State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0099

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Justin Lee Brown,
Appellant.

Filed December 2, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-17-7312

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler , Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction and sentence for first -degree assault, arguing
that his guilty plea was invalid and that the district court abused its discretion by imposing
a guidelines sentence. We affirm.
FACTS
Close to midnight on August 15, 2017, appellant Justin Lee Brown was involved in
an altercation outside of his apartment . According to Brown, A.M. had stopped by , the
two had some drinks, and A.M. attacked Brown from behind without provocation as he
was leaving the apartment. Brown asserted that he fought back to defend himself, but he
also told police that he “got pissed off,” threatened to kill A.M., and “stomped him.”
Witnesses reported seeing Brown strike and kick A.M.’s head as he was lying o n the
ground. As a result of the assault, A.M.’s ear was “nearly amputated.” And A.M. sustained
a serious traumatic brain injury that necessitated appointment of both a legal guardian and
a conservator.
Brown was charged with first-degree assault. In September 2018, Brown petitioned
to enter an Alford plea1 in exchange for a 74-month cap on prison time—the low end of the

1 In an Alford plea, the defendant maintains his claim of innocence , but agrees that the
state’s evidence is sufficient for a jury to find him guilty and wishes to accept the state’s
plea offer. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167-68 (1970);
see also State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977) (recognizing Alford pleas in
Minnesota).

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presumptive 74- to 103-month sentencing range, and the ability to argue for a downward
dispositional departure at sentencing. The district court accepted Brown’s plea.
At sentencing, Brown moved for a downward dispositional departure, arguing that
a probationary sentence is appropriate because he took responsibility for his actions, was
remorseful, had minimal criminal history, was not the aggressor, and was intoxicated at the
time of the assault. The district court credited Brown for expressing some remorse, but
found that he did not take responsibility for his actions. The court noted that Brown
rejected the opportunity to obtain chemical-dependency treatment after the offense, despite
his contention that alcohol mitigated his conduct . And the district court rejected Brown’s
claim of self -defense, stating that while A.M. may have initiated the a ltercation,
independent witnesses saw Brown “kicking and hitting [A.M.] when he was on the
ground.” The district court sentenced Brown to 74 months’ imprisonment. Brown appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Brown’s guilty plea is accurate.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea, State v.
Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017), but must be allowed to do so if “withdrawal
is necessary to correct a manifest injustice ,” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. This
standard is met if a plea is not valid; a guilty plea is valid if it is “accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Taylor v. State , 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016). The accuracy
requirement focuses on the factual basis for the plea and ensures the defendan t does not
plead guilty to a greater offense than what he could be convicted of after a trial. State v.
Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007). The same standards apply to Alford pleas. Id.

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at 646. A defendant may challenge the validity of a guilty plea for the first time on appeal.
State v. Anyanwu, 681 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. App. 2004) , overruled on other grounds
by Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 568 (Minn. 2018).
To ensure th e accuracy of Brown’s Alford plea, the district court was required to
discuss with Brown the evidence the state would likely offer at trial and elicit his agreement
that the evidence was likely sufficient for a jury to find him guilty. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at
649. Once “the State demonstrated a strong factual basis for the plea and [Brown] clearly
expressed his desire to enter the plea based on his belief that the State’s evidence would be
sufficient to convict him,” the district court could a ccept the plea if it “ reasonably
conclude[d] that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the
plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered .” Id. at 647 (quotations
omitted).
Brown argues that his guilty plea is inaccurate because he acted in self-defense and
because the district court faile d to independently determine that there was a strong
probability that a jury would find him guilty. Both arguments are unavailing.
First, the record, including Brown’s testimony at the plea hearing and his admissions
in the Alford addendum to his plea pet ition, fully demonstrates the accuracy of Brown’s
guilty plea. Brown acknowledged that he understood he was pleading guilty even though
he maintained his innocence. At the plea hearing, he agreed that if he “went to trial, there
[was] a substantial likelihood that [he] could be found guilty of the offense” and that a jury
could find him guilty based on the evidence the prosecutor could offer. In reviewing the
evidence with the prosecutor, he agreed that the state could show that he engaged in an

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altercation with A.M., two witnesses would testify that they observed him stomping or
kicking A.M. in the face, and medical evidence would establish that A.M. sustained a
traumatic brain injury. Finally, he agreed that there was a significant benefit for him to
take the plea offered by the state. Before accepting the plea, the district court received all
law enforcement reports as evidence. On this record, we agree with the district court ’s
assessment when accepting the guilty plea, t hat Brown “knowingl y, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived [his] rights; [and] that [he] did provide . . . a sufficient factual basis to
accept [his] guilty plea.”
Second, we reject Brown’s assertion that the district court erred by failing to
“independently conclude th at there was a strong probability that Brown would be found
guilty.” To convict Brown of first-degree assault, the state was required to prove that he
assaulted A.M. and inflicted “great bodily harm” upon him, which is defined to include “a
permanent or p rotracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ.” Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, subd. 8, .221, subd. 1 (2016). The record evidence Brown
admitted clearly satisfies each element of the offense. And we are not persuaded that the
district court’s failure to specifically state that the evidence creates a “strong probability”
that a jury would return a guilty verdict requires plea withdrawal. In State v. Johnson, this
court concluded that a district court is not required to make express findings regarding the
strength of the state’s evidence when the defendant enter s a Norgaard plea. 867 N.W.2d
210, 217 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015).2 Norgaard and Alford

2 In a Norgaard plea, “the defendant asserts an absence of memory on the essential
elements of the offense but pleads guilty because the record establishes, and the defendant

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pleas are both premised on the sufficiency of the state’s evidence, not the defendant’s
admission to the elements of the charged offense. Accordingly, w e observe no reason to
require different findings in cases involving Alford and Norgaard pleas.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a guidelines
sentence.

Brown argues that his particular amenability to probation justifie d a downward
dispositional departure. Dispositional departures are based on offender -related factors
such as the defendant’s age, prior record, remorse, cooperation, attitude in court, and
external support. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). Brown argues that A.M.
was the initial aggressor in the altercation, and his criminal history, respectful court
demeanor, family support, remorse, cooperation through out the proceedings, and
willingness to participate in alcohol-dependency treatment weigh in favor of a probationary
sentence. He also argues that his sentence should be vacated because the district court
failed to weigh the circumstances for and against departure against each other.
A district court is accorded “great discretion” at sentencing. State v. Soto , 855
N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). The court must impose a sentence
within the presumptive range “unless there exist ident ifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances” to overcome that presumption. Id. at 308 (quoting Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.D.1 (2012)). If substantial and compelling circumstances exist, making the case
“atypical,” Taylor v. State , 670 N.W.2d 584, 58 9 (Minn. 2003), the district court “may

reasonably believes, that the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction.” Williams
v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009); see
State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 1961).

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depart,” State v. Kindem , 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981) (quotation omitted) . We will
reverse the imposition of a presumptive sentence only in a “rare case.” Kindem, 313
N.W.2d at 7; see State v. Solberg , 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016) (“A district court
abuses its discretion when its reasons for departure are legally impermissible and
insufficient evidence in the record justifies the departure.”).
We observe no abuse of discretion in the district court’s imposition of a guidelines
sentence. Both the prosecutor and the probation officer who conducted the presentence
investigation recommended a 74 -month prison term , and the district court gave valid
reasons for imposing that sentence. The district court was well aware of Brown’s
arguments for sentencing departure and deliberately weighed the most pertinent
circumstances in reaching its decision. The district court was not required to place Brown
on probation even though a mitigating factor may have been present. State v. Pegel, 795
N.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Minn. App. 2011). And the district court was not required to provide
reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence. State v. Johnson , 831 N.W.2d 917, 925
(Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). In short, this is not a rare case
in which we would reverse a guidelines sentence.
III. Brown’s pro se arguments are unavailing.
In his supplemental brief, Brown argues that (1) evidence of his blood at the crime
scene was destroyed, (2) his attorney was ineffective because he did not “build a case” or
“present discovery material that was in my favor ,” (3) his attorney violated
“confidentiality” by participating in a “roundtable” at a court hearing, and (4) he pleaded
guilty under duress because of his “neglected medical treatment” caused by injuries he

8
received during the offense. Brown also suggests his neglected medical treatment was
cruel and unusual punishment and that his due-process rights were violated.
All of these arguments fail because Brown cites no law to support them. See State
v. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 868, 876 (Minn. 2010) (declining to consider pro se defendant’s
argument offered without supporting legal authority); State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 23
(Minn. 2008) ( noting that “[a]n assignment of error based on mere assertion and not
supported by any argument or authorities . . . is waived and will not be considered on appeal
unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection” (quotation omitted)).
Even if we consider Brown’s arguments on the merits , they fail . Brown’s guilty
plea defeats his evidentiary arguments. See State v. Farnsworth , 738 N.W.2d 364, 371
(Minn. 2007) (noting that a guilty plea generally operates as a waiver of nonjurisdictional
defects, including the admissibility of evidence) ; State v. Johnson , 422 N.W.2d 14, 16
(Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. May 16, 1988). He offers no evidentiary support
for his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, including the purported confidentiality
violation. See Crow v. State , 923 N.W.2d 2, 14 (Minn. 2019) (requiring for a valid
ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim that an attorney’s representation “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness” and that the result would have been different without the
attorney’s errors). Finally, the record belies Brown’s duress argument. His plea petition
expressly states that he had “not been ill recently.” And he denied at both the plea hearing
and in the plea petition that any “promises or threats” induced his guilty plea.
Affirmed.