Abraham Tony Dolo,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-0063

Court of Appeals Chutich, J.

Abraham Tony Dolo,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: April 29, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Appellant.

________________________

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Nicole Cornale, Assistant
County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. When an excerpt of a recorded statement is admitted into evidence,
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 106 requires contemporaneous admission of any other part of
the recording that relates to the facts offered in the excerpt and, in fairness to the opposing
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party, is necessary to correct a misimpression or distortion of the factual content of the
admitted excerpt.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent’s petition
for postconviction relief because the court correctly concluded that the trial court properly
overruled respondent’s objection under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 106 and admitted only
a short excerpt of respondent’s videotaped interview.
Reversed.
O P I N I O N
CHUTICH, Justice.
Appellant State of Minnesota charged respondent Abraham Tony Dolo with
second-degree criminal sexual conduct involving his 5- year-old daughter. At trial, the
State offered as evidence an 8- minute excerpt of a voluntary, hour-long, videotaped
interview of Dolo by a police detective. Dolo objected to introducing only the excerpt ,
arguing that admission of the entire recorded interview was immediately required under
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 106. The trial court overruled his objection and the State
played for the jury only the interview excerpt. The jury found Dolo guilty.
Dolo did not file a direct appeal, but timely filed a petition for postconviction relief.
He alleged that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to play the entire recorded
police interview for the jury. The district court denied Dolo’s request for postconviction
relief. Dolo appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The
court held that, under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 106, the entire interview should have
been played for the jury and that failure to do so was not harmless error beyond a reasonable
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doubt. Dolo v. State, 933 N.W.2d 423, 433–34 (Minn. App. 2019). Because the trial court
did not abuse its discretion under Rule 106 by overruling the defendant’s objection and
allowing the jury to hear only an excerpt of the recorded interview, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Dolo’s petition for relief. Accordingly, we reverse.
FACTS
Dolo has two children with Y.L.C.K. (Mother), K.D., a son, and a daughter, C.D.
On December 21, 2015, a district court granted Dolo sole legal custody of each child and
joint physical custody to Dolo and Mother. According to Mother, the children started
living with Dolo in January 2016, when K.D. was 7 and C.D. was 5 years old.
On January 23, 2016, Mother took the children to a hospital after C.D. told Mother
that Dolo had touched her inappropriately. Doctors examined C.D. and found no physical
signs of abuse, such as scratches, bruises, or abrasions. Police were dispatched to the
hospital, and Mother reported to the off icers that C.D. had told her that Dolo had slept
naked with her, put C.D.’s feet on his penis, and put his hand down C.D.’s pants. K.D.
also reported that Dolo had slept naked with the children.
Officers took C.D. to CornerHouse, an interagency child abuse and maltreatment
center, for an interview. During the interview with CornerHouse staff, C.D. stated that
Dolo did “disgusting things,” slept naked with her and K.D., dug in their pants, and
“scoot[ed] up and hum [ped]” the children. She also stated that Dolo had put her feet on
his “private” part.
Later, a police detective asked to meet with Dolo for a voluntary interview. Over
the course of the hour- long interview, Dolo was asked about many things, including his
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relationship with the children, his relationship with Mother, the sleeping arrangements for
the children, and his custody battle with Mother. He denied touching his children
inappropriately. Dolo also repeatedly stated that Mother fabricated the allegations against
him as a retaliatory act after he won sole legal custody of the children.
About a month later, the State charged Dolo with second-degree criminal sexual
conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(g) (2018),1 and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
The court found C.D. and K.D. to be competent witnesses, and they each testified
at trial. C.D. testified that she and K.D. slept in the same bed as Dolo while his clothes
were off. She also testified that Dolo touched his “private” with her feet, and that these
actions made C.D. feel “sad” and “nasty.” C.D. also told the jury that Dolo was “scooting
up against” her “butt,” and his “private” felt “hard.” She stated that neither Mother nor
anyone else told her what to say during her CornerHouse interview or in court. 2
The detective who interviewed Dolo also testified. During her testimony, the State
sought to introduce an 8-minute excerpt—the piece of evidence at issue here— of Dolo’s
hour-long interview. Dolo’s counsel objected and argued that the entire recording should

1 The relevant portions of section 609.343 provide:

Subdivision 1. Crime defined. A person who engages in sexual
contact with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second
degree if any of the following circumstances exists:
. . . .
(g) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant and the
complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual contact.
Neither mistake as to the complainant’s age nor consent to the act by the
complainant is a defense . . . .

2 K.D.’s testimony corroborated much of the testimony of C.D.
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be admitted into evidence and played for the jury under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 106.
Counsel also stated that he would later play the entire recorded interview during Dolo’s
case-in-chief and it would therefore “make no sense” to play the interview at two separate
times during the trial.
The State argued that it wanted to introduce and play for the jury a “snippet” of the
recorded interview to show that Dolo “lied about the living arrangements at the house
because it shows consciousness of guilt.”
Before ruling, the trial court recessed, reviewed a written transcript of the entire
recorded interview, and considered our decision in State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2 d 352
(Minn. 1999). The court concluded that the recorded interview offered into evidence by
the State was “limited to a specific part of the tape, and [was] an issue of who lives where
in the home.” The trial court decided that it was “appropriate” to play only the requested
excerpt for the jury.
On cross-examination of the detective, Dolo’s counsel questioned the detective
about whether Dolo had professed his innocence during the parts of the recorded interview
that were not played for the jury , but the court sustained each of the State’s hearsay
objections. Counsel briefly argued that Dolo’s statements were not hearsay because he
was a “party,” but offered no other arguments in response to the State’s successful hearsay
objections.
Dolo presented his own witnesses, which included his custody evaluator from the
custody dispute with Mother; Dolo’s mother, who owned the home; and Dolo’s sisters.
Each witness testified that Dolo was an honest man who treated his children well, they had
6
never seen the children sleep with Dolo, and they had never seen him touch the children
inappropriately.
Dolo testified in his own defense and completely denied the allegations against him.
He testified about the custody dispute with Mother that led up to the child abuse allegations
and his interview with the detective . Specifically, Dolo testified that he denied the
allegations during his interview and told the detective about the ongoing custody issue
between him and Mother.
On cross-examination, the State pressed for information about what Dolo did and
did not say to the detective during the recorded interview, referring to parts of the interview
that were not played for the jury. He testified that the interview was months ago and he
could not be “all accurate” in recounting what he said to the detective during the interview.
Dolo testified that he “believe[d]” that he told the detective that Mother had “implanted”
the allegations in the heads of their children. Dolo’s counsel did not object during this
cross-examination or thereafter attempt to refresh Dolo’s recollection of the interview. Nor
did counsel seek to play the entire interview once Dolo had testified.
The jury found Dolo guilty. He moved for a new trial and a judgment of acquittal,
but the trial court denied his motion and sentenced him to a stayed term of 36 months and
5 years of probation.
Dolo did not appeal, but timely petitioned for postconviction relief. He asserted that
“[t]he trial court’s decision to prohibit the jury from considering [ his] entire interview
violated the plain language of Rule 106 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence and prevented
[him] from exercising his right to a meaningful defense.” The district court denied the
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postconviction petition without a hearing, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting only the interview excerpt into evidence.
Dolo appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. Dolo, 933 N.W.2d at 434. The
court of appeals concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to
use only a portion of the interview without conducting a proper fairness analysis under
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 106. Id. at 430–31. The court of appeals held that, because
the State’s purpose in playing the interview excerpt was to show Dolo’s “consciousness of
guilt,” fairness required that the rest of the interview be played so that the “jury could have
better understood the context of the entire interview.”3 Id. at 430.
The court of appeals further concluded that, because the case ultimately turned on
credibility and Dolo’s denials in the recorded interview could have supported his credibility
by showing the “consistency of his defense,” the trial court’s evidentiary error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 433.
We granted the State’s petition for review and now reverse.
ANALYSIS
We review the denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion. Miles
v. State, 840 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Minn. 2013). A postconviction court abuses its discretion
when the court’s “decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and
the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011). We will not

3 The court of appeals also held that Dolo’s statements during the entire interview
were admissible as statements of a party -opponent under Minnesota Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2). Dolo, 933 N.W.2d at 431.
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reverse findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we review conclusions of law
de novo. Miles, 840 N.W.2d at 200.
Here, Dolo bases his claim for postconviction relief upon an allegedly erroneous
evidentiary decision of the trial court. “A district court’s evidentiary rulings will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion, and we ‘largely defer to the trial court’s exercise
of discretion in evidentiary matters and will not lightly overturn a trial court’s evidentiary
ruling.’ ” State v. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d 864, 872 (Minn. 2016) (quoting State v. Kelly,
435 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Minn. 1989)). Dolo bears the burden of showing that an abuse of
discretion occurred and that he was prejudiced by it. State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666
(Minn. 2015).
I.
This case requires us to consider the purpose and application of Rule 106. We
review the application and interpretation of evidentiary rules de novo. State v. Sanchez-
Sanchez, 879 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Minn. 2016).
The parties dispute whether, when applying Rule 106, district courts must consider
the State’s purpose in seeking admission of an excerpt and whether district courts must
explicitly consider fairness when ruling on an excerpt’s admission. We have not previously
addressed the analytical approach to be used when applying Rule 106.
The State asserts that a certain sequence of analysis should occur under the rule.
First, once a party identifies the evidence the party intends to present, if the other party
believes that fairness requires introduction of additional material at the same time, Rule
106 must be raised and the objecting party must make a fairness showing to the district
9
court. Then, according to the State, the court conducts a “fairness analysis” by considering
whether (1) the proposed additional material relates to the admitted portion; and (2) the
admitted portion leaves the factfinder with a “misimpression that require[ s]” correction.
Robertson, 884 N.W.2d at 874. Only if each requirement is met must the court require that
the additional material be presented at the same time.
The State asserts that, when conducting this two-step analysis, district courts must
look to the substance of the offered evidence, and not the State’s purpose in admitting that
evidence. Because a defendant’s out-of-court statements are frequently offered to show a
“consciousness of guilt,” the State warns that defendants should not be able to introduce
inadmissible “exculpatory hearsay statements” in the State’s case without being subject to
cross-examination.
Dolo asserts, by contrast, that the court of appeals was correct in concluding that
district courts must consider the underlying purpose for which the evidence is being offered
when analyzing fairness under Rule 106. Here, he maintains that the purpose was not
limited to explaining the layout of the house, as the trial court and postconviction court
found, but to show that he lied when doing so, thereby exhibiting a consciousness of guilt.
Dolo also contends that our case law previously addressing Rule 106 is not binding
because in each case we determined that the rule did not apply to the challenged evidence
at issue. Instead, he cites decisions of some federal courts of appeals interpreting Federal
Rule of Evidence 106, which has similar language to Rule 106 of the Minnesota Rules of
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Evidence, to urge us to adopt certain fairness factors used by those courts to determine
whether introduction of an entire statement is necessary.4
After considering the language of Rule 106, its purpose, and our relevant precedent,
we agree with the State’s approach. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 106 provides:
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by
a party, an adverse pa rty may require the introduction at that time of any
other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness
to be considered contemporaneously with it.

(Emphasis added.)
The plain language of the rule shows that it operates as follows. First, a party
introduces a “writing or recorded statement” or a “part thereof.” Id. Then, when the
writing or recorded statement is introduced, the adverse party “may require” the
introduction of additional material—that is, “any other part or any other writing or recorded
statement” not already introduced. Id. Then, the district court decides whether “in
fairness” the additional material must be introduced “contemporaneously,” or that is,
immediately at that time. Id.
Rule 106 therefore addresses the timing of when certain additional material is
admitted. The rule does not govern its admissibility—in fact, the additional material must
be independently admissible. 11A Peter N. Thompson & David F. Herr, Minnesota

4 In particular, some federal courts have considered whether introduction of the entire
statement is necessary to “(1) explain the admitted portion, (2) place the admitted portion
in context, (3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) insure a fair and impartial
understanding.” United States v. Sweiss, 814 F.2d 1208, 1211–12 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting
United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see, e.g., United States v. Dotson, 715 F.3d 576, 582 (6th Cir. 2013).
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Practice—Courtroom Handbook of Minnesota Evidence 27 (2019). The rule contains no
presumptions and gives the district court broad discretion to determine its application.
11 Peter N. Thompson, Minnesota Practice—Evidence § 106.01 (4th ed. 2019).
In making fairness determinations under Rule 106, district courts must consider
whether the additional material must be admitted “contemporaneously” because, if not, the
opposing party must wait until later in the trial to supply the evidence necessary to avoid
misleading the jury. Id. In other words, fairness requires that district courts consider
whether the content of the admitted excerpt needs to be explained or clarified by admitting
the additional material at that time to ensure an accurate understanding of the admitted
excerpt and to avoid misleading the factfinder.
The parties dispute what, exactly, is required of district courts when considering the
“fairness” aspect of Rule 106. Although not dispositive because no recorded writing or
statement was admitted under Rule 106 in the following cases, our precedent is helpful on
this point.
For example, in State v. Robertson, an investigator testified at a murder trial about
statements that Robertson made during a recorded interview. 884 N.W.2d at 873 . The
investigator testified that Robertson said that he was in a gang, he owned shoes like those
worn by the shooter, and he had exchanged messages with the intended victim after the
murder. Id. at 868–69, 874. Robertson sought to introduce his entire recorded statement
to the police under Rule 106, including his claim of innocence. Id. at 872. We concluded
that Rule 106 did not apply because no portion of an actual recording was admitted into
evidence. Id. at 873.
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But in discussing Rule 106, and the “rule of completeness,” 5 we noted that
Robertson did “not point to any specific portions of his police interview that he contends
were needed” to correct anything misleading about the evidence offered by the prosecution.
Id. When he contended that the fairness standard in Rule 106 had been extended to oral
statements in two other decisions, we distinguished those cases factually. Id. at 873–74.
We concluded that because the State did not offer evidence that Robertson told the police
that he was involved in the shooting, the jury “was not left with a misimpression that
required clarification.” Id. at 874.
Similarly, in State v. Bauer, the prosecution introduced several incriminating
statements by Bauer through the testimony of police officers who had interviewed him and
who, at times, read from transcripts of the interviews. 598 N.W.2d 352, 368 (Minn. 1999),
overruled on other grounds by State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 160 n.6 (Minn. 2004).
Bauer asserted that Rule 106 required the district court to admit the recordings of the
interviews into evidence. Id.
We held that neither Rule 106 nor the “rule of completeness” compelled admission
of the entire recordings of Bauer’s interviews. Id. at 368–69. We recognized that “ ‘the
“rule of completeness ” applies only when it is necessary to give the jury a full
understanding of the facts and it may not be used to introduce otherwise irrelevant

5 Unlike Minnesota Rule of Evidence 106, the “rule of completeness” applies to
conversations. State v. Mills, 562 N.W.2d 276, 286 n.8 (Minn. 1997). Rule 106 is therefore
more limited than the rule of completeness, but the rule of completeness still does not
extend an absolute right to have an entire conversation admitted into evidence. The
remainder of a conversation is admissible only if it “bears upon the admission” of the
admitted excerpt. State v. Kiewel, 217 N.W. 598, 600 (Minn. 1928).
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statements.’ ” Id. at 368 (quoting State v. Mills, 562 N.W.2d 276, 286–87 (Minn. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 160 n.6).
Considering the text of Rule 106 , its purpose, and the principles enunciated in our
case law, we conclude that Rule 106 applies when the proposed additional material
(1) relates to the facts offered in an excerpt of a recorded statement or writing and (2) is
necessary to correct a misleading or distorted impression of the facts created by the
admitted excerpt or writing.6 Cf. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d at 874. That is, the substance of
the admitted excerpt or writing must so inaccurately or unfairly distort the evidentiary facts
that it requires immediate correction of its content by admitting the additional material.
In addition, the State’s purpose for introducing an excerpt of a recorded statement
is hardly ever determinative when assessing fairness under Rule 106. Prosecutors nearly
always proffer evidence to show criminal guilt—they introduce separate pieces of evidence
that they eventually try to tie together in closing arguments to demonstrate proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. If district courts were to consider this underlying purpose as a
part of the dispositive fairness determination under Rule 106, then, as the State asserts, the

6 We decline Dolo’s invitation to adopt non-binding federal precedent. Nothing in
the body of case law concerning the accompanying federal rule is particularly persuasive;
nor does it offer a definitive rule for how district courts are to apply Rule 106. And at least
one commentator has suggested that federal courts are split on how the rule is applied
concerning timing and admissibility. See Blake R. Hills, Fairness by Omission: Rule 106
and the Doctrine of (In)completeness, 55 Tulsa L. Rev. 45 (2019).
14
district courts would be required to admit exculpatory statements unrelated to the content
of the small piece of evidence offered by the prosecutor.7
Finally, we decline to place any additional burden on the district court to explain its
ruling when determining whether Rule 106 applies in a particular instance. Like most other
evidentiary decisions within the discretion of the district court, we anticipate that the court
will hear arguments on the factors that we have articulated above, and then decide on the
propriety of admitting an excerpt with or without requiring the contemporaneous admission
of additional material.
In sum, we hold that the appropriate consideration for district courts under Rule 106
is the content of the excerpt or writing admitted, rather than the purpose for which it is
admitted. If the factual content of the admitted portion of the writing or recorded statement
leaves the jury with a distorted or misleading understanding of the facts in a way that
requires clarification or correction, then, in fairness to the defendant, Rule 106 requires that
the additional material that provides such clarification or correction must be admitted
contemporaneously with the limited portion.
II.
Applying these principles here, we now consider whether Dolo has shown that the
district court abused its broad discretion in denying his petition for postconviction relief.
To make this determination, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by

7 The State also correctly asserts that admitting the additional material is not
necessary simply to put the admitted portion in “context.” The context of the admitted
statements is relevant to making a fairness determination under Rule 106, but, like the
purpose for which the evidence is offered, it is hardly a dispositive factor.
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playing only the excerpt of Dolo’s recorded interview rather than the entire recording.
Robertson, 884 N.W.2d at 872 (“A district court’s evidentiary rulings will not be reversed
absent a clear abuse of discretion . . . .”).
The State asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because “[f]airness
did not require that the jury in this case hear Dolo’s entire police interview.” Dolo
maintains that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the purpose for which
the State offered the evidence. In addition, Dolo claims that the trial court’s reliance on
Bauer was misplaced and the court failed to conduct a proper fairness analysis. Based
upon the principles articulated above and the specific circumstances of this case, we
conclude that the trial court appropriately considered Rule 106 and did not abuse its
discretion in admitting only the excerpt of the police interview during the State’s case -in-
chief.
When faced with Dolo’s Rule 106 objection, the trial court properly heard
arguments from each party, recessed, analyzed the rule, read Bauer,8 read the transcript of
the excerpt and the entire recorded interview between Dolo and the detective, and then
made its evidentiary determination. In admitting the requested excerpt, the court reasoned
that it is “very limited, it’s limited to . . . an issue of who lives where in the home,” and
found that it was “appropriate to put in the shorter version” that the prosecution offered.
Notably, before the trial court ruled, Dolo did “not point to any specific portions of his

8 When the trial court made its determination on Rule 106, our decision in State v.
Robertson, 884 N.W.2d 864 (Minn. 2016), had not yet issued. Bauer was therefore our
latest discussion of Rule 106 and the “rule of completeness.”
16
police interview that he contends were needed” to cure any misleading impression about
who lived where in the home, see Robertson, 884 N.W.2d at 873, and instead only sought
to introduce the entire hour-long recording.
The transcript shows that the trial court correctly determined that introduction of
this excerpt, without immediate introduction of the full recorded statement, was
appropriate. The content of the 8- minute excerpt was discrete, covering Dolo’s work
schedule, who lived in his mother’s house, where his and the children’s bedrooms were
located, and what was in their rooms. During the excerpt, no discussion of the allegations
of abuse occurred, and nothing in the excerpt created an impression that Dolo admitted
guilt. Nor did the detective testify that Dolo incorrectly described the living arrangements.
And, as we concluded above, the purpose for which the State sought to present evidence
about the sleeping arrangements —to later argue in closing that Dolo’s inaccurate
description showed a consciousness of guilt—was not determinative.
By contrast, the rest of the interview covered many other topics unrelated to the
issue of the living arrangements in the home. These topics included Dolo’s denial of the
allegations, his dysfunctional relationship with Mother, the custody battle over the
children, and why Dolo believed the allegations against him were fabricated. At no time
in the full interview did Dolo further discuss or clarify his state ments concerning the
sleeping arrangements in the home. The rest of the interview was simply unrelated to that
topic.
Accordingly, Dolo cannot show that admitting the entire recorded interview was
necessary to give the jury a “full understanding” of what Dolo said in the 8-minute excerpt
17
or to clarify a “misimpression” that was created when the jury watched only the excerpt
and not the entire recording. The factual content of the excerpt admitted was not distorted
by leaving out the additional material. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion because fairness did not require the court to admit the rest of the
recording contemporaneously with the 8-minute excerpt.9
In sum, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it properly overruled
Dolo’s objection under Rule 106, the district court correctly denied Dolo’s petition for
postconviction relief.10

9 In addition, an independent basis exists to affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling:
Dolo’s statements to the detective denying the sexual abuse were inadmissible self-serving
hearsay when sought to be admitted during the State’s case-in-chief. The court of appeals
incorrectly determined that Dolo’s statements to the detective were admissible under
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) as statements of a party -opponent. Dolo,
933 N.W.2d at 431. A “statement by a party-opponent” is not hearsay and is defined as a
“party’s own statement” being “offered against a party.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).
The State offered Dolo’s statements about the sleeping arrangements “against” him
to show that he lied and therefore possessed a consciousness of guilt. But it did not offer
Dolo’s other statements against him because doing so would not be at all against Dolo’s
interest. Instead, Dolo’s exculpatory statements that he sought to admit during the State’s
case-in-chief were inadmissible self-serving hearsay. See State v. Briggs, 142 N.W. 823,
827 (Minn. 1913) (stating “the general rule that self -serving declarations of an accused
person are not admissible in his f avor, unless part of the res gestae, or part of a general
confession”) (citations omitted); see also State v. Taylor, 2 58 N.W.2d 615, 622 (Minn.
1977) (recognizing that, without the rule against self-serving hearsay, a defendant has “the
opportunity to pre sent his version of the facts without ever being subject to cross-
examination by the state”). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying postconviction relief when it found that the recording, when Dolo sought to admit
it, “contained self-serving hearsay.”

10 Because no abuse of discretion occurred, we need not reach the issue of whether the
exclusion of evidence prejudiced Dolo. We note, however, that an erroneous evidentiary
decision under Rule 106 does not necessarily mean that a defendant was prejudiced or
received an unfair trial. Such a decision may be harmful only if the timing of the
18
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
Reversed.

non-admission of the additional material was so damaging that it would have affected the
jury’s verdict.