A19-0155

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2114
A19-0155

Deborah J. Palmer, surviving spouse and Trustee
for the heirs of Gary J. Palmer,
Appellant,

vs.

Walker Jamar Company,
Defendant (A18-2114),
Respondent (A19-0155),

Honeywell International, Inc.,
Respondent (A18-2114),
Defendant (A19-0155).

Filed September 16, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-18-1147

DeWayne A. Johnston, Johnston Law Office, P.C., Grand Forks, North Dakota; and

David C. Thompson (pro hac vice), David C. Thompson, P.C., Grand Forks, North Dakota
(for appellant)

Richard J. Leighton, Daryl T. Fuchihara, Johnson, Killen & Seiler, P.A., Duluth, Minnesota
(for respondent Walker Jamar Company)

Mark R. Bradford, Jonathan C. Marquet, Jeffrey R. Peters, Bassf ord Remele, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Honeywell International, Inc.)

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Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
These consolidated appeals are taken from judgments dismissing appellant’s
asbestos-related claims against respondents. Appellant Deborah Palmer challenges the
summary-judgment dismissal of her claims against respondent Hon eywell International,
Inc. (Honeywell), arguing that the district court erred in determining that appellant’s claims
were barred by the six-year period of limitations set forth in Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd.
1(5) (2018). Appellant also challenges the dismissal of her cl aims against respondent
Walker Jamar Company (Walker Jamar) on grounds of insufficient service of process,
arguing that the district court erred by (1) determining that, under published caselaw and
Minn. Stat. § 302A.781 (2018), appellant was required to bring her claim within two years
of Walker Jamar’s 1985 corporate dissolution; and (2) concluding that a 2007 amendment
to Minn. Stat. § 302A.781 does not apply to revive appellant’s claim. We affirm.
FACTS
Decedent’s Exposure and Medical History
Gary Palmer (decedent) died of m alignant mesothelioma on March 1, 2015.
Appellant, decedent’s surviving spouse and trustee for his heir s and next-of-kin, alleges
that decedent became ill and died from exposure to asbestos from his father’s work clothes
while his father was working with asbestos and from his own direct exposure to “asbestos
dust from brake and clutch repair activities.”

3
Decedent’s father, Woodbury Palm er, was an “asbestos worker,” a term used to
refer to a tradesman who worked with and installed insulation products containing asbestos.
In a 2013 video deposition, decedent testified that, while he was living in his parent’s home,
Woodbury “always worked for Walker-Jamar or A.W. Kuettel” as an asbestos worker.
Decedent also testified that he was repeatedly exposed to dust from Woodbury’s work
clothes.
Decedent’s second claimed source of exposure was dust from asb estos-containing
brake products made by Bendix. For four months in 1974, decede nt worked as a janitor
for an Oldsmobile dealer, Bob Lewis Olds Inc. Decedent was res ponsible for sweeping
and washing the floors and throwing away brake pad and clutch debris. Decedent testified
that, as a dealer, Bob Lewis Olds would only “install . . . AC Delco, which is a GM product,
into their vehicles that they work[ed] on.”
In 2009, fluid built up in decedent’s right lung. It had to be drained. Decedent
testified that he was treated by a pulmonologist who ordered CT s c a n s . T h o s e s c a n s
revealed calcium deposits and “fib ers in the pleural lining aro und the lung,” leading the
pulmonologist to opine, “‘That’s about . . . what I would expect from a family member of
an asbestos worker.’” Decedent had periodic CT scans thereafter for a year.
In fall 2011, d ecedent again had a buildup of fluid in his lung s. This required
surgery, and some of the tissue was biopsied. On the morning o f December 24, 2011,
hospital staff informed decedent that he had malignant mesothel ioma, and decedent later
testified that he thought asbestos “was the only reason [he] wo uld have contracted that
disease.” Appellant sought out additional medical treatment and was told by his doctors in

4
January 2012 that mesothelioma is an asbestos-related disease.1 Decedent’s right lung was
removed in 2012. A 2013 reoccu rrence of mesothelioma ultimatel y caused his death on
March 1, 2015. There is no dispute that mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure led to
his death.
Honeywell International
Respondent Honeywell is the successor-in-interest of The Bendi x Company
(Bendix). Bendix produced brake products containing asbestos. The parties agree that “for
the purposes of this litigation, Honeywell is legally responsible for the asbestos-containing
brake products sold by Bendix.”
Walker Jamar Company

The historical background of respondent Walker Jamar comes fro m our published
opinion, Podvin v. Jamar Co., 655 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. App. 2003), on which the district
court also relied.
Walker Jamar was a Minnesota company that sold, among other thi ngs, insulation
products containing asbestos. Id. at 646-47. In 1981, Walker Jamar reorganized into “the
Jamar Company (Jamar I), to take over most of the business of Walker Jamar and a holding
company, Norwalk, Inc., to hold the stock of both Walker Jamar and Jamar I.” Id. at 647.
Walker Jamar has steadfastly mai ntained that reorganization was “ t o i n s u l a t e t h e
construction activities of the c ompany from potential liabiliti es stemming from the

1 Appellant concedes in her brief that decedent “knew that he had been diagnosed with the
disease of mesothelioma and that t he cancer generally had been caused by asbestos
exposure as of late January of 2012.”

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distribution of” a nonasbestos-related product. Id. Jamar I was incorporated in early 1982,
“assumed all assets and liabilities of Walker Jamar except thos e associated with” the
nonasbestos product, and “continue d all other aspects of the or iginal business.” Id. In
1983, an attempt was made to sell the company. Id. When those efforts were unsuccessful,
it was instead “decided to dissolve the companies at the end of the fiscal year on January 31,
1985.” Id. However, Jamar I was able to find a buyer before that date and “sold its assets,
including its name, to API, Inc.” and agreed to indemnify API a gainst any liability not
specifically assumed by API in the purchase agreement. Id. Following the sale,
Jamar I merged into the parent company, Norwalk. A few
months later, Norwalk merged into Walker Jamar. . . . On
July 17, 1985, Walker Jamar filed its notice of intent to
dissolve. On August 12, 1985, Walker Jamar filed its articles
of dissolution in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 302A.733
( 1 9 8 4 ) ; t h e s a m e d a y , t h e s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e i s s u e d W a l k e r
Jamar’s certificate of dissolution.

Id.
Procedural History
In 2013, appellant and decedent sued 177 companies in North Dakota, for “asbestos-
related product liability.” Decedent was twice deposed in that case, and the depositions
are part of the record in this appeal. Following decedent’s death in 2015, appellant initiated
a wrongful-death action in Cass County, North Dakota. Honeywel l was not named as a
defendant in either of the North Dakota cases, but Walker Jamar was named as a defendant
in both of them. Walker Jamar was eventually dismissed from the North Dakota wrongful-
death action on forum non conveniens grounds, “the North Dakota court having accepted
the parties’ stipulation that the applicable Minnesota statute of limitations had not run.”

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On February 23, 2018, appellant sued Honeywell and Walker Jamar in Minnesota,
alleging that decedent’s mesothel ioma and death resulted from r espondents’ negligence
and asbestos-related product lia bility. Later in 2018, Walker Jamar moved to dismiss
appellant’s claims for insufficient service of process, arguing t h a t Podvin “directly
addressed the validity of this method of service” and that a 2007 amendment to Minn. Stat.
§ 302A.781 could not apply retroactively to Walker Jamar. 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 54, art.
5, § 6. In August 2018, Honeywell also moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was
entitled to summary judgment because appellant’s complaint was commenced outside the
period of limitations and, in the alternative, appellant “failed to demonstrate that [decedent]
worked with or around any Bendix product.” The two dispositive motions were heard
together.
The district court granted Hone ywell summary judgment in Octob er 2018. The
district court agreed that Honeywell is entitled to summary jud gment on its period-of-
limitations argument and, in the alternative, it also concluded that appellant made “at most
a speculative claim of exposure to Honeywell[’s] asbestos-containing products.”
In November 2018, the district court granted Walker Jamar’s motion to dismiss for
insufficient service of process. The district court concluded that “[u]nless Podvin i s
somehow inapplicable, dismissal of the action for insufficient service of process is
required” and that the 2007 amendment to section 302A.781 does not apply retroactively
to appellant’s claims. The distr ict court also noted that appe llant attempted to avoid
dismissal by alleging “fraudulent dissolution” by Walker Jamar, but noted that her
“abbreviated fraud argument cites only the availability of a fr aud defense without laying

7
out the applicable elements of fraud and without explaining how her alleged evidence of
fraud establishes a prima facie case of fraud sufficient to avoid summary judgment.”
Appellant appealed the judgments resulting from both orders, and we consolidated
the two appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court properly dismissed appellant’s claims aga inst Honeywell by
summary judgment.

Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judg ment in favor of
Honeywell based on the expiratio n of the period of limitations. Appellant contends that
the district court erred in determining when this period began to run and when appellant’s
claims accrued.2
Summary judgment is proper when a moving party “shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to jud gment as a matter of law.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. Appellate courts review a grant of sum mary judgment “de novo
to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court
erred in its application of the law.” Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623,
628 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
appellate courts “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . .

2 Appellant makes a related argument that the district court erred in construing decedent’s
diagnosis of calcium deposits in 2009 and mesothelioma in late 2011 and early 2012 as a
“single disease” and not regardi ng them as two separate disease s. However, the district
court determined that appellant’s claims fell outside the perio d of limitations using either
2009 or 2011 as the relevant disease-onset date.

8
and resolve all doubts and factual inferences against the moving part[y].” Rochester City
Lines, Co. v. City of Rochester, 868 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 2015).
Under Minnesota law, actions “for any other injury to the perso n or rights of
another” shall generally be “commenced within six years.” See Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd.
1(5). Actions “ based on the strict liability of the defendant and arising from t h e
manufacture, sale, use or consumption of a product” must be commenced within four years.
Id., subd. 2. (2018). Expiration of the statutory period of limitations is an affirm ative
defense. Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.03. “[A] party asserting a statut e of limitation . . . as an
affirmative defense bears the burden of proving all elements of the affirmative defense.”
State Farm Fire & Cas. v. Aquila Inc., 718 N.W.2d 879, 885 (Minn. 2006). “Courts have
no power to extend or modify statutory limitation periods.” Johnson v. Winthrop Labs.
Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1971).
An “action[] can only be commenced . . . after the cause of action accrues.” Minn.
Stat. § 541.01 (2018). “A cause of action accrues when all of the elements of the ac tion
have occurred, such that the cause of action could be brought and would survive a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828,
832 (Minn. 2011). “An action for negligence cannot be maintained, nor does the statute of
limitations begin to run, until damage has resulted from the al leged negligence.” Dalton
v. Dow Chem. Co., 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1968); see Fink v. Cold Spring Granite
Co., 115 N.W.2d 22, 30 (Minn. 1962) (applying a similar reasoning to silicosis, an
“insidious disease” that “develops over a long period of time”).

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The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that, “because of the uniq ue character of
asbestos-related deaths, wrongful death actions brought in conn ection with those deaths
accrue either upon the manifestation of the fatal disease in a way that is causally linked to
asbestos, or upon the date of death—whichever is earlier.” DeCosse v. Armstrong Cork
Co., 319 N.W.2d 45, 52 (Minn. 1982) (emphasis added); see Karjala v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1975). Ignorance of a cause of a ction does not
toll the period of limitations. Johnson, 190 N.W.2d at 81.
Here, the district court considered appellant’s arguments regar ding the period of
limitations and rejected them, concluding that there existed no genuine issue of material
fact. The district court noted that appellant was “[t]aking th e controlling cases out of
context,” in order to argue that “the statute of limitations do es not commence until
[decedent] actually knew that he had an expert-supported liability claim against Honeywell
regardless of when [decedent] learned that he sustained a bodily injury caused by asbestos
exposure from one or more potential defendants.” The district court determined, based on
an undisputed record, that de cedent was unquestionably aware by no later than January
2012 both that he had mesothelioma and that the disease had bee n caused by asbestos
exposure. Consequentl y, because this lawsuit was not commenced until February 2018,
the district court concluded th at Honeywell was entitled to sum mary judgment under the
longest potential statute of limitations—six years.
Appellant cites to federal caselaw to argue that the period of limitations should not
have begun to run until decedent was able to specifically identify Bendix brakepads as the
product that caused his mesothelioma. Appellant also appears t o cite Frederick v.

10
Wallerich, 907 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 2018) f or this proposition. As the dis trict court
correctly noted, “ Frederick is not a chemical or product-ex posure case”; neither is it a
product-liability case; Frederick does not impose any new requirements on the period of
limitations in such cases. See Frederick, 907 N.W.2d at 173. Instead, the supreme court
in Frederick examined the elements of legal malpractice to determine when some damage
resulted from an attorney’s negligent acts over a period of several years. Id. at 178-80.
Appellant’s argument, which oth erwise relies wholly on foreign caselaw, is at odds
w i t h M i n n e s o t a S u p r e m e C o u r t p r e c e d e n t , w h i c h h a s r e j e c t e d t h e defendant-specific
knowledge requirement.
In Dalton, a newspaper worker was, over the course of his employment, exposed to
multiple chemicals including a cleaning solvent, vythene. 158 N.W.2d at 581. In 1957,
the worker began experiencing se vere symptoms and ultimately hi s lower extremities
became paralyzed. Id. at 581. Before August 1957, the worker suspected vythene exposure
might be related to his ailments. Id. In late 1957 and early 1958, doctors wrote letters
opining that the worker’s paral ysis resulted from his exposure to methyl chloroform and
trichlorethylene. Id. at 582. In January 1964, almost six-and-a-half years after the worker
was first admitted to a hospital for his symptoms, the worker brought a claim for negligence
and breach of warranty against vy thene’s manufacturer. That cl aim was dismissed for
being barred by the period of limitations. Id. at 582-83.
The supreme court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that “[a]n action for
negligence cannot be maintained, nor does the statute of limita tions begin to run, until
damage has resulted from the alleged negligence.” Id. at 584. The supreme court noted

11
that, by summer 1958, the worker had suffered his injury and chemical exposure had been
discussed as a possible cause of his paralysis. Id. at 585. The supreme court noted that its
approach was similar to prior wo rkers’ compensation cases invol ving occupational
diseases such as silicosis. Id. at 583-84. The worker in Dalton argued that “he must
positively know of, not suspect , the causal relationship befo re the action he commenced
accrues.” Id. at 585 (emphasis added). The supreme court rejected that argument, stating
that “[t]he subjective determination of the accrual of his caus e of action contended for by
[appellant] is obviously without support in our decisions.” Id.
In DeCosse, the supreme court examined the period of limitations in asbes tos-
related wrongful-death actions. 319 N.W.2d at 47. In relevant part, the supreme court held
that, “because of the unique character of asbestos-related deaths, wrongful death actions
brought in connection with those deaths accrue either upon the manifestation of the fatal
disease in a way that is causally linked to asbestos, or upon t he date of death—whichever
is earlier.” Id. at 52.
Here, decedent was diagnosed with mesothelioma by December 24, 2011. He then
knew both that he had mesothelioma and that the disease is link ed to asbestos exposure.
Appellant concedes that decedent was aware of the causal link between mesothelioma and
asbestos by January 2012. Here, the cause of action accrued, a t the latest, as of January
2012. Under Dalton and DeCosse, decedent was only required to “positively know of . . .
the causal relationship” between asbestos and his disease befor e the action would be
considered to have accrued. Dalton, 158 N.W.2d at 585; see DeCosse, 319 N.W.2d at 52.
That he may not then have specifically identified Honeywell as a legally responsible party

12
does not change the analysis of when the cause of action accrue d. See DeCosse, 319
N.W.2d at 52. Under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subds. 1 and 2, appe llant had four years to
bring claims involving strict product liability and six years to bring her other claims. Both
of those statutory periods of limitations had expired when appellant commenced the action
in February 2018, more than six years after the cause of action had accrued. We therefore
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Honeywell.3
II. The district court did not err by applying Podvin v. Jamar Company to dismiss
appellant’s claims against Walker Jamar for insufficient service of process.

Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of the clai ms against Walker
Jamar for insufficient service of process. Appellant contends that her action is not barred
by Minn. Stat. § 302A.781 due to the “‘continuing tort’ nature of latent asbestos-caused
diseases, the 2003 Court of Appeals decision in Podvin, and Minnesota trial and appellate
courts’ recognition” that asbestos claims are “incurred” within the meaning of section
302A.781, subdivision 3, at the time a corporation is dissolved.
“Sufficiency of process is a jurisdictional question.” Podvin, 655 N.W.2d at 648.
“A party may immediately appeal, as a matter of right, from the de ni a l of a m ot i on t o
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, ” which is a legal question we r e vi e w de no v o. Id. A
dissolved corporation may be served under section 5.25, which provides that:
(a) Process . . . may be served on a dissolved . . . business
entity that was governed by chapter 302A, 303, 317A, 321,

3 The district court alternativel y concluded that summary judgme nt was appropriate
because appellant had demonstrat ed only a “speculative” claim o f exposure to asbestos
dust from Bendix products. We decline to address this alternat ive basis for summary
judgment as unnecessary.

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322C, or 323A as provided in this subdivision. The court shall
determine if service is proper.
(b) If a business entity has voluntarily dissolved . . . ,
service must be made according to subdivision 3 or 4, so long
as claims are not barred under the provisions of the chapter
that governed the business entity.

Minn. Stat. § 5.25, subd. 5(a), (b) (2018) (emphasis added).
In Podvin, we addressed asbestos-related claims against Walker Jamar und er the
1984 version of Minn. Stat. § 302A.781, subd. 3. 655 N.W.2d at 649-52. Minnesota’s
1984 corporate dissolution statute provided that, if a “credito r or claimant” had no notice
of a corporation’s dissolution, that claimant must “initiate le gal, administrative, or
arbitration proceedings concerning the claim within two years a fter the date of filing the
notice of intent to dissolve.” Minn. Stat. § 302A.729, subd. 2 (1984). Subdivision 1 of
section 302A.781, in relevant part, provided that a creditor or claimant “who does not file
a claim or pursue a remedy . . . within the time provided in se ction[] 302A.729 . . . [is]
forever barred from suing on that claim or otherwise realizing upon or enforcing it, except
as provided in this section.” M inn. Stat. § 302A.781, subd. 1 (1984). Subdivision 3
provided that:
All debts, obligations, and liabilities incurred during
dissolution proceedings shall be paid by the corporation before
the distribution of assets. . . . A person to whom this kind o f
debt, obligation, or liability is owed but not paid may pursue
any remedy against the officers, directors, and shareholders of
the corporation before the expi ration of the applicable statute
of limitations.

Minn. Stat. § 302A.781, subd. 3 (1984).

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I n 2 0 0 7 , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e a m e n d e d s e c t i o n 3 0 2 A . 7 8 1 t o i n c l u d e s ubdivision 5,
providing that, “[i]n addition to the claims in subdivision 4, all other statutory and common
law rights of persons who may bring claims of injury to a person, including death, are not
affected by dissolution under th is chapter.” 2007 Minn. Laws c h. 54, art. 5, § 6, at 263
(codified at Minn. Stat. § 302A.781, subd. 5 (2018)).
I n Podvin, the plaintiff asserted asbesto s-related claims against Walker Jamar and
Jamar II in 2001, and the two companies “moved to dismiss the l awsuit for insufficiency
of process, claiming that, as dissolved corporations, they could no longer be served.” 655
N.W.2d at 647. The district cour t denied the motion, and we ad dressed subdivision 3’s
applicability. Id. at 647-49. First, we concluded that the two-year period of limitations in
section 302A.781 applied, based in part upon Minnesota Supreme Court precedent strictly
applying the “time limit for asse rting claims against dissolved corporations.” Id. at 649-
5 0 . N e x t , w e h e l d t h a t t h e p h r a s e “‘liabilities incurred’ plainly applies to a debt or
obligation that the obligor was legally obli gated to pay at the time of the dissolution
proceedings, rather than to an un matured tort or contract claim .” Id. at 650 (emphasis
added). Our analysis noted the legislature’s intent that the g oal of every dissolution is to
“end the corporate existence as quickly and neatly as possible” and to avoid “lingering
liability for claims arising after dissolution that could conce ivably extend corporate
accountability in perpetuity.” Id. at 651.
Here, the district court corre ctly observed that appellant “makes the same arguments
that were rejected in Podvin.” Appellant did not file suit against Walker Jamar until more
than 32 years after the company’s voluntary dissolution. The district court applied Podvin

15
and concluded that “service of process was ineffective because Walker Jamar’s liability to
[appellant] was not incurred during dissolution” and could not arise until decedent’s cause
of action accrued. The district court reasoned that decedent’s “cause of action against
Walker Jamar could not have accrued before January 2009.” The district court concluded
that:
Walker Jamar could not have incurred a liability to [decedent]
or his family during dissolution proceedings [in 1985] as a
matter of law. As such, the two-year time-barring provision of
the corporate dissolution statut e controls because none of the
statutory exceptions are applicable. Minnesota Statutes
sections 302A.729 and 302A.781, when read in conjunction
with Podvin, preclude [appellant’s] claim. Unless Podvin is
somehow inapplicable, dismissal of the action for insufficient
service of process is required.

Appellant cites to an unpublished case, Evert v. ACandS, Inc. , Nos. CX-94-1067,
C1-94-1068, C3-94-1069, 1994 WL 654532 at *2 (Minn. App. Nov. 22, 1994), review
denied (Minn. Jan. 25, 1995), in support of her argument. Appellant’s reliance on this
unpublished case is misplaced. In Evert, three plaintiffs, seeking to sue Walker Jamar,
served the individual, Walker Jamar Jr., in his capacity as the former president of Walker
Jamar and former chairman of The Jamar Company, in 1993. Id. at *1. Walker Jamar
“moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming insufficiency of service of process,” which the
district court denied. Id. The district court reasoned that lawsuits against dissolved
corporations were “clearly contemplated” and “someone must be s erved.” Id. We noted
that “[w]hile the law contemplat ed suit against a dissolved cor poration and named who
could defend against a suit after dissolution, the law did not specifically address how a
claimant could effect service of process.” Id. at *2. Ultimately, we affirmed the district

16
court’s order, because Jamar Jr. “was the person who could reas onably be expected to
apprise the corporation of the s ervice and the pendency of the action” given his former
positions, his beforehand involv ement in asbestos litigation, a nd his previous acceptance
of service “for asbestos-related claims on behalf of the dissolved corporations.” Id. at *3-
4 (quotation omitted). However, we expressly declined to addre ss any statute-of-
limitations question, because no such issue was before us on appeal. Id. at *3.
Contrary to appellant’s assertion that Evert is “directly analogous” to this one, Evert
is not controlling for several reasons. Foremost, Evert is not a published opinion and is
therefore not binding precedent; Podvin is published and therefore binding. See Dynamic
Air, Inc. v. Bloch , 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. App. 1993). Podvin is also directly on
point and specifically held that “[t]he definition of ‘liabilities incurred’ under Minn. Stat.
§ 302A.781, subd. 3 (1984), encompassed only debts or claims th at a corporation was
legally obligated to pay at the time of the dissolution process , rather than unmatured tort
and contract claims.” Podvin, 655 N.W.2d at 652. Podvin also noted Evert’s existence but
found it unpersuasive because t he opinion “did not specify how a claimant could effect
service of process.” Id. at 651. As the district court noted, “[b]ecause Podvin is binding,
published precedent, any abrogati on of the [appellate] court’s express and unambiguous
holding based upon an unpublished decision is inappropriate and obviously constitutes
reversible error.” And we, like the district court, are bound b y “ o u r o w n p u b l i s h e d
opinions.” Jackson v. Options Residential, Inc., 896 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Minn. App. 2017).
Finally, Evert is distinguishable in that Evert’s plaintiffs served Jamar Jr. in his capacity as
a former officer, as opposed to attempting service through the Minnesota Secretary of

17
State’s office. Evert, 1994 WL 654532, at *1. Accordingly, Evert only addressed the
available legal methods of service on a dissolved corporation. Id. at *1-3. In contrast,
Podvin addressed whether, considering the two-year liability bar, any form of service is
effective. 655 N.W.2d at 648-51. Podvin concluded any such service of process after the
statutory two-year limitation period is ineffective. Id. at 652.
Appellant also appears to argue that the nature of asbestos in juries makes Podvin
inapplicable. The district court also addressed appellant’s attempt “to distinguish Podvin
by suggesting that case did not consider the continuous nature of asbestos exposure and the
long latency period between exposure and disease contraction.” We agree with the district
court that appellant’s argument fails because (1) “the same argument was fully briefed and
rejected in Podvin,” (2) this argument is “incons istent with when tort liability is incurred
in an asbestos case,” (3) “even if liability could have been ‘i ncurred during dissolution’
through mere exposure without a resulting injury,” decedent was last exposed 11 years
before Walker Jamar’s dissolution, and (4) appellant only cites “district court and
unpublished appellate decisions decided prior to Podvin and which were either expressly
or impliedly rejected by Podvin.” Appellant does not articulate any reasons based in
Minnesota law that provide a rationale for overruling Podvin.4

4 Appellant also argues that Podvin is inapplicable because W alker Jamar’s insurance
companies’ continuing to provide coverage related to asbestos l itigation and injuries is
“concrete and even conclusive” acknowledgement of Walker Jamar’s liability for asbestos-
related injuries. We find no such “acknowledgement” by the insurance companies in this
record. Moreover, Walker Jamar’s insurance status is irrelevant to liability. See Minn. R.
Evid. 411; Kissoondath v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 909, 918-19 (Minn. App. 2001),
review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2001).

18
Appellant also contends that her claims against Walker Jamar ar e not barred by
Minn. Stat. § 302A.781 because of a 2007 amendment to the statu te. In 2007, the
Minnesota legislature amended section 302A.781 to add subdivision 5. 2007 Minn. Laws
ch. 54, art. 5, § 6, at 263. In its entirety, the amendment adding subdivision 5 reads:
Sec. 6. Minnesota Statutes 2006, section 302A.781, is
amended by adding a subdivision to read:

Subd. 5. Other claims preserved. In addition to the
claims in subdivision 4, all other statutory and common law
rights of persons who may bring claims of injury to a person,
including death, are not affected by dissolution under this
chapter.

EFFECTIVE DATE. This section is effective July 1,
2007.

Id.
Minnesota law provides that “[n]o law shall be construed to be retroactive unless
clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (2018); see
Thompson Plumbing Co. v. McGlynn Companies, 486 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Minn. App. 1992)
(“Newly enacted laws or amendments are presumed to apply prospectively unless there is
an unambiguous legislative expression to the contrary.”). Use of the word “retroactive” is
“a clear manifestation by the leg islature that a statute is int ended to be applied
retroactively.” U.S. Home Corp. v. Zimmerman Stucco & Plaster, Inc. , 749 N.W.2d 98,
101 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2008). The legislature may also
indicate its intent for a retroactive effect through other language such as through the phrase
“commenced on or after” a specific date. Gomon v. Northland Fa mily Physicians, Ltd. ,

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645 N.W.2d 413, 417-20 (Minn. 2002). Alternatively, an act may apply retroactively if it
clarifies rather than modifies existing law. Thompson Plumbing Co., 486 N.W.2d at 785.
Here, the district court conclu ded that “the 2007 addition of subdivision 5 to section
302A.781 cannot retroactively re surrect a claim against Walker Jamar that was barred
thirty years ago.” The district court noted that the language in the amendment was “without
additional language expressly ap plying the amendment to claims brought on or after the
effective date.” The district court also rejected appellant’s argument that the amendment
“was a clarification in response to Podvin—an intent to return to the ‘status quo’ of pre-
Podvin interpretation of section 302A.781.” The district court corre ctly noted that there
was no “status quo” before Podvin because the case raised an issue of first impression. It
further observed that an amendment added more than four years after Podvin was decided
cannot be considered a clarification.
The 2007 amendment contains no indication of legislative intent that it should apply
retroactively. In U.S. Home Corp. , we determined that the legislature’s intent for
retroactive effect was evidenced by use of the word “retroactiv e.” 749 N.W.2d at 101.
Similarly, in Gomon, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the phrase “commenced
on or after” a certain date “expresses the legislature’s intent to revive certain claims.” 645
N.W.2d at 417. In contrast, the 2007 amendment at issue here c ontains no indication of
legislative intent to revive claims long barred. The amendment states that it is “effective
July 1, 2007.” 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 54, art. 5, § 6, at 263. I t contains no statement of
legislative intent to apply retroactively. See id. Applying subdivision 5 retroactively in
this circumstance would be an exercise of our will and not that of the legislature. See Minn.

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Stat. § 645.16 (2018) (providing that, when the words of a stat ute are unambiguous, “the
letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit”).
Appellant also contends that subdivision 5 is merely “a clarif ying additional
subdivision” to overturn Podvin. Appellant’s argument fails. Podvin was decided in early
2003. 655 N.W.2d at 645. The amendment was enacted in 2007. As the district court
noted, appellate courts have previously determined legislative amendments as
clarifications when there is a “prompt reaction to a court’s co nstruction of a statute” with
which the legislature disagrees.
I n Hoben v. City of Minneapolis, an amendment was determined to be a clarification
because the legislature amended the statute at the next session of the legislature to override
the supreme court’s interpretation of a provision of the no-fault benefit statute. 324 N.W.2d
161, 162 (Minn. 1982). Similarly, in Carlson v. Lilyerd , we concluded an earlier
amendment to the statute at issue was a clarification based upon “an immediate legislative
response” to a court’s earlier interpretation of that statute. 449 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Minn.
App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Mar. 8, 1990). As the Carlson court explained, the
earlier interpretation of the statute at issue was initially “d ecided February 23, 1989” but
on “June 2, 1989 the governor s igned the bill” amending the sta tute to repudiate that
interpretation. Id. Appellant cites no caselaw in support of her argument that four years is
“an immediate legislative response,” and we are aware of none.
The language of the amendment itself also contains no language suggesting a
“clarifying” legislative intent. 2007 Minn. Laws. ch. 54, art. 5, § 6, at 263. The 2007
amendment states that it is an amendment (“is amended by”). Id. In Carlson, we examined

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previous cases where legislative acts were determined to be cla rifications in part because
the preambles to the acts “explicitly labeled the amendments as ‘clarifying acts.’” 449
N.W.2d at 191. Such language is not required, but the absence of any indication of a
legislative intent to clarify is telling. See id.
In sum, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Honeywell
because appellant’s claims against Honeywell are barred by the statute of limitations. We
also affirm the district court’ s dismissal of appellant’s claim s against Walker Jamar for
insufficient service of process under section 302A.781 and the published caselaw under
that section.
Affirmed.