State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0062

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Brent Scott Darling,
Respondent.

Filed July 1, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-17-1251

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Chip Granger, III, Assistant Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for appellant)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christen Chapman, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
The state appeals the district court’s decision to stay adjudication of respondent’s
second-degree possession of a controlled substance charge when it found him guilty after
2
a stipulated-evidence trial. The state argues that the district court did not have statutory or
inherent judicial authority to stay adjudication of his conviction over the state’s objection.
We reverse and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
On July 10, 2016, Burnsville Police Officers responded to a gas station where they
found appellant Brent Scott Darling in his car and in need of medical attention. After
officers placed Darling in the care of paramedics, Darling consented to a vehicle search.
On the passenger seat, the off icers found a bag that contained a baggie with a chemical
substance and a digital scale. The substance in the baggie was later tested and found to be
6.96 grams of methamphetamine.
In March 2017, t he state charged Darling with one count of second-degree
possession of a controlled substance under Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014).
Darling pleaded not guilty and filed motions to suppress the drug evidence. After an
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Darling’s motions.
The state and Darling then agreed to stipulate to evidence for a court trial under
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. 1 In October 2018, the district court issued a written
decision and found Darling guilt y of second-degree possession. The district court also
ordered a presentence investigation (PSI).

1 The district court’s written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order describe the
parties’ stipulation as a “stipulated facts trial” under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 3. This
appears to be a clerical error and the district court intended to cite Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 3, which is a trial on stipulated facts or evidence, and allows a defendant to “raise
issues on appeal as from any trial to the court.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3(f). Darling
did not appeal the district court’s pretrial order.
3
The PSI report stated that “[t]he 2015/2016 Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
recommend a [prison commitment] for a period of 58 (50-69 range) months.” But the report
also stated that the court could consider the new guidelines in the recently adopted Drug
Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA), which “reduced the offender’s presumptive sentencing
range” and “calls for a stay of 58 months.” The PSI recommended a stay of imposition and
10 years of probation.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court asked whether the parties had any
additions or corrections to the PSI report; both parties said they did not. The district court
then stated it would hear from the state, Darling’s attorney, and Darling, before imposing
a sentence.
The state “strongly disagree[d]” with the PSI and urged the district court to stay
execution of a 58-month sentence. The state argued that, at the time Darling committed his
offense, the sentencing guidelines recommended “a presumptive commit to prison of 58
months.” The state agreed with the PSI report that the sentencing guidelines had changed
under the DSRA and, currently, the guidelines recommendation for Darling’s offense was
“a presumptive stay . . . and no longer [a] presumptive commit.”
Initially, Darling’s counsel asked the district court to follow the PSI
recommendation and stay imposition of sentence, arguing that “it’s appropriate to treat this
[offense] as we would treat it if it had occurred now after that change in policy was
identified [by the legislature in the DSRA].”
Darling’s counsel then argued, apparently in the alternative, that “under the new
sentencing statu[t]es that we have,” Darling “would actually be entitled to [ a stay under
4
section] 152.18,” which authorizes a district court to defer prosecution for some drug
offenses. Darling’s counsel stated that section 152.18 applied because Darling’s only prior
offense was a paraphernalia conviction from Missouri. The district court disagreed and
stated: “I don’t think [Darling is] eligible for a stay of adjudication.” The state argued that
section 152.18 did not apply to Darling, in part, because the statute authorizes a stay of
adjudication for persons found guilty of drug possession in the third, fourth, and fifth
degrees and does not apply to second -degree drug possession. Darling’s counsel stated
“[t]hat is accurate,” but added that, if Darling committed the same offense today, it would
be charged as a third -degree offense or less. After the court hel d an off -the-record
discussion with the parties, Darling’s counsel concluded his remarks by stating that, under
the DSRA, the state would have charged Darling with fifth-degree controlled-substance
possession, and Darling is “entitled [to] and the Court is required to impose a 152.18.” The
district court then heard from Darling, who discussed his sobriety and treatment, along with
his concern that he would have a hard time finding a new job with a felony record.
The district court then stayed adjudication, stating:
[B]ased on the fact that probation also recommended a
probationary sentence and talked about, to some extent, the
change in law, although, not as extensively as would have been
helpful for the Court, and the fact that this offense, had it been
a week later, as defense counsel stated, would have been
charged as a controlled substance crime in the 5th degree, the
Court will grant the defense request for a stay of adjudication
under Minnesota statute 152.18.
Under that stay of adjudication, though, I a m going to
put you on probation for the next five years and require you to
be on probation . . . .

5
After stating the terms of the stay, the district court acknowledged that it was “[ t]rue” that
Darling was not convicted of an offense because the court had stayed adjudication. The
district court then spoke to Darling and stated:
I’m . . . sort of cutting you a break here. I do agree that you
really sort of fell in that little abyss before the drug laws
changed, and I am giving you the benefit of the doubt for that.
Since it’s not a departure, the Court doesn’t have to make any
other additional findings.

When asked if it had anything further, the state remarked that section 152.18 “does
not apply by its terms to the [second] degree, which [Darling] was convicted of.” The
district court then stated that it “will make a departure” and stay adjudication “based on the
fact that the guidelines changed.” Finally, the district court found “substantial and
compelling grounds to depart from the guidelines because Darling is “amendable to
probation supervision,” “had been fully cooperative,” and “expressed remorse and done an
acceptance of responsibility as of the sentencing.”2 The state appeals.
D E C I S I O N
When a district court stays adjudication, the defendant pleads guilty or is found
guilty, but the court “does not adjudicate the defendant guilty [and instead] imposes
conditions of probation.” State v. Martin, 849 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. App. 2014), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2014). If the defendant successfully completes probation, he avoids

2 Following the hearing, the district court’s departure report stated that section 152.18 was
the basis for the departure in addition to “compelling reasons.” The warrant of commitment
stated that Darling’s disposition is a “[s]tatutory stay of adjudication.”
6
a criminal conviction. See id. Whether a district court exceeds its authority by imposing a
stay of adjudication raises a question of law, which we review de novo. See id. at 105. 3
The state argues that the sentencing court exceeded its authority “ when it stayed
adjudication of [Darling’s] sentence” for controlled-substance possession in the second
degree. Darling contends that the district court acted within its inherent authority when it
imposed a stay of adjudication. To decide this issue, we first examine the district court’s
statutory authority to stay adjudication and then analyze the district court’s inherent
authority to stay adjudication.
The state contends, and Darling concedes on appeal, that the sentencing court did
not have statutory authority to stay adjudication. Minn. Stat. § 609.095(b) (2014) provides
that, unless an enumerated exception applies, “a court may not refuse to adjudicate the guilt
of a defendant . . . who has been found guilty by a court or jury following a trial.”
(Emphasis added). There are three enumerated exceptions, one of which is the exception
for first-time drug offenders that was discussed during Darling’s sentencing hearing.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.095(b). But controlled-substance possession in the second degree is
not mentioned in section 152.18. See Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1 (2014). Consequently,

3 The parties contend that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to this appeal.
It is true that some earlier caselaw regarding stay s of adjudication applied an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See, e.g., State v. Angotti, 633 N.W.2d 554, 556
(Minn. App. 2001). More recent caselaw, however, has held that a de novo standard of
review applies when the issue is whether the district court has authority to impose a stay
of adjudication. See Martin, 849 N.W.2d at 105. Because the district court’s authority to
stay adjudication is at issue in this appeal, we apply a de novo standard of review.
7
we conclude that the district court lacked statutory authority to stay adjudication of
Darling’s case.
Darling contends that the district court exercised its inherent authority when it
stayed adjudication of his case. Minnesota district courts have limited inherent judicial
authority to stay adjudication over a prosecutor’s objection to serve the administration of
justice. See State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 540-41 (Minn. 1996). A district court should
exercise this power “only for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the
prosecutor’s clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.” State v.
Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Minn. 2005) (quoting Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541). A district
court’s “mere disagreement” with the prosecutor’s exercise of charging discretion does not
rise to the level of a prosecutorial abuse of discretion. Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541.
If a district court stay s adjudication over the prosecutor’s objection, “whether in
writing or on the record,” the district court must state its reasons for doing so. State v. Ohrt,
619 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Minn. App. 2000). These reasons must include a finding that
“special circumstances” apply and, specifically include a finding that injustice would
otherwise result from the prosecutor’s clear abuse of charging discretion. Lee, 706 N.W.2d
at 495-96 (citing Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541).
We begin by addressing the district court’s stated reasons for staying adjudication
in Darling’s case. Here, the district court did not state it was exercising its inherent
authority to stay adjudication, nor did it find an abuse of the prosecutor’s charging
discretion, nor did it identify special circumstances warranting a stay of adjudication.
Rather, the district court stated it was departing from the sentencing guidelines because
8
“there are substantial and compelling grounds” for departure.4 The district court identified
specific reasons for departure because Darling is “fully cooperative,” “amenable to
probation,” and “expressed remorse and [had] done an acceptance of responsibility as of
the sentencing.”
Even if we assume, without deciding, that the district court implicitly identified
these reasons for departure as special circumstances that supported a stay of adjudication,
we would reject each reason because none of them relate to a prosecutor’s chargin g
discretion. As Lee clarified, even if a “special circumstance” exists, the district court still
must determine a clear abuse of a prosecutor’s charging discretion. 706 N.W.2d at 496.
Additionally, existing caselaw has rejected the district court’s specif ic reasons and held
they are not special circumstances. See, e.g ., State v. Leming, 617 N.W.2d 587, 589-90
(Minn. App. 2000) (“Remorse and cooperation with authorities are also not special
circumstances.”); Ohrt, 619 N.W.2d at 792 (holding “amenability to probation” is not a
special circumstance).5

4A stay of adjudication is not a sentencing departure. If there is a stay of adjudication, there
is no conviction. See Martin, 849 N.W.2d at 102. And if there is no conviction, there cannot
be a sentence under the guidelines from which to depart. See Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd.
1(a) (2018) (providing that a sentence can only be imposed “[u]pon conviction”) ; see also
State v. Greenough, 915 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Minn. App. 2018) (“A stay of adjudication is
not a sentence under the guidelines because when a district court orders a stay of
adjudication, no conviction is entered or sentence imposed.”).
5 Darling also argues that a felony conviction would negatively affect his abilit y to find
employment, and that this is an injustice. But the supreme court previously has determined
that a potential loss of employment is not a “special circumstance.” See State v. Twiss,
570 N.W.2d 487, 487 (Minn. 1997) (“The possibility that a defendan t may lose her
job . . . as a result of a conviction . . . is not a special circumstance allowing the trial court
to stay an adjudication of guilt over the prosecutor’s objection.”).
9
Darling also argues that the district court made an “implicit finding” that the
prosecutor committed a clear abuse of charging discretion because the prosecutor “charged
Darling under the pre -DSRA law” and “ignored the policy reasons behind” DSRA
amendments that reduced weight thresholds for drug-possession offenses. Darling is
correct that the DSRA amended the threshold weight requirements for certain
drug-possession offenses, including second-degree possession of a controlled substance.
Importantly, at the time of Darling’s July 2016 offense, this section of DSRA was enacted
but was not yet effective. See 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 4 (providing that this section is
effective on August 1, 2016). In State v. Otto, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
DSRA provisions that amended the weight requirements for drug- possession offenses
applied to crimes committed on or after August 1, 2016. 899 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Minn.
2017) (citing 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 3-4). Darling’s offense was committed on
July 10, 2016. Relying on Otto, the state argues that the prosecutor did not commit a
clear abuse of discretion in exercising the charging function in Darling’s case. We agree
because the state charged Darling with second-degree possession based on the criminal
statute in effect at the time Darling committed his offense.6

6 The state also contends that it followed State v. Kirby in the sentencing recommendation
it made for Darling. 899 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2017). Darling does not dispute this point
in his brief to this court. W e briefly address the issue to provide guidance upon remand.
Initially, the DSRA’s revisions to the sentencing guidelines provide that, for a person with
a criminal history score of one, such as Darling, a controlled-substance crime in the second
degree has a 58 -month presumptive stayed sentence instead of a 58 -month presumptive
prison sentence. Compare Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2015), with Minn. Sent. Guidelines
4.C (2016). The DSRA ’s changes in the sentencing guidelines became effective “the day
following final enactment.” 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 18. See also Kirby, 899 N.W.2d
at 496.
10
In short, none of Darling’s public-policy arguments suffice to demonstrate that the
prosecutor violated existing law nor does he establish that the district court found a clear
abuse of the prosecutor’s discretion in exercising the charging function. Accordingly, we
conclude that the prosecutor acted within the “considerable discretion” prosecutors have in
charging Darling. See State v. Herme, 298 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Minn. 1980).
We conclude that the district court erred in staying adjudication of Darling’s offense
for second-degree possession of a controlled substance. Thus, we reverse and remand for
sentencing consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.