Connie J. Meier, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0105

Connie J. Meier,
Relator,

vs.

Steven E. Pierce, CPA, Ltd.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed January 13, 2020
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 36694439-3

Connie J. Meier, Truman, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Steven E. Pierce, CPA, Ltd., Fairmont, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Anne Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and John P.
Smith, Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
Connie J. Meier sought unemployment benefits after her employment as a certified
public accountant was terminated . The department of employment and economic
development concluded that she is ineligible for benefits because her employment was
terminated for employment misconduct. We affirm.
FACTS
Steven E. Pierce, CPA, Ltd. (doing business as Pierce Accounting and Tax Services)
is an accounting firm in the city of Fairmont. The firm is owned and managed by Sara
Pierce. Meier worked for the firm as a full-time certified public accountant (CPA) from
December 2012 to July 2018. She was responsible for working with the firm’s clients on
payroll and tax matters.
Before Meier ’s employment was terminated, several of the firm ’s clients
complained about her work. In May 2018, Pierce was informed by a client that Meier had
acted unprofessionally at a meeting with the client and its attorneys in late April. The client
reported that Meier was 15 minutes late for the meeting and acted “very strange and rude,”
“kept interrupting everyone,” and “had food on her shirt.” The same client also stated that
Meier had made mistakes on its employees’ W-2 forms, which resulted in errors on the
employees’ income tax returns, which required amended filings. The Pierce firm paid for
the costs of the amended tax returns. The client threatened to discontinue its business
relationship with the firm. Pierce gave Meier an oral warning after receiving this client ’s
complaints.

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In June 2018, a second client informed Meier that he had received a letter from the
IRS about errors on his tax return, which was prepared by Meier. The client requested that
Meier verify items on the tax return in advance of a n upcoming child-support hearing.
Meier reviewed the tax return but could not understand the error. She put the client’s file
“on the back burner ” because she was busy working on tax refunds for other clients.
Several weeks later, in mid-July, the client contacted Meier again because he had not heard
back from her and urgently needed assistance. Meier told the client that she would talk
with Pierce about the issue, but she did not do so. Meier later testified that she did not talk
with Pierce about the client’s problem because she believed that Pierce would be
displeased. On July 26, 2018, the client contacted Pierce directly to ask why Meier had
not sent him the information he had requested. Pierce later testified that Meier “failed the
client” because IRS issues are deadline-driven and, thus, “usually take priority.”
On July 26, 2018, a third client complained to Pierce that Meier was one week
overdue in completing routine QuickBooks work. Meier was not present at work that day,
which made it difficult for Pierce to respond to the client’s inquiries. As it turned out,
Meier was absent from wo rk that day because she had been arrested for driving while
impaired (DWI) after she hit a parked car while driving to work. Pierce learned about the
nature of the incident that afternoon, after receiving the complaint from the third client.
On Monday, July 30, 2018, Pierce terminated Meier’s employment. On that date,
Pierce wrote a letter to Meier stating that her employment was being terminated for poor
performance based on multiple clients’ complaints. Pierce also informed Meier in person
that her employment was being terminated. After terminating Meier’s employment, Pierce

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reviewed the file of a fourth client, who had complained in March 2018 about mistakes by
Meier on the company’s bi-weekly payroll, which needed to be redone. Pierce determined
that Meier had failed to complete routine work for the fourth client.
In August 2018, Meier applied for unemployment benefits with the department of
employment and economic development. The department made an initial determination
that Meier is ineligible for unemployment benefits because she was discharged for
employment misconduct. Meier filed an administrative appeal. A n unemployment-law
judge (ULJ) conducted a hearing by telephone in September 2018 . Pierce appeared and
testified on behalf of the accounting firm; Meier appeared and testified on her own behalf.
After the hearing, the ULJ issued a written decision in which she determined that
Meier engaged in employment misconduct . The ULJ concluded, “ The firm had the right
to reasonably expect that Me ier would appear and act professional ly in meetings with
clients and would show up for client meetings on time” and “would not put away a client’s
file without doing any work on it for several weeks when the client had made it clear that
he really wanted t o get the work completed. ” The ULJ found that Meier was chemically
dependent, but, based on Meier’s own testimony, the ULJ found that her chemical
dependency was not the cause of her poor work performance. Accordingly, the ULJ
concluded that the firm discharged Meier for employment misconduct and that she is
ineligible for unemployment benefits. Meier requested reconsideration, but the ULJ denied
the request and affirmed the prior ruling.
Meier appeals by way of a petition for a writ of certiorari.

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D E C I S I O N
Meier argues that the ULJ erred by finding that she is ineligible for unemployment
benefits because she was discharged for employment misconduct.
Unemployment benefits are intended to provide financial assistance to persons who
have been discharged from employment “through no fault of their own.” Stagg v. Vintage
Place, Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, a person
who has been discharged from employment based on “employment misconduct ” is
ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4 (2018); Stagg,
796 N.W.2d at 314. “Employment misconduct ” is defined by statute to mean “any
intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job , that is a serious
violation of the standards of behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect of an
employee.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a) (Supp. 2019). But certain conduct is not
within the definition of employment misconduct, including the following:
(2) conduct that was a consequence of the
applicant’s inefficiency or inadvertence;

(3) simple unsatisfactory conduct; [or]

. . .

(9) conduct that was a consequence of the
applicant’s chemical dependency, unless the applicant was
previously diagnosed che mically dependent or had treatment
for chemical dependency, and since that diagnosis or treatment
has failed to make consistent efforts to con trol the c hemical
dependency . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)( 2), (3), (9) (Supp. 2019) . The statutory definition of
misconduct is exclusive such that “no other definition applies ” to an application for

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unemployment benefits. Id., subd. 6(e) (Supp. 2019) ; see also Wilson v. Mortgage
Resource Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 456-60 (Minn. 2016).
This court reviews a ULJ ’s decision denying unemployment benefits to determine
if the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are unlawful or in excess of the ULJ ’s
authority, unsupported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary or capricious . Minn. St at.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(d ) ( 2018). We review a ULJ ’s findings of fact “in the light most
favorable to the decision ” to determine whether “there is evidence in the record that
reasonably tends to sustain them. ” Stagg, 796 N.W.2d at 315 (quotation omitted). We
apply a de novo standard of review to mixed questions of fact and law, such as whether an
employee’s conduct “disqualifies the employee from unemployment benefits. ” Id.
(quotation omitted). “Whether the employee committed a particular act is a question of
fact.” Skarhus v. Davanni’s, Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006).
Meier argues that the ULJ erred for two reasons.
A.
Meier first argues that the ULJ erred by concluding that her conduct is not within
the chemical-dependency exception to employment misconduct.
As stated above, the definition of employment misconduct includes an exception for
“conduct that was a consequence of the applicant’s chemical dependency.” Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 6(b)(9) (Supp. 2019). This exception is its elf subject to two exceptions.
The first applies if “the applicant was previously diagnosed chemically dependent or had
treatment for chemical dependency, and since that diagnosis or treatment has failed to make
consistent efforts to control the chemical dependency.” Id. The second applies if the

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applicant engaged in “ conduct in violation of sections 169A.20, 169A.31, 169A.50 to
169A.53, or 171.177 that adversely affects the employment.” Id., subd. 6(c) (Supp. 2019).
Section 169A.20 of the Minnesota Statutes prohibits driving while impaired. See Minn.
Stat. § 169A.20 (2018).
The ULJ made the following findings concerning Meier’s chemical dependency:
“Meier is chemically dependent. None of the conduct described above, except for the
drinking . . . that led to her DWI, was a consequence of chemical dependency. Meier had
not been diagnosed with or treated for alcoholism before July 25, 2018. ” These findings
appear to be based, in part, on the portion of Meier’s testimony in which she said, “I don’t
think the work performance is misconduct, and I don’t think that chemical dependency had
any effect on my work performance because I don’t think it was poor. ” These findings
make clear that, to the extent that Pierce terminated Meier ’s employment because of her
accounting mistakes, the discharge was not for “conduct that was a consequence of the
applicant’s chemical dependency” because her accounting mistakes were not a
consequence of her chemical dependency. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, sub d. 6(b)(9)
(Supp. 2019). The ULJ made additional findings concerning the DWI incident, as follows:
Although Meier also violated section 169A.20 on July
26, a preponderance of the evidence does not show that the
DWI interfered with or adversely affected the employment
apart from causing Meier’s absence on July 26. And the DWI
was not, by itself, the reason Pierce decided to discharge Meier.
Rather, Pierce discharged Meier in part because she believed
the DWI was evidence that Meier had a drinking proble m or
poor judgment, and Pierce did not trust Meier to handle the
responsibilities of her job if she had a drinking problem or poor
judgment that drove her to drink to excess. To the extent this
concern played a part in Pierce ’s decision to discharge Meier ,

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Meier’s drinking was not employment misconduct because it
was a consequence of chemical dependency.

These findings indicate that, to the extent that Pierce terminated Meier ’s employment
because she was arrested for DWI, the discharge was not for “conduc t that was a
consequence of the applicant’s chemical dependency,” see Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 6(b)(9) (Supp. 2019) , because she was discharged for “ conduct in violation of
section[] 169A.20 . . . that adversely affect [ed] the employment ,” see id. , sub d. 6(c)
(Supp. 2019).
On appeal, Meier asserts that, after speaking with a chemical-dependency counselor,
she now believes that her drinking affected her work performance. But she acknowledges
that she testified at the hearing that her work performance was not affected by her drinking.
Nonetheless, she contends that Pierce believed that her drinking had affected her work
performance and that Pierce’s belief is sufficient to prove that the firm discharged her for
conduct that was a consequence of her chemical dependency. Meier’s argument fails
because it requires this court to disregard her testimony. Even if Pierce believed that
Meier’s poor work performance was a consequence of chemical dependency, the ULJ’s
findings concerning the consequences of Meier’s chemical dependency would not be
erroneous because “there is evidence in the record that reasonably tends to sustain them. ”
See Stagg, 796 N.W.2d at 315 (quotation omitted ). As stated above, to the extent that
Pierce believed that Meier’s absence from work on July 26 was a consequence of chemical
dependency, that belief was based on Meier’s apparent violation of the DWI statute, which
means that Meier was not discharged for “conduct that was a consequence of the

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applicant’s chemical dependency,” see Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(9) (Supp. 2019),
but, rather, was discharged for “conduct in violation of section[] 169A.20 . . . that adversely
affect[ed] the employment ,” see id. , subd. 6(c) (Supp. 2019). Accordingly, t he ULJ ’s
reasoning is consistent with both the law and the evidentiary record.
Thus, the ULJ did not err by concluding that Meier did not satisfy the chemical -
dependency exception to the definition of misconduct.
B.
Meier also argues, in the alternative, that the ULJ erred by concluding that her work
performance is within the definition of employment misconduct.
Meier contends that her conduct was not employment misconduct because it was
“simple unsatisfactory conduct, ” which is an exception to the definition of misconduct.
See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(3) (Supp. 2019) . She does not elaborate on the
reasons why her conduct should be deemed simpl e unsatisfactory conduct rather than
employment misconduct. This court applied the simpl e-unsatisfactory-conduct exception
in Bray v. Dogs & Cats Ltd. , 679 N.W.2d 182 (Minn. App. 2004). In that case, the
employee struggled to meet her employer ’s expectations regarding filing deadlines ,
arranging meetings, disciplining workers, and managing schedules. Id. at 184. This court
determined that the simple-unsatisfactory-conduct exception applied because the employee
“attempted to be a good employee but just wasn’t up to the job and was unable to perform
her duties to the satisfaction of the employer.” Id. at 185.
The facts of thi s case are distinguishable. Meier’s performance was unacceptable
to the client with whom she attended a meeting. Meier consciously disregarded another

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client’s requests for assistance with a problem arising from a tax return she had filed, and
she did not seek assistance from Pierce, even after she told the client that she would do so.
Some of Meier’s work for other clients was so flawed that it needed to be redone. Meier’s
conduct was much worse than the conduct of the appellant in Bray because it was far below
the standards of performance that the firm had a right to expect.
Meier also contends that her conduct was not employment misconduct because it
was mere “inefficiency and inadvertence,” which also is an exception to the definition of
misconduct. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(2) (Supp. 2019) . In this context,
“inadvertence” means “‘an oversight or a slip ’” or “‘[n]ot duly attentive’ or ‘[m]arked by
unintentional lack of care.’” Dourney v. CMAK Corp., 796 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Minn. App.
2011) (alterations in original) (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 910 (3d ed. 1992)). The ULJ considered the inefficiency -and-inadvertence
exception with respect to the second client ’s tax issues and concluded that Meier’s
testimony was not credible and that her “neglect of the client ’s request was negligent or
indifferent and not the consequence of mere inefficiency or inadvertence. ” This
determination was based in part on Meier’s admission that she could have taken s teps to
find a solution to the client ’s problem. In her appellate brief, Meier repeats many of the
explanations she provided to the ULJ. She has not demonstrated that the ULJ erred by
concluding that she committed “a serious violation of the standards of behavior the
employer has the right to reasonably expect of the employee.” See Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 6(a) (Supp. 2019).

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Meier also contends that her conduct was not employment misconduct because she
did not intend to harm her employer. “Employment misconduct” is defined by statute to
include conduct that is “intentional, negligent, or indifferent .” Id. The ULJ found that
“Meier’s neglect of the [second] client’s request was negligent or indifferent.” The ULJ’s
finding of employment mis conduct is proper even though she did not find that Meier
intentionally violated her employer’s standards.
Thus, the ULJ did not err by concluding that Meier engaged in employment
misconduct.
In sum, the ULJ did not err by concluding that Meier is ineligible for unemployment
benefits.
Affirmed.