In re the Marriage of: James Richard Huntsman, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0040

In re the Marriage of: James Richard Huntsman, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Zenith Annette Huntsman,
Respondent.

Filed July 22, 2019
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-F7-98-002231

James R. Huntsman, Mounds View, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Bradley C. Eggen, Law Offices of Brad C. Eggen, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant-husband, a judgment debtor, argues that the distr ict court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for amended findings in regard to appellant’s motion for
contempt, fraud, and triple damages and respondent’s motion to vacate the full satisfaction
of judgment filed by appellant and by granting respondent’s motion for sanctions under
Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9. He also argues that the district court erred in granting respondent’s
motions for an order compelling appellant to respond to discovery requests and abused its
discretion in awarding her conduct-based attorney fees. Because we see no abuse of
discretion in the findings or in the award of attorney fees and no error in the order
compelling discovery, we affirm.
FACTS
When the marriage of appellant James Huntsman and respondent Zenith Annette
Huntsman was dissolved in 2000, appellant was required to pay respondent monthly
permanent spousal maintenance of $1,562.27. In 2010, a Qualified Domestic Relations
Order (QDRO) provided that payments of ongoing maintenance and arrearages be made
from appellant’s 3M retirement account and that a supersedeas security fund of $52,000 be
set up at US Bank.
In 2012, the district court, having found that appellant “ha[d] engaged in frivolous
litigation through numerous appeals that were found to be without merit ,” ordered him,
under Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9, to “confirm by sworn statement that he has paid all his arrears
of spousal maintenance and medical insurance premiums to the date” of any future motion

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he brings in this case. That order was affirmed by this court. Huntsman v. Huntsman, No.
A12-2147 (Minn. App. Oct. 28, 2013), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2013).
In April 2015, the QDRO was amended and the district court issued an order finding
that: (1) appellant filed motions on May 12, 2014, July 3, 2014, J uly 11, 2014, and six
motions on Sept. 4, 2014; (2) appellant was not truthful when he “confirmed to the Court
that he had paid all arrears”; and (3) appellant owed respondent $17,083.80 in arrearages
and $17,158.10 in need and conduct -based attorney fees. The order required appellant to
pay respondent $17,158.10 in need -based and conduct -based attorney fees. Again, this
court affirmed. Huntsman v. Huntsman, No. A15-1781, (Minn. App. July 28, 2016) (order
op.) (noting that “[t]his is the fourteenth of fif teen actual or attempted appeals taken by
[appellant] in the proceedings involving the dissolution of his marriage” and that appellant
sought a stay of his 15th appeal so that it could be consolidated with his 16th appeal in the
interest of “judicial economy”).
Between April 2016 and Ma y 2017, judgments totaling $60, 696.46 were entered
against appellant by the district court, this court, and the supreme court. On December 22,
2017, the district court granted respondent’s motion to compel appellant to respo nd to
interrogatories and a request for production. On May 16, 2018, the district court issued an
order (1) granting respondent’s motions for a Rule 9 order, an amended QDRO, and
attorney fees, (2) denying respondent’s motion to consolidate the judgments against
appellant, (3) denying appellant’s motions for damages for contempt and fraud, and
(4) awarding respondent $22,400 in additional conduct -based attorney fees. On

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November 5, 2018, the district court issued an order denying appellant’s motions for
amended findings and awarded respondent additional conduct-based attorney fees.
Appellant challenges the orders of December 22, 2016, May 16, 2018, and
November 5, 2018.
D E C I S I O N
1. Motion for Amended Findings
A district court abuses its discretion regarding maintenance if its findings of fact are
unsupported by the record or if it improperly applies the law. Dobrin v. Dobrin , 569
N.W.2d 199, 202 & n.3 (Minn. 1997) (citation omitted).
A. Contempt, Fraud, and Triple Damages
The district court denied appellant’s motion for damages for contempt and fraud and
for triple damages because appellant’s allegations were based on the premises that (1) he,
not respondent, had the right to decide to which judgments his $600 payments would be
applied and (2) respondent’s application of the payments to judgments other than the
September 3, 2015 QDRO was contempt and fraud and violated Minn. Stat. §§ 481.06(4),
481.07, and 481.071 (2018). This court affirmed the September 3, 201 5 QDRO.
Huntsman, No. A15-1781.
In February 2018 , respondent moved to amend the QDRO to provide continual
monthly payments until she filed a satisfaction of the judgments of September 3, 2015,
June 6, 2016, November 21, 2016, and December 29, 2016. The district court granted her
motion, “conclud[ing] that the proposed Amended QDRO as a means to collect
maintenance arrearages and attorney fee judgments is necessary to implement the

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provisions in the Decree.” Neither the original QDRO nor its amended ver sion entitles
appellant to recover damages for contempt or fraud or triple damages. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion.
B. Vacating the Satisfaction of Judgment
In a May 16, 2018 order, a different district court judge found:
25. On May 20, 2015, [appellant] moved for amended
findings of [the previous judge’s] April 15, 2015 Order. On
September 2, 2015, [that judge] issued an “order affirming
[appellant’s] maintenance arrearage payments.” [That judge]
concluded th at [appellant] owed $4,029.53 in unpaid
maintenance. . . .
. . . .
32. On November 21, 2017 , [appellant] filed a Full
Satisfaction of Judgment for the $4,029.53 in maintenance
arrearages from the September 3, 2015 Judgment.

The district court concluded: “7. The Court Administrator shall vacate the ‘Full Satisfaction
of $4,029.53 judgment’ filed by [appellant] on November 21, 2017.”
Appellant decided that the $600 monthly payments should be applied to the
judgment of maintenance arrearages. When he co ncluded that there had been enough
payments to satisfy the judgment, he filed a full Satisfaction of Judgment and directed 3M
to stop making the $600 payments. However, resp ondent had applied the payments to
attorney fees, not to the judgments, and the ma intenance arrearage judgment was not
satisfied. Appellant also made a payment of $2,900 that he said was partial satisfaction of
that judgment.
Appellant argues that he, not respondent, had the right to decide where the payments
would be applied and t hat respondent’s application of them to attorney fees constituted

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fraud upon the court. The district court rejected this argument in its November 5, 2018
order at Finding 17.
17. Appellant extensively briefed this issue at the motion
hearing and it for med the basis for his motion for fraud upon
the court. The Court rejected that argument in its Conclusions
of Law (specifically Conclusion of Law 24). Thus, to the
extent that [appellant] reargues his prior briefs, this is more
properly characterized a s a motion for reconsideration which
does not form the basis of a motion for amended findings.
Appellant also argues that respondent improperly applied a
$2,900 payment received from the sale of a collector car in
2016 to attorney fee judgments and not to maintenance
arrearages. Respondent’s attorney provided an affidavit
indicating that at the time the car funds were received, the
application of these funds [was] not restricted to any certain
judgment. Even if [it was], appellant failed to raise this is sue
in a timely manner and this Court will not address it more than
two years after the payment was received.

Appellant provides no support for his view that he had the right to decide whether
his payment would be applied to attorney fees or maintenance arrearages. Respondent
notes that appellant “had been informed by the court in the past that he did not get to pick
and choose to which judgments the involuntary payments would be applied” and claimed
that the maintenance-arrearages judgment was paid “to avoid the collection of arrears on
attorney fee judgments which resulted from his failure to pay maintenance.” Appellant
does not refute respondent’s argument that, when he filed his “full satisfaction” of the
$4,029.53 judgment, that judgment had not bee n satisfied. Therefore, the district court
did not err in ordering that the full satisfaction filed by appellant be vacated.

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2. Motion for Sanctions under Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9
This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard to its review of a district court’s
decision to impose sanctions. See Cole v. Star Tribune, 581 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Minn. App.
1998); Huntsman, No. A12 -2147 (Minn. App. Oct. 28, 2013) ( stating that an abuse of
discretion standard is applied to decisions on sanctions under Minn. Stat. § 549.21 or Minn.
R. Civ. P. 11).
“The [district] court may . . . enter an order . . . (b) imposing preconditions on a
frivolous litigant’s service or filing of any new claims, motions, or requests . . .” Minn. R.
Gen. Prac. 9.01. Before imposing such a sanction, the court is to consider sev en factors.
Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(b).
The first two factors are (1) the frequency and number of claims pursued with an
adverse result and (2) the probability of prevailing on the current claim, motion, or request.
Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(b) (1)(2). The district court concluded that: (1) the case file
includes over 1,500 entries; (2) appellant generated all the appellate filings; (3) a ll
respondent’s motions were brought to collect outstanding maintenance and attorney fees,
and all appellant’s motions were brought to contest maintenance and attorney fee awards;
(4) appellant has had “very little success” with his motions and appeals; and (5) appellant
filed over ten pages of pleadings for an exemption claim of $402.28. Thus, appellant had
pursued a large number of claims with an adverse result and had little probability of
prevailing on his current motions, and these facts supported respondent’s Rule 9 motion.
The third factor is whether the claim, motion, or request was brought for the purpose
of harassment, delay, or vexatiousness, or otherwise in bad faith. Minn. R. Gen. Prac .

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9.02(b)(3). The district court relied on this court’s holding in its 2013 Huntsman decision,
rejecting appellant’s procedural objections and noting that:
The district court did not base its [Rule 9] limitations solely on
appellant’s current motions. Rather, it considered appellant’s
behavior throughout the more than decade-long history of the
case. The district court found that “throughout the history of
this case, [appellant] has engaged in frivolous litigation
through numerous appeals that were found to be without merit,
and that [r]espondent as a result of [appellant’s] litigious
behavior, has been left in an extremely compromised financial
position.”

2013 WL 5777908 at *8. It is now almost two decades since appellant began his protracted
litigation in opposition to respondent’s awards of maintenance a nd attorney fees, and his
tactics do not seem to have changed from those rejected by this court in 2013.
The fourth factor is the injury incurred by prevailing litigants and to the efficient
administration of justice. Minn. R. Gen. Prac . 9.02 (b)(4). The district court noted the
financial injury incurred by respondent as she attempted to oppose appellant’s “confusing
and inconsistent” claims in his motion to modify maintenance, the frustration of the district
court’s efforts to determine the amounts owed t o respondent by appellant’s failure to
provide the appropriate financial documents , and “numerous other examples of the
financial strains suffered by [respondent] caused by [appellant’s] excessive litigation as
well as the burden his excessive litigation p laces on both the district and appellate courts
to efficiently administer justice.” The record supports the district court’s finding.
As to the fifth factor, the effectiveness of prior sanctions in deterring the pursuit of
frivolous claims, Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(b)(5), the district court noted that, as stated in a
2015 district court order, appellant was not truthful to the court concerning his payment of

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arrearages when he filed nine motions between May and September 2014, and respondent
has been awarded over $50,000 in attorney fees by district and appellate courts since the
2012 order that imposed Rule 9 sanctions. Thus, the prior sanctions have n ot deterred
appellant from his pursuit of frivolous claims.
As to the sixth factor, the likelihood that sanctions will ensure adequate safeguards
and enable the compensation of the adverse party, Minn. R. Gen. Prac . 9.02(b)(6), the
district court observed that requiring appellant to pay outstanding attorney fees and costs
before bringing any other motions will help to compensate respondent.
As to the seventh factor, whether a less severe sanction would adequately protect
litigants, the public, or the courts, Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(b)(7), the district court noted
that appellant had not followed the 2012 sanc tion requiring him to verify payment of
maintenance arrearages and health insurance premiums prior to filing new motions; he had
also caused respondent to incur over $50,000 in attorney fees since that sanction was
imposed, thus justifying the more severe sanction in the 2016 order. The Rule 9 sanction
imposed in that order was not an abuse of discretion.
3. Respondent’s Discovery Requests
Respondent moved “for an order compelling [appellant] to respond to the
interrogatories and request for production served November 13, 2016.” The district court
granted her motion in its order of December 22, 2017, concluding that “Respondent’s
November 13, 2016 interrogatory and request for production is in compliance with
Minnesota law.” Appellant argues that this conclu sion is erroneous. This court reviews

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the district court’s application of the law de novo. In re Estate of Barg , 752 N.W.2d 52,
63 (Minn. 2008).
Respondent requested post -judgment discovery of appellant’s complete income
stream, bank accounts, and assets. Appellant argues that, because respondent’s discovery
request began with the phrase, “Pursuant to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure” and
did not specify any particular rule or rules, she failed to comply with Minn. R. Civ. P. 69.
That rule states that a judgment creditor seeking the execution of a judgment “may obtain
discovery from any person.” Respondent, in a reply to appellant’s objection, did cite the
rule but omitted the phrase that the procedure “shall be in accordance with the Minnesota
Statutes, chapter 550.”
Appellant concedes that respondent “finally complied with” the statute by having
an order for disclosure served on him, but argues that her omission of the phrase “negated
any need for [appellant] to comply formally with [responden t’s] discovery requests” and
that he “did informally essentially comply with the information [sought] in respondent’s
discovery request” in Exhibits 3-6 of his affidavit opposing her motions. But the affidavit
and exhibits, a series of letters between appellant and respondent’s attorney, do not provide
any clear statement of appellant’s full income stream, bank accounts, and other assets.
The district court did not err in concluding that respondent had complied with
Minnesota law in her interrogatory and request for production of documents or in ordering
appellant to comply with them.

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4. Conduct-based Attorney Fees
Conduct-based attorney fees “may be awarded against a party who unreasonably
contributes to the lengt h or expense of the proceedings and are discretionary with the
district court.” Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007) (quoting
Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2006)).
The district court found in its May 16, 2018, order that, between April 2016 and
May 2017, the district court entered attorney -fee judgments against appellant of $3,350;
this court entered $52,786.46; and the supreme court entered $4,560, a total of $60,696.46.
The district court also found that “[Respondent] seeks $30,405.00 in attorney fees and
$267.50 in costs. Of those fees, $3,255 were related to the garnishment proceeding which
this Court already denied and $4,740.00 relate to the Removal motion and hearings.” The
district court then concluded that “The Findings of Fact as set forth in this Order
demonstrate that [appellant’s] conduct has unreasonably contributed to the length and
expense of the proceeding ” and entered judgment for respondent agai nst appellant in the
amount of $22,400.1 Thus, the total of the attorney-fee judgments against appellant in May
2018 was $83,276.46 ($60,876.46 + $22,400). Both this court and the district court have
referred repeatedly to appellant’s excessive litigation. See, e.g., Huntsman, No. A16-0971
(order op.) (affirming conduct-based attorney fees and quoting the district court’s reference
to appellant’s “‘excessive litigation conduct’ in which he repeatedly has sought to avoid
paying spousal maintenance by raising specious issues”) (quotation omitted)).

1 $3,255 + $4,740 = $7,995; $30,405 - $7,995 = $22,410.

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In its November 5, 2018 order, the district court found that “[appellant’s ] motions
are too lengthy and address numerous issues that have already been decided by prior
decisions of the district court and appellate courts. Thus, [appellant’s] actions
unreasonably contributed to the expense of the proceedings.” The district court awarded
respondent a further $2,520 in conduct-based attorney fees, which was $1,350 less than she
requested.
Particularly in light of the district court’s careful review of respondent’s attorney -
fee requests and its awards of only part of her requested fees, there is no indication that the
district court abused its discretion in awarding conduct-based attorney fees.
Affirmed.