Gabrielle Marie Geraci, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2108

Gabrielle Marie Geraci,
Appellant,

vs.

Jack Cyril Maxwell,
Respondent.

Filed June 10, 2019
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HR-CV-17-102

Kassius O. Benson, Sarah B. Perlmutter, Kassius Benson Law, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Michael J. Brandt, Nicole A. Kettwick, Brandt Criminal Defense, Anoka, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Smith,
John P., Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Gabrielle Marie Geraci challenges the district court’s denial of a
harassment restraining order (HRO) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.748 (2018). Appellant
alleges the district court abused its discretion by denying her request for an HRO because:
(1) the district court relied on evidence about the parties’ social relationship before and
after the alleged sexual assault, and (2) the district court should have issued an HRO based
on appellant’s testimony. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
On February 14, 2017, appellant filed an affidavit and petition for an HRO alleging
an incident of sexual assault in October 2016 committed by respondent Jack Cyril Maxwell
against her. The matter came before the district court for an evidentiary hea ring. Nine
witnesses testified and the district court received exhibits offered by r espondent without
objection. In its written order, the district court found a sexual assault did not occur and
denied appellant’s request for an HRO.
“Ultimately, the issuance of an HRO is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Peterson
v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). “ A district court’s findings of fact
will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard is given to the district court’s
opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. ” Kush v. Mathison , 683 N.W.2d 841,
843-44 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004); Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
“Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with the definite
and firm convictio n that a mistake has been made.” Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press,

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589 N.W.2d 96, 101 ( Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). However, “[w]e will not reverse
merely because we view the evidence differently.” Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514
(Minn. App. 2004). Matters of conflicting testimony and credibility are exclusively the
province of the fact-finder. Id.
I. The district court did not err as a matter of law in considering the parties’
social relationship before and after the October 2016 incident.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence related to her
social relationship with respondent before and after the alleged sexual assault. Appellant’s
argument derives from Minnesota’s statutory definition of consent. We are not persuaded
that the district court improperly considered the parties’ social relationship.
First, appellant did not object to admission of the social-relationship evidence. A
party’s failure to object to the admission of evidence, generally, constitutes forfeiture of
any challenge to that evidence. Helm v. El Rehbein & Son, Inc., 257 N.W.2d 584, 587 n.2
(Minn. 1977) (“Where allegedly improper or prejudicial evidence has been admitted
without objection, a party may not object to its admissibility for the first time in a motion
for a new trial or on appeal.”); see also Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d
42, 45 -46 ( Minn. 1997) (recognizing that district courts possess broad discretion in
admitting evidence). Additionally, a ppellant offered the social-relationship evidence
through her own testimony, w hich allowed examination of the evidence by respondent .
See Busch v. Busch Const., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 386-87 (Minn. 1977) (recognizing that
a party may introduce similarly inadmissible evidence when the opposing party opened the
door).

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Second, the appellant’s assertion that the social-relationship evidence considered by
the district court violates Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 4 (2018), is unavailing. Pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5, a district court may issue an HRO when it finds reasonable
grounds to believe a party engaged in an act of harassment. The statutory definition of
harassment includes, among other things, “a single incident of physical or sexual assault.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1). Consent constitutes a defense to certain sexual assault
offenses. See generally Minn. Stat. §§ 609.341-.345 (2018) (identifying forms of criminal
sexual assault). The statutory definition of consent, relevant here, provides:
“Consent” means words or overt actions by a person indicating
a freely given present agreement to perform a particular sexual
act with the actor. Consent does not mean the existence of a
prior or current social relationship between the actor and the
complainant or that the complainant failed to resist a particular
sexual act.
Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 4(a). Appellant argues this statutory definition precludes
admission of any evidence about the actor and complainant’s social relationship. Though
it is correct that s ection 609.341, subdivision 4(a), says that a current social relationship
does not equal consent, neither the statute nor evidentiary rules exclude such evidence for
other purposes.
Moreover, the district court did not improperly use the social-relationship evidence.
The district court rejected the argument that appellant’s continued contact with respondent
undercut her sexual assault allegation. Instead, the district court explained: “[T]he question
here is not what occurred before and after the October 2016 incident, t he question is what
occurred in the room between [appellant] and [respondent]. The circumstances as they

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exist before and after the October 2016 incident can, however, inform credibility
determinations.” Within this context, the district court used the social-relationship
testimony to address credibility, which is proper. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 626 (2019) (“As a
general rule, anything having a legitimate tendency to throw light on the accuracy,
truthfulness, and sincerity of a witness may be shown and con sidered in determining the
credit to be accorded his or her testimony.”); see also Roy Matson Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Michelin Tire Corp. , 2 77 N.W.2d 361, 362 (Minn. 1979) (“The [district] court, sitting
without a jury, is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and may accept all or only
part of any witness’ testimony.”). Accordingly, appellant fails to show the district court
improperly used the social-relationship evidence.1 Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461,
464-65 (Minn. 1944) (“It is well to bear in mind that on appeal error is never presumed. It
must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal. Not only that, but the
burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.”).
II. The district court permis sibly exercised its discretion by denying issuance of
an HRO.
A district court’s decision to issue an HRO is a function of its discretionary
authority. Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761. For a district court to properly issue an HRO it
must find “reasonable grounds” to find the respondent engaged in harassment. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3).

1 Appellant also argues in her brief that the use of the parties’ social relationship violates
the Minnesota Rape-Shield statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.347 (2018). Appellant did not raise
this challenge to the district court. Therefore, the question is not properly before this court
on appeal, and we decline to address it. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).

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Appellant, citing unpublished cases, argues the district court erred by not granting
her an HRO. Unpublished cases are not binding authority. See Minn. Stat. § 480A.08,
subd. 3 (2018). Upon inspection of the cases relied on by appellant, appellant’s claim fails.
Although appellant cites to cases in which this court affirmed issuances of an HRO based
on one witness’s testimony, both cases involved a district court finding that witness
credible. Here, however, the district court credited testimony by witnesses contradicting
appellant’s sexual-assault allegation. These findings necessarily result in the district court
not crediting appellant’s allegation. See Pechovnik v. Pechovnik , 765 N.W.2d 94, 99
(Minn. App. 2009) (noting that district court ’s findings “implicitly indicate[d] ” that it
found certain evidence credible).
The district court found appellant failed to establish reasonable grounds to find
harassment occurred. In reaching this conclusion, the district court found credible the
testimony of respondent, B.M., respondent’s roommate, and C.D., a third party who walked
appellant home following sexual contact between appellant and respondent . B.M.
explained that he walked into the dorm room and observed appellant seem to get off
respondent’s lap as though he interrupted the two. B.M. reported this to E.A., another
student at the parties’ school, which the district court found also corroborated the statement.
B.M. left the room to brush his teeth and observed, after returning to the room, appellant
leave. Appellant contacted C.D. to walk her home. Both B.M. and C.D. stated appellant
did not appear intoxicated, contrary to appellant’s testimony. The district court also
credited respondent’s testimony that the parties engaged in consensual sexual activity in
his dorm room.

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This court cannot determine matters of fact because fact-finding, in this context, is
solely a function of the district court. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.
1988) (recognizing appellate courts defer to district court credibility determinations). After
inspection of the record, we find t he record sufficiently supports the district court’s
findings.2
Affirmed.

2 Appellant d raws on several secondary sources related to responses of sexual assault
victims, and she argues the district court relied on common myths of their behavior.
Appellant did not raise these issue before the district court. “[A] party cannot complain
about a district court’s failure to rule in [ their] favor when one of the reasons it did not do
so is because th at party failed to provide the district court with the evidence that would
allow the district court to fully address the question. ” Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668
N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003).