altepeter allowed the children to play on the monkey bars
in her yard, but that afternoon the picnic ta ble sat on top of the monkey bars. The picnic
table had been moved to the top of the monkey bars so that Altepeter could mow the grass,
but no one was around to help her move the picnic table when she finished.
When Altepeter went outside with the child ren that afternoon, J.V.R. went over to
the monkey bars and tried to push the table off so that he could use the equipment.
Altepeter told J.V.R. to stop, and he climbed back down a nd ran across the yard, sticking
his tongue out at Altepeter in a way that sh e described as “sassing” or “mocking.” When
Altepeter saw J.V.R. a few minutes later, he was, again, on the monkey bars, trying to push
the table out of the way to play on the equipmen t. She again told him to get off the bars.
J.V.R complied, and then tried for a third time to run back to the monkey bars. J.V.R. was
talking back and telling Altepeter he could go on the monkey bars.

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Altepeter kneeled down in the grass, held onto J.V.R.’s arms with her hands, and
told him that he could not use the monkey bars . J.V.R. was in front of Altepeter at the
time, was not on the monkey bars, and was not in any immediate danger. When Altepeter
let go of J.V.R., she saw that her grip had le ft marks on both his arms. She then sent him
to a time-out.
J.V.R.’s aunt picked him up at the end of the day. Al tepeter told her about the
bruises on J.V.R.’s arms. When Altepeter expl ained to the aunt what happened, she said
that “she told [J.V.R.] not to go on the monkey bars because she had a picnic table up there
and he stuck his tongue out at her a couple of times, so she was trying to make him look at
her.” Later in the evening, J.V.R.’s mother took him to the emergency room to make sure
he was okay.
Personnel in the emergency room called the Crookston Police consistent with their
responsibilities as mandatory child-abuse reporters under Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat.
§ 626.556 (2018).1 An officer responded to the hosp ital, where she took photos of the
bruises on J.V.R.’s arms and spoke with both J.V.R. and hi s family. Two days later, the
officer went to Altepeter’s home and interviewed her about the incident.
Respondent the State of Minn esota charged Altepeter with one count of malicious
punishment of a child—less than substantial bo dily harm, Minn. Stat. § 609.377, subd. 2,
which is a gross misdemeanor. The case proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict

1 Section 626.556 was repealed in 2020 ; the mandatory reportin g obligation is now
codified at Minn. Stat. § 260E.06 (2020).

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of guilty. The district court imposed a misdemeanor sentence of 90 days in jail, stayed,
and placed Altepeter on probation.
Altepeter filed a timely notice of appeal. She argued that the court of appeals should
overturn her conviction because Minn. Stat. § 609.377 requires the State to prove that she
used unreasonable force in the course of punishment and the State did not present sufficient
evidence that she was pu nishing J.V.R. when she grabbed his arms. State v. Altepeter ,
No. A18-2086, 2019 WL 5543923, at *2–3 (Mi nn. App. Oct. 28, 2019). The court held
that the plain language of the statute did not require the State to prove that Altepeter acted
in the course of punishment and affirmed the conviction. Id. at *3–4. We granted
Altepeter’s petition for review on the issue of whether Minn. Stat. § 609.377 requires the
State to prove both that a defendant used un reasonable force and that it was in the course
of punishment.
ANALYSIS
The question before us is whether Minn. Stat. § 609.377 requires the State to prove
that a defendant’s use of unreasonable force was in the course of punishment. Altepeter
claims that the statute clearly requires the State to show that injury to a ch ild occurred in
the course of punishment. The State disagree s, arguing that Altepeter’s interpretation is
not consistent with the plain language of the statute.
We review the interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 609.377 de novo. Larson v. State ,
790 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2010). We begin by analyzing the statute to determine if it
is unambiguous. Id. If the language of the statute is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation, the statute is ambiguous. See State v. Pakhnyuk , 926 N.W.2d 914, 920

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(Minn. 2019). “On the other hand, when the la nguage of a statute is susceptible to only
one reasonable interpretation, it is unambiguo us and we must apply its plain meaning.”
State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. 2020).
We therefore begin with the language of th e statute. The controlling statute in this
case is Minn. Stat. § 609.377, which is en titled “malicious punish ment of child.”
Subdivision 1 of the statute, captioned “Malicious punishment,” reads as follows: “A
parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who, by an intentional act or a series of intentional acts
with respect to a child , evidences unreasonable force or cr uel discipline that is excessive
under the circumstances is guilty of malicious punishment of a child . . . .” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.377, subd. 1.
The rest of the statute addresses when the offense is a gross misdemeanor or is
enhanced to a felony, and provides the applicable maximum sentence and fine. See id.,
subds. 2–6. If “punishment results in less than substantial bodily harm,” subdivision 2
makes the offense a gross misdemeanor. Id., subd. 2. If a person “violates the provisions
of subdivision 2” and has cert ain prior convictions or adjudications of delinquency, the
offense is a felony. Id., subd. 3. The offense is also a felony if “the punishment” was to a
child under the age of four and caused bodily harm to certain parts of the body or multiple
bruises, id., subd. 4, or if “the punishment re sult[ed] in substant ial bodily harm,” id.,
subd. 5, or if “the punishment resulted in great bodily harm,” id., subd. 6.
Altepeter argues that the plain language of the statute unambiguously requires the
acts described in subdivision 1 to occur “in the course of punishment.” Altepeter points to
the statute’s repeated use of the phrase “the punishment” in subdivisions 2 and 4–6. She

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contends that the “ ‘punishment’ at issu e in subdivisions 2 and 4–6 is the conduct
criminalized by subdivision 1,” and “[t]herefore, the conduct criminalized by subdivision
1 must be ‘punishment.’ ” She claims that the phrase is meaningless if the actions
criminalized by subdivision 1 are not punishment.
The State argues that the statute require s proof that a caregiver used unreasonable
force, but does not require proof that it was in the course of punishment. The State claims
that the language of the statute is unambiguous because the word “punishment” is not used
as part of the operative language of the statute and cannot be construed as an element of
the offense.
The State’s reading of the statute is consiste nt with the plain language of the statute.
Subdivision 1 focuses on the defendant’s pr ohibited conduct and defines two types of
“malicious punishment”: (1) “an intentional act or a series of intentional acts with respect
to a child” that “evidences unreasonable force . . . that is excessive under the
circumstances” or (2) “an intenti onal act or a series of inten tional acts with respect to a
child” that “evidences . . . crue l discipline that is excessive under the circumstances.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.377, subd. 1. This lengthy, detailed definition of “malicious punishment”
does not state that the defendant’s acts must be done in the course of punishment.
Moreover, subdivisions 2 and 4–6 addre ss the applicable sentence based on the
resulting harm caused to the victim, not on the defendant’s acts. When subdivisions 2 and
4–6 mention “the punishment,” they are referring back to, not adding to, the definition of
malicious punishment provided by subdivision 1. The term therefore has meaning without
reading subdivision 1 in the manner urged by Alte peter. There is no n eed to read in an

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additional element that the intentional acts occur “in the course of punishment” to properly
interpret the statute.
Altepeter also makes an argument based on State v. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280 (Minn.
2015). She claims that Minn. Stat. § 609. 377 is similar to the statute involved in Struzyk
and that our reasoning in Struzyk can provide guidance here. The statute in Struzyk
provided the following:
Whoever physically assaults a peace officer . . . when that officer is effecting
a lawful arrest or executing any other duty imposed by law is guilty of a gross
misdemeanor and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one
year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both. If the assault
inflicts demonstrable bod ily harm or the person intentionally throws or
otherwise transfers bodily fluids or feces at or onto the officer, the person is
guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than
three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $6,000, or both.

Id. at 285 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1 (2014)).
We began by explaining that the term “physi cally assaults” in the first sentence is
synonymous with the definition of fifth-degree assault provided in a separate statute, and
held that the subsequent reference in the second sentence to “the assault” refers back to the
term “physically assaults.” Id. at 285–86. We th en turned to the second sentence of the
subdivision to “determine wh ether the phrase located in the second sentence—‘or the
person intentionally throws or otherwise tran sfers bodily fluids or feces at or onto the
officer’—defines an independent felony offense or whether it defines an aggravated form
of the gross-misdemeanor physical assault referenced in the first sentence.” Id. at 285. We
held that the phrase did not create a separate offense and that the State had to prove both a
physical assault and the transfer of bodily fluids for the assault to be elevated to a felony.

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Id. at 286–87 (“The presence of ‘if’ links the second sentence to the first—when either of
two conditions about the misdemeanor assault de scribed in the first sentence occurs, the
crime is elevated to a felony.”).
Altepeter argues that we sh ould interpret Minn. Stat. § 609.377 in a similar way
because the statute, like the statute in Struzyk, uses definite articles (“the punishment” and
“the assault”), and both statutes use the conj unctive “if” in the sentencing subdivisions.
There are similarities between the statutes, but Altepeter’s argument fails because Minn.
Stat. § 609.377 has a de finition provision in subdivision 1, which was not present in the
statute in Struzyk.
In Struzyk, we analyzed how the first and second sentences of a subdivision related
to one another to determine what co nstituted a crime under the statute. Struzyk,
869 N.W.2d at 282 (identifying the issue before the court as “whether the intentional act
of throwing or transferring bodily fluids at or onto the officer, in its elf, is the crime of
felony fourth-degree assault of a peace officer”). Here, Minn. Stat. § 609.377 provides the
definition of “malicious punishment” in subd ivision 1 and the subsequent subdivisions
address when the offense is a gross misdemeanor or is elevated to a felony. The statute’s
use of the term “the punishment” in the later subdivisions does not mean that a defendant’s
use of unreasonable force must occur only duri ng the course of punis hment. Similar to
how the term “the assault” in the statute in Struzyk refers back to th e term “physically
assaults” that appears earlier in the text, th e phrase “the punishment” refers back to the
conduct satisfying the definition of malicious punishment set forth in subdivision 1.

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Altepeter’s third argument is that the pattern jury instructions for Minn. Stat.
§ 609.377 demonstrate that the statute unambiguo usly requires the State to prove that the
defendant acted “in the course of punishment .” The pattern jury instruction states,
“Unreasonable force is such forc e used in the course of puni shment as would appear to a
reasonable person to be excessive under the circumstances.” 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n,
Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 13.85 (6 th ed. 2019).
But, as Altepeter acknowledges, the jury instructions do not bind our court. See State v.
Peterson, 673 N.W.2d 482, 48 4 n.1 (Minn. 2004) (“The conten t of [the jury instruction
guides] does not control over statutory or cas e law.”). Furthermore, following the jury
instructions as a guide in this instance would lead us to insert the phrase “in the course of
punishment” into the plain language of the statute, which is contrary to basic principles of
statutory interpretation. See KSTP-TV v. Ramsey Cty. , 806 N.W.2d 785, 790 n.9 (Minn.
2011) (declining to “abandon the plain language” of a statute in favor of an interpretation
that “inserts” a limitation not otherwise present); Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis ,
622 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. 2001) (“The rules of construction forbid adding words or
meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently left out.”).
Altepeter’s fourth argument concerns the statutory context of the term
“unreasonable force.” She argue s that the plain language of the statute requires that a
defendant must have used unreasonable force “in the course of punishment” based on the
use of the term “cruel discipline” in the same subdivision. According to Altepeter, because
“discipline” implies “punishment,” it would be illogical for the Legislature to require proof
of punishment for one act but not for the other.

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Even if Altepeter is correct that “cruel discipline” implies punishment and that it is
illogical for the Legislature to impose this requirement for one act (cruel discipline) but not
another (unreasonable force), a policy choice on which we do not opine, this is a separate
issue from whether the plain language of the statute unambiguously requires the State to
show that a defendant used unreasonable force in the course of punishment. The question
of which reading of a statute is more logi cal or reasonable only arises once we have
determined that the provision is ambiguous. See Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d
643, 651 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that the “rule of construction” that “the Legislature did
not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable” only “applies when the words of the
statute are ambiguous” and should not be used to “override the plain language of a clear
and unambiguous statute, except in an exceedingly rare case”). In this case, the statute is
unambiguous, and thus Altepeter’s argument is unavailing.
Altepeter’s final point in support of he r argument that the statute unambiguously
requires proof of punishment is that such a requirement is necessary for the statute to
survive constitutional scrutiny. Again her argum ent is misplaced. The possible
constitutional implications of an interpretation are not a reason why the plain language of
a statute is unambiguous. The question of wh ether a particular interpretation avoids a
constitutional conflict only arises after we determine that a statute is ambiguous. See
Schumann v. Comm’r of Taxation , 253 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Minn. 1977) (“Where a statute
is ambiguous, the construction that will avoid constitutional conflict is to be preferred, even
though it is less natural.”).

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Based on the above, we ho ld that the malicious punish ment of a child statute is
subject to only one reasonable interpretation: the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 609.377
requires the State to prove that a defendant used unreasonable force, but does not require
that the force occur in the course of punishment. Because Altepeter’s
insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is premised on the erroneous legal conclusion that the
State needs to prove that she used unreasonable force in the course of punishment, she has
failed to show that the State presented insufficient evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.