John Louis Corrigan, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0019

John Louis Corrigan, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 26, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-16-14594

John L. Corrigan, Shakopee, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County A ttorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assista nt County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Sc hellhas, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant John Corrigan, who is self-represented in this appea l, challenges the
denial of his postconviction pe tition, arguing that the postcon viction court (1) abused its

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discretion by deciding that his petition was procedurally barred and (2) erred by summarily
denying his petition. We affirm.
FACTS
The facts of this case were established at Corrigan’s trial. In August 2016, A.B. was
driving home from work on Highway 169 in Shakopee during aftern oon rush hour. She
was alone in her car. Corrigan was driving alone in his car, directly in front of A.B. in the
same left-hand lane. As A.B. was changing lanes to the middle lane in order to move onto
Highway 13, Corrigan cut A.B. off. A.B. moved to the next lane over, and, as she passed
Corrigan, she and Corrigan exchanged angry glances. Corrigan then pulled quickly behind
A.B., and he followed her car cl osely as she left Highway 169 a nd continued along
Highway 13. As A.B. moved into and out of turn lanes on Highway 13, Corrigan continued
to follow her closely. A.B. became very scared. After talking to her husband on the phone,
A.B. pulled over near a fire station in order to stop and call the police. Corrigan followed
A.B and parked near her. A.B. yelled at Corrigan through her op e n w i n d o w , “ S t o p
following me or I’m going to call the police.” Corrigan replied , “I figured you already
have.” A.B. called 911 and was directed to a nearby police station. Corrigan followed A.B.
to the police station, and the police arrived on the scene.
Corrigan was charged with stalking. A.B. and the responding of ficers testified at
trial, and the jury found Corrigan guilty. Corrigan filed a motion for a new trial, asserting
that A.B. had testified falsely about events. The district cour t did not hold an evidentiary
hearing and did not grant a new trial. The district court convi cted Corrigan and sentenced
him to 120 days in jail. Corrigan appealed, and this court affi rmed. State v. Corrigan ,

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No. A17-1145, 2018 WL 3214271 (Minn. App. July 2, 2018), review denied ( M i n n .
Oct. 16, 2018). In November 20 18, Corrigan filed a petition for postconviction relief,
asserting error regarding the jury instructions and alleged fal se testimony by the victim.
The postconviction court denied the petition without an evident iary hearing, concluding
that Corrigan’s claims were procedurally barred.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by dec iding that
Corrigan’s petition was Knaffla-barred.

The denial of a petition for postconviction relief is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015). Appellate courts “will not
reverse an order unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly
erroneous factual findings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The postconviction court decide d that Corrigan’s claims were barred under State v.
Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976). The Knaffla rule is that, “once a direct appeal has
been taken, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims that were known or should
have been known but were not raised in the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” Colbert
v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 626 (Minn. 2015) (emphasis omitted). There are two exceptions
to this rule:
First, a claim is not barred if the claim involves an issue so
novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available at the
time of the direct appeal. Second, in the interests-of-justice
exception, the court may review a claim as fairness requires if

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the claim has substantive merit and the petitioner did not
deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue in a previous
proceeding.

Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 215 (Minn. 2016) (citations omitted). A petitioner bears
the burden of establishing a Knaffla exception. Buckingham v. State, 799 N.W.2d 229, 233
(Minn. 2011) (holding that an argument is Knaffla-barred because the petitioner failed to
explain “why [the] argument was not available on direct appeal” and “why his failure to
raise [the] argument should be excused”); see also Tscheu v. State, 829 N.W.2d 400, 403
(Minn. 2013) (“A petitioner bear s the burden to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that facts exist that warrant postconviction relief.”).
It is undisputed that Corrigan’s claims “were known or should have been known but
were not raised in the direct appeal.” Colbert, 870 N.W.2d at 626 (emphasis omitted). It is
also undisputed that they do not “involve[] an issue so novel t hat its legal basis was not
reasonably available at the time of direct appeal.” Swaney, 882 N.W.2d at 215. The
question is whether the second Knaffla exception—the interest s-of-justice exception—
applies.
A. Deliberate and inexcusab le failure to raise the issue
To satisfy the interests-of-justice exception, Corrigan had to establish that he did
not inexcusably fail to raise the issue in a previous proceedin g. See Swaney, 882 N.W.2d
at 215. Corrigan brought three claims before the postconviction court: (1) the jury
instructions incorrectly describ ed the law; (2) the prosecuting attorney committed
misconduct by failing to correct A.B.’s false testimony; and (3 ) the district court, on

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Corrigan’s posttrial motion alle ging false testimony, should ha ve granted an evidentiary
hearing or a new trial.
As to the first two claims, Corrigan provided the postconviction court no excuse for
his failure to challenge the jury instructions or assert prosec utorial misconduct on direct
appeal. Corrigan thus failed to m eet his burden as to those two claims, and the
postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that they were Knaffla-
barred.
As to his third claim, Corriga n blamed his appellate counsel fo r failing to raise on
direct appeal the denial of his posttrial motion for an evident iary hearing on the alleged
false testimony. Corrigan stated in his petition, “I gave my op inion a few times that some
mention of [the trial judge’s] d enial of an evidentiary hearing be made, but the lawyer
insisted that his brief was interconnected, and ultimately, I d id not know how to persuade
him to do otherwise.” The postconviction court determined that, even if appellate counsel’s
refusal excused Corrigan’s failu re to raise the issue on appeal , Corrigan nevertheless did
not meet the substantive-merit requirement of the Knaffla exception. We turn to that
question.
B. Substantive merit
To satisfy the interests-of-justice exception, Corrigan had to demonstrate that his
false-testimony claim had substantive merit. See Swaney, 882 N.W.2d at 215. Corrigan
argues that the postconviction co urt should have granted him an evidentiary hearing to
establish his right to a new trial under the three-prong test derived from Larrison v. United
States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928), overruled by United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d

6
712, 718 (7th Cir. 2004) (adopting a different test).1 As the Minnesota Supreme Court has
explained,
Under Larrison, a petitioner is entitled to a new trial based on
false trial testimony if: (1) the court is reasonably well satisfied
that the testimony given by a material witness was false;
(2) without the false testimony, the jury might have reached a
different conclusion; and (3) t he petitioner was taken by
surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to
meet it or did not know that the testimony was false until after
trial.

Caldwell v. State, 853 N.W.2d 766, 772 (Minn. 2014).
Corrigan asserts no newly discov ered evidence in support of hi s claim of false
testimony. Cf. Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 442 (Minn. 2002) (“A three-prong test,
known as the Larrison test, is applied to claims of newly-discovered evidence of falsified
testimony.” (footnote omitted)). Instead, he identifies 13 inst ances in which A.B.’s trial
testimony contradicted other parts of her testimony or her prio r statements to the police.
The falsehoods that Corrigan alleges pertain to the following issues: (1) exactly how A.B.’s
lane change occurred; (2) when the eye contact between the part ies occurred during the
lane change; (3) what A.B. told the police about the manner in which Corrigan drove his
car and whether she indicated that Corrigan drove unsafely; (4) whether A.B. told the 911
operator that she was scared becau se of Corrigan and, more spec ifically, because of his
getting out of his car; (5) at which point A.B. started to cry during the entire encounter with
Corrigan; (6) whether A.B. told law enforcement that she called her husband during the

1 The Larrison test is still good law in Minnesota. See Campbell v. State, 916 N.W.2d 502,
507 (Minn. 2018) (applying Larrison).

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encounter; and (7) whether A.B. to o k i t a s a t hr e a t whe n C or r i gan said, “I figured you
already have [called the police].”
The postconviction court concluded that, even taking Corrigan’ s allegations of false
testimony as true, Corrigan could not satisfy the second prong of Larrison—that, without
the false testimony, the jury might have reached a different conclusion. The postconviction
court observed that the challenged testimony “addresses such qu e s t i o n s a s : h o w c l o s e
[Corrigan’s] and the victim’s cars were, when the victim began crying, and what the victim
told police throughout the invest igation.” The postconviction c ourt determined that the
challenged testimony conflicted w ith other testimony “in largel y minor ways” and that
“[o]verall, the testimony provided the jury ample ground to con clude that [Corrigan] had
violated the stalking statute.” Thus, it concluded, Corrigan’s claim lacked substantive
merit.
Corrigan challenges this conclusion, arguing that the alleged false testimony was so
significant that, without it, the jury might have reached a dif ferent conclusion. He bases
this argument on his interpretation of the elements of the stalking statute. Under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.749, subd. 1 (2016), “‘stalking’ means to engage in conduct which the actor knows
or has reason to know would cause the victim under the circumst ances to feel frightened,
threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated, and causes t his reaction on the part of
the victim regardless of the relationship between the actor and victim.” The specific
conduct—the actus reus—that is criminalized under the stalking statute is further defined
in subdivision 2 as follows:

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A person who stalks another by committing any of the
following acts is guilty of a gross misdemeanor:
(1) directly or indirectly, or through third parties,
manifests a purpose or intent to injure the person, property, or
rights of another by the commission of an unlawful act; [or]
(2) follows, monitors, or pursues another, whether in
person or through any available technological or other means[.]

Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2 ( 2016). Corrigan was charged wit h stalking under Minn.
Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(2). As the district court instructed the jury, the first two elements
of the charged offense were: (1) “the defendant followed . . . another” and (2) “the
defendant knew or had reason to know that the conduct would cause the victim, under the
circumstances, to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, perse cuted or intimidated.”
Corrigan argues that “the conduct” under the second element cannot be mere following of
the victim. In other words, he argues that following of the victim cannot alone be the actus
reus of the crime of stalking. And, he asserts that, without the alleged false testimony, the
only remaining evidence is that he followed A.B. and, based on mere following, the jury
would have reached a different conclusion.
Corrigan’s argument rests on the implicit proposition that the actus reus of the crime
of stalking must be unlawful independent of the stalking statut e. Corrigan cites State v.
Pegelow, 809 N.W.2d 245 (Minn. App. 2012). In Pegelow, the defendant was charged with
harassment in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(a)(1) (2008). 809 N.W.2d at 246.
At that time, section 609.749 pr ohibited what it called “harass ment,” but the legislature
subsequently amended section 609.749 and changed “harassment” to “stalking.” Compare
Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (2008) with Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (2016). The actus reus of the crime
of harassment under subdivision 2(a)(2) was defined as “directly or indirectly manifest[ing]

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a purpose or intent to injure the person, property, or rights o f another by the commission
of an unlawful act.” Pegelow, 809 N.W.2d at 247. The question in Pegelow was whether
“an unlawful act” under subdivision 2(a)(1) could include condu ct that met the definition
o f “ h a r a s s ” b u t w a s n o t o t h e r w i s e u n l a w f u l . Id. This court answered that it could not,
holding that, to convict a defe ndant under subdivision 2(a)(1), “the jury must determine
that the defendant committed an act that is unlawful independent of” the harassment statute.
Id. at 251. Corrigan argues that the holding in Pegelow carries over to subdivision 2(2) in
the current stalking statute.2
The argument is unpersuasive. The plain-language basis for thi s court’s conclusion
in Pegelow was that subdivision 2(a)(1) required an “unlawful act.” Id. at 248. If
harassment could be “an unlawful act,” we concluded, subdivision 2(a)(1) would read that
a person “harasses” another by the “commission of [ the harassing act].” Id. (alteration in
original). The definition would be circular. Id. But subdivision 2(2), unlike
subdivision 2(1), does not require the commission of “an unlawful act”; rather, it specifies
acts that, when committed with t he requisite state of mind unde r subdivision 1 of the
statute, constitute criminal stal king. Minn. Stat. § 609.749, s ubd. 2(2). There is nothing
circular about this definition because the specific acts—follow ing, monitoring, and
pursuing of another—are not by themselves stalking. See id., subds. 1-2.
Corrigan further argues, howe ver, that a definition that does not require an
independent unlawful act would be unconstitutionally vague. In Pegelow, we reasoned that

2 Subdivisions 2(a)(1) and 2(a)(2) in the 2008 statute are renumbered as subdivisions 2(1)
and 2(2) in the current statute.

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section 609.749 must be interpreted as requiring conduct that satisfies one of the provisions
of subdivision 2(a) to avoid unconstitutional vagueness. 809 N. W.2d at 248. Corrigan
argues that subdivision 2(2) requires an independent unlawful a ct to avoid the same
constitutional concern. But this court rejected that argument i n State v. Stockwell ,
upholding Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(a)(2) (2006) against a vagueness challenge. 770
N.W.2d 533, 540-41 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009). We held
that subdivision 2(a)(2), “when read as a whole, does not crimi nalize the mere following
of a person” because the requirements of subdivision 1 apply—sp ecifically, that that the
offender knows or has reason to know the conduct will cause the victim “to feel frightened,
threatened, oppressed, persecute d, or intimated” and the offend er actually causes that
reaction. Id. at 541. We concluded that subdivision 2(a)(2) “provides sufficient clarity such
that an ordinary person could understand what conduct is prohibited.” Id.
In sum, Corrigan’s argument—that the actus reus of the crime o f stalking under
subdivision 2(2) must be unlawful independent of the stalking statute and that, without the
allegedly false testimony, there is no evidence of an unlawful act—is unpersuasive.
Therefore, the postconviction c ourt did not abuse its discretio n in concluding that
Corrigan’s false-testimony claim lacked substantive merit and that his claim was Knaffla-
barred.
II. The postconviction court did n o t e r r b y s u m m a r i l y d e n y i n g Corrigan’s
petition.

Corrigan argues that the postconviction court “summarily denie d” his petition and
that a remand is required. Corrigan relies on State v. O’Leary , 359 N.W.2d 703 (Minn.

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App. 1984). In O’Leary, the postconviction court denied relief without making the
“findings of fact and conclusions of law” contemplated in Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1
(1982). Id. at 704. Instead, the postconvic tion court “summarily denied” t he petition. Id.
We held that a summary denial was not warranted in the circumstances of that case under
Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (Supp. 1983), and remanded to the district court to make
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 704. Here, in contrast, the
postconviction court issued a wr itten order with findings of fa ct and conclusions of law
fully explaining its decision. Co rrigan asserts that the findin gs and conclusions are
inadequate, but we disagree.3 Corrigan is not entitled to a remand.
III. Corrigan forfeited his other arguments.

Corrigan includes in his briefing to this court arguments rega rding citizen’s arrest
and the district court’s use of 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 13.57 (2015) in its jury
instructions on stalking. We need not address these arguments. Corrigan did not make them
to the postconviction court and thus forfeited them. See Andersen v. State , 913 N.W.2d
417, 428 n.11 (Minn. 2018) (citing Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996))

3 To the extent Corrigan argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Minn.
Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2018), we reject the argument. A postc onviction petitioner is not
entitled to an evidentiary heari ng if the petition and record “ conclusively show that the
petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Caldwell, 853 N.W.2d at 770 (quoting Minn. Stat.
§ 590.04, subd. 1). The petition and record here conclusively show that Corrigan’s claims
are procedurally barred, and the postconviction court therefore did not abuse its discretion
in denying his petition withou t an evidentiary hearing. See id. (explaining that appellate
courts review the decision to deny a postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing
for an abuse of discretion).

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(holding that some of appellant’s claims would not be considere d on appeal because they
were not raised before the postconviction court).
Affirmed.