State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2145

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tescil Romalis Mason-Kimmons,
Appellant.

Filed May 18, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-30036

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this combined appeal from the judgment of conviction for second-degree murder
and the district court’s denial of his pe tition for postconviction relief, appellant Tescil

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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Romalis Mason-Kimmons argues that (1) his guilty plea wa s involuntary because the
district court denied his meritorious motion to continue the trial, (2) his guilty plea was
involuntary because the district court did not inquire into the state’s promise of leniency to
a third party, and (3) he should be entitled to postconviction relief because his attorney was
ineffective.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for an evidentiary hearing on
appellant’s petition for postconviction relief.
FACTS
On September 15, 2017, Minn eapolis police responded to a report of a shooting in
South Minneapolis. Upon arriving at the scene, police discovered J.R.L. lying face down
on the sidewalk with blood pooled around his head. J.R.L. was later pronounced dead as
a result of a single gunshot wound to the head . As part of their investigation, police
retrieved surveillance footage of the area surro unding the crime scen e. The surveillance
footage showed an African American man in a blue hooded sweatshirt get out of the
passenger side of a green Subaru. The man approached J.R.L. from behind, raised his right
hand, and fired a pistol at J.R.L.’s head. The man left the scene in the Subaru. According
to a witness, the Subaru was driven by E.R.D., who was, herself, later charged in J.R.L.’s
murder. Investigation led police to believe that the man who shot J.R.L. was appellant
Tescil Romalis Mason-Kimmons.
After securing a warrant to search a ppellant’s home, police discovered a blue
hooded sweatshirt and a box of .38 caliber ammunition. Police also determined that, three
days before the shooting, appellant had been a rrested for stabbing J. R.L. In phone calls

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from the jail after that arrest, appellant was recorded telling E.R.D. that he intended to kill
J.R.L.
On November 30, 2017, the state charged appellant with second-degree murder. On
March 1, 2018, a grand jury indicted appellant for first-degree murder and possession of a
firearm by an ineligible person. A public defender was appointed to represent appellant.
On March 2, 2018, appellant discharged his public defender and retained private
defense counsel, who represented appellant at hearings on March 15 and April 24. A trial
date was set for August 13, 2018.
On May 31, appellant’s counse l moved the district court to continue the trial date.
Counsel claimed that he had not had an adequate opportunity to investigate appellant’s case
because the state had failed to disclose the identity of a pa rticular unidentified witness
(UW1) and that the volume of discovery would require additional time to prepare for trial.
The district court denied the motion to continue the trial, but it ordered that defense counsel
be allowed to interview UW1.
On August 9, 2018, appellant’s counsel ag ain moved the district court to continue
the trial, because counsel di d not feel prepared to try the case the following week.
Specifically, the lawyer told the district court that his investigator had been unable to speak
to an additional unidentified witness (UW2), whose identity the state declined to disclose,
and that UW2 may have exculpatory informa tion. Additionally, counsel believed that
UW2 may know the names of other witnesses to the shooting. Coun sel stated that the
people for whom his investigator was looking are “street people” and therefore difficult to
find. The district court expressed that it understood that defense counsel wanted to locate

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eyewitnesses, but it questioned whether the defense’s investigator would find eyewitnesses
who had so far refused to come forward.
Appellant’s counsel also told the district court that he recently learned that another
witness, who is at places in the record referred to as “Chicken Wing,” had given a statement
to police that was inconsiste nt with the statement that he provided to the defense
investigator. Counsel requested additional time to review the statement and conduct further
investigation to assist in appellant’s defense.
Lastly, appellant’s counsel stated that he needed additional time to prepare for both
cross-examination of the state’s witnesses and direct examination of the defense witnesses,
and to review discovery with appellant. He told the district cour t that he was “not
prepared . . . to start a trial next Monday,” that doing so would be “ineffective assistance
of counsel,” and that it would “deny [appellant] his right to a fair trial.”
The state opposed the continuance request , arguing that counsel had been provided
sufficient time to prepare for trial. Among ot her things, the state noted that it had been
experiencing witness-location issues similar to those that defense counsel was having. Like
defense counsel, the state had been unable to find that witness. Concerning the witnesses
it had managed to locate, the state assured th e district court that it had provided defense
counsel with the names of the identified witnesses.
The district court denied appellant’s motion to continue the trial. The district court
stated that “from a factual development standpoint I’m comfortable that you’ve got the
information that you need,” and that counsel will “be able to be prepared so that [appellant]
get[s] a fair trial.” The district court no ted that counsel was an experienced and skilled

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attorney who had considerable trial experience and that the motions filed by counsel until
that point indicated that counsel had a “good handle on [the] issues and facts.” Concerning
witnesses, the district court noted that the defense investigator had spent months “diligently
looking for people that are really hard to find.” Defense counsel responded that despite the
district court’s “arbitrary determination that . . . you’ve given me enough time,” counsel
had not in fact had adequate time to prepare.
On the scheduled trial date, appellant’s c ounsel filed a third motion for continuance.
He indicated that the state had provided him with an extensive amount of additional
discovery material on August 1, 2018, and that he was unable to review that material until
after the hearing on August 9, 2018. Counsel noted that the additional discovery included
information that required that he attempt to locate and speak with the additional witnesses.
Additionally, counsel stated that the new discovery in cluded information about a
man who was charged with murder “one month to the day after the murder in this case.”
According to counsel, th e witnesses to that other murder sa id that the perp etrator in that
case had features similar to the person who killed J.R.L., a fact that warranted investigation.
Appellant’s counsel stated he that was not prepared to go to trial, that he did not
intend to go to trial, and that if the district court made him go to trial, he would “have no
alternative” but to seek immediate relief from the court of appeals. The district court
responded to counsel, “you’ve had your inves tigator looking for these people for several
months. I don’t understand why you can’t be ready [to] go to tria l. So my intention is to
continue to go to trial.”

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At that point, and without prompting from the district court or the prosecutor,
appellant’s counsel proposed “as an alternative” that the parties discuss resolving the case
by agreement. The district court granted the parties time to “talk about the case” and stated,
“we’ll come back and deal with issues in about an hour.”
Approximately 90 minutes later, the parties informed the district court that they had
reached an agreement to resolve all matters before the court concerning appellant.
Appellant agreed to plead guilty to an amended count of second-degree murder in this case.
In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person in this case and all the charges against appe llant in a separate pending
case. The state agreed to appellant’s request for leniency for his co-defendant, E.R.D., and
agreed to offer her a plea ag reement that would include a probationary sentence. The
parties agreed that appellant would be senten ced to an executed 366 months in prison for
second-degree murder, which was at the lower end of the presumptive guidelines sentence
“based on [appellant’s] criminal history [score] of seven points.”
The district court then asked appellant whether appellant understood the plea
agreement and stated that it was “[appellant’s] decision to make.” Appellant indicated that
he understood the agreement. The district court further inquired:
DISTRICT COURT: And like I said, it’s a big decision and I
know there’s been some time pressure. I don’t want to pressure
you into it. And I know it seems like I’ve been trying to move
the case forward. But as I mentioned a couple of times, I
recognize this is a big case for you and for [counsel]. And I
don’t want the pressure of the moment to be the only thing that
allows you to make your decisi on. Do you know what I’m
saying?
APPELLANT: I hear what you’re saying, but you didn’t give
us no time to speak to the other witnesses, though. Yeah.

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DISTRICT COURT: All right. You understand that you’d be
giving up your right to continue to ask for a continuance, as
well as to go forward with the trial in this case?
APPELLANT: Yes, Your Honor.
DISTRICT COURT: All right. And knowing the options that
you have, is this the option you want to exercise?
APPELLANT: Yes, Your Honor.
DISTRICT COURT: Okay. Do you have any questions of me,
or do you need any more time to talk to [defense counsel] . . . ?
APPELLANT: No.

Appellant entered a plea of guilty to second-degree murder. Defense counsel
presented appellant with the signed plea pet ition. Appellant acknowledged that he and
defense counsel went through each line of the document; he understood his rights; he
understood that by entering a plea of guilty, he would waive those rights; he did not have
any questions for defense atto rney or the court; and he ha d signed the plea petition.
Appellant then testified that, on September 15, 2017, he appr oached J.R.L. from behind,
“raised [his] hand with a revolver in it or gun in [his] hand,” intentionally shot J.R.L. in the
back of the head, and that J.R.L. died as a result. The district court accepted appellant’s
guilty plea.
On March 29, 2019, appellant appeared fo r sentencing. Appellant stated to the
district court that he “apologize[s] for taking the plea agreement, but [that he] wasn’t going
to get a fair trial.” He told the district court that the “prosecuting attorney was withholding
evidence . . . and gave it to [defense counsel] two weeks before, so [counsel wasn’t]
prepared for trial, which made [for] ineffectiv e [assistance of] counsel.” Appellant made
no motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
The district court sentenced appellant to 366 months in prison, consistent with the
plea agreement.

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Appellant filed a notice of direct app eal but requested a stay and remand for
postconviction proceedings, wh ich this court granted. Appellant filed a petition for
postconviction relief with the district court.
In his postconviction petition, appellant a sserted that his guilty plea was involuntary
because it was the product of a “Hobson’s choice” between pleading guilty or proceeding
to an unconstitutional trial with unprepared counsel. Additionally, he argued that his plea
was invalid because the district court did not conduct an inquiry into the state’s agreement
to show leniency to a third party, E.R.D. Appellant also contended that his lawyer was
ineffective during plea negotiations because hi s lawyer’s failure to adequately prepare
rendered him unable to advise appellant concerning the strengt h of the state’s evidence,
possible defenses, or the relative risks of going to trial or entering a guilty plea.
The postconviction court denied appellant’s petition for postconviction relief
without an evidentiary hearing, noting th at appellant’s counsel ha d been unprepared, but
that his unpreparedness was a “self-inflicted circ umstance.” The district court noted that
it had denied appellant’s continuance motion on the morning of tria l, but it nevertheless
determined that appellant’s plea was voluntary and that appellant was not denied his right
to effective assistance of counsel.
This combined a ppeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
On de novo review of the plea record, ap pellant has not established that his guilty
plea was involuntary.

Appellant argues that his plea was involunt ary and that we should therefore reverse
his conviction and remand for tria l. A “manifest injustice ex ists where a guilty plea is

9
invalid” because it is inaccurate, involuntary, or unintelligent. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d
643, 646 (Minn. 2007). In explaining the validity requirement, the supreme court has stated
that “[t]he purpose of the voluntariness requirement is to insure that the defendant is not
pleading guilty because of improper pressures.” State v. Trott , 338 N.W.2d 248, 251
(Minn. 1983); see State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000); State v. Ecker, 524
N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 1994). To determin e whether a plea is voluntary, courts must
consider “all of the relevant circ umstances surrounding” the plea. State v. Danh , 516
N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994). An appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that his
plea is invalid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). We assess the validity
of a guilty plea de novo. Id.
Appellant supports his argument—that his lawyer’s unpreparedness for trial
presented appellant with a “H obson’s choice” between pleadi ng guilty or proceeding to
trial with an unprepared lawyer—with citations to federal case law. A “Hobson’s choice”
is generally defined as “the c hoice of taking either that wh ich is offered or nothing; the
absence of a real alternative [1640-50; after Thomas Hobson (1544-1631), of Cambridge,
England, who rented horses and gave his customer only one choice, that of the horse nearest
the stable door].” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 909 (2d ed.
1987). Although not binding on Minnesota courts, federal courts have held that a
“Hobson’s choice” is “something one must accep t through want of any real alternative.”
U.S. v. Blum, 65 F.3d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). It has been held that
a defendant faces a “Hobson’s choice” in plea negotiations when defense counsel has not

10
undertaken any factual investigation but inst ead pressures the defendant into pleading
guilty. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bliss, 84 F. App’x 820, 822 (9th Cir. 2003).
We note that the state argue s on appeal that appellant’s continuance motion on the
morning of trial was not denied and that appellant’s la wyer was prepared to seek
emergency appellate relief from this court had the parties not resolved the case by
agreement. We reject the state’s argument as unsupported by the record. The district court
itself noted in its order and memorandum de nying appellant’s petition for postconviction
relief that it “did deny trial counsel’s oral mo tion for a continuance on the day of trial.”
While the transcript is not crystal clear c oncerning whether the continuance motion was
denied, the district court found as a fact that it had denied the motion. And the district
court is best situated to determine that fact . Appellant’s counsel had repeatedly told the
district court that he was unprepared to go to trial. The district court nevertheless stated its
“intention . . . to continue to go to trial” on the scheduled date. For purposes of appellate
review, the record supports the district court’s factual finding that appellant’s morning-of-
trial continuance motion was denied.
After the district court denied the moti on to continue and the discussion of the
possibility of seeking emerge ncy appellate relief, appellant ’s counsel proposed—without
prompting—that the parties discuss resolving the case by way of a plea agreement. The
parties discussed the options and arrived at what appears to our review of the record to be
a plea agreement favorable to appellant. He was able to avoid a first-degree-murder
conviction and, at appellant’s request, E. R.D. was provided th e opportunity for a
probationary sentence for her involvement in the murder.

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Nothing in the record indicates that defe nse counsel or the district court pressured
appellant into pleading guilty. Cf. Bliss, 84 F. App’x at 822 (holding that a defendant faces
a “Hobson’s choice” in plea negotiations when a defense counsel pressures the defendant
into pleading guilty). Instead, the district court ensured that appellant understood the plea
agreement and told appellant that it was “[ appellant’s] decision to make.” Appellant
clearly expressed in the plea colloquy that he understood his rights and that he voluntarily
gave up those rights. Appellant acknowled ged in his written and signed plea agreement
that “[n]o one—including my attorney . . . has made any promises to me . . . to obtain a
guilty plea from me,” and that “[n]o one—including my attorney . . . has threatened me . . .
to obtain a guilty plea from me.”
Although appellant made the plea agreem ent while facing the immediacy of a trial
and the prospect of a life sentence if he were to be found guilty of the charged first-degree
murder, the record as constituted reveals no “improper pressures” brought to bear on
appellant. Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 251. Appellant re tained a meaningful choice between
standing trial—which could have resulted in e ither acquittal or conviction of first-degree
murder—or accepting the plea offe r which afforded him an op portunity to both reduce
appellant’s own sentencing exposu re and obtain leniency for a person important to him.
We are satisfied on our de novo review of the plea record that appellant has not
demonstrated that his guilty plea was involuntary.
Appellant’s plea was not coerced by an offer of third-party leniency.
Appellant argues that his “guilty plea [w as] not voluntary because the district court
did not inquire into the state’s plea promise to show leniency to” E.R.D. The state responds

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that appellant’s plea was “not coerced by an offer of third-party leniency,” because
appellant initiated the prospect of third-party leniency for E.R.D.
In considering whether a plea is voluntary, additional scrutiny is required when there
is a “package deal” in which the plea agre ement includes leniency for a defendant’s
accomplices. Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 3 39 (Minn. 2003); Danh, 516 N.W.2d at
542.
In Danh, the defendant entered in to a plea agreement th at was dependent upon a
“package deal” for his three codefendants, including a mo re-lenient sentence for the
defendant’s younger brother. 516 N.W.2d at 540-41. The dist rict court conducted a rule
15.01 inquiry before accepting the plea but was not informed of the offers of leniency to
the brother. Id. at 541. The defendant later moved to withdraw his plea, and the district
court denied the motion. Id.
On appeal, the supreme court commented th at plea agreements that include third-
party-leniency promises, while not per se invalid, are “generally dangerous because of the
risk of coercion” because of the “risk that a defendant, who would otherwise exercise his
or her right to a jury trial, would plead guilty out of a sense of family loyalty.” Id. at 542.
The supreme court therefore held that, to ensure th at package-deal pl ea agreements are
voluntarily made, “the state must fully inform the [district] court of the details of these
agreements,” and that the district court mu st conduct “further in quiries” beyond the
standard rule 15.01 inquiry. Id.
In Butala, the defendant and his attorney engaged in plea negotiations with the state
concerning charges of first-degree murder and arson. Butala, 664 N.W.2d at 335. While

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negotiating with the state, Butala requested immunity for family members in exchange for
his guilty pleas. Id. The state provided Butala’s defe nse counsel a letter “certifying that
in exchange for appellant’s pleas of guilty” the state would not prosecute any of Butala’s
immediate family members. Id. at 336 (alterations omitted). The state thereafter filed a
subsequent letter with the district court outlining the terms of the plea agreement, but the
letter did not mention family immunity. Id. That same day, Butala appeared in district
court and pleaded guilty with the assistance of counsel. Id. The district court additionally
conducted a rule 15.01 inquiry. Id. However, no mention of the third-party family
immunity was made during the plea proceedings. Id. at 337.
Nearly two years later, Butala filed a petition for postconviction relief, seeking plea
withdrawal. Id. An evidentiary hearing followed, at which defense counsel testified that
Butala had initiated discussions of im munity for his fa mily members. Id. T h e
postconviction court denied Butala’s request to withdraw his pleas. Id. at 338.
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the postconviction c ourt, reasoning that,
although the third-party-immunity condition had not been placed on the record at the time
of the plea, withdrawal of the guilty plea was not warranted under Danh. The supreme
court reasoned that withdrawal was not warranted because Butala had himself initiated the
subject of third-party immunity for his family members, the district court had conducted a
thorough rule 15 inquiry, Butala stated on th e record that he had chosen to plead guilty,
and that Butala had not disclosed the third-party condition on the record despite initiating
the subject of such immunity. Id. at 340.

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Appellant argues that his plea was involuntary under Danh because the district court
did not “adequately inquire into the voluntariness of the plea at the time of the guilty plea.”
In our view, this case is very similar to Butala. Appellant initiated the discussions of third-
party leniency for E.R.D. Although appellant initially requested that the “charges against
[E.R.D. be] dismissed,” the par ties eventually agre ed that E.R.D. would be allowed to
“plead to an amended count . . . but receive a probationary sentence.” It is clear from the
record that appellant was the originator of the third-party-leniency discussion and he makes
no contrary argument on appeal. Appellant was not pressured by the state to plead guilty
in exchange for lenien cy for E.R.D.; instead, he insisted on leniency for her before he
would plead guilty to the reduced charge of second-degree murder.
The district court, fully aware of th e leniency agreement for E.R.D., made a
thorough rule 15 inquiry on the record, supplemented with a plea petition that appellant
read, agreed to, and signed. Nothing in the plea record indicates any pressure on appellant
as a result of the state’s agreem ent with appellant’s wish that E.R.D. be treated leniently.
We see no improper coercion of appellant by th e state’s agreement to appellant’s request
for leniency to the benefit of his friend and accomplice, E.R.D.
Appellant’s postconviction petition warrants an evidentiary hearing.

Appellant argues that he did not have the effective assistance of counsel because his
lawyer’s lack of preparati on rendered him unable to adequa tely consult with appellant
about the case.
A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel under
both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn.

15
Const. art. I, § 6. “A postconviction court’ s decision regarding a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel involves mixed questions of fact and law and is reviewed de novo.”
Carter v. State, 787 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Minn. App. 2010).
A postconviction court must hold an evidentiary hearin g on a petition for
postconviction relief “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding
conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1
(2016); Leake v. State , 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007). “An evidentiary hearing is
unnecessary if the petitioner fails to allege fact s that are sufficient to entitle him or her to
the relief requested.” Davis v. State , 784 N.W.2d 387, 392 (M inn. 2010). Moreover,
allegations in a postconvic tion petition are required to be “more than argumentative
assertions without factual support.” Hodgson v. State, 540 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Minn. 1995)
(quotation omitted).
Minnesota courts apply a two-part test to cl aims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); see State v.
Eling, 355 N.W.2d 286, 293 (Minn. 1984) (applying Strickland to Minnesota courts). To
succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, appellant must show (1) “that [his]
counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2 ) “that the deficient performance prejudiced
[his] defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Courts analyze the first
part of the test using an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at
2064. Courts consider under the second part of the test whether the petitioner has shown
that “there is a reasonable probability that , but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

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result of the proceeding woul d have been different.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 718 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068).
Appellant asserts that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction
petition to demonstrate that his counsel’s unpreparedness amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel.
As recited above, appellant’s trial counsel had thrice requested that the district court
afford him more time to prepare, alleging that his investigatio n and discovery was
insufficient. The district court correctly recited the applicable case law in its order denying
appellant’s postconviction petition. But then, having previously observed in the very order
that denied appellant’s postconviction petition that defense counsel’s unpreparedness was
“a self-inflicted circumstance,” it held with out an eviden tiary hearing that defense
counsel’s performance was not unreasonable. Without an evidentiary hearing, we cannot
on this record affirm that appellant receive d effective assistance of counsel during the
hastily arranged plea discussions. Appellant contends that defense counsel “stated that he
was unprepared for trial” and “could not provide a full assessment of the evidence and the
likelihood of conviction after trial.” Moreover, appellant cl aims in his postconviction
petition that he “only agreed to plead guilty because [he] did not believe a trial was a
reasonable option based on [defense counsel’s ] statements that he was unprepared to
represent [appellant].” Having carefully review ed the record, we conc lude that appellant
has made at least a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. An evidentiary
hearing is warranted. Accordingly, the postconviction court erred in finding that the record
conclusively showed that appellant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

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The district court did not ad dress the second part of the Strickland test. To our
review of the record, appellant made at le ast a prima facie showing that his lawyer’s
deficient performance prejudiced him and that he would not have pleaded guilty but for
that deficiency. Here again, appellant made a sufficient showing under Strickland to have
warranted an evidentiary hearing.
We therefore reverse the summary denial of appellant’s petition for postconviction
relief and remand for an evidentiary hearing on that petition.1
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

1 We do not by this remand express any indica tion concerning whether appellant actually
received effective assistance from his trial counsel or whether the result of this case would
have been any different had it not been for any such deficiency. As noted above, there are
aspects of this plea agreement that, in light of the record evidence, suggest that the plea
agreement was favorable to appellant. And, as discussed, the guilty-plea record as
currently constituted demonstrates that appellant’s plea was voluntary. The questions on
remand are factual: Was the perfo rmance of appellant’s trial counsel deficient and, if so,
was appellant prejudiced in the plea negotiations as a result? And, of course, any relief
afforded to appellant in the postconviction proceedings woul d reinstate the first-degree-
murder indictment.