In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of E. C. S., S. K. D., J. M. N., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2106

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of
E. C. S., S. K. D., J. M. N., Parents.

Filed May 28, 2019
Reversed and Remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-JV-18-214

Anne M. Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant
E.C.S.)

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Center City, Minnesota (for respondent Chisago
County Health and Human Services)

Charlene Larsen, Cedar, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD , Judge
Appellant-mother E.C.S. (mother) challenges the district court’s decision to
terminate her parental rights to her two youngest children. Because respondent Chisago

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
County Health and Human Services (the county), failed to make reasonable efforts to
reunite mother and her children, we reverse the decision terminating mother’s parental
rights, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
Mother and father S.K.D. are the parents of H.D. (born in 2011) and K.D. (born in
2013). Mother also has children with father J.M.N. D.N. was born in 2003 and B.N. was
born in 2006.1 During the time leading up to the termination trial, mother lived with B.N.,
H.D., and K.D.
Mother and her children have a history of involvement with the county including
services provided for children in need of protection (CHIPS). According to the county, the
family has “come to the attention of [the county] nineteen (19) times in the last twelve
years.” The relevant events leading up to this appeal began with a report from the Chisago
Lakes School District to the county in January 2017. The report stated that B.N. and H.D.
had several unexcused absences and tardies, and that the school district’s letters and phone
calls to mother were not successful in correcting the absences. County social worker
Caitlin Chandler interviewed B.N. and H.D.; B.N. told Chandler that she suffered from
celiac disease and struggled to “get to school because she is ill the majority of the time.”
When Chandler met with mother to di scuss the absences, mother explained that B.N.
missed school because of her health issues. Mother also told Chandler that she “was

1 Mother voluntarily transferred her custodial rights of D.N., and D.N. has lived with his
paternal grandparents since “early 2012.” Mother maintains shared legal custody of D.N.
D.N. “was at no time subject to the CHIPS proceedings related to this appeal.”
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struggling with a [low] platelet level [and] struggled to get up and out of bed” and that this
made it “difficult for her to essentially care for herself” and the children. Chandler testified
that mother failed to provide documentation to the school regarding B.N.’s illness and
dietary needs. Mother told Chandler that her boyfriend, B.H., helped care for the children
on nights while she worked. Chandler expressed concerns to mother “about the children
being left in the care of [B.H.], who has a criminal history and substance use.”
After attempting to provide services, Chandler determined that mother was not
“address[ing] the educational concerns.” Consequently, the county filed a CHIPS petition
in March 2017. In June 2017, mother entered an admission to the CHIPS petition and the
district court found that the children were “habitually truant.” The CHIPS adjudication was
stayed up to 180 days on the condition that mother co mply with the case plan that was
agreed to and submitted to the court. The plan addressed mother’s mental-heal th issues,
chemical-dependency concerns, housing instability, and the children’s physical and mental
health. Additionally, mother agreed that the children would not be left in B.H.’s care.
Shortly before the CHIPS admission, B.H. was arrested for offenses that were later
charged as second-degree controlled-substance possession and criminal vehicular
operation while under the influence of a controlled substance. O n July 7, 2017, law
enforcement executed a search warrant at mother’s home for evidence related to B.H. In a
bedroom near where the children were sleeping, law enforcement “located a glass pipe with
burnt residue on it.” The residue field test ed positive for methamphetamine. Mother
admitted to police that she had used drugs the night before. The state charged mother with
storing drug paraphernalia in the presence of a child and child endangerment. Law
4
enforcement removed the children from the home and placed them on a 72-hour hold.
Later, the district court issued a protective-care order for foster-care placem ent. H.D. and
K.D. have remained in foster care since being removed from the home in July 2017. 2
The district court lifted the stay of the CHIPS proceedings. At a July hearing, the
district court ordered mother to comply with the provisions of the out-of-home placement
plan, cooperate with services offered by the agency, and arrange visitation with the
children. Mother began supervised visits on August 3, 2017. The county filed an amended
CHIPS petition in August 2017.
On December 4, 2017, the district court adopted a placement plan, which had an
effective date of September 25, 2017. Mother did not sign the December 2017 place ment
plan, although the district court found that the county met with mother “jointly” to make
the plan. The plan included approximately 20 goals or objectives for mother, including:
abstain from alcohol and other mood-altering substances; complete a chemical-dependency
assessment and comply with recommendations; submit to random drug testing; complete a
psychological evaluation, comply with the evaluation’s recommendations, and allow the
results to be sent to the county; arrange supervised visits with the children; maintain
suitable employment, housing, and physical health; and demonstrate an ability to parent
her children in a safe and healthy way.

2 B.N. was placed i n the care of her paternal grandparents, who also care for her brother,
D.N. After the termination petition was filed, mother and father J.M.N. agreed to
voluntarily transfer permanent physical and legal custody of B.N. to J.M.N.’s parents.
Accordingly, B.N. was removed from the permanency proceeding.
5
On July 13, 2018, the county filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental rights to
H.D. and K.D.3 The county asserted that mother’s parental rights should be terminated for
the following statutory bases: Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2018) (parent failed
to satisfy the duties of the parent-child relationship); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4)
(2018) (parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship); and Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2018) (reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions
leading to the out-of-home placement).
Mother’s termination trial took place over several days, beginning on September 18,
2018. The county’s social-worker witnesses, Chandler, Chris Johnson, and Amanda Mitby,
provided testimony about the family’s 2017 CHIPS cases, and the county’s involvement
with the family since 2006. Mitby testified that mother complied with many of the case
plan’s requirements. For example, evidence established that mother completed
chemical-dependency assessments, neuropsychological testing, parenting assessment, and
attended parenting classes; mother also sought assistance at Nystrom & Associates for
Adult Rehabilitative Mental Health Services (ARMHS) and therapy, and completed an
intake for medication management. In addition, mother obtained employment and stable
housing, remained law abiding, and abstained from alcohol and other mood-altering
substances.

3 The petition also sought to terminate mother’s parental rights as to B.N.; see note 2 for
further details. And the petition sought to terminate father S.K.D.’s parental rights, but his
termination proceedin gs were bif urcated and his parenting status is not an issue in this
appeal.
6
Despite completing many of the case plan’s requirements, Mitby testified that
mother did not gain insight from the services provided and failed to complete several of
the case-plan goals. For example, mother completed chemical-dependency assessments,
but failed to timely comply with recommendations for mental-health therapy and a
neuropsychological evaluation. Mother underwent a neuropsychological exam in April
2018; yet, as of June 2018, the county asserted that she had only attended three
therapy sessions. Mother completed an intake for medication management, but the
county contended that she failed to attend follow-up appointments. In addition, the
county witnesses testified that mother failed to prioritize her visits with the children.
According to the county, mother “was late to, cancelled, or no showed approximately 37
visits out of 90.”4
With regard to demon strating her ability to parent and understand the children’s
needs, mother participated in a parenting assessment with Frank Weber, a licensed
psychologist. Weber testified at mother’s trial about the assessment, in which Weber
concluded that mother “lacks insight into how her own choices and interpersonal
relationships are impacting her ability to provide a stable and loving home.” The
parenting-assessment report also stated that mother failed to take responsibility for the

4 This statement is concerning because it was repeated in the district court’s analysis and
implies that mother missed many visits without providing notice. I n fact, based on the
termination petition and Mitby’s testimony, in 2018, mother had only one “no call, no
show” visit. Mother cancelled “approximately four or five” visits, but did so after
informing the county that she would be unable to attend. Mother was late for at least 12
visits, but was allowed to complete the visits. Based on this record, mother appears to have
missed approximately six visits in 2018.
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incidents that led to the children being removed from the home and mother does not
“appear appropriate to independently parent her children.” Mother also participated in a
neuropsychological evaluation with a licensed clinical psychologist, Dr. Fischer. The
psychological assessment concluded that:
[T]he results of [mother’s] neuropsychological testing are such
that would likely create deficits in her functioning in all areas,
including employment, money management, education,
socialization, and parenting. These results suggest that it would
be extremely difficult for [mother] to learn a new skill given
her severe memory deficits. She also would be significantly
challenged in coping with the unexpected changes that occur
in everyday life situations (e.g., lack of cognitive flexibility).

Both assessments were admitted at trial. Read together, the assessments describe mother’s
chemical-dependency history, traumatic brain injury (TBI) and related memory
impairment, and mental-health diagnoses.
The district court heard testimony about K.D.’s needs and mental-health issues from
treating physicians. Dr. Nos-Tollefson and Dr. Deling testified that K.D. has been
diagnosed with disinhibited social engagement disorder, global development delay,
adjustment disorder, anxiety, depression, language disorder, and speech sound disorder.
Dr. Nos-Tollefson also testified that K.D. has been exposed to traumatic experiences
including “adult chemical use, witnessed domestic violence, was the victim of neglect, and
possibly exposed to chemicals in utero.” K.D. has an individualized education program
(IEP), and the guardian ad litem (GAL) testified that her needs are being met in her current
foster home and through individual therapy.
8
The district court also heard testimony about H.D.’s needs and development. H.D.’s
therapist, Lauren Sinn, testified that H.D. was diagnosed with PTSD due to her exposure
to multiple traumatic events, including “witness[ ing] domestic violence,” overdosing on
methadone as an infant, and experiencing multiple moves and changes in her living
environment, including foster care. H.D. is in therapy, and, according to the GAL, has
shown significant progress since being removed from the home.
C.C., the paternal grandmother, testified regarding a 2011 incident where S.K.D.
used a methadone syringe to administer Tylenol to H.D., who was taken to the hospital for
a drug overdose. Mother was working at the time of the overdose. C.C. testified that she
took the blame for the incident, but her son S.K.D. was caring for H.D. at the time. C.C.
also testified that she was aware of a domestic-abuse incident between S.K.D. and mother,
where mother called for help after S.K.D. held her arms down on the bed, and C.C.
intervened.
Mother testified regarding her drug use, which began when she was 18 years old.
Mother also testified that she attended chemical-dependency treatment and was sober from
approximately 2010 to 2016, then relapsed in 2016, and again in 2017, but that she had not
used since July 2017, when the children were removed from the home. Mother also testified
about past trauma, a car accident that caused her TBI, and her mental illnesses. Finally,
mother testified that she is currently employed, attending therapy once a week, living with
her grandmother, working on her parenting skills, not using drugs, and ended her
relationship with B.H.
9
On December 14, 2018, the district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of
law and terminated mother’s parental rights. On December 20, 2018, the district court
issued amended findings of fact and conclusions of law and order, correcting a clerica l
error in the previous order. The court found the county witnesses’ testimony to be credible,
and did not find mother credible because she “testified in her own self-interest.” The district
court found that the county had provided reasonable efforts to reunite the family. The court
concluded that the following statutory grounds supported termination of mother’s parental
rights by clear and convincing evidence: mother failed to s atisfy the duties of the
parent-child relationship; mother is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child
relationship; and reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s
out-of-home placement. The court also concluded that termination was in the children’s
best interests. Mother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Mother appeals from the district court’s order terminating her rights, arguing that
the district court erred in four ways: (1) the district court misapplied the presumption of
palpable unfitness; (2) the record does not support the district court’s determination that
she failed to satisfy her parental duties; (3) the record does not support the district court’s
determination that she failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-of -home
placement; and (4) the district court erred in concluding that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunite the family.
This court reviews the district court’s termination of parental rights to determine
“whether the trial court’s findings address the statutory criteria, whether those findings are
10
supported by substantial evidence, and whether those findings are clearly erroneous.” In re
Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). While we give considerable
deference to the district court’s decision to terminate parental rights, we closely inquire
into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the evidence was clear and
convincing. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
We will affirm the district court’s termination of parental rights when a statutory ground
for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence, termination is in the best
interests of the child, and the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. Id.
We decide this appeal based on our analysis of the fourth issue raised by mother’s brief to
this court. Because our decision on the fourth issue results in reversal and remand, we do
not fully analyze the other three issues raised by mother. But this opinion does comment
on some aspects of issues that we believe are likely to arise on remand.
I. The district court’s conclusion that the county provided reasonable efforts to
reunite the family is not supported by the record.

“Reasonable efforts at rehabilitation are services that go beyond mere matters of
form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W. ,
727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar.
28, 2007). For the county’s efforts to be reasonable, the services offered must be
“(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the
child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and
timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2018). The
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district court must make “specific findings” that the county made reasonable efforts. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2018).
Mother contends that the district court erred in deciding that the county provided
reasonable efforts to reunite the family for three reasons, each of which we discuss in turn.
A. The case plan did not specifically address the family’s needs.
When a child is placed in foster care by a court order, the county’s reasonable efforts
to reunite the family include the responsible social services agency ’s preparation of an
out-of-home case plan. In re Welfare of Children of A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Minn.
App. 2018). The case plan must identify the specific reasons why the child was placed in
foster care, the changes or requirements a parent must make or satisfy in order for their
child to return home, and the services that are available to help a parent achieve these
changes or requirements and reunify the family. Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 1(c)(2), (3)
(2018). Further, the out-of-home case plan must be reflected in a written document that is
prepared jointly with a parent, signed by a parent, approved by the court, and explained to
all involved parties. Id.; A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d at 897.
Preliminarily, we note that there is some uncertainty as to mother’s involvement
with the preparation of the case plan. The case plan included approximately 20 goals or
tasks, which the district court found mother substantially attained. While the case plan was
adopted by the district court on December 4, 2017, m other did not sign the out- of-home
placement plan. Mother asserts in her brief to this court that she did not participate in
drafting the plan and the plan was not explained to her. The district court found, despite
mother’s lack of signature, that the county met with mother “jointly” to make the plan. The
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record, however, does not include testimony from the county social worker who created
the case plan, which includes a note that she met with mother “to jointly make this plan.”
At trial, Mitby testified that she was not assigned to mother’s case until January 2018, yet
it was her understanding that mother “ was given a copy” of the plan in August 2017, and
mother was aware of the case-plan requirements.
It is true that the plan was submitted to the district court for approval in December
2017. But the district court’s approval of the plan and the parent’s signature and
participation in the case plan are separate requirements, and the statute requires that both
must be satisfied. Thus, even if mother knew of the plan’s requirements, the county’s
alleged failure to include her in the drafting and obtain her signature violates the statutory
requirements. As stated above, the “out-of -home placement plan means a written
document . . . prepared . . . jointly with the parent.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 1(b)
(2018). “The plan ‘shall be’ signed by the parent, submitted to the court for approval, and
explained to all persons involved in its implementation.” A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d at 897
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. (1)(b)(1), 3(c) (2018)) (emphasis added). The
district court’s finding misses the point when it states that the county met with mother to
make the plan. The district court erred in not determining mother’s involvement in drafting
and agreeing to the case plan.
More fundamentally, based on our detailed review of the record and the county’s
reasons for concluding that mother had failed to correct t he conditions leading to
out-of-home placement, we conclude that mother is correct in asserting that the case
plan did not include services adequate to meet the needs of the f amily nor did it
13
sufficiently explain changes that mother needed to make for the children to return home.
See In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn. 2008) (“[T]he nature
of the services which constitute reasonable efforts depends on the problem presented.”
(quotation omitted)).
First, the parenting assessor’s determination that mother was not “appropriate to
independently parent her children” was, in large part, why the county sought to terminate
mother’s rights. Yet, the case plan includ ed few services or requirements aimed at
overcoming mother’s parenting deficits. See , e.g., Matter of Welfare of S.Z., 547 N. W.2d
886, 892 (Minn. 1996) (stating that mental- health services should be “tailored to the
problem that prevented [mother] from being able to parent”). For example, the case plan
did not explicitly require that mother receive parenting-education classes. Instead, the case
plan provided that mother should “demonstrate the ability to parent her children in a safe
and healthy way. Demonstration of these parenting abilities may be completed by
successful completion of a parenting education course.” Although the county did not
require parenting education, mother attended a parenting-education course. At trial, Mitby
testified that this course was not “especially appropriate” because of mother’s “extensive
needs” and that family therapy would have been more beneficial. But the county did not
assist mother in requiring or completing a more “beneficial” program. And the county did
not infor m mother why the parenting class she chose was not adequate to address her
parenting deficits.
Additionally, the case plan r equired that mother complete a psychological
evaluation and “follow all of the recommendations of the assessment.” Mother completed
14
this evaluation, and the assessor recommended that mother receive ARMHS support, which
could assist her with “managing mental health symptoms, including scheduling and
maintaining appointments, managing housework and other responsibilities, parenting
skills, sober support, social functioning, interpersonal functioning, and self -care.” Mother
testified that she has an ARMHS worker, and has received services that are related to her
ability to be a responsible parent.
We are troubled that the district court accepted Mitby’s conclusion that mother
could not parent independently, even though Mitby never received any significant
information from mother’s ARMHS worker. Mitby testified that she had never spoken on
the phone or had a planned visit with mother’s ARMHS worker, although Mitby had tried
to contact him. Because the county limited this aspect of its services to mother and merely
made unsuccessful phone calls to the ARMHS worker, we conclude that the county
did not provide “real, genuine assistance” related to mother’s neuropsychological and
mental-health issues that prevent her from parenting independently. See S.W., 727 N.W.2d
at 150.
The county also asserted, and the district court found, that mother had a “long
history of allowing her children to be supervised and cared for by inappropriate
caregivers.” The district court also found that mother “had no insight” into how B.H.’s
criminal history “could affect her children.” But, as mother argues to this court, the case
plan includes no services directed at this issue and fails to even state that mother
needed to end her relationship with B.H. for the children to be returned to her care.
Although the county offered testimony that it conveyed to mother that B.H. was not
15
allowed at supervised visits, the case plan failed to provide clear guidance because it
did not include the specific changes mother must make, regarding her relationships and
choice of caregivers, in order for her children to return home. Minn. Stat. § 260C.212,
subd. 1(c)(2), (3).
In sum, the termination of mother’s parental rights was based mainly on mother’s
perceived inability to adequately parent the children and understand their needs. But, as we
have stated, the county’s services and case -plan requirements did not sufficiently address
these issues. See T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 664. The county undisputedly offered mother many
services throughout the years. Yet when those services are compared with the reasons for
termination, we are left with the conviction that the December 2017 case plan is a detailed
boilerplate checklist, with no indication of what mother should prioritize, and the case plan
also failed to include sufficient services to help achieve reunification, or remedy mother’s
purported parenting failures.
B. The county did not provide mother with a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate an ability to appropriately parent the children.

The district court’s decision to terminate was also based largely on its determination
that mother cannot provide for the children’s needs. The district court found specifically
that the children have “serious mental health needs” and need “six (6) hours of therapy per
week,” and mother is not capable of meeting those needs. But the record does not show
reasonable efforts b y the county to allow mother a meaningful opportunity to show
whether she can meet her children’s needs. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (providing that
16
services must be “available and accessible” and “consistent and timely”). Two examples
illustrate the county’s failure in this area.
First, the county did not allow any unsupervised visits between mother and the
children. The GAL agreed at trial that unsupervised visits are “generally the first step
towards getting the kids reunified with the parents.” The GAL also agreed that, in April
2018, she had sent Mitby an email stating that she was “comfortable with unsupervised
visits” between mother and the children. Mitby responded that she had “strong opinions
about wanting to wait” and made the unilateral decision not to “move forward” with
unsupervised visits. Then, in June 2018, mother moved for “trial home [unsupervised]
visits,” and, at a hearing, the district court “indicate[d] that the county should move to
unsupervised visits in coordination with the [GAL], once the [GAL] feels it’s an
appropriate way to proceed.” When asked at the termination trial what steps she took to
move forward with unsupervised visits after this hearing, Mitby testified that she consulted
with her supervisor, and ultimately decided she was not “comfortable moving towards
unsupervised visits.” Because the termination petition relied on the county’s determination
that mother was unable to “parent her children,” the county’s efforts should have been
aimed at helping mother demonstrate how she cared for her children and provide any
necessary assistance. We are troubled by the county’s failure to provide unsupervised
visitation that was recommended by the GAL and approved by the district court.
Second, the county did not establish that it provided mother with sufficient
opportunity to participate in specialized care for her children. As part of the case plan,
mother was required to utilize services for her child’s “developmental, educational,
17
medical, and mental health needs.” The county determined that mother failed to complete
this requirement. The county cited, however, a single instance where mother was invited
to and missed an IE P meeting in March 2018. But, other than a single meeting, Mitby
agreed that mother did not miss “anything that has been asked of her with regard to the
children’s developmental, education, medical, or mental health needs.” Accordingly, the
record does not support the district court’s conclusion that mother could not “assume the
responsibilities” for the children’s health needs when the record reflects that she only failed
to attend one IEP meeting. Frankly, our review of the record suggests that it is inco mplete
on important details about mother’s participation in, transportation to, attendance at, and
follow up for her children’s special needs. As a starting point for the district court’s
assessment of this issue, the record must establish that mother was provided with an
opportunity to participate and then document what followed.
In sum , the county did not provide mother with a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate her ability to parent the children. See T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 666.
C. The record does not support the district court’s conclusion that mother’s
completion of the case plan was rote.

The county recognized at trial that mother completed many, or most, of the plan’s
requirements. The county alleged, however, that mother’s completion was “superficial,”
“rote,” and she failed to gain insight into the plan’s goals. The district court found that,
although mother completed “most of her case plan in spring of 2018, [she] has not gained
insight from the services provided” and her completion of the plan was “not adequate.” On
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appeal, mother argues that she was not informed that she had failed to sufficiently comply
with the plan or meet the county’s expectations.
The record evidence supports mother’s argument. Mitby testified that, in part,
mother’s lack of progress with the case plan led to the county’s decision to file the
permanency petition in July 2018. But Mitby also testified that she did not express her
concerns about mother’s compliance until around March 2018, almost eight months after
the children had been removed from the home. And it is not clear when, if ever, the county
communicated to mother that her compliance with the case plan was superficial and did
not satisfy the county’s expectations. It is also not clear, based on our review of the record,
that mother’s completion of the plan was “rote.” The county offered no evidence that
mother’s compliance was insincere, except to say that mother’s compliance with services
increased after the termination case was filed.5 But given mother’s substantial compliance
with more than 20 requirements in this case plan, and the county’s vague claim that she
increased her intensity after the termination petition was filed, we find no record support
for the finding that mother’s near completion of the case plan was inadequate, and we
conclude that the district court clearly erred in making this finding.

5 We recognize that a parent’s delayed compliance with a case plan is significant and
material when children are in need of protection and services. See In re Welfare of A.J.C.,
556 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. App. 1996) , review denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 1997). We also
recognize that a parent’s complete compliance with a case plan is no guarantee that a
termination petition will be denied. In re Welfare of Children of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656,
667 (Minn. App. 2012). Nonetheless, on this record, we cannot affirm the district court’s
determination regarding the county’s reasonable efforts to reunite this family.
19
In sum, on this record, we conclude that the county failed to provide relevant
services, failed to allow mother an opportunity to demonstrate her ability to parent with
assistance, and show that mother’s completion of the plan was insufficient. We conclude
that the county failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite mother and her children.
Accordingly, we reverse the termination of mother’s parental rights and remand to the
district court.
II. Additional remand considerations
Because the district court has discretion on the scope of the proceedings on remand,
we offer additional comments on the remaining issues raised by the parties. See In re Estate
of Vittorio, 546 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Minn. App. 1996) (providing that this court may address
issues that will arise on remand “in the interest of judicial economy”).
First, the district court determined that the county had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that mother was palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child
relationship. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). On appeal, mother asserts that the
district court erred by applying the presumption of palpable unfitness in her case because
she “has never had her parental rights involuntary terminated, and therefore, the statutor y
presumption does not apply.” We agree.
A parent is presumed to be palpably unfit if the parent’s rights to one or more
children have been involuntarily terminated or “the parent’s custodial rights to another
child have been involuntarily transferred to a relative.” Id. (emphasis added). Mother is
correct that the presumption does not apply to her; mother voluntarily transferred her

20
custodial rights of D.N. and B.N. to their paternal grandparents. A voluntary transfer of
rights does not give rise to the palpably -unfit presumption. See id. In its decision, the
district court stated that a parent may rebut the presumption of unfitness and then concluded
that mother had failed to rebut the presumption. On remand, the district court should not
apply the presumption in mother’s case.
Second, the district court found that mother was “palpably unfit due to her struggles
with mental health, lack of insight into her children’s mental-health needs, and lack of
insight into her interpersonal relationships.” Under the palpably-unfit basis for termination,
the county must prove “a consistent pattern of specific conduct or specific conditions
existing at the time of the hearing that appear will continue for a prolonged, indefinite
period and that are permanently detrimental to the welfare of the child.” T.R., 750 N.W.2d
at 661; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). A parent’s mental illness, alone,
cannot be used as the basis for terminating parental rights. S.Z., 547 N.W.2d at 892. As the
district court found, mother has “taken steps to address concerns regarding” her
mental-health issues. Mitby also agreed at trial that mother did not miss “anything that has
been asked of her with regard to the children’s developmental, education, medical, or
mental health needs.” Accordingly, the findings in the district court’s opinion regarding
mother’s deficits in functioning do not rise to a “pattern of specific conduct or specific
conditions” that are detrimental to the welfare of the children. See id.
Third, the district court determined that mother substantially, continuously, or
repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties of a parent, within the meaning
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of Minn. Stat § 260C.301, subd 1(b)(2). Under this factor, the court must find that at the
time of termination , the parents are not “presently able and willing to assume [their]
responsibilities” and that the parents’ neglect of these duties “will continue for a prolonged,
indeterminate period.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 90 (emphasis added). The court must make
“clear and specific findings conforming to the statutory requirements, and the evidence
must address conditions that exist at the time of the hearing.” Id. In its conclusion that
mother neglected to comply with the duties of a parent, the district court considered the
previous “nineteen (19) child protection intake reports over the years.” The district court
also reflected that mother “voluntarily transferred her other two children,” which it
concluded showed her lack of parenting skills. But mother’s past CHIPS involvement and
decision to voluntarily transfer her parental rights does not support the court’s
determination that she is presently unable to parent. For example, based on our review of
the record, out of the 19 CHIPS intake reports, 14 predate 2015. On remand, the district
court should consider the conditions that exist at the time of the hearing when deciding
whether mother has neglected her parental duties.
We recognize that the parenting assessment supports the district court’s finding that
mother is “not presently able to assume the responsibilities of caring for” the children.
Therefore, we do not suggest that the district court should unsettle the current out-of-home
placement until mother can, in fact, “demonstrate the ability to parent her children in a safe
and healthy way.” But, based on this record, the county failed to make reasonable efforts
to reunite mother and her children. Thus, we reverse and remand this matter to the district
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court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The district court may at its discretion
reopen the record.
Reversed and remanded.