Johnathan Bernard Edwards, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2123

Johnathan Bernard Edwards, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 15, 2019
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-13-9489

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Tracy M. Smith, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant argues that a postconviction court erred by denying him relief after an
evidentiary hearing because his trial counsel provided him ineffective assistance and his
sentence is based on an erroneous criminal-history score . Appellant also raises pro se
claims. We affirm.
FACTS
After a jury found appellant Jonathan Edwards guilty of one count of first -degree
sex trafficking of a 15-year-old victim, the district court sentenced Edwards to 240 months’
imprisonment. On direct appeal to this court, Edwards argued that the court erroneously
admitted: objected-to and unobjected-to hearsay statements, a statement by a nontestifying
codefendant, and improper bad-acts evidence; and that the cumulative effects of the alleged
errors denied him a fair trial. In a pro se supplemental brief, Edwards also argued that: he
did not knowingly waive a challenge to probable cause; the court erroneously joined his
trial with a codefendant ; the court erroneously failed to strike a juror ; the pr osecutor
committed misconduct ; he receiv ed ineffective assistance of trial counsel; the court
erroneously calculated his criminal -history points; and the court erroneously assigned to
him a custody -status point. This court affirmed but preserved for a postconviction
proceeding Edwards’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. State v. Edwards, No. A15-
0836 (Minn. App. May 23, 2016) ( Edwards I), review denied (Minn. Aug. 9, 2016), cert.
denied 137 S. Ct. 484 (2016).

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Edwards petitioned for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of trial
counsel and an improper sentence due to an erro neous calculation of his criminal -history
score. In a pro se petition, Edwards also asserted arguments about ineffective assistance of
trial counsel and the calculation of his criminal-history score. Following two evidentiary
hearings, the postconviction court denied Edwards’s petition.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellate courts “review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief . . . for an
abuse of discretion.” Reed v. State , 925 N.W.2d 11, 18 (Minn. 2019). A postconviction
court “abuses its discretion if it exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual
findings.” Id. (quotati on omitted). “The postconviction court’s conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo.” Fox v. State, 913 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Minn. 2018). We address each of
Edwards’s postconviction claims, counseled and uncounseled.
I. Ineffective assistance of counsel: failure to object to hearsay
“The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to effective assistance of counsel.” Crow v. State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 14 (Minn. 2019).

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, [an]
appellant must show both that (1) his trial counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that,
but for the counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.

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Id.; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). “The
objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising
the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform
under similar circumstances.” Crow, 923 N.W.2d at 1 4 (quotation omitted). A reviewing
court “considers the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury in making a
determination of prejudice.” Andersen v. State , 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013). “ In
evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is a st rong presumption that
counsel’s performance was reasonable and this court does not review matters of trial
strategy or the particular tactics used by counsel.” Crow, 923 N.W.2d at 1 4. Appellate
courts review a postconviction court’s application of the Strickland test “de novo because
it involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn.
2017). Edwards argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel failed “to object to inadmissible, highly damaging hearsay evidence.”
Respondent State of Minnesota argues that this claim is Knaffla barred. See Leake
v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007) (“When a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel can be adjudicated on the basis of the trial record, it must be brought on direct
appeal or it is barred by the Knaffla rule if raised in a postconviction petition.”); see also
State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) (barring postconviction review of all
claims raised “and all claims known but not raised” on direct appeal). Because Edwards’s
claim lacks merit, w e decide this case on other grounds and need not address the state’s
argument. See Wayne v. State, 866 N.W.2d 917, 920 n.3 (Minn. 2015) (refusing to address
argument where case decided on other grounds).

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In his postconviction petition, Edwards claimed that he received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel because of his counsel’s failure to object to testimony from
victim T.S.’s mother, T.S.’s “auntie,” T.S.’s father’s girlf riend, and two investigating
officers who testified about T.S.’s description about various aspects of Edwards’s
involvement in facilitating T.S. having sex with men for money (“7 to 20 men a day”), and
T.S.’s written statement in a notebook that she kept. On direct appeal, Edwards challenged
the district court’s failure to strike these alleged hearsay statements sua sponte. This court
concluded that admission of the alleged hearsay was not plain error because it was “not
clear or obvious” as to whether the statements would have been admissible under the
residual exception to hearsay. Edwards I, 2016 WL 2945947, at *6.1
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Edwards’s trial counsel testified that after
T.S. testified at trial that “everything [she had reported] was a lie,” he was “not going to
hammer and object to what she’s already said [were] lies. If I object to it, I’m bringing
attention to it”; and he further explained that “the strategy at that point was not to belabor
what the lies were . . . . I wasn’t going to draw what would be unnecessary attention to
something she said she already lied about.” The postconviction court concluded that
Edwards’s counseled ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim failed because he presented
“no evidence” that his trial counsel’s performance was not reasonable and his decisions not
to object amounted to unreviewable “tactical” trial decisions.

1 This court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by overruling
Edwards’s trial counsel’s objection to other hearsay statements. Id. at *3

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The state argues that this court’s conclusion in Edwards I, that the district court did
not plainly err by not sua s ponte striking the alleged hearsay , shows that the statements
were not obviously inadmissible and that Edwards therefore did not receive ineffective
assistance of trial counsel on the basis that his counsel did not object to admission of the
statements. We agree.
In Leake, the supreme court concluded that a defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim based on his counsel’s failure to object to hearsay “despite the judge’s
observation that ‘extensive hearsay of very questionable admissibility’ had be en elicited,”
was not unreasonable because the decisions not to object “were sound strategic decisions.”
737 N.W.2d at 542. Similarly here, Edwards’s counsel’s decision not to object to the
alleged hearsay in order not “to bring attention to” T.S.’s admitted lies was a sound
strategic trial decision. See id. at 536 (stating that “[m]atters of trial strategy lie within the
discretion of trial counsel and will not be second guessed by appellate courts,” and that
“[d]ecisions about objections at trial are matt ers of trial strategy”); see also Mosley, 895
N.W.2d at 591–92 (concluding that postconviction court did not err in denying ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim based on failure to object because it “is well established that
we give an attorney’s trial -strategy decision particular deference,” and that “decisions
about objections at trial are matters of trial strategy, which we will not review” (quotations
omitted)); State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 818 n.3 (Minn. 2013) (stating that appellate
courts “do not second-guess trial counsel’s decisions about trial strategy,” and declining to
address claim involving counsel’s trial strategy to not have client testify).

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Citing State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 507 (Minn. 2013), Edwards argues that even
though appellate courts generally do not review trial strategy, this court should “reject” this
approach. But Nicks is inapposite because it involves a postconviction court that did not
grant an evidentiary hearing, and the petitioner’s trial counsel allegedly failed to investigate
facts “directly related to the defendant’s theory of that case.” Id. at 508. The Nicks court
emphasized that “trial counsel’s choices made after conducting a thorough investigation of
the law and the facts are virtually unchallengeable.” Id. (quotation and emphasis omitted).
In t his case, Edwards has not overcome the “strong presumption” that his trial
counsel acted reasonably ; he relies on case law from foreign and federal courts, and
unpublished cases from this court , none of which is binding on this court. See Johnson v.
Soo Line R. Co. , 463 N.W.2d 894, 899 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (stating that federal cases are
“helpful and instructive but not necessarily controlling”); Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co., 344
N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. 1984) (stating that decisions from other states “are no t binding
on us as authority”). Edwards has failed to meet the first Strickland prong because his trial
counsel, by choosing not to object to the alleged hearsay statements as part of his trial
strategy, did not perform below an objective level of reasonableness. See Mosley, 895
N.W.2d at 591–92 (concluding that challenge to trial counsel’s failure to object to in-court
identification was “legally insufficient to show that . . . attorney’s performance was
unreasonable,” because decision amounted to trial strategy).
Because we determine that Edwards’s claim does not meet the first requirement of
the Strickland test, we need not consider the other requirement. See id. at 591. (“If a claim
fails to satisfy one of the Strickland requirements, we need not consider the ot her

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requirement.”). We therefore conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Edwards ’s counseled ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim. See
Griffin v. State , 883 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. 2016) (“An attorney’s failure to m ake an
objection that would have been properly denied is not objectively unreasonable under the
Strickland test.”).
II. Custody-status point
Edwards argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by concluding
that the sentencing court did not err “by assigning [him] a custody-status point based on
offenses for which he had served more than the executed prison sentence.” The state argues
that Edwards’s claim is barred from consideration because this court already considered
the same claim in Edwards I. In his reply brief, Edwards does not respond to the state’s
argument. The state is correct, and, citing Edwards I, the postconviction court concluded
that Edwards’s custody -status-point claim had been “ruled on” by this court. On direct
appeal in Edwards I, this court stated:
Edwards also argues that he should not have received a
custody-status point because he was not on probation or parole.
But the presentence -investigation report shows that Edwards
was placed on felony probation on May 24, 2012, for a period
of ten years. Although Edwards was discharged from probation
on January 22, 2013, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
state: “Early Discharge From Probation. Assign a custody
point if the offender is discharged from probation but commits
an offense within the initial period of probation pronounced by
the court.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2(4) (2012). The dates
of offense for this case were from July 1, 2013, to November
24, 2013, which was within the initial ten -year period of
probation pronou nced by the court for Edwards’s earlier
conviction. Thus, Edwards properly received a custody -status
point. Given Edwards’s five criminal -history points and his

9
conviction under a statute with a severity level of B, his 240 -
month sentence was within the pr esumptive range under the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.

2016 WL 2945947, at *11.
Under Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2016), a postconviction court may “summarily
deny a petition when the issues raised in it have previously been decided by the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court in the same case.” In Wayne v. State, a postconviction court
denied a petitioner’s ninth petition ; the supreme court affirmed the denial, stating,
“[b]ecause we have already addressed these claims, they are procedurally barred by
Minnesota Statutes section 590.04.” 912 N.W.2d 633, 638 –39, 641 (Minn. 2018).
Similarly, in this case, we have already addressed Edwards’s claim of error regarding the
assignment of a custody-status point. We therefore conclude that Edwards’s claim is
procedurally barred. See Roby v. State , 531 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn. 199 5) (concluding
that claim could not be relitigated in a postconviction petition after assertion in pro se brief
in prior direct appeal).
III. Edwards’s pro se claims
Edwards raises a number of additional claims i n his pro se supplemental brief ,
arguing ineffective assistance by his trial counsel for failing to : investigate his case;
challenge probable cause; challenge certain evidence; present favorable evidence; and
impeach witnesses. Edwards cites to no legal authority to support his claim that his trial
counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or to explain how, but
for the alleged failures, a jury would not have rendered a guilty verdict. See State v.
Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 868, 876 (Minn. 2010) (declining to consider pro se argument where

10
appellant failed to cite legal authority to s upport claim). Instead, Edwards’s pro se brief
focuses on how the evidence was presented at trial, and how evidence that he allegedly
presented to his trial counsel could have defeated the state’s case. The postconviction court
concluded that these claims were time-barred and, citing to Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10,
challenged unreviewable trial tactics. 2 Even if they were not time-barred, Edwards failed
to present any evidence showing that trial counsel’s tactics “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, or that the outcome would have been different.”
The supreme court “ha[s] repeatedly stated that we generally will not review attacks
on counsel’s trial strategy.” Opsahl v. State , 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004). The
supreme court’s “reluctance to scrutinize trial tactics is grounded in the public policy of
allowing counsel to have the flexibility to represent a client to the fullest extent.” Id.
(quotation omitted). In Opsahl, the supreme court concluded that a postconviction court
did not abuse i ts discretion for rejecting an ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim based
on counsel’s failure to investigate and challenge evidence because his decisions fell “within
the realm of defense strategy,” and the court was “in no position to second-guess counsel’s
decision” on trial strategy. Id. And , in Andersen, the supreme court concluded that a
counsel’s failure to investigate, impeach witnesses, and call exculpatory witnesses fell
“within trial strategy and therefore is not reviewable.” 830 N.W.2d at 13.

2 Although the postconviction court concluded that Edwards’s pro se ineffective-of-counsel
claims were “time-barred” because he failed to argue it in his direct appeal in Edwards I,
this court explicitly reserved th e ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for review in a
postconviction proceeding. Edwards I, 2016 WL 2945947, at *10. The state concedes that
Edwards’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was properly before the postconviction
court. We therefore conclude that the claim was not time-barred.

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Here, at the postconviction hearing, Edwards’s trial counsel testified about his
strategic decisions regarding investigation, probable cause, challenges to and presentation
of certain evidence, and not impeaching some witnesses. Edwards’s counsel recounted how
he “read through all the discovery; looked at [the] background of the witnesses; looked at
the evidence that the State had. We also looked at [Edwards’s] medical records . . . . And
we went through and looked at the electronic data that was provide d by the State.” When
Edwards asked his trial counsel whether he ever found anything that could be used to
defend him, his trial counsel responded, “To be honest . . . a lot of this stuff worked against
you,” and that the evidence Edwards presented “didn’t have a lot of information . . . that
would’ve been beneficial.” Edwards’s counsel further testified that, based on the
information Edwards provided , additional “investigation would not have been anything
other than redundant or useless ” because “there’s also a point where I got to figure out
whether or not it makes sense, if it’s a good use of time and if there’s a relevant purpose
behind it, and none of those presented in this case.”
Edwards’s trial counsel testified that he did not challenge probable cau se because
he “believe[d] there was probable cause. The issue [wa]s whether or not there was proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to convict [Edwards].” He testified that he did not challenge a
search warrant because he did “not see[] that there was an issue [with] it,” and that his
decision not to impeach T.S. “came down to trial strategy on how much of the bell I was
going to re -ring after she said she lied about her statement to police. So in terms of
impeaching the other witnesses, that came down to a strategy.” He further explained that
after T.S. stated on the stand that she lied, his strategy was not going to “highlight

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something to make . . . the jury, think, ‘Well, why are they objecting to something she just
said she lied to you about?’ I wasn’t going to draw what would be unnecessary attention to
something she said she already lied about.”
Similar to Opsahl and Andersen, Edwards’s pro se ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims challenge his trial counsel’s defense strategy, which the supreme court has
“repeatedly stated that [it] generally will not review.” Opsahl, 677 N.W.2d at 421. Edwards
cites to no law or facts in the record to explain why this court should depart from such an
approach; nor does he explain, beyond speculati on, about how the outcome of the trial
would have been diff erent, but for his trial counsel’s defense strategy. We conclude that
the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief to Edwards on his
pro se claims. See id. (affirming postconviction court’s denial of ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims challenging trial strategy).
Affirmed.