In re the Marriage of: Benjamin Walter Eidem, petitioner, Appellant,
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Marriage of Hecker v. Hecker 568 N.W.2d 705
- Youker v. Youker 661 N.W.2d 266
- Madden v. Madden 923 N.W.2d 688
- Claybaugh v. Claybaugh 312 N.W.2d 447
- Marriage of Halvorson v. Halvorson 402 N.W.2d 168
- Marriage of Kielley v. Kielley 674 N.W.2d 770
- Starr v. Starr 251 N.W.2d 341
- Marriage of Grachek v. Grachek 750 N.W.2d 328
- Pechovnik v. Pechovnik 765 N.W.2d 94
- Marriage of Sefkow v. Sefkow 427 N.W.2d 203
- Lee v. Lee 775 N.W.2d 631
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0060
In re the Marriage of:
Benjamin Walter Eidem, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Debra Louise Eidem,
Respondent.
Filed November 4, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge
Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-FA-12-5484
Kay Nord Hunt, Marc A. Johannsen, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)
Carrie Osowski, Dittrich & Lawrence, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Husband challenges the denial of his motion to modify spousal maintenance based
on wife’s increased income and decreased needs. Because the district court did not abuse
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its discretion by concluding that husband did not meet his burden to show a substantial
change in circumstances, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Benjamin Walter Eidem and respondent Debra Louise Eidem married in
1987 and have one child born in 1999. In 2013, the marriage was dissolved by a stipulated
judgment. At the time of the dissolution, husband earned approximately $410,000 a year
as a pediatric ca rdiologist at Mayo Clinic . Wife had not worked outside the home since
the child’s birth , bu t a vocational assessment determined she had the capacity to earn
$30,000 per year. The judgment awards wife permanent spousal maintenance of $9,000
per month. In early 2018, a stipulated cost-of-living adjustment increased monthly
maintenance to $9,753.28.
In May 2018, husband moved to reduce his maintenance obligation. He asserted a
substantial change in circumstances due to wife’s full -time employment as a school
paraprofessional, her increased income from investments, her decreased living expenses,
and the child’s emancipation.
The district court denied the motion following a hearing. The district court found
that wife’s employment income is “abo ut $18,318.86 per year or $1,526.57 per month .”1
But the court concluded that neither wife’s income from employment nor decreased need
1 The district court also found that husband’s income increased “approximately $200,000
or $16,666.66 per month since the [s]tipulation.” While husband challenges this amount,
the record shows that during the first five months of 2018 he had employment gross income
of over $252,961.82, suggesting increased income of at least $50,000.
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constituted a substantial change of circumstances to support modification. Husband
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A district court may modify spousal maintenance if the terms of a prior order are
“unreasonable and unfair” because one of the parties has experienced a substantial increase
or decrease in gross income, or a substantial increase or decrease in needs. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (2018). When the dissolution judgment is based on the parties’
stipulation, the judgment constitutes “baseline circumstances” from which any change is
measured. Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 1997). The party seeking to
modify maintenance has the burden of proof. Youker v. Youker , 661 N.W.2d 266, 269
(Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2003); see Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd.
2(a) (requiring movant to show grounds for maintenance modification). We review a
district court’s decision to modify maintenance for abuse of discretion. Madden v.
Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Minn. App. 2019). But our supreme court has “suggested
that [district] courts exercise that discretion carefully and only reluctantly alter the terms
of a stipulation governing maintenance.” Claybaugh v. Claybaugh, 312 N.W.2d 447, 449
(Minn. 1981).
Husband makes two general arguments to support modification of his maintenance
obligation. He asserts that wife’s increased employment income (from $0 to $18,318.86)
and her decreased need show a substantial change in circumstances . We address each
argument in turn.
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As to wife’s income, husband first challenges the district court’s finding that wife’s
income only increased by 17%. Husband contends the district court should have used $0,
rather than the $9,000 wife received as spousal maintenance , as the baseline. This
argument is unavailing.
In determining whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances, a
district court compare s the circumstances at the time of the prior order with the current
circumstances. The judgment does not impute income to wife . But it is undisputed that
wife had the capacity to earn annual income of $30,000 at the time of the dissolution . In
that context, the parties agreed wife would receive permanent maintenance of $9,000 per
month. Because wife’s current $18,318.06 annual salary is well below her $30,000 earning
capacity, we discern no change—substantial or otherwise—in her income.
Even if we acc ept husband’s contention that wife’s income increased by 100%,
caselaw persuades us such a change does not make the existing order unreasonable or
unfair. In Halvorson v. Halvorson, the maintenance obligee’s income increased from $194
to $19,870; the obligor’s income increased from $21, 981 to $40,530. 402 N.W.2d 168,
171 (Minn. App. 1987). We affirmed the district court’s determination that the obligee’s
increased income did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances warranting
modification. Id. at 172-73. In rejecting the obligor’s argument, we noted the parties both
experienced increased income of “nearly the same” amount , and that permanent
maintenance was based on the parties’ stipulation. Id. at 172.
More recently i n Kielley v. Kielley , we confirmed that district courts have broad
discretion to determine whether a substantial decrease in an obligor’s income renders an
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existing maintenance order unreasonable or unfair. 674 N.W.2d 770, 779 (Minn. App.
2004). Although the obligor testified that his annual income decreased from $250,000 to
$22,000 due to a job loss, we agreed with the district court’s assessment that “it lacked
sufficient evidence to order modification” because the obligor provided no evidence
regarding “the parties’ overa ll financial pictures.” Id. These cases support the district
court’s exercise of discretion, including considering husband’s increased income here. The
parties’ marital income supported an affluent standard of living. On this record, we discern
no abuse of discretion by the district court in rejecting husband’s contention that wife’s
modest income from employment constitutes a substantial change in circumstances.
Husband next points to a provision in the dissolution judgment as support for his
argument. When interpreting a provision in a stipulated judgment, we apply general
contract principles, including that “where the language employed by the parties is plain
and unambiguous there is no room for construction.” Starr v. Starr, 251 N.W.2d 341, 342
(Minn. 1977). And we review de novo a stipulation in a dissolution matter. Grachek v.
Grachek, 750 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2008).
The relevant provision states:
The parties agree maintenance is based on [h]usband’s primary
employment, but he has other sources of earned income.
Therefore, if [w]ife obtains part -time employment, temporary
employment or earns secondary income, rather than from
primary employment, the secondary income will not be
considered in a modification of maintenance.
Husband asserts that this provision should be read to treat wife’s salary as income from
“primary employment,” requiring modification of his maintenance obligation. We are not
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persuaded. Even if wife’s current position is considered her pr imary employment, her
earnings do not reach the level of her earning capacity at the time of the dissolution. The
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying husband’s maintenance -modification
motion based on wife’s increased income.
As to wife’s needs, husband contends that they have substantially decreased because
she has been able to save more than $800 per month for retirement, an amount that far
exceeds what the parties saved during the marriage. The judgment does no t include
findings regarding the marital standard of living or wife’s reasonable monthly expenses.
In its order denying modification , the district court found that “the parties saved for
retirement under a standard of living based on [husband’s] income at the time” and that
wife “would be unable to save enough for retirement at the marital standard of living
without using funds from maintenance.” Husband also offered evidence that wife’s
monthly expenses exclusive of savings in the years 2015 to 2017 were between roughly
$7,000 and $8,000. Bank records from the same time period reflect average monthly
expenses between $8,700 and $15,900. The district court weighed the competing evidence
and made implicit credibility determination s. See Pechovnik v. Pech ovnik, 765 N.W.2d
94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009). We defer to such credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow,
427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
Husband also points to wife’s investment income and her ability to save for the
child’s post -secondary education as evidence the awarded maintenance exceeds her
reasonable needs. But t he judgment specifically excludes husband’s “other sources of
earned income” from the maintenance calculation and does not mention wife’s other
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potential sources of income, despite the fact the parties’ investment assets , which
presumably produced income, were divided as part of the dissolution. Likewise, any
reduction in wife’s needs due to the child’s emancipation was anticipated and could have
been addressed in the parties ’ maintenance negotiations . It was not. We decline to now
penalize wife for living frugally in order to save for the child’s college education. And we
see no error by the district court in determining wife’s maintenance award reflects the
standard of li ving established during the parties’ marriage. See Lee v. Lee , 775 N.W.2d
631, 642 (Minn. 2009) (“We have repeatedly stated that the support to which a divorced
party is entitled is not simply that which will supply her with the bare necessities of life,”
and “the obligee can expect a sum that will [keep] with the circumstances and living
standards of the parties at the time of the divorce.” (alteration in original) (quotations
omitted)).
In sum, as the party seeking to modify maintenance, husband had the burden to show
a substantial change in circumstances that rendered the existing order unreasonable and
unfair. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in concluding
husband failed to meet this burden either by demonstrating that wife’s income has
substantially increased or that her needs have substantially decreased.
Affirmed.