In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Ignatius Chukwuemeka Udeani,

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-2139

Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam
Dissenting, McKeig, Lillehaug, JJ.

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action
against Ignatius Chukwuemeka Udeani, Filed: July 1, 2020
a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0300615. Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Timothy M. Burke, Deputy Directo r, Siama C. Brand,
Senior Assistant Director, Office of La wyers Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for petitioner.

Ignatius Chukwuemeka Udeani, Bloomington, Minnesota, pro se.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S

An indefinite suspension wi th no right to petition for reinstatement for 3 years is the
appropriate discipline for an attorney who committed wide -ranging misconduct causing
substantial harm to multiple clients, incl uding engaging in a pa ttern of incompetent
representation, neglect, failure to communicate with clients, and failure to return unearned
fees; failing to properly supervise a non-lawy er assistant and failing to take reasonable
steps to prevent the known misconduct of the non-lawyer assistant that resulted in the theft
of client funds; failing to safeguard client funds and maintain all trust-account related
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records; representing a client with a conflict of interest; and failing to cooperate in multiple
disciplinary investigations.
Suspended.
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.
The sole issue before us is the appr opriate discipline to impose on respondent
Ignatius Chukwuemeka Udeani for his wide -ranging misconduct that caused substantial
harm to multiple clients. The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility
filed a petition and a supplementary petition for disciplinary action against Udeani.
Following a hearing, a referee found that Udeani committed numerous and varied acts of
misconduct. Udeani’s misconduct involved: engaging in a pattern of incompetent
representation, neglect, failure to communicate with clients, and failure to return unearned
fees; failing to properly supervise a non-lawy er assistant and take reasonable steps to
prevent the known misconduct of this assistant that resulted in the theft of client funds;
failing to safeguard client funds and maintain all trust-account related records; representing
a client with a conflict of interest; and failing to cooperate in multiple disciplinary
investigations. The referee also found mu ltiple aggravating fact ors and no mitigating
factors. We conclude that the appropriate di scipline is an indefin ite suspension with no
right to petition for reinstatement for 3 years.
FACTS
Ignatius Chukwuemeka Udeani was admitte d to practice law in Minnesota on
May 12, 2000. In 2007, Udeani was placed on private probation for failing to diligently
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handle an immigration matter, for failing to properly withdraw from a matter, and for
financial misconduct. Udeani was admonished in 2012 for not promptly informing a client
that his motion to withdraw from representati on had been denied and for failing to attend
a hearing. He was admonished again in 2013 for failing to de posit a client’s funds into a
trust account. Finally, we suspended Udeani for 30 days in 2017 for “failing to diligently
handle three client matters, simultaneously re presenting two clients despite a concurrent
conflict of interest, and communica ting with a represented party.” In re Udeani ,
897 N.W.2d 253, 253 (Minn. 2017) (order). We reinstated Udeani and placed him on
supervised probation for 2 years. In re Udeani, 899 N.W.2d 829, 830 (Minn. 2017) (order).
The Director’s petitions assert sixteen co unts of misconduct ag ainst Udeani that
largely took place during his 2-year post-reinstatement probation. Fourteen of these counts
concern client-related misconduct, failure to supervise a non-lawyer assistant, and financial
misconduct. Two counts are for failure to coop erate with the Director’s investigations.
We summarize the referee’s findings and conclusions regarding each of these categories of
misconduct in turn.
Client-related misconduct
Udeani represented a family in their i mmigration matters beginning in September
2016. Two of the family members hoped to ap ply for legal resident status before their
U-Visas expired in November 2017. Udeani never filed their applications. Udeani’s
failure to file their applications left them without legal status, making them subject to
deportation, unable to work, and unable to legally drive. Two other family members also
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retained Udeani. He performed no work on their cases. Fi nally, members of the family
paid for immigration physicals, the results of which Udeani allowed to lapse.
D.A.C.H. retained Udeani to represent him in his second-degree murder trial set for
July 2018. Udeani was pres ent when law enforcement se parately interviewed both
D.A.C.H. and his brother, who the police believed were present at the crime. Importantly,
the brother was a witness for both D.A.C.H. a nd for the State. The State recognized the
existence of this potential conflict of interest the weekend before trial. The judge removed
Udeani from the case, and the trial—including 52 witnesses—was postponed for nearly 5
months, until December 2018.
Udeani represented J.L. in his Deferre d Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
application. The immigration court granted Udeani’s request to continue J.L.’s hearing
when J.L. failed to appear. About 1 month before the continued hearing took place, Udeani
filed a motion to withdraw from the representation. The court mailed its order denying this
motion to Udeani nearly 2 weeks before the hearing. Nonetheless, Udeani failed to appear.
J.L. was deported.
I.R.Z. was a former client of Udeani’s wh o later retained different counsel to
represent her in removal proceedings. This a ttorney requested I.R.Z.’s file from Udeani
for the first time in Decembe r 2017. Udeani neither se nt the file nor responded. I.R.Z.’s
new attorney requested the file again on January 15, 2018, and filed a complaint in
February with the Director’s office after receiving no response. Udeani, through counsel,
sent the file to I.R.Z.’s attorney on March 23, 2018.
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Udeani represented M.E. in her U-Visa matter. Udeani believed that his office filed
her U-Visa application, but he failed to follow up on it after he did not receive a receipt or
a biometrics request. The government typically issues receipts and biometrics requests
when U-Visa applications are filed; thus, Ud eani should have realized that he made a
mistake when he received neither of these. Roughl y 1 year after she retained him, M.E.
called Udeani’s office for an update on her case. Only then did Udeani discover that he
had lost her file . Udeani claimed that he filed a Fr eedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request to find out what happened to her application 1 month after M.E. called him. Udeani
claimed that he did not receive a response be cause his employees either failed to mail the
request or destroyed any resp onse. Udeani never personally followed up on the FOIA
request.
A married couple with U-Visas, M.D.R.G. and J.C.G.M., retained Udeani to obtain
permanent resident status. When they retain ed Udeani, these client s informed him that
they had less than 9 months left to achieve permanent resident status. Udeani relied on his
non-lawyer assistant to file the applications. She did not file the a pplications, but falsely
attested in the case-management system that she had done so. She also stole the money
orders these clients had provided to pay filing fees. Around October 2017, M.D.R.G. called
Udeani for the receipt numbers so that she could track the applications on her own. At a
meeting the next day, Udeani told her that he had lost their applications and that his
non-lawyer assistant stole their filing fees. He told her that “he would act expeditiously to
correct the situation.” Udeani received a pa yment towards his fee, but “failed to respond
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until January 2018 to multiple requests for communication.” Udeani missed the deadline
to apply for permanent resident status on his clients’ behalf.
Udeani represented F.Y.Z.C. in immigra tion matters that the retainer failed to
identify. F.Y.Z.C. believed that Udeani would transfer her case from Virginia to
Minnesota, update her asylum application, determine her eligibility for work authorization,
and represent her in immigration proceedings. At her first meeting with Udeani, F.Y.Z.C.
informed him that she was less than 2 months away from turning 18. Udeani filed a petition
in district court to obtain the custody order required for Special Juvenile Immigration Status
relief about 1 week before for F.Y.Z.C.’s 18th birthday. He filed this petition in the wrong
county. By the time Ud eani corrected his error and the proper court heard the matter,
F.Y.Z.C. was already 18 and no longer eligible for relief. When she retained a new lawyer,
Udeani sent her file to the new lawyer, alon g with hundreds of pages of documents that
included information about at least one other client who had nothing to do with F.Y.Z.C.’s
case.
B.P.D.L.R retained Udeani to: (1) seek a U-Visa certification from law
enforcement; (2) apply for a U-Visa for himself and for others, and; (3) help his son apply
for DACA relief. After several unsuccessful attempts at reaching Udeani, B.P.D.L.R. was
able to speak to Udeani’s non -lawyer assistant for a stat us update on the U-Visa
applications. Udeani’s non-lawyer assistant told him that Udeani had filed the applications
when he had not. After informing B.P.D.L.R. that the applications were not filed and that
his money had been stolen, Udeani refused to meet with him again unless B.P.D.L.R. made
additional payments toward Udeani’s fees.
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Udeani filed a DACA application on beha lf of B.P.D.L.R.’s son and received a
Request for Evidence from the government. When B.P.D.L.R. learned of the Request for
Evidence from the government directly—not from Udeani—he tried several times to
contact Udeani. Udeani did not advise the fa mily on how to respond, did not return their
calls, and did not respond to the Request fo r Evidence. B.P.D.L.R.’s son was denied
DACA relief—a final determination that he cannot appeal.
B.A.D.D.C. retained Udeani to help her seek CHIPS 1 relief and Special Juvenile
Immigration Status for her child and to repr esent them both in removal proceedings.
Udeani filed a petition for Special Juvenile Immigration Status, but he named the wrong
client. Udeani then stopped wo rking on the matter and faile d to withdraw. B.A.D.D.C.
stopped paying Udeani’s fees, but she did not terminate him until she hired a new lawyer.
This lawyer requested the file from Udeani. Approximately 3 months later, Udeani sent
the file to her new attorney.
Udeani represented A.B.Z.P in her asylum matter, and her daughter in her Special
Juvenile Immigration Status and CHIPS matters. Udeani filed an asylum application with
numerous errors on A.B.Z.P.’s behalf. When she informed Udeani that her daughter
moved out of her home, he res ponded that “he had to separate their matters and could no
longer represent [her daughter].” Udeani never filed a CHIPS petition.
With respect to these matters, the referee concluded that Udeani violated Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 1.1 (competenc e), 1.2(a) (scope of repr esentation), 1.3 (diligence),

1 See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2018) (d efining a child in need of protection
or services).
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1.4 (communication with client), 1.6(a) (confidentiality regarding representation of client),
1.7(a) (prohibiting concurrent conflict of in terest), 1.16(a)(1) (circumstances requiring
lawyer to withdraw from representation), 1.16(d) (returning client papers upon termination
of representation), 3.1 (prohibiting a lawyer from asserting frivolous claims), 3.2 (requiring
a lawyer to expedite litigation), 3.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice).
Failure to supervise non-lawyer assistant
No later than June 7, 2017, Udeani learned that his non-lawyer assistant altered and
stole three money orders that a client paid to cover the f iling fees associated with the
client’s case. Udeani asked that client not to go to the police a nd told him that his
non-lawyer assistant would pa y him back. Although Udeani subsequently prevented his
non-lawyer assistant from handling outgoi ng mail, her duties remained otherwise
unchanged. Critically, Udeani continued to allow his non-lawyer assistant to have access
to client funds and he did not conduct an internal audit at that time to ensure that other
clients had not been harmed. Udeani’s non-lawyer assistant continued to steal from clients
until November 2017.
The referee found that Udeani fired his non-lawyer assistant on November 11, 2017,
and filed a police report on November 20, 2 017. Shortly after the termination, Udeani
completed an internal audit. The audit revealed that hi s non-lawyer assistant stole
$9,115.00 from eight clients. A later audit revealed that she stole $11,018 from seventeen
clients.
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The referee concluded that in failing to adequately supervise his non-lawyer
assistant, Udeani violated Minn . R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a) (re quiring a lawyer to deposit
client or third-party funds into a trust account and prohibiting lawyers from depositing their
own funds into a trust account with exceptions not relevant here), 5.3(a) (providing that a
lawyer “shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that the [assistant’s] conduct is compatible ” with the lawyer’s
obligations), 5.3(b) (requiring a lawyer with “direct supervisory authority over [a
non-lawyer assistant to] make reasonable efforts” to ensure that the assistant’s conduct is
appropriate), and 5.3(c)(2) (providing that a partner or a lawyer with “comparable
managerial authority in the law firm” or “d irect supervisory authority” over the assistant
responsible for the conduct of that assistant).
Financial misconduct
Udeani had improper flat-fee agreements w ith several clients and failed to deposit
advance fees he received from th ese clients into a trust account. He also did not obtain a
signed receipt from clients for their cash pa yments toward attorn ey’s fees on multiple
occasions. Finally, and most significantly, Ud eani has failed to re turn unearned fees
exceeding $20,000 to eleven clients. This total does not include the stolen filing fees.
The referee concluded that, in these ma tters, Udeani violated Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 1.5(b)(1) and (3) (imposing requireme nts for flat-fee agre ements), 1.15(c)(4)
(requiring a lawyer to promptly return clie nt funds in the lawyer’s possession when
requested), 1.15(c)(5) (requiring a lawyer to place client funds in trust), 1.15(h) as
interpreted by Appendix 1 (requiring a lawyer to maintain trust account books and records),
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and 1.16(d) (requiring a lawyer to repay unearned fees or expenses upon termination of
representation).
Noncooperation
The Director’s office sent Udeani two letters dated August 16, 2018. The first letter
requested information concerning his prob ation, and the second was a Notice of
Investigation concerning a client’s complaint. On October 2, 2018, the Director mailed a
new notice of investigation concerning another client’s complaint.
Near the end of 2018, the Director sent Udeani additional notices of investigation
with requests for information concerning at least six more complaints from clients. After
several attempts to follow up with Udeani, he still failed to respond. Udeani did not
respond in full to the Director’s letters until March 10, 2019.
The referee concluded that Udeani viol ated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c)
(knowingly disobey an obligation under the rule s of a tribunal), 8.1(b) (knowingly fail to
respond to disciplinary investiga tion), 8.4(d) (engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice), and Rule 25, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility
(RLPR) (cooperating with a disciplinary investigation).
In addition to findings a nd conclusions regarding misconduct, the referee found
seven aggravating factors: (1) a history of prior discipline; (2) the current misconduct was
similar to Udeani’s prior misconduct; (3) the current misconduct was committed while
Udeani was on probation; (4) Udeani’s client s were vulnerable; (5) lack of remorse or
acknowledgment of its effects on others; (6 ) an indifference or unwillingness to make
restitution; and (7) failure to cooperate after the Director served th e initial petition. The
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referee found no mitigating factors. The referee recommended that we indefinitely suspend
Udeani, with no right to petition for reinstatement for 3 years.
ANALYSIS
A referee’s findings and conclusions are deemed conclusive when neither party
orders a transcript of the proceeding. Rule 14(e), Rules on Lawyers Professional
Responsibility (RLPR); see In re Fru, 829 N.W.2d 379, 387 (Mi nn. 2013). We review a
referee’s findings and conclusions for clear error when a party orders a transcript. Rule
14(e), RLPR; In re Wentzell, 656 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Minn. 20 03). But if a party orders a
transcript and subsequently fails to file a brief, he or she has essentially failed to allege that
the referee committed clear error. See In re Graham, 609 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Minn. 2000).
Absent allegations of clear error, we will uphol d the referee’s findings and conclusions.
Id.
Here, Udeani requested a transcript, but failed to file a brief. Udeani has therefore
not alleged that the referee clearly erred in any of her findings and conclusions. See id.
Accordingly, the only issue before us is the appropriate discipline to impose. The referee
recommended an indefinite suspension for a minimum of 3 years, and the Director agreed.
“We do not impose disciplinary sanctions to punish a lawyer; rather, we do so ‘to
protect the public, to guard the administration of justice and to deter future misconduct’ by
both the individual lawyer and by othe r members of the legal profession.” In re Rhodes,
740 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Minn. 2007) (quoting In re Grzybek , 567 N.W.2d 259, 262
(Minn. 1997)). We consider the following when determining the appropriate discipline for
an attorney: “(1) the natu re of the misconduct; (2) th e cumulative weight of the
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disciplinary violations; (3) the harm to the public; and (4) the harm to the legal profession.”
In re Nelson , 733 N.W.2d 458, 463 (M inn. 2007). In weighing these factors, we also
consider aggravating or mitigating circum stances and look to similar cases. Fru,
829 N.W.2d at 388. Although we give great weight to the referee’s recommendation, we
alone are responsible for the fi nal discipline determination. Id. We consider each factor
in turn.
A.
Udeani committed wide-ranging, very serious misconduct. “We have not hesitated
to impose lengthy suspensions when serious client neglect and incompetence is combined
with other disciplinary rule violations.” Id. at 389. Here, Udeani’s pattern of
incompetence, client neglect, and noncommunication persisted during much of his 2-year
probation and involved numerous clients.
This type of “serious client neglect and incompetence” causes us to treat concurrent
disciplinary rule violations more severely. Id. Udeani’s other disciplinary rule violations
include: (1) an impermissible conflict of in terest; (2) failure to maintain a current
inventory of active client files in accordance with this court’s orders; (3) failure to protect
confidential client information; (4) failure to deliver client files to successor counsel;
(5) improper fee agreements; (6) failure to deposit unearned fees into a trust account;
(7) failure “to obtain a receipt signed by the payor for cash payment toward attorney’s
fees”; and finally, (8) refusing to meet with current clients unless they paid attorney’s fees.
We consider the failure to return unearned fees to be “serious misconduct,” while
“the most serious form of financial misconduct” is misappropriation of client funds. In re
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Taplin, 837 N.W.2d 306, 312 (Minn. 2013). The referee found that Udeani failed to return
unearned fees in five cases, involving eleven clients, exceeding $20,000.
Udeani is also responsible for the misc onduct that his non-lawyer assistant
committed. See Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.3(c); see, e.g., In re Kaszynski, 620 N.W.2d 708,
712 (Minn. 2001) (stating that “under Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.3, [an attorney] is
responsible for the considerable damage [a non- lawyer assistant] causes . . . clients”).
Here, a non-lawyer assistant repeatedly stole filing fees from Udeani’s clients. Despite
knowing of the theft, Udeani did not curtail his non-lawyer assistant’s access to client
funds, and she continued to steal client f unds. Udeani’s non-lawyer assistant remained
employed for at least 5 months after Udeani discovered her miscond uct, and Udeani has
failed to fully compensate all of the affected clients.2
“[F]ailure to cooperate w ith the Director’s investig ation constitutes independent
grounds for serious discipline.” In re Villanueva , 931 N.W.2d 816, 823 (Minn. 2019).
Udeani failed to cooperate with the Director’s office before the Dire ctor filed both the
original petition and the supplemental petition. The nature of the misconduct here weighs
heavily in favor of serious discipline.
B.
Concerning the second factor, “the cumu lative weight and severity of multiple
disciplinary rule violations may compel severe discipline even when a single act standing

2 At oral argument, Udeani asserted that he paid the application fees for all but three
clients who were victimized by his non-lawyer assistant. The record does not support this
assertion, however, with respect to the clients identified in the Director’s petitions.
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alone would not have warranted such discipline.” In re Oberhauser, 679 N.W.2d 153, 160
(Minn. 2004). We distinguish between a brief lapse in judgment or a single, isolated
incident from multiple instances of misconduc t occurring over a substantial amount of
time. See In re Fairbairn , 802 N.W.2d 734, 743 (Minn. 2011) . Udeani violated 29
different rules of professional conduct, many of them repeatedly, over about 2 years. There
is no doubt that he committed many acts of misconduct over a substantial amount of time.
C.
We next consider the harm to the public and to the legal profession. We measure
harm to the public based on the quantity (the number of c lients harmed) and the quality
(the extent of the clients’ injuries). In re Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 308 (Minn. 2011).
Udeani’s misconduct caused harm to over 20 c lients, and in some instances, their family
members as well.
In addition, Udeani’s misconduct harmed multiple clients. Udeani’s misconduct led
to the deportation of a client who was eligib le for DACA and to two temporary lapses in
status, putting two other clients at risk for removal proceedings. See Kaszynski ,
620 N.W.2d at 711 (concluding that, among other serious examples of misconduct, an
attorney’s mishandling of a case that put clients “in jeopardy of being deported” warranted
disbarment); In re Muenchrath , 588 N.W.2d 497, 501 (M inn. 1999) (indefinitely
suspending an attorney for, among other thin gs, misconduct that resulted in deportation).
Udeani’s misconduct caused a DACA denial for another client. Importantly, a DACA
denial is final; it cannot be appealed and an individual may not reapply. Udeani delayed
another client’s U-Visa application by at least 3 years, which was especially harmful
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because the client needed this status to more easily secure a necessary kidney transplant.
Udeani’s failure to file anot her client’s U-Visa applicati on delayed the entire family’s
citizenship timeline.3 Similar delays caused other comp lications for another client, who
had her driver’s license suspended and her work authorization lapse.
Udeani also caused significant financial harm to his clients. He has failed to return
unearned fees, totaling over $20,000, to eleven clients. One family who did not receive a
refund for Udeani’s unearned fees had to wo rk multiple jobs and still needed to borrow
funds to cover the costs of the subsequent a ttorney they retained to correct Udeani’s
mistakes.
We measure harm to the legal profession by considering whether an attorney’s
“breach of trust . . . reflects poorly on the entire legal profession and erodes the public’s
confidence in lawyers.” See In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 270 (Minn. 2006). We have
previously recognized that an immigration attorney’s “w ide-ranging misconduct” harms
the legal profession by eroding this trust. Fru, 829 N.W.2d at 390. Here, three of Udeani’s
former clients and an attorney who later represented one of Udeani’s former clients testified
to this lost trust at the hearing before the referee. Further, delaying a second-degree murder
trial, with a jury selected and 52 witnesses called for trial, for nearly 5 months because he
did not recognize his obvious conflict of interest harms the legal profession by wasting the
court’s resources. In re Murrin, 821 N.W.2d 195, 208 (Minn. 2012).

3 The referee noted that, after 3 years with a U-Visa, B.P.L.D.R. and his family could
have applied for residency, a nd then could have a pplied for citizenship after 5 years.
Udeani’s delay in the U-Visa application, therefore, delayed their entire citizenship
timeline.
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D.
We then consider any aggr avating or mitigating factor s. Udeani presented no
evidence of mitigating factors and the refe ree found none. The referee found seven
aggravating factors: (1) Udeani’s history of prior discipline; (2) the current misconduct is
similar to Udeani’s prior misconduct; (3) Udeani committed the misconduct during
probation; (4) Udeani’s clients were vulnerable; (5)  Udeani lacked remorse; (6) Udeani’s
“indifference or unwillingness to make restitu tion”; and finally, (7) Udeani’s failure to
cooperate after the Director served the initial petition.
Our case law recognizes the first five fa ctors, and the referee’s findings clearly
support these conclusions. See In re Severson , 860 N.W.2d 658, 670 (Minn. 2015)
(recognizing lack of remorse is an aggravating factor); Kaszynski, 620 N.W.2d at 712
(recognizing client vulnerability is an aggravating factor); In re Milloy , 571 N.W.2d 39,
45–46 (Minn. 1997) (recognizin g a prior disciplinary history, the similarity between the
current misconduct and the lawyer’s prior misconduct, and committing misconduct while
on probation are aggravating factors). Our case law does not support an aggravating factor
based on Udeani’s indifference toward restitution because we have already considered his
failure to make restitution to clients when analyzing the harm caused to his clients. See
Villanueva, 931 N.W.2d at 824. Further, only Ud eani’s failure to cooperate in the
disciplinary proceeding before this court—i. e., his failure to appear for a scheduling
conference and his failure to adequately respond to the Director’s discovery request—may
support an aggravating factor for noncooper ation, to avoid “double counting” this
misconduct. See Taplin, 837 N.W.2d at 313.
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E.
Finally, we look to similar cases. In Fru¸ we indefinitely suspended an immigration
attorney, with no right to petition for reinstatement for 2 years, who had “a persistent and
pervasive pattern of incompetence, client neglect, and noncommunication.” 829 N.W.2d
at 380–81. Fru’s misconduct harmed at least eight clients, including jeopardizing the legal
status of seven of them. Id. at 390. Fru also failed to deposit unearned fees into his trust
account, failed to enter into written retainer agreements, engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law, and failed to cooperate with the Director. Id. at 389. Udeani’s misconduct
parallels Fru’s.
In some ways, however, Udeani’s misconduct is more serious than Fru’s, primarily
because Udeani has a disciplinary history that includes similar misconduct and he was on
probation when he committed the misconduct. Nevertheless, both the referee and the
Director recommend that we indefinitely su spend Udeani, with no right to petition for
reinstatement for 3 years. The Director considered disbarment but ultimately
recommended suspension based partly on a belief that we do not disbar attorneys without
misconduct involving “personal misappropria tion, serious dishonesty or a felony
conviction.” Although disbarment most often results from these forms of misconduct, we
have disbarred attorneys for other forms of misconduct. See, e.g. , In re Redburn ,
746 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. 2008); Rhodes, 740 N.W.2d 574; In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274
(Minn. 1983).
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Still, we agree with the Director’s reco mmendation. Based on Udeani’s specific
misconduct and the aggravating factors, we conc lude that the appropriate discipline is an
indefinite suspension, with no right to petition for reinstatement for 3 years.
Accordingly, we order that:
1. Respondent Ignatius Chukwuemeka Udeani is indefinitely suspended from
the practice of law, effective 14 days from the date of this opinion, with no right to petition
for reinstatement for a minimum of 3 years.
2. Respondent shall pay $900 in costs, pursuant to Rule 24(a), RLPR, and
comply with the requirements of Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice of suspension to clients,
opposing counsel, and tribunals).
3. If respondent seeks reinstatement, he must comply with the requirements of
Rule 18(a)–(e), RLPR. Reinstatement is conditioned on the su ccessful completion of the
written examination required for admission to the practice of law by the State Board of
Law Examiners on the subject of professional responsibility and satisfaction of continuing
legal education requirements. Rule 18(e), RLPR.
Suspended
.
D-1 
D I S S E N T
MCKEIG, Justice (dissenting).
Because disbarment is the appropriat e discipline for respondent Ignatius
Chukwuemeka Udeani based on the incalculable harm he ha s inflicted upon his clients, I
respectfully dissent.
The overwhelming majority of the 24 clients and client family members harmed by
Udeani’s misconduct are immigrants. Immigran ts face substantial obstacles in seeking
adequate legal representation, including co mmunication barriers, financial burdens, and
limited opportunities for self-protection. See Erin B. Corcoran, Bypassing Civil Gideon:
A Legislative Proposal to Address the Rising Costs and Unmet Legal Needs of
Unrepresented Immigrants , 115 W. Va. L. Rev. 643 (2012); see also In re Kaszynski ,
620 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Minn. 2 001). These obstacles mean that immigration clients rely
heavily on their attorneys, and attorneys who abuse that trust are subject to serious
discipline. See Kaszynski, 620 N.W.2d at 712.
Immigration proceedings come with strict deadlines and filin g requirements, and
the consequences for missteps are severe. Faced with the most important legal proceedings
of their lives, immigration clients think that they are being responsible by hiring an attorney
like Udeani. Udeani’s clients made significant sacrifices to save the necessary funds to
retain him. They worked multiple jobs, opened their home s to renters, borrowed from
family members, and even we nt without medication and treatment. They placed this
money, and their trust, in Udeani’s care. Udeani then wholly abused that trust, performing
nominal or no work on most of these cases.
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It is difficult to overstate the harm that Udeani has caused. Because of his deficient
representation, thirteen clients and their fam ily members experienced denials, lapses, or
delays in legal status. One client was deported. Another was permanently denied Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, a decision which cannot be appealed. Two
other clients experienced lapsed statuses, making them vulnerable to deportation and
removal proceedings. At least three clients experienced delays in their paths to citizenship.
Consequences for these clients are about mo re than these life-altering changes in
legal status, although those burdens are clearly substantial. The negative effects on clients’
health, livelihoods, and well-being are just as heavy a cost. Udeani’s failures affected one
client’s ability to secure a ki dney transplant. At least tw o clients suddenly faced the
challenge of not being able to obtain a driver’s license or work authorization. One client
may not be able to attend college. Still ot hers have been subject to questioning by
employers and law enforcement about their legal status, which has become a source of fear
and anxiety.
Worse still, Udeani consistently kept his clients in the dark, preventing them at every
turn from protecting themselves. When clients checked on their cases, Udeani was either
completely non-responsive or reassured them that progress was being made on their cases.
Meanwhile, Udeani was missing deadlines and mi splacing files. Hi s clients could not
submit supplemental or replacement documents that they did not know needed to be
submitted.
Clients fortunate enough to eventually rece ive an update were usually told they
needed to produce additional money for their ca ses to proceed. This was in large part
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because Udeani’s negligence allowed his nonlawyer assistant to misappropriate the filing
fees of seventeen clients. Most of that misappropriated money remains unrepaid, as does
more than $20,000 in unearned attorney’s fees. Time and time again, Udeani failed to take
action on his clients’ cases, resulting in serious and sometimes irreversible consequences.
And yet, it never seems that Udeani failed to take their money. It is almost beyond
comprehension that an attorn ey in Udeani’s position could negligently mismanage his
practice to such an extent.
We have disbarred immigration attorneys for misconduct similar to Udeani’s. See
Kaszynski, 620 N.W.2d at 712. In Kaszynski, we stated that the attorney’s misconduct “had
a significant adverse impact on the lives of ma ny of his clients, se parating families, and
threatening the ability of client s to obtain permanent reside ncy status. We do not allow
attorneys who display such a ‘ callous disregard for the phys ical and financial well-being
of vulnerable, dependent persons’ to continue the practice of law.’ ” Id. at 714 (quoting
In re Franke, 345 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Minn. 1984)). I would apply the same principle here
and disbar Udeani.
When both the Director a nd the referee recommend the same discipline, we should
be generally reluctant not to defer to that recommendation. But this case cries out for
disbarment. The record shows that Udeani has been unable or unwilling to change. This
is his fifth disciplinary action since 2007. Of critical importance, the present misconduct
largely took place during a prob ationary period from the last disciplinary action. Well
knowing that his license was at stake, Udea ni committed 16 counts of misconduct and 29
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different rule violations. He committed th e misconduct even while under the supervision
of a well-qualified immigration attorney.
In light of what Udeani did and what he failed to do while on supervised probation,
the risk is too great to leave open the possibility that this attorney might practice again. For
his repeated failures to adequa tely and competently represent vulnerable clients, and for
the threat his misconduct poses to the public and the profession, Udeani should be
disbarred.

LILLEHAUG, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice McKeig.