State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2096

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Brandon Michael Wilson,
Appellant.

Filed November 25, 2019
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-6296

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn M iddlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal -Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Brandon Michael Wilson challenges his conviction for being an ineligible
person in possession of ammunition under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (201 6).
Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence that he constructively possessed the
ammunition and alleges multiple prosecutorial errors in his pro se supplemental brief.
Because the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, and the issues raised in
appellant’s pro se supplemental brief do not warrant relief, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
We review sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to support a conviction with
“heightened scrutiny.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). To preserve
the jury’s credibility determinations, we “winnow down the evidence presented at trial by
resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d
592, 600 (Minn. 2017). A conviction must be reversed “[i]f a reasonable inference other
than guilt exists.” State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2018). But we will uphold a
conviction if the circumstantial evidence creates “a complete chain that, in view of the
evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a
reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” Id.
Appellant contends he never possessed the ammunition. A defendant’s possession
of ammunition can be established in two ways: actual or constructive. State v. Salyers, 858
N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. 2015). The state needed to prove constructive possession because
no witness observed appellant in actual possession of the ammunition. See id. Constructive

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possession requires the state to demonstrate that the prohibited item was found “in a place
under defendant’s exclusive control to which other people did not normally have access”
or, if others had access, “there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that
defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion and control over it.” State v.
Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975).
The evidence establishes these facts: 1) on March 11, 2018, appellant was driving a
vehicle owned by a friend; 2) there was an individual seated in the passenger’s seat;
3) Officer Schoenhard observed appellant run a red light and hit a curb; 4) appellant
continued to drive a few blocks after Officer Schoenhard initiated his lights and sirens;
5) officers observed “a lot of movement and some of it was of quick” within the vehicle
that “seemed . . . out of place for a traffic stop”; 6) Officer Schoenhard observed appellant
hunching forward in the front seat; 7) o fficers observed a firearm with an extended
magazine partially sticking out from under the driver’s seat; 8) the firearm had an extended
magazine that protruded from the firearm’s base; 9) t he firearm was not reported stolen
and did not register to appellant, the passenger, or the vehicle owner; 10) one piece of the
vehicle owner’s mail was found in the vehicle; 11) no fingerprints fit for comparison were
found on the firearm or ammunition; 12) no DNA sample from the firearm was suitable for
analysis; 13) a DNA sample from the ammunition contained a mixture of DNA from at
least three individuals; 14) appellant’s DNA could not be excluded from the mixture ; and
15) the DNA sample from the ammunition excluded 99.9992 percent of the general
population from the mixture.

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Having identified the circumstances proved, we now consider whether the
circumstances proved support a reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with guilt. See
Peterson, 910 N.W.2d at 7. Appellant argues there are two reasonable inferences
inconsistent with guilt: the firearm and ammunition were placed in the vehicle before
appellant borrowed it, or the passenger placed the firearm and ammunition in the vehicle
without appellant’s knowledge. These inferences are not reasonable. Appellant delayed
pulling over and was observed moving in the vehicle , including hunching forward in the
driver’s seat; the firearm was found in plain sight under the driver’s seat; and appellant’s
DNA from the ammunition could not be excluded when 99.9992% of the general
population could be excluded. We reject appellant’s argument that the DNA could have
transferred from his feet while driving because there is no record evidence to support this
argument.
Appellant relies on State v. Sam , but Sam is distinguishable from this case .
859 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. App. 2015). In Sam, this court reversed the conviction because it
determined that the inferences that the methamphetamine was already in the vehicle or that
the passenger placed it in the vehicle were reasonable inferences inconsistent with guilt .
Id. at 835. Here, the record evidence establishes the ammunition, which almost ce rtainly
contained appellant’s DNA, was in a magazine in plain sight under the driver’s seat where
appellant was consciously exercising dominion and cont rol over it. Florine, 226 N.W.2d
at 611.
Appellant’s pro se supplemental brief reiterates the insufficient evidence argument
and contends he was deprived of his right to a fair trial by a vindictive prosecutor.

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“Arguments are forfeited if they are presented in a summary and conclusory form, do not
cite to applicable law, and fail to analyze the law when claiming that errors of law
occurred.” State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Minn. App. 2017). Appellant’s argument
that the jury had to first find him guilty of possessing a firearm before it could find him
guilty of possessing the ammunition is forfeited because appellant does not provide legal
citations or record cites in support of this argument. Additionally, the argument is meritless
because the charging statute requires proof of possession of either a firearm or ammunition,
but not both. See Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1 (2016).
Appellant argues he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor 1) falsely accused
him of having prior felony convictions; 2) wrongly charg ed him with possession of a
firearm when the prosecutor knew that appellant’s DNA was not on the firearm; and
3) trying appellant for driving while impaired along with the possession of firearm and
ammunition prejudiced his “DWI trial.”
Appellant stipulated to being an ineligible person and waived his right to testify. At
trial, appellant reversed his waiver and testified. He was informed that the state would be
free to introduce his prior felony convictions . When appellant was asked on cross -
examination whether he had been convicted of a felony, it was appellant who exposed the
details to the jury, not the prosecutor. Appellant argues he was wrongly charged with
possession of a firearm because his “DNA fingerprint[s]” were not on it and this false
accusation prejudiced his “DWI trial.” However, there is no DNA or finger print
requirement to charge appellant and “a prosecutor has broad discretion in the exercise of

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the charging function.” State v. Foss , 556 N.W.2d 540 , 540 (Minn. 1996). We conclude
appellant’s arguments do not amount to prosecutorial error.
Because the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction and none of
the issues raised in appellant’s pro se brief warrant relief, we affirm .
Affirmed.