Christopher London Walker, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0029

Christopher London Walker, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 16, 2019
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-8870

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer W orkman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his postconviction petition, arguing that the
postconviction court erred by concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying his motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the complaint or by de nying his
motion for a downward durational sentencing departure, and that the postconviction court
erred by denying his claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Christopher Walker with one
count of ine ligible person in possession of a firearm on April 6, 2015. 1 The complaint
alleged that Minneapolis police officers received information from a confidential informant
who identif ied Walker as a person who was selling narcotics in the area of 17th and
Chicago A venue in Minneapolis. Minneapolis Police O fficers J arrod Silva and Efrem
Hamilton went to the area described by the informant and observed Walker “engage in
hand-to-hand transactions consistent with narcotics deals” with “multiple persons.” The
officers then followed Walker as h e drove to the 3900 block of 6t h Avenue North,
Minneapolis, where he stopped, opened his trunk, and appeared to move items around. The
officers stopped Walker’s vehicle, arrested him, searched the trunk, and found a handgun.
Walker moved to suppress all evidence and dismiss the complaint on the basis that
law enforcement illegally searched his vehicle and seize d evidence. Following a

1 Walker stipulated at trial that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm due to a prior
second-degree assault conviction.

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Rasmussen hearing, the district court denied Walker’s motion. A jury found Walker guilty,
and he moved for a downward dispositional and durational sentencing departure. The court
denied the motion and sentenced Walker to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of
60 months. Walker petition ed for postconviction relief without an evid entiary heari ng,
claiming that the district court erred by denying his suppression motion because law
enforcement lacked probable cause to arrest and search him and his vehicle, and by denying
his motion for a downward durational sentencing departure, and that his tria l counsel
provided ineffective assistance. The postconviction court denied the petition.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellate courts “review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief . . . for an
abuse of discretion.” Reed v. State , 925 N.W.2d 11, 18 (Minn. 2019). A postconviction
court “abuses its discretion if it exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual
findings.” Id. (quotati on omitted). “The postconviction court’s conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo.” Fox v. State, 913 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Minn. 2018).
I. Denial of motion to suppress and dismiss
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against “unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “The touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” State v. Johnson , 813 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted). Generally, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.

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State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 33 (Minn. 2016). When reviewing a district court’s pretrial
order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district cour t’s factual findings for
clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Ortega , 770 N.W.2d 145, 149
(Minn. 2009).
A. Probable cause to arrest
Walker argues that police lacked probable cause to arrest him because the informant
was not actually reliable. “A seizure by warrantless arrest is reasonable if it is supported
by probable cause.” State v. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d 334, 343 (Minn. 2016). “Probable cause
exists when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the totality of circumstances
objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific individual has
committed a crime.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The quantum of proof required for a finding
of probable cause is more than mere suspicio n but less than the evidence necessary for a
conviction.” Id. (quotation omitted).
1. Informant’s reliability
Walker argues that the informant was not reliable, that the postconviction court
erred by concluding that the informant voluntarily came forward, and that police officers
therefore lacked probable cause to arrest him . “Whether the information provided by a
confidential informant is sufficient to establish probable cause is determined by examining
the totality of the circumstances, particularly ‘the cred ibility and veracity of the
informant.’” State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 303–04 (Minn. App. 2004) (quoting State v.
Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999)). We consider six factors when determining
the reliability of an informant:

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(1) a first-time citizen informant is presumably reliable; (2) an
informant who has given reliable information in the past is
likely also currently reliable; (3) an informant’s reliability can
be established if the police can corroborate the information;
(4) the informant is presumably more reliable if the informant
voluntarily comes forward; (5) in narcotics cases, ‘controlled
purchase’ is a term of art that indicates reliability; and (6) an
informant is minimally more reliable if the informant makes a
statement against the informant’s interests.

Id. at 304.
At the Rasmussen hearing, Officer Silva testified that on April 3, 2015, he had been
working with a confidential informant, who had been useful to him and other Minneapolis
police officers on prior occasions and had been found to be reliable and truthful in previous
cases. See id. (“There is no need for law -enforcement officers to provide specifics of the
informant’s past veracity.”). “The second factor is fulfilled by a simple statement that the
informant has been reliable in the past . . . .” Id.
Officer Silva also testified that the confidential informant told him that “a male
known to be a narcotics dealer” would be selling narcotics on 16th and Chicago in a gold-
colored Saturn, described as a station wagon, and the informant provided a phone number
and a physical description, which Officer Silva recapped as follows: “a light-skinned black
male with dreadlocks . . . [w]ith dreads, braids – whatever you want to call them.” Officer
Silva showed the informant a picture of Walker , and the informant verified that Walker
was the person described. Officer Silva then observed Walker in a gold Saturn on 16th near
Chicago, where he “observed multiple people approach the vehicle on the driver’s side.
The window was down. [He] observed multiple people conduct hand-to-hand transactions

6
through this window.” Officer Silva believed that narcotics were being sold out of that
vehicle by Walker based on his training and experience.
The informant reported that Walker “was go ing to head to the north side to re -up,
which is common street term for getting more narcotics and would be coming back.”
Officer Silva observed Walker travel to the north side of Minneapolis , where he drove
“behind a house, and . . . got out of his vehicle and . . . had the trunk open. I observed him
digging, moving stuff around – whether it was hiding, grabbing . . . moving panels around.”
Officer Silva testified that, based on his training and experience, this activity was consistent
with Walker “gettin g more narcotics again or possibly hiding them.” Similar to the
information corroborated in Ross, Officer Silva verified Walker’s identity and the type of
car he was driving, and observed Walker engage in activity consistent with narcotics
dealing and “re-upping,” thereby corroborating the informant’s information. See id. at 305
(concluding that probable cause existed when informant provided “a detailed prediction of
future behavior that was corroborated by police before the search”).
2. Officers’ observations
Walker also argues that the officers’ observations do not support probable cause for
his arrest . We disagree. In State v. Hawkins , officers observed the defendant riding a
bicycle around an intersection for about 15 minutes, during which the defendant “whistled
and waved at approa ching vehicles, ” which officers described as “a common way for
street-level narcotics dealers to get people’s attention and let them know that they are
selling narcotics.” 622 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Minn. App. 2001). Officers also observed “two
hand-to-hand transactions with other individuals in a manner that [ they] concluded was

7
consistent with a drug transaction and not with innocent behavior.” Id. This court
concluded that these observations were “sufficient to permit a prudent person to reasonably
believe that [the defendant] h ad engaged in the sale of drugs, ” and that probable cause
existed to arrest and search the defendant. Id.
Similarly, here, investigating officers observed multiple individuals approach the
driver’s side window of Walker’s car and engage in hand-to-hand transactions. The officers
followed Walker to the north side of Minneapolis where they observed him moving panels
in his trunk as if he was hiding something. Both officers testified that this activity was
consistent with narcotics dealing, based on their experience and training, which involved
hundreds of narcotics cases. See State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 99 (Minn. 1999) (stating
that officer “may draw inferences and deductions that might elude an untrained person”).
In this case, c iting Ross, the postconviction court found that the confidential
informant was not a first-time informant, was reliable, and voluntarily came forward; that
officers independently corroborated the information given ; and that neither the fifth nor
sixth Ross factor weighed in favor of or against reliability. Walker challenges the
postconviction court’s finding that the informant voluntarily came forward, noting that the
record contains no evidence about how the informant came to provide information to
police, but that the record reveals that police paid for the information. The fact that the
informant was paid does not necessarily suggest that the informant did not provide
information voluntarily, as opposed to providing information under a threat of prosecution.
Regardless, the postconviction court’s other findings regarding the Ross factors support the
court’s probable-cause determination.

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Because the informant was reliable and provided information that the investigating
officers corroborated and that would allow a prudent person to reasonably conclude that
Walker was engaging in unlawful activity , w e conclude that under the totality of the
circumstances, probable cause existed to arrest Walker. Because the district court did n ot
err in concluding that police had probable cause to arrest Walker, the postconviction court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Walker relief on this claim.
B. Probable cause to search car
Walker argues that police lacked probable cause to search his car because the
information obtained from the informant was not reliable. “We review de novo a
[postconviction] court’s determination of probable cause as it relates to a warrantless
search.” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016). “A search conducted without
a warrant is unreasonable unless it satisfies one of the well -delineated exceptions to the
warrant requirement.” Id. (quotation omitted). “One such exception is the ‘automobile
exception,’ under which the police may search a car without a warrant, including closed
containers in that car, if there is ‘probable cause to believe the search will result in a
discovery of evidence or contraband.’” Id. (quoting State v. Search, 472 N.W.2d 850, 852
(Minn. 1991)). “Probable cause exists when there are facts and circumstances sufficient to
warrant a reasonably prudent person to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “Probable cause is an objective inquiry that depends on the totality of
the circumstances in each case.” Id. “It is a common -sense, nontechnical concept that
involves the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent people, not legal technicians, act. ” Id. (quotations omitted). “In addition, the

9
totality of the circumstances includes reasonable inferences that police officers draw from
facts, based on their training and experience, because police officer s may interpret
circumstances differently than untrained persons.” Id. “[An] appellate court must give due
weight to reasonable inferences drawn by police officers and to a district court’s finding
that the officer was credible and the inference was reasonable.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In Munson, the supreme court concluded that probable cause to search a defendant’s
vehicle existed when a confidential reliable informant (CRI) provided information that a
rented green vehicle with Minnesota license plates would arrive at a certain address in St.
Paul; the occupants of the vehicle would be three African-American males, two of whom
the CRI identified; and the vehicle contained a large amount of crack cocaine hidden
somewhere inside or underneath the vehicle . 594 N.W.2d at 132. Officers observed the
vehicle, that it was rented, and the two identifie d individuals, as described by the CRI. Id.
at 136. The supreme court concluded that the “independent corroboration of even innocent
details of an informant’s tip . . . gave the police probable cause to believe that the [vehicle]
was carrying illegal drugs and thus justified the search . . . under the motor vehicle
exception.” Id. at 136–37.
Here, the district court found that the testimony of Officers Silva and Hamilton at
the Rasmussen hearing was credible, and that based on the informant’s information a nd
their own observations, the officers believed that Walker was engaged in criminal activity.
And the postconviction court concluded that probable cause existed to search Walker’s
vehicle based on the “reliability of the CRI’s information coupled with the officers’
independent observations of [Walker] conducting hand -to-hand transactions f rom his car

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and rummaging through the trunk.” We conclude that the postconviction court did not err
in its determinations regarding the reliability of the informant and the officers ’
corroboration of the informant’s information. Similar to Munson, officers corroborated an
informant’s information and , beyond Munson, independently observed activity that was
consistent with criminal activity based on their training and experience with “[300] to 500”
narcotics cases. The informant’s information and officers’ corroboration would lead a
prudent person to conclude that a reasonable probability existed that narcotics were in
Walker’s vehicle. We therefore conclude that under the totality of the circumstances
probable cause existed to search Walker’s vehicle. The postconviction court did not abuse
its discretion in denying relief on this claim.
II. Denial of downward durational sentencing departure
Walker requested a downward durat ional sentencing departure following his
conviction of ineligible person in possession of a firearm. A defendant convicted of
violating Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2014), “shall be committed to the
commissioner of corrections for not less than five years, nor more than the maximum
sentence provided by law.” Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 5(b) (201 4). The statutorily
mandated sentence is the presumptive sentence. State v. Fleming , 869 N.W.2d 319, 323
n.1 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d, 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016). The district court sentenced
Walker to the mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months, which was the presumptive
sentence. Walker argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
sentencing-departure motion.

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A district court has broad discretion with regard to sentencing departure, and
generally appellate courts will not interfere with that discretion. See State v. Kindem, 313
N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981) (stating that “it would be a rare case which would warrant
reversal of the refusal to depart”); accord State v. Solberg , 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn.
2016) (“We review a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive guidelines
sentence for an abuse of discretion.”). “A court may depart from the presumptive sentence
only when there are identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a
departure.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623 (quotation omitted). “A downward durational
departure is justified only if the defendant’s conduct was significantly less serious than that
typically involved in the commission of the offense.” Id. at 624 (quotation omitted).
Before denying Walker’s departure motion, the district court reviewed letters sent
on behalf of Walker, a presentence investigation report, the arguments of Walker’s counsel
and the prosecutor, and considered facts that could support a downward departure . The
court concluded that the facts spoke to Walker’s “person” but were not ground s for a
durational departure and denied Walker’s motion. We conclude that t he postconviction
court did not abuse its discretion by affirming the district court’s denial of Walker’s
departure motion. See id. at 625 (“Because the guidelines’ goal is to create uniformity in
sentencing, departures are justified only in exceptional cases.”).
III. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Walker argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he agreed
to the introduction of “inadmissible and extremely damaging ev idence at trial,” citing the
drug-investigation evidence that led to his arrest as evidence that should have been objected

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to and excluded . “The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal
defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel.” Crow v. State , 923 N.W.2d 2, 14
(Minn. 2019). “To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, [an] appellant must
show both that (1) his trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.; see also
Strickland v. Washington , 466 U. S. 668, 687–92, 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 2064 –67 (1984)
(establishing two-part test for ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claims). Appellate courts
review a postconviction court’s application of the Strickland test “de novo because it
involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn.
2017).
At a pretrial hearing, the district court heard the state ’s argument that the drug -
investigation evidence would be “helpful for the jury to understand the officer’s state of
mind and ultimately the reason for searching the vehicle . . . and finding the firearm and
ammunition.” Walker’s counsel responded: “I don’t disagree. I think the jury needs to hear
the immediate episode evidence to understand what happened. I don’t have an objection.”
In his opening statement, Walker’s counsel stated:
This was a drug investigation that the police were
conducting, and what the state didn’t tell you is that there were
many officers involve d surveilling my client for alleged drug
transactions. They’re watching him closely . . . . And why do I
mention this? This is not a gun case . . . . They are not asking
about a gun. They don’ t have any information about a gun.
You’re not going to hear any testimony from anybody that says
I’ve ever seen Mr. Walker with a gun. They rely – when I say
“they,” the police rely heavily on a[n informant], which, by the

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way, you won’t hear from . . . . And markedly and really
importantly, never mentions that Mr. Walker has a gun . . . .
[I]t’s not anywhere on the radar of the police that are
surveilling my client.

On cross-examination of Officer Silva, Walker’s counsel asked, “During your
surveillance of Mr. Walker, do you ever see him with a weapon whenever he got out of the
car allegedly,” and asked Officer Hamilton whether anybody gave him any information
about whet her Mr. Walker would have a gun. And in his closing argument, Walker’s
counsel again b rought up the fact that the informant never mentioned anything about
Walker possessing a firearm and that “the purpose of the investigation” was no t whether
Walker had a firearm.
“In evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is a strong
presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable and this court does not review
matters of trial strategy or the particular tactics used by counsel.” Crow, 923 N.W.2d at 14
(quotation omitted). And the supreme court has “repeatedly stated that we generally will
not review attacks on counsel’s trial strategy.” Opsahl v. State , 677 N.W.2d 414, 421
(Minn. 2004). The supreme court’s “reluctance to scrutinize trial tactics is grounded in the
public policy of allowing counsel to have the flexibility to represent a client to the fullest
extent possible.” Id. In Opsahl, the supreme court concluded that a postconviction court
did not abuse its discretion when it rejected an ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim
based on a failure to investigate and challenge evidence because those decisions fall
“within the realm of defense strategy,” and the court was “in no position to second-guess
counsel’s decision” on trial strategy. Id.

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Here, the postconviction court found that Walker’s trial counsel did not object to
the drug-investigation evidence as a matter of trial strategy and denied Walker’s claim
because “[n]o matter how debatable trial counsel’s decision was to not object to the
admission of this evidence, it was clearly an informed and conscious decision. This Court
finds that trial counsel’s decision was a reasonable trial tactic.” The record supports the
postconviction court’s findings and conclusion. The record clearly shows that Walker’s
counsel’s strategy was to include the drug -investigation evidence to show the jury that
despite the surveillance and the informant’s information, no one saw or heard of Walker
possessing a firearm. See State v. Smith, 476 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. 1991) (stating that
in ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claims, the “distorting effects of hindsight must be
filtered out” (quotation omitted)). Choosing to object or not object to evidence is tr ial
strategy. See Leake v. State , 737 N.W.2d 531, 54 2 (Minn. 2007) (“Decisions about
objections at trial are matters of trial strategy .”). We therefore conclude that the
postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walker’s ineffective -
assistance-of-counsel claim. Because we decide this case based on the first Strickland
prong, we need not review Walker’s arguments on prong two. See Mosley, 895 N.W.2d at
591 (“If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland requirements, we need not consider
the other requirement.”).
Walker also argues that the postconviction court erred by refusing to consider
documentation he submitted about a disciplinary action pending against his trial counsel .
The court did not consider the disciplinary information because it involved “cases unrelated
to this one.” In Smith, the supreme court concluded that a loss of a law license during trial

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was relevant in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, as “there may be a rare case
where the substantive reasons for loss of licensure are so egregious, so notoriously bad,
that it might be said that th ese reasons alone render the court proceedings unfair and
unreliable.” 476 N.W.2d at 514 (emphasis added). But the supreme court rejected a
defendant’s claim of ineffectiveness of counsel whe n the defendant alleged that his
counsel’s disciplinary proceedings “preoccupied” him, concluding that nothing in the
record show ed that the attorney ’s impending suspension created any distracting
preoccupation, because the alleged misconduct involved other clients. Id. at 516. Similarly
here, Walker’s counsel’s disciplinary proceedings involved other clients and other matters,
and Walker points to no facts in the record to show how the disciplinary proceedings
affected counsel’s representation. Walker’s argument therefore is unavailing. See id .
(“Speculation by the defendant is not enough,” in claiming disciplinary proceedings impact
a counsel’s representation).
Affirmed.