In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Karl Leonard Meyer.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2118

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Karl Leonard Meyer.

Filed May 20, 2019
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-MH-PR-18-1171

Mark Gray, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant Karl Leonard Meyer)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin Coun ty Attorney, John L. Kirwin, A ssistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Medical Center)

Considered and decided by Clear y, Chief Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
On appeal from his commitment as mentally ill, appellant Karl Leonard Meyer
argues that the district court erred in (1) admitting hearsay evidence, (2) finding that Meyer
had made threats against governme nt figures, and (3) concluding that Meyer poses a
substantial likelihood of physical harm to himself or others as shown by a recent attempt
or threat to harm others. We affirm.

2
FACTS
Meyer has schizoaffective disorder and had multiple previous c ivil commitments.
One commitment came in 2009 after Meyer was found incompetent t o stand trial when
faced with charges of internet or computer solicitation of children and attempted burglary.
The state brought these charges after Meyer described sexual co nduct, prostitution, and
masturbation to a 13-year-old girl and violated a harassment restraining order. After being
recommitted several times, Meyer was released in 2012.
In 2014, Meyer began to harass S.K. by showing up at his offic e with gifts, sending
him emails, and leaving voicema ils. Meyer believes that S.K. i s a biblical prophet and
asked him to share Meyer’s story with President Obama. Despite being told that he was
trespassing and that if he returned he would be arrested, Meyer continued to show up at
S.K.’s office. S.K. eventually obtained a harassment restraining order against Meyer.
Meyer was again committed as men tally ill in 2015. Starting i n July 2017, Meyer
resided in Birchwood Home Care where he received nursing servic es. Although his
doctors supported con tinued commitment, a pre-petition screenin g suggested that Meyer
was stable. As a result, the county did not seek recommitment, and in October 2017,
Meyer’s commitment ended. Meyer continued to live at Birchwood for several months
after his commitment expired, but he expressed that he was not mentally ill and refused to
take psychoactive medications.
Meyer’s medical records reflect that, throughout his stay at B irchwood, Meyer
maintained an ongoing, fixed delusion about wanting to fight the police and raise a militia

3
t o f i g h t t h e g o v e r n m e n t o v e r h i s d i s p l e a s u r e w i t h t h e F o u r t e e n th Amendment. 1 T h e
Birchwood records show that Meyer has a history of planning to solicit funds online in
order to purchase specialized weapons and recruit others to help him “shoot up City Hall”
to protest forcing children to attend school. He has stated that he “has the right to a machine
gun” and wants “to get a machine gun and use it upon the Minneapolis Police Department.”
Meyer left Birchwood at the end of February 2018.
In early July 2018, Meyer cont acted S.K. again by posting a do cument on his
Facebook timeline and sending a document by facsimile. Meyer also emailed S.K. to ask
if he could meet S.K. at his office and later sent a follow-up email. S.K. applied for a
second restraining order and in his affidavit, S.K. stated that Meyer made a threatening
reference to the prior restraining order in the first email and the second email allegedly
frightened and intimidated S.K.
Also in early July, Meyer applied for a permit to purchase a f irearm. The Edina
Police Department denied his pe tition, stating that Meyer neede d to provide additional
documentation showing that his c ivil commitments did not bar hi m from purchasing a
handgun. Approximately two months later, Meyer wrote a letter to the Edina Chief of
Police in response stating, “When the time comes to bear arms i n defense of our mutual
liberty . . . maybe as soon as now . . . I will be provided wit h a suitable weapon by one of
my compatriots.” (Ellipses in original.)

1 The record also indicates that Meyer takes issue with the Fourth Amendment.

4
In September, Meyer saw a picture of E.H., a 12-year-old girl, in the newspaper
after she won a sporting event. Meyer testified that, through his organization, the
Inalienable Rights Coalition, he wished to honor E.H. and a boy featured in the paper for
their achievements. Meyer founded the Inalienable Rights Coali tion to spread his belief
that he has the right to be free from compelled school attendan ce. Meyer asserted that
honoring E.H. and the boy would help improve relations between the Inalienable Rights
Coalition and the public. Meyer manufactured an award with E.H .’s picture on it and
received a donation card from a local sporting goods store. He then went to E.H.’s school
to present the award. School staff informed Meyer that he coul d not present the award to
E.H. without her parents present but that they may come to pick her up and if he waited,
he could present the award when they arrived. Meyer testified that he was on a schedule,
gave the award to the staff, and left.
Later that month, staff at Community Outreach for Psychiatric Emergencies (COPE)
met with Meyer to evaluate him. COPE responders made contact w ith Meyer and
transported him to Hennepin Coun ty Medical Center (HCMC) withou t incident. HCMC
staff determined that he needed treatment and should be committed to a treatment facility.
On October 1, a social worker at HCMC petitioned for the judicial commitment of Meyer.
O n e o f M e y e r ’ s d o c t o r s a t H C M C also requested authorization to impose treatment
because of Meyer’s “incompetency to make a rational decision re garding the proposed
treatment.”
The district court appointed Dr. Kathryn Jameson as the examine r, and she
interviewed Meyer on October 8. In her report to the court, Dr. Jameson stated her opinion

5
that civil commitment was necessar y because of Meyer’s mental i llness. She also stated
that Meyer had made a recent attempt or threat to physically harm himself or others based
on his recent efforts to present E.H. with an award and his history of inappropriate contact
with minors. Dr. Jameson also discussed Meyer’s attempt to pur chase a gun and his
previous threats against law enfo rcement. When Dr. Jameson ask ed Meyer why he had
applied for a permit to purchase a gun, Meyer stated that he is a “commenter on social
media” and remarks on “controversial topics” so it is “prudent for me to own a gun in case
I was tracked and assaulted by a fanatic.”
The district court held a hearing on October 11, at which E.H.’s parents, Meyer, and
Dr. Jameson testified. Dr. Jameson’s testimony repeated much of what was in her report.
Dr. Jameson also testified that Meyer poses a substantial threat of continuing to harass S.K.
and to have inappropriate contact with a minor. The district c ourt admitted eight exhibits
without objection, and three over Meyer’s objection to their relevance.
After trial, Meyer left a voicemail with the Hennepin County At torney’s Office,
s t a t i n g t h a t h e h a d a m e s s a g e f o r E . H . ’ s f a t h e r : “ [ D ] e a r [ M . H .]. Having been now
described as, quote, fixated, unquote, upon [E.H.]. I will att empt to live up to that
description and learn more about you.” The petitioner moved to reopen the record, and the
district court admitted the voic email into evidence over Meyer’ s objection. The district
court also admitted additional medical records without objection. The district court found
by clear and convincing evidence th at Meyer is mentally ill and there is no suitable
alternative to judicial commitment.

6
D E C I S I O N
If a district court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a proposed patient is
mentally ill and that there is no suitable alternative to judicial commitment, the court shall
civilly commit the patient. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2018). “A person who is
mentally ill” is defined to include a person who has
a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception,
orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment,
behavior, capacity to recogniz e reality, or to reason or
understand, which is manifested by instances of grossly
disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions and poses a substantial
likelihood of physical harm to se lf or others as demonstrated
by:
. . .
(3) a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or
others.

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13(a) (2018).
The district court found that Meyer has “schizoaffective disor der, a substantial
psychiatric disorder of his thought, mood, perception, and orie ntation, grossly impairing
his judgment, behavior, capac ity to recognize reality, and capa city to reason or
understand.” Meyer does not challenge this finding. Instead, Meyer argues that the district
court erred in (1) admitting hear say evidence, (2) finding that Meyer had made threats
against government figures, and (3) concluding that Meyer poses a substantial likelihood
of physical harm to himself or others. We address the arguments in turn.
Meyer first challenges the district court’s decision to admit exhibits containing
hearsay statements into evidence. The Minnesota Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply
at a civil commitment hearing. See In re Civil Commitment of Williams, 735 N.W.2d 727,

7
730-31 (Minn. App. 2007) (explaining that at civil commitment hearings, the district court
must determine relevancy in accordance with the rules of evidence, but need not apply the
other rules of evidence), review denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2007). Instead, the Commitment
and Treatment Act Rules apply to civil commitments. Minn. Spec . R. Commit. & Treat.
Act 1(a). Rule 15 provides that the district court “may admit all relevant, reliable evidence,
including but not limited to the respondent’s medical records, without requiring foundation
witnesses.” Minn. Spec. R. Commit. & Treat. Act 15; see also Minn. Stat. § 253B.08,
subd. 7 (2018) (“The [district] court shall admit all relevant evidence at the hearing.”). The
district court may therefore admit hearsay if the court determi nes the evidence is reliable
and relevant. Williams, 735 N.W.2d at 730-31. The district court’s decision to admit
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Civil Commitment of Spicer , 853
N.W.2d 803, 813 (Minn. App. 2014).
Meyer appears to argue that the district court abused its discr etion by admitting
unreliable hearsay. But Meyer did not present this argument to the district court. An
appellate court generally will not consider matters not argued to and considered by the
district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). “Nor may a party obtain
review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under a different theory.” Id.
Meyer did not object to the admissibility of any exhibits on reliability grounds. As a result,
Meyer’s argument is forfeited. Even considering the merits of the argument, the district
court relied on the exhibits, implicitly finding them to be rel iable. Meyer fails to explain
why this finding was an abuse of discretion.

8
Meyer further challenges the dis trict court’s factual findings that Meyer had made
threats toward governmental figures and that Meyer has a fixed delusion about wanting to
fight the police. When reviewing a district court’s findings of fact in a civil commitment,
we view the record in the light most favorable to the findings and apply a clear-error
standard of review. Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 807.
The record supports the district court’s findings that Meyer ha s a fixed delusion
about wanting to fight the police and he had made previous thre ats toward governmental
figures and law enforcement. The Birchwood records show that M eyer has a history of
making statements indicating his desire to fight the police. T hese records also state that
Meyer has a “fixed perception . . . that he has the right to raise a militia to fight against the
government regarding his displeasure with the [Fourteenth Amendment].” Meyer’s belief
that he has the right to raise a militia, his displeasure with the Fourteenth Amendment, and
his desire to fight the police appear throughout the record. T he Birchwood notes also
reflect that Meyer tried to acquire guns and recruit nine other people to “shoot up City
Hall” to protest forcing children to go to school. He also stated he wants to get a machine
gun and use it on the Minneapolis Police Department. Meyer’s COPE records also reveal
that he made threats toward law enforcement. Meyer offered no evidence to rebut these
claims or deny that he made these statements. Viewing the reco rd in the light most
favorable to the district court’s decision, we hold that these findings are not clearly
erroneous.
Finally, Meyer argues that the district court’s findings of fa ct do not support a
conclusion that he poses a subs tantial likelihood of physical h arm to himself or others as

9
shown by a recent attempt or threat to physically harm himself or others. Whether the facts
found by the district court satisfy the statutory criteria for commitment is a question of law
which we review de novo. In re Civil Commitment of Janckila , 657 N.W.2d 899, 902
(Minn. App. 2003). The district court found that Meyer poses a substantial likelihood of
physical harm to self or others based on his attempt to acquire a gun coupled with his
previous threats toward the polic e, his threatening behavior to ward S.K., and his fixation
on and attempt to contact E.H. When deciding whether a person poses a risk of physical
harm to self or others, the district court need not wait until someone is actually harmed, so
long as the danger of the person’s condition has become evident. In re Terra, 412 N.W.2d
325, 328 (Minn. App. 1987).
M e y e r ’ s a r g u m e n t i s t w o f o l d . First, he argues that the distri ct court erred by
considering incidents that are not recent. And second, that hi s recent actions are not
attempts or threats to physically harm others showing that he poses a substantial likelihood
of physical harm to others. At oral argument to this court, both parties agreed that Meyer’s
actions within the past year were recent actions. Assuming, without deciding, that Meyer’s
actions within a year of the commitment hearing are “recent,” we conclude that the district
court did not err in finding that Meyer poses a substantial lik elihood of physical harm to
others.
Meyer’s Birchwood records fro m October 2017 until his release in February 2018
consistently maintain that he has a fixed delusion about wanting to fight the police and the
government over the Fourteenth Amendment. These notes include Meyer’s statements that
he has the right to own a machine gun, and in January 2018, staff at Birchwood noted that

10
Meyer threatened to “shoot up” City Hall and use a machine gun on the Minneapolis Police
Department. Meyer moved out of Birchwood at the end of February, and by July, he was
seeking to purchase a gun. Two months after his application to purchase a handgun was
denied, Meyer sent a letter to the Edina Police Department, sta ting that now may be the
time to bear arms and that his compatriots will provide him with a weapon. These threats
of violence against the governme nt, combined with Meyer’s deter mination and recent
attempts to obtain a firearm, demonstrate that the district cou rt did not err in ruling that
Meyer poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to others.
Affirmed.