State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0010

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ali Joshua Jalil Robida,
Appellant.

Filed December 2, 2019
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-18-1349

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Jennifer D. Plante, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, appellant Ali Joshua Jalil
Robida argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a downward

2
dispositional or durational sentencing departure because he is particularly amenable to
treatment and the district court did not explain its reasons for denying the durational
departure. Because the district court imposed a presumptive guidelines sentence only after
carefully considering the testimony and all evidence including that which support s
appellant’s departure motion, we affirm.
FACTS
The state charged Robida with aiding and abetting first degree assault, great bodily
harm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2016); aiding and abetting first degree
aggravated robbery, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2016); and aiding and
abetting second degree assault with a dangerous weapon, substantial bodily harm , in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 2 (2016). Robida proceeded to a jury trial on the
charges. On the second day of trial, Robida decided to enter a guilty plea based on a plea
agreement. Robida pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting first degree assault , with the
opportunity to request a downward dispositional departure and an agreement that the state
would recommend “a lawful sentence.”
Robida admitted the following information as part of the factual basis in support of
his plea. Robida went to a store in Olmsted County with an accomplice to rob the business.
Robida knew that his accomplice pos sessed a hammer when entering the store. While in
the store, Robida’s accomplice assaulted the store clerk with the hammer. Rather than
assisting the store clerk, Robida stole merchandise during the assault. Robida denied that
he intended to hurt the store clerk during the robbery, but he agreed that it was reasonably
foreseeable that his accomplice would assault the store clerk. Robida also agreed that the

3
victim sustained severe and long-lasting disfigurement to his head as a result of the assault,
and he was unable to work. Robida acknowledged understanding that his plea to
first-degree assault would result in a presumptive prison sente nce between 74 and 103
months.
Before the sentencing hearing, Robida filed a motion seeking a downward
dispositional or durational sentencing departure. Specifically, Robida requested the district
court either stay execution of the presumptive prison sentence or execute a 48 months’
prison sentence.
The district court heard arguments from counsel about the departure mo tion,
listened to a statement from Robida, considered information in the written victim impact
statement, and reviewed the presentence investigation report. The district court explained
on the record at sentencing:
[M]y decision is based on the evidence that is in the record, is
in [district court record], that I heard at trial, that I read through
these reports, that I saw in the complaint. That’s what my
decision is based on. So the entire record, the proceedings, the
arguments of the attorneys, the p resentence investigation
report, the victim impact statement that was filed with the court
earlier and also provided in the [presentence investigation], as
well as the allocution of the defendant, that is what my decision
is based on.
Then the district court identified the relevant factors related for dispositional and durational
departures. Based on these factors, the district court made explicit factual findings.
The district court identified Robida’s criminal history that started “in 2010
. . . [including] a fourth degree assault from December 2010, a fifth degree assault from
January 2012, a fourth degree burglary from May 2016, and then August 2016 gross

4
misdemeanor domestic assault convict ion.” Further, the district court noted that Robida
“struggled while on juvenile probation. He failed to engage in programming at times, and
at times when he did engage in programming, he did not successfully complete it.” And
the district court commented that Robida “was asked this question: how do you feel about
your behavior; and his answer was: people need to stop blowing it out of proportion.”
Despite this background, the district court acknowledged that Robida recognized his guilty
conscience for the offense and that Robida sent an apology letter to the victim of his own
volition.
The district court also considered a doctor’s report about Robida while addressing
sentencing. Specifically, the district court explained on the record at sentencing that, “[the
doctor’s report] provides that the defendant was determined to be a person with no pro -
social associates, a leader in antisocial behavior presenting a danger to other people, and a
person that blames others for his aggressive behavior.” The district court explained that
“[the doctor] wrote it would be unrealistic to expect additional mental illness treatment to
correct his antisocial behaviors, and he presents a serious danger[] to other people,
including lethality, without structure and supervisi on.” The district court acknowledged
that Robida’s childhood included: “foster homes, parents in jail, parents using drugs, [and]
abusive treatment to him.”
Based on its consideration of the record , the district court concluded that Robida
failed to establish reasons to justify a departure:
Departure is warranted when a defendant is particularly
amenable to probation compared with other defendants, and
there needs to be substantial and compelling circumstances to

5
support the same. I do not find that he pl ayed a reduced role
in the commission of the offense. I’ve made some statements
about his mental illness, his age and his maturity. The
vulnerability to a prison setting is something that the Court
takes into consideration. This is a 20-year-old individual. It’s
most unfortunate that life has dealt him the hand that it did. No
one deserves to have the childhood that he had, but he is an
adult now. He has received probationary [sentences] for many,
many years. The reports from the professionals that w ere
consulted do not support that this is an individual that would
do well on probation or that there are substantial and
compelling circumstances that would support either a
dispositional or a durational departure. The defendant made
the comment to the C ourt that he was choosing to be around
the wrong crowd. I think that’s the quote I wrote down.
Sometimes there are individuals that are in the wrong crowd,
but they are really the ones that are orchestrating the behavior,
leading the antisocial behavior that presents a danger to others
within the community, and to me, it appears that defendant is
that person.
Based on the entire record, my findings, the Court,
again, is denying the motion that is before the Court, and I’ll
move forward with sentencing.
The district court sentenced Robida to an executed 86 months’ imprisonment —a
presumptive sentence for the offense. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A, 5.A (2017). This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellate courts “review the sentence imposed or stayed to determine whether the
sentence is inconsistent with statutory requirements, unreasonable, inappropriate,
excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact issued by the
district court.” Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2016). “This court will not generally
review a district court’s exercise of its discretion to sentence a defendant when the sentence

6
imposed is within the presumptive guidelines range.” State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428
(Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). “A district court’s departure
decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Abrahamson ,
758 N.W.2d 332, 337 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009). And “[a]
district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the
law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark , 927 N.W.2d 281,
291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
“Accordingly, a sentencing court can exercise its discretion to depart from the
guidelines, only if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present, and those
circumstances provide a substantial[] and compelling reason not to impose a guideline
sentence.” State v. Soto , 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 ( Minn. 2014) (alteration in original)
(quotations and citations omitted). “When factors that may justify departing from the
presumptive sentence are present, a court must exercise its discretion and consider the
factors.” State v. Kier , 678 N.W.2d 672, 677 (Minn. App. 2004). But “the presence of
mitigating factors does ‘not obligate the court to place [a] defendant on probation or impose
a shorter term than the presumptive term.’” Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Min n.
App. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Wall , 343 N.W.2d 22, 25 ( Minn.
1984)), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2014). “We will affirm the imposition of a
presumptive guidelines sentence when ‘the record shows [that] the sentencing court
carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a
determination.’” State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Van Ruler , 378 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. App. 1985)), review

7
denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013) . “However, the district court is not required to explain its
reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence.” Id.
When a district court considers a dispositional departure, the question turns on
whether “‘a defendant’s particular amenability to individualize d treatment in a
probationary setting will justify departure in the form of a stay of execution of a
presumptively executed sentence.’” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308 (quoting State v. Trog ,
323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) ). The supreme court in Trog identified several “factors
that can be relevant in determining if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation,
including ‘the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude
while in court, and the supp ort of his friends and/or family.’” Id. at 310 (quoting Trog,
323 N.W.2d at 31 ). These factors, however, are “not the only factors that can bear on a
defendant’s amenability to probation, and they may not all be relevant in any given case.”
Id. But, “even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to
probation,” a district court is not required to depart. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 663
(Minn. App. 2009).
Unlike a dispositional departure, “[d]urational departures ma y be justified by
offense-related reasons only.” State v. Rund , 896 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn. 2017) .
“Offender-related reasons —such as particular amenability to probation or treatment,
remorse that does not reduce the seriousness of the offense, or age —are not legally
permissible reasons for a downward durational departure.” Id. “Substantial and
compelling circumstances are those demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct in the
offense of conviction was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in

8
the commission of the crime in question.” State v. Jones , 745 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn.
2008) (quotation omitted). A downward or upward durational departure may be justified
by either a single mitigating or a single aggravating factor. See, e.g., State v. Solberg ,
882 N.W.2d 618, 627 (Minn. 2016) ; State v. Hicks , 864 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2015) .
One such factor may be an offender’s minor or passive role in the crime. State v. Stempfley,
900 N.W.2d 412, 418 (Minn. 2017).
Beginning with the dispositional departure, the district court considered the Trog
factors in reaching its determination that Robida was not particularly amenable to probation
after reviewing all the evidence presented on the motion. Robida asks this court to reweigh
the evidence and reach a different result. This we may not do. As the supreme court
recognized in Stempfley, “[e]ven if we might have come to a different conclusion had we
been weighing the evidence ourselves, that is not the applicable standard upon appellate
review.” Id. at 419 (footnote omitted). The district court provided its rationale for denying
the dispositional departure on the record identifying Miller’s prior failure to complete
programming, and considered his age, maturity, and mental illness, but it concluded that
he was not particularly amenable to probation. We conclude the district court’s decision
was not an abuse of discretion. See Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at 925.
As to the durational departure, Robida argues “[t]he district court did not explain
why it was denying the durational departure.” Robida misconstrues the district court’s
explanations at sentencing. The district court acknowledged Robida’s counsel’s arguments
that Robida played “a minor or passive role;” and Robida lacked a “substantial capacity for

9
judgment due to physical or mental impairment.” The district court addressed these
arguments in its sentencing comments.
First, the district court disagreed “that [Robida] played a reduced role in the
commission of the offense.” Robida’s own admissions during his guilty plea support the
court’s conclusion . Robida acknowledged going to the store knowing his accomplice
possessed a hammer , intending to rob the store , and failing to intervene when th e
accomplice used the weapon. Robida also admitted that it was reasonably foreseeable that
his accomplice would use the hammer in committing the robbery. The district court
rejected Robida’s claim that he played a reduced role in the offense to justify a durational
departure and imposed a presumptive durational sentence based on the law and facts that
it determined. See State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7-8 (Minn. 1981) (affirming imposition
of a presumptive sentence for aiding and abetting a robbery).
Second, the district court acknowledged Robida’s claims regarding his mental
health. An offender’s lack of substantial capacity for judgment based on a mental illness
may permit a district court to grant a durational departure. See State v. McLaughlin ,
725 N.W.2d 703, 716 (Minn. 2007). But the district court made no findings that Robida
lacked substantial capacity for judgment which demonstrated its rejection of this claim.
Robida also argues for application of post -offense remorse and vulnerability in a
prison setting as grounds this court should reverse and direct resentencing. We are not
convinced that either claim is valid. As a matter of law, an offender’s “remorse that does
not reduce the seriousness of the offense” is not relevant for a durational departure. Rund,
896 N.W.2d at 533. The district court acknowledged Robida sent an apology letter to the

10
victim, which suggested he had a guilty conscience. Robida’s feeling of remorse after the
criminal conduct was completed does not reduce the seriousness of the offense to merit
consideration for a durational departure. Id. Next, a defendant’s vulnerability has been
considered grounds for permitting a dispositional departure not a durational departure. See
State v. Wright , 310 N.W.2d 461, 462 -63 (Minn. 1981) (affirming a district court’s
dispositional departure because a defendant was particularly vulnerable in the prison
setting); see also Solberg , 882 N.W.2d at 624 ( recognizing the holding in Wright as
addressing factors for dispositional departures). Even so, the district court considered
Robida’s vulnerability in the prison setting and exercised proper discretion and determined
the presumptive sentence was appropriate.
The district court considered Robida’s motion for a dispositional or durational
departure and acted within its discretion to deny the request and impose the presumptive
sentence. We affirm.
Affirmed.