Friends to Restore St. Mary's, LLC, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2107

Friends to Restore St. Mary's, LLC,
Appellant,

vs.

Church of Saint Mary, Melrose, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed September 3, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-17-7601

Erik F. Hansen, Elizabeth M. Cadem, Martin C. Melang, Burns & Hansen, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Cooper S. Ashley, Cyri A. Van Hecke, Maslon LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars adjudication of claims under the
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA), Minn. Stat. §§ 116B.01 -.13 (2018), if an
affirmative defense cannot be resolved without disturbing the ruling of a governing
ecclesiastical body wit h respect to issues of doctrine and without interfering with an
internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.

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O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges summary judgment dismissing its MERA claim, arguing that
adjudication of the claim is not precluded by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, and that
neither the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
nor the Freedom of Conscience Clause of the Minnesota Constitution bar the MERA claim.
Because adjudication of appellant’s MERA claim is precluded by the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine, we affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises from a dispute over whether an arson-damaged church building
is a “historical resource” entitled to protection under MERA. Appellant Friends to Restore
St. Mary’s, LLC, was formed by a group of current and former parishioners of respondent
Church of St. Mary, Melrose (St. Mary’s or parish), after the St. Mary’s church building
was da maged by a fire . Appellant seeks an injunction preventing respondents from
demolishing the church building “or otherwise impairing its esthetic and historic
characteristics, including but not limited to the removal of architectural features ,” and a
declaration that the church building is a natural resource and cannot be demolished under
MERA.1 In addition to the parish , respondents include the Diocese of St. Cloud (the

1 See Minn. Stat. §§ 116B.02, subd. 4 (defining natural resources to include historical
resources), .03, subd. 1 (authorizing civil action for declaratory or equitable relief for
protection of natural resources, “whether publicly or privately owned”).

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diocese) and The Most Reverend Donald J. Kettler, Bishop of St. Cloud (Bishop Kettler or
the bishop).
The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed. The St. Mary’s church building
was dedicated in 1899. It was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1993.
Although religious properti es are not ordinarily listed on the National Register, the
registration form states that the church building is historically significant as an institution
of outstanding social, cultural, ethnic, and religious importance to the community of
Melrose. The Romanesque Revival style recalls the architecture of many of the twin -
towered churches and cathedrals of medieval Germany.
In March 2016, the church bu ilding was gutted in a fire. The blaze and fire -
suppression efforts substantially damaged or destroyed much of the interior of the church,
but left the exterior relatively intact. The church building is no longer usable for any parish
activities. All masses and worship services since the fire have occurred at a neighboring
church or the St. Mary’s school gymnasium.
A parish steering committee studied the viability of restoring the church building—
in consultation with architects, construction companies, and o ther restoration
professionals—and interviewed four construction companies. Ultimately, the parish
presented a “narrative on a proposed restoration post fire damage” to the Diocesan Building
Commission (DBC). The narrative recommended restoration to “pre-fire condition to the
extent that it is technically feasible and will meet the minimum code requirements,” rather
than construction of a new church building. But the narrative acknowledged that

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[f]rom a liturgical perspective, our experience on Catholic
Church projects over the past 15-20 years would likely indicate
the incorporation of a much different interior space than w hat
existed pre-fire. It is likely that relatively drastic changes to
the finishes, furnishing and possibly functional layout based on
the “Built of Living Stones” document may be suggested if not
required. We will defer such opinions to the [DBC] and/or a
liturgical consultant to be retained by the Church.

Although the church building is owned by St. Mary’s, u nder canon law, the final
decision to restore or build rests with the bishop. The DBC advises the bishop as to whether
the renovation or building of a worship space meets the liturgical guidelines of the Roman
Catholic Church. Applying liturgical guidelines established since the Second Vatican
Council, the DBC unanimously recommended construction of a new church building .
Bishop Kettler accepted the recommendation, determining that the many changes and
developments in liturgy and worship since the 1899 dedication require construction of a
new church building.
Apparently due to zoning constraints at the existing site, plans were developed for
new construction on nearby land the parish had previously set aside for other purposes.
The plans incorporate various components of the existing church building, including
stained glass windows, religious statues and other art, bells, the altar, and other salvageable
attributes. After removing these features, some of which are identified on the National
Register registration form, respondents intend to demolish the church building.2

2 At the outset of this litigation, respondents orally agreed to preserve the church building
in its current condition, presumably for the duration of the litigation.

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Respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that granting the relief sought
in the complaint would violate the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and impose an
unconstitutional burden on St. Mary’s free -exercise rights under the state and f ederal
constitutions. The parties stipulated that discovery was not necessary for resolution of the
summary-judgment motion. After a hearing, the district court granted respondents’
motion, concluding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine “preclude s this Court from
exercising any authority to issue an injunction under MERA to prevent the demolition of
the [church] building.”3 This appeal follows.
ISSUE
Does the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine preclude adjudication of appellant’s
MERA claim?

ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record reflects “no genuine issue as to any
material fact” and the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R.
Civ. P. 56.0 1. This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, evaluating
whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court properly applied
the law. See Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc. , 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017) .
Interpretation of a statute is a legal question subject to de novo review. Lewis-Miller v.
Ross, 710 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Minn. 2006). The constitutionality of a statute is also a

3 The district court did not reach respondents’ free -exercise arguments. Because our
determination that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precludes adjudication of
appellant’s MERA claim resolves this appeal , we too decline to reach respondents’
arguments that the free-exercise clauses of the state and federal constitutions bar relief.

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question of law reviewed de novo. Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Minn. 2014)
(citing Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 643, 653 (Minn. 2012)).
I. MERA protects the church building unless, in relevant part, there is no feasible
and prudent alternative to destruction or impairment of the building.

Under MERA, any person or organization may maintain a civil action in district
court for declaratory or other equitable relief in the name of the state to protect natural
resources located within the state. Minn. Stat. § 116B.03, subd. 1. “Natural resources” is
defined to include “historical resources.” Minn. Stat. § 116B.02, subd. 4. Minnesota courts
have relied principally on the criteria used to determine whether a property qualifies for
inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places to determine whether it is a protected
historical resource under MERA. See State by Archabal v. County of Hennepin , 495
N.W.2d 416, 421 (Minn. 1993); State by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn.
1979). For purposes of this appeal, we assume the church building remains, after the fire,
eligible for inclusion on the National Register and is therefore a protected “historical
resource.”
To obtain relief under MERA, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that “the
conduct of the defendant has [caused], or is likely to cause the pollution, impairment, or
destruction of the air, water, land or other natural resources located within the state.” Minn.
Stat. § 116B.04(b). If the plaintiff makes this showing, “[t]he defendant may attempt to
rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case with a showing of contrary evidence or . . . offer an
affirmative defense.” Archabal, 495 N.W.2d at 422. It is an affirmative defense under
MERA

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that there is no feasible and prudent alternative and the conduct
at issue is consisten t with and reasonably required for
promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare in light of
the state’s paramount concern for the protection of its air,
water, land and other natural resources from pollution,
impairment, or destruction.

Minn. Stat. § 116B.04(b). The critical question in this appeal is whether the district court
can evaluate whether there are feasible and prudent alternative s to destroying the church
building without implicating the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
II. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precludes adjudication of this action.

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, also known as the church-autonomy doctrine,
“has its roots in a line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding church property and
church schisms.” Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church , 877 N.W.2d 528,
532 (Minn. 2016). In Pfeil, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified that the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine is not a matter of subject -matter jurisdiction. Id. at 535. After
reviewing the United States Supreme Court caselaw, our supreme court identified helpful
general rules for applying the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Id. at 534.
First, civil courts cannot overturn decisions of governing ecclesiastical bodies
concerning purely ecclesiastical matters, such as internal church governance or church
discipline. Id. (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1872)). Second, courts may not
decide cases that require extensive inquiry into issues of polity or interpretation of church
doctrine. Id. (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich , 426 U.S. 696, 720, 96
S. Ct. 2372, 2385 (1976); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S. Ct. 601, 606 (1969)). Third, courts

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may only resolve disputes involving religious organizations if (a) the court is able to rely
exclusively on neutral principles of law, (b) the court does not disturb a ruling of a
governing ecclesiastical body on a matt er of doctrine, and (c) “the adjudication does not
‘interfere[] with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church
itself.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012)).
Before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor, Minnesota
courts analyzed the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as solely an Establishment Clause
question and applied the three -pronged Lemon test. Id. at 536 -37 (c iting Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 -13, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (1971) (holding that a state action
must have a secular legislative purpose, must neither inhibit nor advance religion in its
primary effect, and must not foster excessive governmental ent anglement with religion );
Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh -Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 435 (Minn.
2002)). But the court recognized in Pfeil that the doctrine is grounded in both the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. Id. And the supreme court
noted that Lemon’s excessive-entanglement prong is “substantially similar” to Hosanna-
Tabor’s faith-and-mission inquiry.4 Id. at 537.
Synthesizing this caselaw in light of the arguments raised in this appeal, we focus
our analysis on whether an examination of feasible and prudent alternatives to demolition

4 We note that the United States Supreme Court recently addressed the Lemon test in Am.
Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). The discussion of the Lemon test
in Am. Legion is not helpful to our analysis.

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of the church building would disturb a ruling of a governing ecclesiastical body with
respect to issues of doctrine, interfere with an internal decision that affects the faith and
mission of the church, or foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion.
A. The MERA claim cannot be resolved without disturbing a ruling of the
governing ecclesiastical body with respect to issues of doctrine.

Applying Pfeil, the district court concluded that any decision about “dealing with
the [church building] is an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the
church itself,” that the bishop’s decision was grounded in canon law and the norms of the
Roman Catholic Church, and that application of a secular statute to interfere with the
bishop’s decision would foster excessive government entanglement with religion.5
Appellant argues that resolution of its MERA claim would not disturb any ruling of
a governing ecclesiastical body because Bishop Kettler did not actually decide to demolish
the church building. In the alternative, if Bishop Kettler did make the demolition decision,
appellant contends that it was not based in theology, faith, or church rule, custom, doctrine,
or law. We address each argument in turn.
1. Demolition Decision
The record includes the affidavit of the vicar general of the diocese, who chairs the
DBC and is a representative of and advisor to Bishop Kettler. The vicar general avers that

5 Appellant argues that the district court erred because the application of neutral principles
of law would resolve its MERA claim. But we need not evaluate whether neutral principles
could resolve the dispute if the application of those principles would otherwise violate the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. See Pfeil , 877 N.W.2d at 534. Because other Pfeil
considerations resolve this appeal, we do not address appellant’s neutral -principles
arguments.

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“[t]he decision by Bishop Kettler to demolish the Church building and build a new one is
a decision that impacts the faith and mission of the Roman Catholic Ch urch” and that
“Bishop Kettler has the final say for all decisions made about the church buildings in his
Diocese” under canon law. It is undisputed that the parish’s recommendation to restore
the church building was directed to the DBC, and the DBC’s rec ommendation to build
anew was directed to Bis hop Kettler. The bishop’s own affidavit states that he has final
legislative, executive, and judicial authority to govern the parishes in his diocese. And a
declaration submitt ed by appellant states that the parish, diocese, and the bishop “have
made it clear that their intention is to demolish” the church building. Indeed, appellant’s
complaint alleges that demolition is imminent and seeks an order enjoining respondents
from doing so.
Moreover, appellant points to no record evidence that a person or body other than
Bishop Kettler made the demolition decision. Nor does appellant argue that the bishop is
not the governing ecclesiastical body charged with making the decision. And the parties
stipulated that discovery was unnecessary to decide the summary -judgment motion. On
this record, it is undisputed that the governing ecclesiastical body —the bishop—decided
to demolish the church building.
2. Basis for Decision
Appellant asserts that “there is nothing codified in church teaching or doctrine that
disallows multiple structures or the continued existence of a former church building, nor
would resolution of this matter . . . dictate church worship practices.” Because t his
argument is unsupported by citation to legal authority or the record, other tha n the district

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court’s decision, we need not address it. See Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918,
919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (stating arguments unsupported by legal analysis or citation
need not be addressed). We nevertheless consider the argument because it implicates other
issues in this case.
Canon law provides that “[i]f a church can in no way be employed for divine
worship and it is impossible to repair it, it can be relegated to profane but not sordid use by
the diocesan bishop .” See 1983 Code C.1222, § 1. Appellant does not dispute that the
bishop is charged with determining the appropriate use, if any, of a church structure that
can no longer be used for worship. But appellant contends that it is not challenging a
decision of the bishop as to how to use the church building. Rather, appellant asserts its
MERA claim —and respondents’ affirmative defense —turns on whether the church
building can be used by any entity for activities other than worship:
[F]ormer church buildings may be used for many purposes.
For example, a former Seventh Day Adventist Church in
Duluth has been converted into a book store and a former
church in Dundas, Minnesota, was renovated and adapted into
a single -family re sidence. Other worship spaces have been
rehabilitated and transformed into schools, condominiums,
lofts, restaurants, and hotels. . . .

The Building has many potential alternative uses that do
not affect Catholic tenets, including housing a church of
another denomination, a community center, or an institution
commemorating the historical significance of Melrose and the
German immigrants that founded the city. These would be
feasible and prudent alternatives to demolition that in no way
invoke an analysi s of Canon Law and prevent respondents
from showing that “no alternative was available that did not
itself create extreme hardship.” Archabal, 495 N.W.2d at 426.
The test is not limited to analysis of possible ways the Catholic
Church could use the building.

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This argument is unavailing.
In Piletich v. Deretich , our supreme court observed that states have an “‘obvious
and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes , and in providing a
civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively.’” 328
N.W.2d 696, 700 (Minn. 1982) (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S. Ct. 3020,
3024 (1979)). The Piletich court declined to apply the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
because the court could resolve a property-ownership and member-qualification dispute by
applying purely secular law, the matter was not “committed to adjudication by the highest
tribunal in a hierarchical church,” and the dispute was not doctrinal. Id. But the supreme
court reiterated, “It is axiomatic that civil courts may not constitutionally decide
ecclesiastical or doctrinal disputes.” Id. at 699. The United States Supreme Court similarly
concluded that civil courts may resolve questions of church -property ownership with
reference to deeds and trust law, where no interpretation of religious doctrine was required.
Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-05, 99 S. Ct. at 3024-26. “Indeed, a State may adopt any one of
various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no
consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets
of faith.” Id. at 602, 99 S. Ct. at 3025 (quotation omitted).
We agree with a ppellant that this caselaw permits Minnesota courts to apply and
interpret a church’s charter, constitution, bylaws , and other internal documents where
interpretation is not reserved to the highest tribunal in a hierarchical church and does not
involve a doctrinal matter. But that is not the situation here. Appellant implicitly concedes

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that the Roman Catholic polity is hierarchical and that the bishop has the ultimate authority
to make decisions regarding the use of church property . And appellant’s contention that
Roman Catholic doctrine is irrelevant to the use of a former worship space is not supported
by the record.
At oral argument, appellant’s counsel asserted that it is “undisputed” that the church
building “isn’t a sacred space anymore.” We disagree. Implicit in the bishop’s decision to
destroy the burned church building is a d etermination that there is no acceptable secular
use of the building. Respondent’s counsel confirmed on the record at the summary -
judgment hearing that the church building has not been deconsecrated . Although it is
undisputed that the church building is no longer used for worship , nothing in the record
supports appellant’s assertion that the structure therefore lacks religious significance or has
become secular in nature.
As noted above, canon law authorizes the bishop to choose a “profane but not sordid
use” for a church building that can no longer be used for worship. 1983 Code C.1222 § 1.
Roman Catholic doctrine informs that choice. The record contains a 72-page document
issued by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops regarding the liturgical standards
that apply to church structures. Nat’l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, Built of Living Stones :
Art, Architecture, and Worship (2000). This document states that “special care” must be
taken “when it becomes necessary to raze an old church.” Id. at 44. And it highlights the
importance of respecting and preserving church artifacts and furnishings. Id. When a
church building is to be torn down, Built of Living Stones stresses the importance of
recognizing the building’s significance; “the most appropriate ritual” is the celebration of

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a final mass at the old worship space followed by a procession of the people to the new
worship space. Id.
Appellant also argues that, although the bishop has the authority to choose a use for
the church building, this authority does not extend to demolition. We are not persuaded.
Indeed, appellant’s argument demonstrates that resolution of its MERA claim implicates
church doctrine. Only an interpretation of canon law and related doctrinal guidelines could
resolve the question whether de molishing or repurposing an arson -damaged church
building located on church property, where church activities continue, constitutes a
“profane but not sordid use.” On this record, we cannot conclude that the church building
is, as appellant asserts, “[a] secular building [that] requires an application of secular law,”
or that a decision about its use does not implicate the ritual and liturgy of worship or the
tenets of faith.
In sum, on the undisputed facts presented, the use of the church building —even
though it is no longer suitable for worship —is reserved to the bishop’s authority and
implicates Roman Catholic tenets and beliefs. Appellant’s MERA claim is premised on
the existence of feasible and prudent alternatives to demolition. Asking the district court
to determine whether the church building could be used for secular purposes would disturb
a ruling of the governing ecclesiastical body with respect to issues of doctrine.
B. The MERA claim cannot be resolved without interfering with an
internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church
itself.

Appellant next argues that adjudication of its MERA claim does not implicate the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine because St. Mary’s will continue to celebrate the liturgy,

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perform sacraments, house its congregation, and otherwise fulfill its mission in a new
church building, regardless of whether the damaged church building is demolished. The
district court noted the significance of church buildings in the Roman Catholic faith
tradition. Because these buildings play an important role in facilitating a regular unfolding
of the Christian mystery, the district court concluded that “any decisions about renovating
or otherwise dealing with the [church building] is an internal church decision that affects
the faith and mi ssion of the church itself.” Appellant does not directly challenge this
determination, but suggests that the impact of its MERA claim on faith and mission is not
substantial enough to apply the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. We disagree.
In Pfeil, our supreme court held that “adjudicating a defamation claim based on
statements made during a church disciplinary proceeding and published only to members
of the religious organization and its hierarchy would ‘interfere [] with an internal church
decision t hat affects the faith and mission of the church itself’ and would excessively
entangle the courts with religion.” 877 N.W.2d at 541 (alteration in original) (quoting
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190, 132 S. Ct. at 707). Notably, the supreme court did not
premise its decision on whether the church could continue to pursue its faith and mission
generally. Rather, the focus was on whether the defamation claim could be resolved
without interfering with church decision-making that implicates faith and mission. Id. In
Hosanna-Tabor, t he United States Supreme Court likewise focused its analysis on the
precise church conduct at issue, holding that resolution of employment-discrimination
claims brought by ministers would interfere with the religious organization’s right to select
its own ministers to shape its faith and mission. 565 U.S. at 188, 132 S. Ct. at 706.

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But in Odenthal, the supreme court held that allowing a negligent-counseling claim
to proceed against a minister did not create excessive entanglement, as long as neutral
principles of law could be applied without regard to religious doctrine. Odenthal, 649
N.W.2d at 436. Unlike Pfeil and Hosanna-Tabor, Odenthal did not involve an institutional
decision. See id. at 435. But the supreme court reaffirmed that, “Under the entanglement
doctrine, a state may not inquire into or review the internal decisionmaking or governance
of a religious institution.” Id.
Similarly, in Black v. Snyder, this court held that a former pastor’s employment -
discharge claims were barred due to excessive entanglement, but her sexual -harassment
claims were not. 471 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Aug. 29,
1991). We concluded that the discharge -related claims “are fundamentally connected to
issues of church doctrine and governance and would require court review of the church’s
motives for” discharge. Id. at 720. But b ecause the sexual -harassment claim was
“unrelated to pastoral qualifications or issues of church doctrine,” the First A mendment
did not bar it. Id. at 721. In Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., lay
teachers petitioned for determination of an appropriate bargaining unit and certification to
exclusively represent the teachers on issues related to hours, wages, and working
conditions. 487 N.W.2d 857, 86 0-61 (Minn. 1992). Noting that “[t] he first amendment
wall of separation between church and state does no t prohibit limited governmental
regulation of purely secular aspects of a church school’s operation ,” our supreme court
allowed the litigation to proceed because “the level of state intervention is minimal.” Id.
at 864.

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Here, the bishop made an internal, institutional decision to demolish the church
building; the question is the degree to which the decision is connected to the church’s faith
and mission. “Excessive entanglement is, ultimately, a question of degree.” Black, 471
N.W.2d at 721; see also Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 537 (determining that “faith and mission”
factor and “excessive entanglement” question under Lemon test are substantially similar).
We conclude that claims relating to a religious organization’s internal decision on what to
do with an arson-damaged, consecrated worship space are more analogous, with respect to
faith and mission, to selecting ministers or determining church membership than to claims
relating to secular aspects of an employment relationship or sexual harassment. On the
record before us, the decision to remove features of religious significance and demolish the
church building is an internal decision that affects the faith and mission of the church.
Appellant’s MERA claim cannot be adjudicated without violating the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine.
We recognize that the loss of this beautiful, old, treasured church building is , and
will continue to be, keenly felt. And we are cognizant that our ruling leaves appellant
without a remedy under t he law. “Sometimes . . . the courts cannot award a remedy, no
matter how valid the claim. These are not easy decisions. But they are necessary decisions,
particularly where, as here, the right to a remedy must be weighed against constitutionally
enshrined commitments to religious freedom.” Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 542.
D E C I S I O N
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precludes adjudication of this MERA claim .
Respondents’ affirmative defense that there are no feasible and prudent alternatives to

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demolishing the church building cannot be resolved without disturbing a ruling of the
governing ecclesiastical body with respect to issues of doctrine, interfering with an internal
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church, and fostering excessive
governmental entanglement with religion. The district court properly granted summary
judgment.
Affirmed.