State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2134

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Wendy Kristine Abbott,
Appellant.

Filed September 16, 2019
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-18-2085

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Ashley A. Nelson, Assistant County Attorney,
Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Ch ief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and

Kirk, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction of fifth -degree possession of a controlled
substance, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by declining to stay
adjudication. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 30, 2017, law enforcement responded “to a report of suspicious activity
possibly involving drugs.” Officer Matthew Thorsheim made contact with two individuals
in a parked vehicle and observed both occupants to be under the influence of a controlled
substance. Through f urther investigation , Officer Thorshei m discovered that one of the
vehicle’s occupants, appellant Wendy Abbott, possessed two Oxycodone pills.
A few months later, on November 25, 2017, law enforcement arrested Abbott for
storing methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence of a child. In March 2018, Abbott
pleaded guilty to that offense, and a district court stayed imposition of sentence.
In June 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged Abbott with felony fifth -
degree possession of a controlled substance arising from the incident in June 2017. Abbott
pleaded guilty, admitting that she possessed two Oxycodone pills without a prescription.
Abbott argued a t sentencing that the district court should stay adjudication of her guilt
because, at the time she committed the offense, she “had no prior felonies or drug
convictions.” The district court rejected th e argument, adjudicated Abbott guilty, and
stayed imposition of sentence.
This appeal follows.

3
D E C I S I O N
Abbott challenges the district court’s denial of her request for a stay of adjudication.
District courts are generally afforded “great discretion in the imposition of sentences” and
we will reverse a sentencing decision only when a district court abuses its discretion. State
v. Soto , 855 N.W.2d 303, 307 –08 (Minn. 2014) (footnote and quotation omitted). But
whether a sentence is authorized by a Minnesota statute is a question of law that is reviewed
de novo. State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 719 (Minn. 2019.
A stay of adjudication “is a procedure whereby the district court, upon a defendant’s
guilty plea or a fact-finder’s determination of guilt, does not adjudicate the defendant guilty
but imposes conditions of probation.” State v. Martin , 849 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. App.
2014) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2014). Generally, district courts
may stay adjudication only with the prosecutor’s consent. Id. But the legislature has created
narrow exceptions to this rule , including the e xception contained in Minn. Stat. § 152.18
(2016), which, after the enactment of the Drug Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA), requires
a district court to stay adjudication for some offenders. Spec ifically, the statute provides
that a district court “must defer prosecution” for any person found guilty of fifth -degree
possession who, among other things “has not previously been convicted of a felony offense
under any state or federal law.” Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1(b).
Abbott acknowledges that after she committed the fifth -degree possession offense,
she pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence of a
child and received a stay of imposition. But Abbott asserts that at the time she committed
the fifth-degree possession offense, she did not have a previous felony conviction. Abbott

4
contends that because she did not have a felony conviction at the time she committed the
fifth-degree possession offense, the district court was required to stay adjudication under
Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1(b).
Abbott’s argument presents a question of statutory interpretation. “The objective of
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” State v.
Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280, 284 (Minn. 2 015). When interpreting a statute, words and
phrases are “construed according to the rules of grammar and according to their common
and approved usage.” State v. Pakhnyuk , 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019) (quotation
omitted). A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than
one reasonable interpretation, and if the statute is unambiguous, this court applies the
statute’s plain meaning. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012).
The statute at issue here is unambiguous. See State v. Overweg , 922 N.W.2d 179,
184 (Minn. 2019) (concluding that the phrase “has previously been convicted” is not
ambiguous). The statute provides that a district court “must defer prosecution . . . for any
person found guilty of” fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance “who . . . has not
previously been convicted of a felony offense under any state or federal law.” Minn. Stat.
§ 152.18, subd. 1(b). The statute does not state that prosecution must be deferred for any
person found guilty o f fifth -degree possession of a controlled substance who has not
previously been convicted of a felony offense at the time the possession offense occurred.
See id. Such an interpretation would require us to read additional language into the statute,
a practice that is prohibited by the rules of statutory construction. See State v. Noggle, 881
N.W.2d 545, 550–51 (Minn. 2016) (stating that appellate courts “cannot read in additional

5
language [to a statute], but rather must apply the plain language of the statute as written”).
At the time Abbott pleaded guilty to fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, she
had a felony conviction for possession of methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence
of a child. Under the plain language of the statute, the district court therefore, was not
required to stay adjudication of Abbott’s fifth-degree possession-of-a-controlled-substance
offense.
Abbott also contends that “[e]ven if the district court [was] not required t o stay
adjudication, it abused its discretion in declining to impose the permissible stay of
adjudication because it unfairly exaggerated the criminality of the [her] conduct.” But
Abbott cites no authority that provides the district court with the discret ion to stay
adjudication. Although Minn. Stat. § 518.18, subd. 1(a) provides that a district court “may
defer prosecution” for any person found guilty of fifth -degree possession of a controlled
substance, such discretion may be exercised only if, among oth er things, the person “has
not been convicted of a felony violation of this chapter.” Abbott was convicted of storing
methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence of a child under Minn. Stat. § 152.137
(2016). Abbott therefore had been convicted of a felony violation of chapter 152 at the time
she pleaded guilty to fifth -degree possession of a controlled substance. As a result, the
district court did not have discretion to stay adjudication of Abbott’s fifth -degree
controlled-substance offense under Minn. Stat. § 518.18, subd. 1(a), at the time she pleaded
guilty to it. Moreover, district courts may generally only stay adjudication with the
prosecutor’s consent. Martin, 849 N.W.2d at 102. The record reflects that the prosecutor
did not consent to a st ay of adjudication. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its

6
discretion by declining to stay adjudication for Abbott’s fifth-degree-controlled-substance
offense.
Affirmed.