Pierre A. Goudiaby, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2133

Pierre A. Goudiaby,
Relator,

vs.

Sky Water Technology Foundry, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed August 5, 2019
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 36745359-3

Pierre A. Goudiaby, Brooklyn Center, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Sky Water Technology Foundry, Inc. (pro se employer)

Katherine Conlin, Anne B. Froelich, Saint Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Relator challenges the determination of an unemployment-law judge (the ULJ) that
he is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because he was discharged for

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employment misconduct. Because substantial evidence supports the ULJ’s determination
that relator committed employment misconduct by failing to respond to alarm s at a
semiconductor facility in a timely manner as required by the employer’s written policies,
we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
Relator Pierre A. Goudiaby argues that the ULJ erred in finding him ineligible for
unemployment benefits. When reviewing an unemplo yment-insurance-benefits decision,
this court may affirm, remand the case for further proceedings, or reverse and modify the
decision if the substantial rights of the relator have been prejudiced because , among other
things, the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as
submitted. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2018).
An employee who is discharged for employment misconduct is ineligible for
unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4 (1) (2018). Employment
misconduct is defined as “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job or
off the job that displays clearly: (1) a serious violation of the standards of behavior the
employer has the right to reasonably expect of the emp loyee; or (2) a substantial lack of
concern for the employment.” Id., subd. 6(a) (2018). “Whether an employee engaged in
conduct that disqualifies the employee from unemployment benefits is a mixed question of
fact and law.” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011) (quotation
omitted). Whether an employee committed a particular act is a question of fact viewed in
the light most favorable to the ULJ’s decision and affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006) . But we

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review de novo the legal question of whether the particular act committed by the employee
constitutes employment misconduct. Id.
Here, substantial evidence in the record supports the ULJ’s decision that relator was
discharged for employment misconduct. Relator was employed as a facilities technician
with respondent Sky Water Technology Foundry, Inc. (the employer), a semiconductor
facility. The employer’s written policies requir ed employees to monitor the waste-water
tanks and respond to alarms on the tanks within a reasonable amount of time. In the event
he could not respond to the alarms in a timely manner , relator was responsible for
contacting a supervisor for additional assistance. It is uncontes ted that relator failed to
respond to the alarms in a timely manner on three separate occasions between December
2017 and August 2018. After the second incident, the employer advised relator that failure
to respond to future alarms could “ result in discip linary action up to and including
immediate termination.” After the third incident, the employer terminated relator’s
employment for repeatedly failing to follow escalation protocols in a timely manner in
violation of the employer’s written policies.
Relator does not challenge the ULJ’s factual findings, which are supported by
substantial evidence in the record. Instead, relator argues that his conduct does not rise to
the level of misconduct. We disagree. “[R]efusing to abide by an employer’ s reasonable
policies and requests amounts to disqualifying misconduct.” Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp.,
644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002). And committing multiple violations of the same rule
demonstrate an employee’s substantial lack of concern for the employment. See Gilkeson
v. Indus. Parts & Serv., Inc., 383 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Minn. App. 1986) (noting that a pattern

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of failing to follow policies and procedures and ignoring directions and requests constitutes
misconduct). The ULJ found that relator failed to follow his employer’s written policies.
Based on the relevant statute and caselaw, we determine that relator’s failure to respond to
alarms within a timely manner on three separate occasions constitutes employment
misconduct because it displayed “a serious violation of the standards of behavior” that the
employer had a right to reasonably expect from him. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a)(1);
see also Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 344 (stating that it is a question of law whether an act
constitutes employment misconduct).
We read relator’s brief to argue that he did not commit employment misconduct
because he acted in good faith when he thought that other employees were responding to
the alarms. A good-faith error in judgment is not employment misconduct. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 6(b)(6) (2018). However, conduct inconsistent with an employee ’s
training or established procedure is not considered a good-faith error of judgment. See
Ress v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., Inc ., 448 N.W.2d 519, 525 (Minn. 1989). Here, the employer
had checklists with detailed written instructions regarding responding to alarms, and
expected its employees to follow those instructions or communicate problems to a
supervisor. Relator does not deny that he was aware of these written policies and received
a warning for failing to follow these policies. Relator’s failure to follow the employer’s
established policies does not constitute an error of judgment, and he is not entitled to relief
on that basis.
Relator also argues that his termination was racially motivated. However, relator
did not provide any factual support for this argument, and we therefore consider the

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argument forfeited. See State v. Manley, 664 N.W.2d 275, 286 (Minn. 2003) (considering
arguments forfeited when they are unsupported by facts in the record and contain “no
citation to any relevant legal authority”).
Because we determine that substantial evidence in the record support s the ULJ’s
determination that relator was discharged for employment misconduc t and therefore was
ineligible to receive unemployment benefits, we affirm.
Affirmed.