State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Raymond Joseph Bellcourt, Appellant.

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0100
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Raymond Joseph Bellcourt,
Appellant.
Filed December 16, 2019
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Dissenting, John Smith, Judge
Becker County District Court
File No. 03-CR-18-265
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Kristal E. Kadrie, Assistant County
Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and John
Smith, Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
A state-licensed peace officer employed by a federally recognized Indian tribe is
authorized to seize and arrest a person outside the boundaries of the tribe’s reservation for
an offense that occurred outside the boundaries of the reservation if the officer is within
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
the course and scope of employment, as provided by section 629.40, subdivision 3, of the
Minnesota Statutes.
O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
While driving on a county highway in rural Becker County, Raymond Joseph
Bellcourt failed to stop for a school bus with an extended stop-signal arm and flashing
lights while the bus driver was dropping off schoolchildren. Minutes later, Bellcourt was
seized in Becker County by a police officer employed by the White Earth Band of Ojibwe.
The tribal police officer cited Bellcourt for the offense of failure to stop for a school bus
with an extended stop-signal arm and flashing lights. Bellcourt later moved to suppress an
admission he made during the seizure on the ground that the tribal police officer did not
have authority to seize him outside the boundaries of the White Earth reservation for an
offense that occurred outside the reservation. The district court denied the motion. We
conclude that the tribal police officer’s seizure of Bellcourt is valid because the tribal police
officer is a state-licensed peace officer and was acting in the course and scope of his
employment. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In the late afternoon of January 19, 2018, two school buses were northbound on
county highway 21 in rural Becker County, dropping off schoolchildren near their homes.
The first school bus stopped on the highway to allow four schoolchildren to disembark.
The second school bus stopped behind the first. The driver of the first school bus extended
the stop-signal arm on the left side of the bus and activated the bus’s flashing lights . As
3
two children were in front of the first school bus and two other children were stepping off,
a pickup truck with an attached snowplow passed on the right shoulder at a high rate of
speed and knocked over a mailbox. The driver of the pickup stopped briefly and spoke
with the driver of the first school bus before leaving the scene and continuing to drive
northward.
The Becker County sheriff ’s department received a call about the in cident with a
description of the pickup and its license-plate number. The caller reported that the pickup
was heading north on county highway 21 toward the White Earth reservation. The Becker
County dispatcher relayed the report to a sheriff’s deputy, who went to the location of the
incident. The Becker County dispatch er also contacted the dispatch er of the White Earth
police department to request assistance in searching for the pickup and its driver. The
White Earth dispatcher communicated the request to White Earth tribal police officers.
At that time, Officer Bryan Byrne of the White Earth police department was on duty
and on patrol on the White Earth reservation, driving south on highway 21. He later
testified that, when he heard the dispatcher ’s report, he was approximately three to four
miles from the location of the incident. He decided to take the call and to “keep [his] eyes
open” for the pickup. He continued driving south on highway 21 until he reached the small
community of Richwood, which he described as being “right at the south line of the
reservation” and “actually right on the line,” although he also testified that county highway
21 “dips down and . . . catches [county highway] 34 right by the store and then it comes
back up onto the reservation.” Officer Byrne further testified that he “was going to circle
around [county highway] 34 after I checked the store.” The parties agree that Richwood
4
and the intersection of county highway 21 and county highway 34 are not on the White
Earth reservation.1
Officer Byrne drove through the parking lot of the Richwood Store and saw a pickup
truck with an attached snowplow. He parked his squad car next to the pickup. He talked
to the driver of the pickup and asked about the reported incident concerning the school bus.
The driver, Bellcourt, showed Officer Byrne his driver ’s license, admitted that he had not
stopped for the school bus ’s stop-signal arm and flashing lights, and explained that his
brakes had failed. Officer Byrne issued Bellcourt a citation for three misdemeanor
offenses, including failure to stop for a school bus with an extended stop-sign al arm and
flashing lights, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.444, subd. 1 (2016).
A Becker County sheriff’s deputy later interviewed the two school bus drivers. The
driver of the first school bus stated that, when Bellcourt passed on the right shoulder, two
children had stepped off the first school bus and were standing in front of it,
and one child
was standing on the ground next to the open door. The driver of the second school bus
stated that he was stopped approximately 250 feet behind the first school bus, with his four-
way lights activated, when he saw the pickup approaching in his rear-view mirror. He
1The parties’ agreement is confirmed by the state department of transportation’s
online roadmap and another commonly used online map, which collectively indicate that
Richwood is a very short distance south of the reservation boundary, perhaps no more than
1,000 feet. See Minnesota State Highway Map (2019 -2020),
https://www.dot.state.mn.us/statemap/2019/Frontside_2019_2020.pdf (last visited Dec. 9,
2019); https://www.google.com/maps/place/Richwood,+MN+56501 (last visited Dec. 9,
2019). At Richwood, county highway 34 runs east from county highway 21 and then turns
north and enters the White Earth reservation.
5
stated that the pickup passed the second school bus on the left side before swerving to the
right and passing the first school bus along the right shoulder.
The following month, the state filed a complaint in which it charged Bellcourt with
the gross-misdemeanor offense of failure to stop for a school bus with an extended stop-
signal arm and flashing lights by passing on the right-hand side, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 169.444, subd. 2(b)(1), and the gross-misdemeanor offense of failure to stop for a school
bus with an extended stop-signal arm and flashing lights by passing while a child is outside
the bus, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.444, subd. 2(b)(2).
In April 2018, Bellcourt moved to suppress the statements he made to Officer Byrne
in the parking lot of the Richwood Store, including his admission that he did not stop, and
to dismiss the complaint. The district court conducted an omnibus hearing in May 2018.
The state presented the testimony of Officer Byrne. He testified that he is licensed by the
State of Minnesota as a peace officer, that he has been employed by the White Earth police
department for approximately one and one-half years, and that he has 17 years of prior law-
enforcement experience. When asked whether there are “circumstances where you go off
the reservation to assist other officers, ” he answered in the affirmative and provided an
example of a recent incident in which he provided assistance directing traffic in Becker
County during a response to a shooting. Officer Byrne also testified about his response to
the report concerning Bellcourt, as described above.
The state also introduced five exhibits without objection : two surveillance video-
recordings created by cameras inside the school bus; audio-recorded statements of the two
school bus drivers; a video-recording of Officer Byrne ’s interactions with Bellcourt in

6
Richwood that was created by Officer Byrne’s body-worn camera; police reports; and an
eight-page agreement between Becker County and the White Earth Reservation, entitled
“Cooperative Law Enforcement Agreement” and dated October 29, 2004.
The cooperative agreement states in its preamble that it is entered into “pursuant to
the provisions of Minnesota Statute Sections 626.93, Subd. 4 and 471.59.” The first section
of the agreement states that its purpose is to:
a. Coordinate, define, and regulate the provision of
law enforcement services and to provide for mutual aid and
cooperation between the Reservation and the County relating
to enforcement of the laws of the State of Minnesota, and laws
of the White Earth Reservation, on that portion of the White
Earth Reservation that lies within Becker County.

b. Establish a process by which the Reservation and
the County will work together cooperatively to enhance public
safety efforts on the White Earth Reservation.

c. Preserve the parties ’ respective jurisdictions on
the White Earth Reservation so that neither the Reservation nor
the County is conceding any claim to jurisdiction by entering
into this cooperative agreement.

The second section of the agreement provides, “The White Earth Reservation is authorized,
pursuant and subject to Minnesota Statute Section 626.93, to enforce the criminal laws of
the State of Minnesota within that portion of the White Earth Reservation that li es within
Becker County,” so long as specified conditions are satisfied.
After the hearing, Bellcourt filed a memorandum of law in which he argued that
Officer Byrne did not have authority to seize him outside the White Earth reservation for
an offense that occurred off the reservation. In response, the state argued that Officer Byrne
was authorized by statute to seize Bellcourt. In June 2018, the district court filed an order

7
denying Bellcourt’s motion, reasoning that Officer Byrne is a licensed peace officer and
was within the course and scope of his employment when he seized and cited Bellcourt, as
permitted by section 629.40, subdivision 3, of the Minnesota Statutes.
At a pre-trial hearing in September 2018, Bellcourt’s attorney informed the district
court that the parties had agreed that the pre-trial ruling is dispositive of the case and that
the case would be tried to the district court pursuant to a stipulation. See Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.01, subd. 4. At trial in October 2018, Bellcourt waived his right to a jury trial and
stipulated to a summary of the state’s evidence. Three days later, the district court filed an
order in which it found Bellcourt guilty of both charges. The district court imposed an
agreed-upon sentence of 365 days in jail on the first count but stayed execution of the
sentence and placed Bellcourt on probation for two years. Pursuant to the parties ’
agreement, the district court dismissed the second count. Bellcourt appeals.
ISSUE
Was the White Earth tribal police officer , who is a state-licensed peace officer,
authorized to seize and cite Bellcourt outside the boundaries of the White Earth reservation
for an offense that was committed outside the boundaries of the reservation?
ANALYSIS
Bellcourt argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence. His argument has two parts. First, Bellcourt argues that Officer Byrne was not
authorized by the cooperative agreement between the White Earth Band and Becker
County to seize and cite anyone outside the boundaries of the reservation. Second,
Bellcourt argues that Officer Byrne was not authorized by statute to seize and cite him

8
outside the boundaries of the reservation. At oral argument, Bellcourt’s appellate attorney
clarified that Bellcourt is relying solely on state law and is not relying on federal Indian
law. The state argues primarily that Officer Byrne, as a state-licensed peace officer, was
authorized by section 629.40 of the Minnesota Statu tes to seize and cite Bellcourt outside
the boundaries of the reserv ation. Neither party questions the district court’s finding that
Bellcourt was seized by Officer Byrne.
We begin by considering Bellcourt’s second argument, which challenges the district
court’s reasoning and corresponds to the state’s primary argument for affirmance.
A.
In Minnesota, peace officers are licensed by the Minnesota Board of Peace Officer
Standards and Training. Minn. Stat. §§ 626.841, .845, subd. 1(3) (2018). A police officer
employed by a federally recognized Indian tribe may be licensed as a peace officer. Minn.
Stat. § 626.84, subd. 1(c)(1) (2018).
A state-licensed peace officer is authorized by statute, in certain circumstances, to
make an arrest within the state b ut outside the geographic area of his or her appointing
authority. Minn. Stat. § 629.40 (2018). The district court cited the following statutory
provision as the legal basis of Officer Byrne’s authorization to seize Bellcourt:
When a person licensed unde r section 626.84,
subdivision 1, in obedience to the order of a court or in the
course and scope of employment or in fresh pursuit as provided
in subdivision 2, is outside of the person ’s jurisdiction, the
person is serving in the regular line of duty as fully as though
the service was within the person’s jurisdiction.

9
Id., subd. 3 (emphasis added). The district court relied on the above-highlighted language
concerning a peace officer who is outside his or her jurisdiction but “in the course and
scope of employment.”
The meaning of “in the course and scope of employment,” as that phrase is used in
section 629.40, subdivision 3, is illustrated by a series of opinions of th e Minnesota
appellate courts. In State v. Tilleskjor, 491 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. 1992), a police officer
employed by the City of Litchfield followed a car within the city limits and later saw the
car weaving within its lane. Id. at 894. The officer stopped the car and arrested the driver
for driving while impaired. Id. At a suppression hearing, the officer testified that he could
not remember whether the car was inside or outside the city limits when it was weaving.
Id. The district court suppressed the evidence of the stop. Id. On appeal, the supreme
court applied the c ourse-and-scope clause of section 629.40, subdivision 3. Id. The
supreme court’s reasoning is confined to a single sentence: “We hold that the statute, which
is without ambiguity, clearly gave the officer all the authority he needed to act as he did. ”
Id. Seven years later, this court applied Tilleskjor in a case with substantially similar facts.
See Lorenzen v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 594 N.W.2d 552, 553-55 (Minn. App. 1999).
In State v. Bunde, 556 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. App. 1996), this court considered two
consolidated cases. In each case, a police officer employed by the City of Janesville
stopped a car outside the city limits. Id. at 918-19. In one of the consolidated cases, the
officer followed a speeding car from within the city limits to a location approximately three
miles beyond the city limits, where he saw another car turn without signaling and weave
within its lane. Id. at 919. The officer stopped the second car and arrested the driver,

10
Francis, for driving while impaired. Id. On appeal, we determined that the stop was valid,
reasoning as follows: “On this record, we hold that [the officer], although outside his
municipality when he arrested Francis, was nonetheless —under Tilleskjor—in the course
and scope of his employment and with authority to arrest.” Id. We reached that conclusion
based on the premise that on-duty police officers may “operate free from the limitations of
their city borders when the policing mission itself commences within the city —regardless
of where they first observe a defendant.” Id.
In the other consolidated case, the officer was patrolling approximately three miles
beyond the city limits, where he saw a car run a stop sign. Id. In the process of following
that car, the officer saw another car parked along the side of the road with the driver lying
back in the driver’s seat. Id. The officer arrested the person in the second car, Bunde, for
driving while impaired. Id. at 919-20. On appeal, we noted that “[t]he record does not
indicate why [the officer] was patrolling outside Janesville . . . , but the State ’s affidavits
show that Janesville officers regularly patrol outside the city.” Id. at 920. We determined
that the stop was valid, reasoning as follows: “We feel bound by Tilleskjor to read the
statute as requiring a holding that [the officer] acted lawfully in the course and scope of his
employment when he arrested Bunde, even though he was outside his municipality at the
time—and even though . . . his mission also commenced outside that jurisdiction.” Id.
In State v. Meyer, 641 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. May
14, 2002) , a police officer employed by the City of Madison Lake routinely drove to
Mankato to pick up records from the county’s law-enforcement center. Id. at 325. On one
such occasion, when the officer was in uniform and driving a marked squad car, he saw a

11
speeding vehicle outside the city limits of Madison Lake. Id. at 325 -26. The officer
stopped the vehicle approximately three miles outside Madis on Lake and arrested the
driver for driving while impaired. Id. at 326. On appeal, Meyer argued that the course -
and-scope clause should be limited to situations in which an officer “is performing ‘a core
law enforcement activity,’” such as “activities related directly to the investigation of crime
and the apprehension of criminals,” but not if an officer is “engaged in a ‘purely ministerial
task.’” Id. at 326, 327. We rejected the argument, reasoning that “various administrative
and ministerial acts a re essential and valid components of law enforcement efforts, ” that
the officer was “acting in furtherance of his employer’s interests,” and that the officer was
“acting within the course and scope of his employment” at all relevant times. Id. at 327-28.
In Yoraway v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 669 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. App. 2003),
a police officer employed by the City of Chaska was on patrol within the city limits when
he heard a dispatch concerning a reckless driver in the city of Chanhassen. Id. at 624-25.
The officer drove east until he saw the car described in the dispatch and stopped it outside
the Chaska city limits . Id. at 625. On appeal, the driver argued that the officer was not
authorized to “make an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when both the alleged illegal
driving and the stop occur outside the officer ’s territorial jurisdiction unless the officer is
in fresh pursuit of the offending driver. ” Id. We rejected the argument, reasoning that
patrolling police officers typically enga ge in “the investigation of citizen complaints and
the enforcement of traffic laws, ” that the officer “responded to an official dispatch
requesting the investigation of a complaint that an identified vehicle was being operated
recklessly,” and that the officer’s “response was quintessentially what police officers do in

12
furtherance of their employment duties. ” Id. at 626. We also stated that the statutory
authority to arrest includes the authority to make a “stop necessary to effect the arrest.” Id.
B.
Before applying th is body of caselaw to the facts of this case, we must consider
Bellcourt’s contention that all of the above -discussed opinions are distinguishable and,
thus, inapplicable. Bellcourt contends that this case is meaningfully different from the
prior cases because there is a cooperative agreement between the White Earth Band and
Becker County , which, Bellcourt asserts, exclusively defines the course and scope of
Officer Byrne’s employment as a White Earth tribal police officer. Specifically, Bellcourt
contends that, because the cooperative agreement does not expressly authorize White Earth
tribal police officers to enforce state law in those parts of Becker County that are outside
the boundaries of the reservation, the course and scope o f Officer Byrne’s employment
must be limited to the geographic area of the White Earth reservation. In response, the
state contends that the cooperative agreement provides for concurrent jurisdiction on the
White Earth reservation but has no effect on Officer Byrne’s statutory authority to enforce
the state’s criminal laws off the reservation.
The language of the cooperative agreement does not support Bellcourt’s argument.
The stated purposes of the cooperative agreement relate to law-enforcement services “on
that portion of the White Earth Reservation that lies within Becker County ” and to public
safety “on the White Earth Reservation. ” The contractual provision implementing those
purposes provides that White Earth tribal police officers are “authorized, pursuant and
subject to Minnesota Statute Section 626.93, to enforce the criminal laws of the State of

13
Minnesota within that portion of the White Earth Reservation that lies within Becker
County.” (Emphasis added.) In essence, the cooperative agreement confers some law-
enforcement authority on White Earth tribal police officer s when they are on the White
Earth reservation. But n o provision of the cooperative agreement refers to law -
enforcement services or public safety in those parts of Becker County that are off the White
Earth reservation. The cooperative agreement simply is not concerned with whether White
Earth tribal police officers may or may not engage in any law-enforcement services outside
the boundaries of the White Earth reservation. Thus, the cooperative agreement does not
limit the course and scope of Officer Byrne’s employment to the geographic area of the
White Earth reservation.
This interpretation of the cooperative agreement is reinforced by the agreement ’s
reference to section 626.93 of the Minnesota S tatutes, which is captioned “Law
Enforcement Authority; Tribal Peace Officers.” Section 626.93 co-exists with the federal
law that defines the relationships between Indian tribes and states. See State v. Manypenny,
682 N.W.2d 143, 148-49 (Minn. 2004). A federal statute commonly known as Public Law
280 generally “grants the state criminal jurisdiction over ‘offenses committed by or against
Indians . . . to the same extent that [the state] has jurisdiction over offenses committed
elsewhere within the state.’” State v. Davis, 773 N.W.2d 66, 68-69 (Minn. 2009) (quoting
Pub. L. No. 83 -280, 67 Stat. 588, 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a))). In
light of Public Law 280 , the state may, in certain circumstances, prosecute a member of
the White Earth Band for a criminal offense committed on the White Earth reservation.
See State v. Busse , 644 N.W.2d 79 , 82-88 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that state had

14
jurisdiction under Public Law 280 to prosecute White Earth member for offense of driving
after cancellation as inimical to public safety); cf. State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 728-31
(Minn. 1997) (concluding that state did not have jurisdiction under Public Law 280 to
prosecute White Earth members for driving-related offenses that are “civil/regulatory,” not
“criminal/prohibitory”). In addition, the state may, in certain circumstances, assert
jurisdiction over criminal offense s committed on the White Earth reservation even if
jurisdiction is not expressly authorized by Public Law 280. See State v. R.M.H.,
617 N.W.2d 55, 60-65 (Minn. 2000) (concluding that prosecution of non -member Indian
for speeding and unlicensed driving on the White Earth reservation was not in conflict with
federal and tribal interests recognized by federal law). This body of caselaw allows a state
law-enforcement agency, such as the Becker County sheriff’s department, to enforce some
Minnesota criminal laws on the White Earth reservation.
Against this backd rop, s ection 626.93 of the Minnesota Statutes was enacted in
1999. See 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 175, § 2, at 954-55. The statute authorizes certain tribes
and counties to enter into cooperative agreements “ to coordinate, define, and regulate the
provision of law enforcement services and to provide for mutual aid and cooperation .”
Minn. Stat. § 626.93, subd. 4 (2018).2 If a tribe and a county enter into such a cooperative

2Concurrent jurisdiction on some Indian reservations is governed by statutes that are
specifically limited to particular tribes. See Minn. Stat. § 626.93, subd. 7 (Supp. 2019)
(Prairie Island Indian Community); Minn. Stat. § 626.90 (2018) (Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians); Minn. Stat. § 626.91 (2018) (Lower Sioux Indian Community); Minn.
Stat. § 626.92 (2018) (Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa). The state has no
law-enforcement authority on the Red Lake reservation due to an express exception in
Public Law 280. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2018). Thus, section 626.93 applies to the six
other Indian bands with reservations in Minnesota: the Bois Forte Band of Chippewa, the

15
agreement and if other requirements are met, “the tribe shall have concurrent jurisdictional
authority under this section with the local county sheriff within the geographical
boundaries of the tribe’s reservation to enforce state criminal law.” Id., subd. 3 (emphasis
added). In essence, section 626.93 allows a c ounty to share with an Indian tribe the
county’s authority to enforce state criminal law s on the tribe’s reservation, thereby
establishing concurrent jurisdiction on the tribe’s reservation . That the cooperative
agreement in this case expressly refers to section 626.93 in dicates that the agreement was
intended to fulfill that statutory purpose by providing for concurrent law-enforcement
jurisdiction on the White Earth reservation. But section 626.93 does not contain any
provision allowing a tribe and a county to agree to establish concurrent law-enforcement
jurisdiction off the tribe’s reservation. Section 626.93 simply is not concerned with the
enforcement of state criminal laws outside the boundaries of Indian reservations.
Accordingly, it is only natural that the coopera tive agreement in this case does not speak
to the question whether a White Earth tribal police officer may enforce state criminal laws
outside the boundaries of the White Earth reservation. Even without such a provision, the
cooperative agreement serves the purposes of section 626.93 by authorizing White Earth
tribal police officers to enforce state criminal laws on the White Earth reservation. The
absence of a provision expressly allowing a White Earth tribal police officer to enforce
state criminal laws outside the boundaries of the White Earth reservation does not indicate

Grand Portage Indian community , the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe , the Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community, the Upper Sioux Community, and the White Earth Band
of Ojibwe. See Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Service s from the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 84 Fed. Reg. 1200, 1200-05 (Feb. 1, 2019).

16
that the tribe and the county intended to forbid a White Earth tribal police officer from
doing so.
Thus, the cooperative agreement between the White Earth Band and Becker County
does not preclude a determination that Officer Byrne was in the course and scope of his
employment when he seized and cited Bellcourt outside the boundaries of the White Earth
reservation.3
C.
Having determined that the cooperative agreement between the White Earth Band
and Becker County does not limit or alter the course-and-scope-of-employment analysis,
we proceed to apply the above-described caselaw to the facts of this case.
In its order denying Bellcourt’s motion to suppress, the district court noted that the
Becker County dispatcher contacted the White Earth dispatcher to request assistance. The
district court also noted that Officer Byrne was on duty as a White Earth tribal police officer

3The dissenting opinion asserts that the caselaw interpreting the course -and-scope
clause of section 629.40, subdivision 3, is distinguishable on the ground that the officer in
each of those cases was employed by a municipality. Infra at 3. The dissenting opinion
further asserts, “Federal Indian tribes are quasi-sovereign bodies possessing all the powers
of an independent nation, except those ceded by treaty, withdrawn by Congress, or
otherwise incompatible with their domestic dependent status.” Infra at 3 -4. But the
dissenting opinion cites no legal authority that preclude s the application of the
course-and-scope clause of section 629.40, subdivision 3. By statute, a police officer
employed by a federally recognized Indian tribe may be licensed by the state as a peace
officer, see Minn. Stat. § 626.84, subd. 1(c)(2), and the course-and-scope clause applies to
all state -licensed peace officers, without exception , see Minn. Stat. § 629.40, subd. 1 .
Under state law, there is no reason why a White Earth tribal police officer should have less
authority outside his or her jurisdiction than, for example, a police officer employed by the
City of Chaska. See Yoraway, 669 N.W.2d at 624-26. As stated above, Bellcourt has not
invoked federal law concerning the relationships between Indian tribes and states.

17
when he received the call from the White Earth dispatcher and decided to respond to it .
The district court then stated, “Clearly, he was working within the ‘course and scope of
employment’ at the time. ” Bellcourt does not challenge any o f the district court ’s
underlying findings of fact. Rather, he challenges the district court’s application of the law
to undisputed facts. Accordingly, we apply a de novo standard of review. See Yoraway,
669 N.W.2d at 625; Bunde, 556 N.W.2d at 918.
As an initial matter, we note that the caselaw is quite permissive with respect to
licensed police officers who seize or arrest persons outside their jurisdictions. In each of
the opinions described above, the appellate court concluded that the officer ’s seizure or
arrest was in the course and scope of the officer’s employment. Tilleskjor, 491 N.W.2d at
894; Yoraway, 669 N.W.2d at 626; Meyer, 641 N.W.2d at 328; Lorenzen, 594 N.W.2d at
554-55; Bunde, 556 N.W.2d at 919-20.
We also note Officer Byrne ’s testimony that, during his employment as a White
Earth tribal police officer, he occasionally has provided assistance to Becker County law-
enforcement officers outside the boundaries of the White Earth reservation. That testimony
about Officer Byrne’s past practice indicates that the course and scope of his employment
is not necessarily limited to the geographic area of the White Earth reservation.4

4Our analysis necessarily is based on the record of the suppression hearing in this
case. Officer Byrne was the sole witness concerning the nature of his duties and where he
performs them. The evidentiary record does not include any documentary evidence of the
official policies or procedures of the White Earth Band, which is not a party to this case
and has not otherwise made an appearance in the case. We are not at liberty to either
disregard or add to the evidentiary record created by the parties at the suppression hearing.
See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 8.

18
The particular circumstances of this case support the district court’s conclusion that
Officer Byrne was in the course and scope of his employment when he seized and cited
Bellcourt. Officer Byrne was on patrol on the White Earth reservation when he received a
call for assistance from the White Earth dispatcher. In that way, the facts of this case
resemble the facts of Bunde, in which the officer’s “policing mission” originated within his
employer’s jurisdiction. See 556 N.W.2d at 919. In addition, the facts of this case are quite
similar to the facts of Yoraway, in which the officer was within his employer’s jurisdiction
when he received a dispatch requesting assistance outside that jurisdiction . See 669
N.W.2d at 624-25. In Yoraway, this court reasoned that patrolling police officers typically
engage in “the investigation of citizen complaints and the enforcement of traffic laws,” that
the officer in that case “responded to an official dispatch requesting the investigation of a
complaint that an identified vehicle was being operated recklessly, ” and that the officer ’s
“response was quintessentially what police officers do in furtherance of their employment
duties.” Id. at 626. The same may be said of Officer Byrne’s actions in this case.
Furthermore, even though Officer Byrne was outside the White Earth reservation
when he seized and cited Bellcourt, he intended to be outside the reservation only briefly
before returning to the reservation. He testified that he intended to turn from county
highway 21 onto county highway 34 at Richwood and then drive back onto the reservation.
He also testified that he is not aware of any backroad that would have allowed him to drive
to the same part of county highway 34 without leaving the reservation.

19
Thus, the district court properly determined that Officer Byrne was in the course
and scope of his employment when he seized and cited Bellcourt. Accordingly , the
evidence gathered by Officer Byrne during the seizure is admissible.
D.
Before concluding, we address Bellcourt’s argument that the district court erred on
the ground that the cooperative agreement between the White Earth Band and Becker
County does not expressly authorize Officer Byrne to seize and cite a person outside the
boundaries of the White Earth reservation for an offense committed off the reservation.
We have concluded that Officer Byrne’s seizure of Bellcourt is independently authorized
by section 629.40, subdivision 3 , and that the cooperative agreement does not determine
the course and scope of Officer Byrne’s employment. In light of those conclusions, it is
immaterial whether the seizure is or is not expressly authorized by the cooperative
agreement. Thus, we need not consider Bellcourt’s first argument.
We also note that Bellcourt filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he argues that
the existence of the White Earth police force is unconstitutional under the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe constitution. A similar argument was made in State v. Manypenny, 662
N.W.2d 183 (Minn. App. 2003), aff’d, 682 N.W. 2d 143 (Minn. 2004) . T he appellant in
that case argued that “the tribe’s creation of a law enforcement agency was an ultra vires
act, done without the tribal members ’ consent through a tribal constitutional amendment
or a constitutional convention.” Mannypenny, 662 N.W.2d at 189. We declined to consider
that issue in Manypenny on the ground that “Minnesota state courts should [not] intervene
in a matter of internal tribal governance ” in light of “the absence of any developed and

20
articulated argument with cited authority supporting appellant ’s argument .” Id. (citing
Bryan v. Itsaca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388, 96 S. Ct. 2102, 2110-11 (1976)). For the same
reason, we decline to consider the argument in this case.
D E C I S I O N
The district court did not err by denying Bellcourt’s motion to suppress evidence.
Affirmed.
D-1

SMITH, JOHN, Judge (dissenting)

I respectfully dissent. Laws provide guidelines for the behavior of society for our
protection and safety. Cross a line and a law is broken. Fail to stop at a sign and you are in
violation of the law. Much like the boundaries in sports activities, if you cross the boundary,
you are in violation of the rules and out-of-bounds.
Jurisdiction has clear boundaries as well. If there is no jurisdiction, there is no
authority to act. The defined jurisdictional authority of a tribal police officer ends at the
boundaries of the reservation unless some other authority is granted by agreement with the
state government.
The majority concludes that a tribal police officer has the authority to seize and cite
a person outside the tribe’s reservation for conduct occurring outside the reservation, even
if that tribal police officer is otherwise subject to a cooperative agreement with the county
that does not contemplate such cross -jurisdictional authority. Because I believe this
interpretation disregards the plain language of the cooperative agreement at issue, I
disagree.
If a tribe and a local governmental unit wish to share law enforcement resources,
“and to provide mutual aid and cooperation,” they must enter into a cooperative agreement
under Minnesota Statute section 471.59. See Minn. Stat. § 626.93, subd. 4 (2018).
Cooperative agreements allow governmental units to “jointly or cooperatively exercise any
power common to the contracting parties or any similar powers, including those which are
the same except for the territorial limits within which they may be exercised.” Minn. Stat.
§ 471.59, subd. 1 (Supp. 2019). If such an agreement authorizes the exercise of police
D-2

powers by an officer of one governmental unit within the jurisdiction of another
governmental unit, “an officer acting pursuant to that agreement has the full and complete
authority of a peace officer” appointed by both governmental units. Id., subd. 12.
Enforcement of state criminal law is traditionally within the jurisdiction of local
county law enforcement, both within the reservation and outside its boundaries.1 In
drafting the cooperative agreement at issue, Becker County and the White Earth band
agreed to extend that authority to White Earth law enforcement “within that portion of the
White Earth Reservation that lies within Becker County.” The agreement expressly limits
its reach to the four corners of the White Earth reservation —specifically, to the
enforcement of state and tribal laws on the reservation, the enhancement of “public safety
efforts” within the reservation, and the preservation of “the parties’ resp ective
jurisdictions” on the reservation.
The majority concludes that this language has no effect on Officer Byrne’s authority
to enforce the state’s criminal laws outside of the reservation, reasoning that the agreement
is silent on issues of law enforcem ent “in those parts of Becker County that are off the
White Earth reservation,” and thus does not address “whether White Earth tribal police
officers may or may not engage in any law-enforcement services outside the boundaries of
the White Earth reservation.” To support this interpretation, the majority finds meaning in
the agreement’s reference to section 626.93, which they contend contains language with
the exclusive effect of allowing counties to share their authority to enforce state criminal

1 As the majority correctly points out, the county has extended authority to enforce
state criminal laws within reservation boundaries under federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a)
(2018); State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 728-31 (Minn. 1997).
D-3

law within the reservation with the tribes themselves. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); Minn. Stat. §
626.93, subd. 3.
Yet, even if the majority is right about the legislature’s intent for subdivision 3, the
cooperative agreement also directly quotes subdivision 4 by providing for “mutual aid and
cooperation” between the county and the tribe, then consciously limiting that aid to the
enforcement of laws on the portion of the reservation “that lies within Becker County.”
Thus, while the cooperative agreement at issue allows White Earth tribal police officers to
exercise the Becker County sheriff’s police powers within the reservation’s boundaries, it
does not authorize the Becker County sheriff to enforce tribal laws within the reservation’s
boundaries, nor does it authorize White Earth tribal police officers to enforce state or tribal
laws outside the reservation’s boundaries.
The majority concludes that Officer Byrne acted within the course and scope of his
employment as a police officer, highlighting a number of factually simila r cases for
support. See, e.g., State v. Tilleskjor, 491 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. 1992); Yoraway v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety , 669 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. App. 2003); State v. Meyer , 641 N.W.2d 324
(Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. May 14, 2002); Lorenzen v. Comm’r o f Pub.
Safety, 594 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. App. 1999); State v. Bunde, 556 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. App.
1996). But these cases all involve municipalities and are therefore distinguishable from the
case before us. This is a case involving tribal law enforcement. Federa l Indian tribes are
quasi-sovereign bodies possessing all the powers of an independent nation, except those
ceded by treaty, withdrawn by Congress, or otherwise incompatible with their domestic
dependent status. See United States v. Wheeler , 435 U.S. 313, 323, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1086
D-4

(1978). As a White Earth tribal police officer, Officer Byrne is essentially a state -licensed
officer of a foreign jurisdiction, subject to a separate set of law enforcement requirements,
and to a binding cooperati ve agreement. Minn. Stat. § 626.93, subd. 4. As stated above,
this cooperative agreement dictates the terms of any mutual law -enforcement efforts
between Becker County and the White Earth band. Thus, because the record is clear about
the limitations of Off icer Byrne’s cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement authority, I find it
unnecessary to look to his testimony about prior cooperative police activity in Becker
County for guidance.
The majority’s interpretation would make any written agreement between the parties
unnecessary because licensed peace officers could always act within the scope of their
duties without regard to jurisdictional boundaries. The contracting parties control the scope
of the agreement. Had the tribe and the county wished to engage in a higher level of police
cooperation, they could have written the cooperative agreement to reflect that goal. Instead,
the agreement is clear: once Officer Byrne exits the boundaries of the White Earth
reservation, he loses the authority to enforce state criminal laws. Officer Byrne could still
make an arrest in Becker County under the fresh -pursuit exception or pursuant to a court
order, see Minn. Stat. § 629.40, subds. 2 -3 (2018), but he does not act within the “course
and scope” of his employment as Whi te Earth police officer by consciously disregarding
his employer’s cooperative agreement and exiting his jurisdiction to cite a driver for an
offense committed outside of the reservation. Because the cooperative agreement at issue
does not provide for such cross-jurisdictional authority, I would reverse Bellcourt’s
conviction.