Preston Ryan Lee, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0107

Preston Ryan Lee, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed November 18, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-15-368

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Deanna N. Natoli, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After pleading guilty to sexually abusin g his ten-year-old daughter, appellant
Preston Ryan Lee sought to withdraw his plea, alleging that he was high on

2
methamphetamine at his plea hearing. Because Lee failed to prove that he was under the
influence during his plea, we affirm.
FACTS
M.L. reported that her father, appellant Preston Ryan Lee, sexually abused her.
Following a police investigati on, the state charged Lee with one count of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct. 1 After several preliminary hear ings, Lee pleaded guilty to the
charge. At the plea hearing, Lee testified that he understood what was happening, he knew
what was at stake, and he was not under th e influence of any alcohol or drugs. Lee
acknowledged the plea petition and stated that he reviewed it and understood that the
maximum penalty for his offense included up to 25 years of jail time. The district court
accepted Lee’s plea and found it was knowing and intelligent with sufficient facts to
support the charge. And the court sentenced Lee to 120 months in prison.
Eleven months later, Lee filed a petition for postconviction relief requesting to
withdraw his guilty plea. Lee alleged that his plea was not intelligent because he was under
the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the plea hearing.
The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing. Lee and his brother testified
that Lee was using methamphetamine frequently while this case was pending—up to three
times a day. According to Lee and his brot her, Lee was high during the plea hearing,
having used methamphetamine the whole night before and an hour before the hearing.
They testified that Lee can “hide it” well from strangers when he is intoxicated but that he

1 Lee was charged under Minnesota Statutes section 609.343, subdivision 1(a) (2012).
Lee’s daughter was ten when the abuse occurred.

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is “erratic,” “sporadic,” “hard to talk to,” and not “of a sane mind” behind closed doors.
According to Lee, he did not understand what was going on at the plea hearing and
merely responded to hi s attorney’s prompting. And he did not remember parts of the
hearing, like when the district court asked him if he was under the influence. Lee testified
that he lied at his plea hearing when he said he understood and that he was not under the
influence.
The postconviction court denied Lee’s petition. It concl uded that Lee’s request to
withdraw his plea eleven months later was not timely and that Lee “failed to establish he
was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the plea hearing and that his
plea was unintelligent.” Lee appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Lee challenges the postconvic tion court’s denial of his petition on two grounds.
First, Lee argues the postconviction court erred when it denied his petition because it was
untimely. The state concedes that Lee’s petition was timely. Lee was sentenced on
September 19, 2017, and he petitioned for postconviction relief on August 9, 2018.
Because Lee filed his petition within two ye ars as required under Minnesota Statutes
section 590.01, subdivision 4(a)(1) (2018), we agree with the parties that the petition was
timely.
Accordingly, we turn to L ee’s second claim: that the postconviction court abused
its discretion by denying his petition because he proved that he was under the influence at
the plea hearing making his plea unintelligent and therefore invalid. As a result, Lee argues
that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition.

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A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But a district court must grant a
defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea if “necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.”
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. “[A] guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent”
to be valid. Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016). A defendant bears the
burden of showing that their guilty plea is invalid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
We review the denial of a postconvicti on petition for an abuse of discretion.
Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). The postconviction court’s findings
will not be disturbed if they are supported by sufficient evidence in the record.
Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn.
Apr. 21, 2009).
Here, the postconviction court found that Lee failed to establish he was under the
influence of methamphetamine at his plea hearing and therefore failed to establish that the
plea was unintelligent. We agree.
For a plea to be intelligent, the defendant must understand the charges against him,
the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of the plea. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. Lee
testified repeatedly at his plea hearing that he understood the charges and the plea
document, that he understood what he was giving up by plea ding guilty, and he
acknowledged that he could be sentenced to up to 25 years in prison. For about half of the

5
plea-hearing transcript, 2 defense counsel, the prosecuto r, and the district court judge
questioned Lee about his choice to plead guilty to ensure he understo od the proceeding,
what he was giving up by pleading guilty, and the consequences of the plea. For example,
Lee stated that he recognized the plea petition, understood it, and had gone over it with his
attorney that morning. Lee ag reed with his attorney that th ey “kept in touch on a regular
basis,” met every other month, and talked “at least five or six times” in the last week. We
note that the district court judge observed, “I know in this particular case, you’ve had quite
a bit of time to talk to your attorney.” A nd the judge commented after the plea colloquy,
“[defense counsel] was very thorough” to which Lee responded, “[h]e was very, very
thorough, Your Honor. I do not have any questions.”
Lee also testified at his plea hearing that he was clear-minded. According to Lee,
he was not under the influence of any alcohol or drugs at the time. He acknowledged on
the plea-agreement form as well that he was not taking any pills or medications.
Nor does the plea transcript give us any indication that Lee was under the influence
at the hearing. He was responsive to qu estioning. Many of his answers followed his
lawyer’s prompting and were short—for exampl e, “yes,” “correct,” and “I understand.”
But Lee also responded substantively to many questions. For example, when the
prosecutor was asking Lee open-ended questions about the circumstances of the abuse, he
answered and added details about his conduct. Lee was able to sufficiently articulate the
facts and circumstances surrounding his offense. And Lee accurately addressed each other

2 The questioning occurred over 12 pages of the 23-page hearing transcript.

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person in the hearing. He addressed his lawy er as “sir,” the prosec utor as “ma’am,” and
the judge as “Your Hono r.” This demonstrates his awareness of the formality of the
situation and with whom he was interacting.
Still, Lee contends that his plea was not intelligent based on the evidence presented
that he was high at the hearing. According to Lee, his and his brother’s testimony proved
that his plea was unintelligent. But Lee had to prove this “to the satisfaction of the court.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. And th e postconviction court was not convinced. It
noted several inconsistencies between Lee’s testimony at the plea hearing and his and his
brother’s testimony at the postconviction hearing. And the judge relied on her observations
of Lee—gathered in at least nine heari ngs between July 2015 and September 2017—in
assessing credibility, a determination to which we defer. State v. Olson, 884 N.W.2d 906,
911 (Minn. App. 2016), review denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2016). Finally, we note that the
postconviction court’s conclusion here is consistent with our existing precedent. See
Erickson v. State, 702 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. App. 2005) (finding that a guilty plea was
valid despite defendant’s later statement that he was under the influence at the time of his
plea because he testified at the plea hearing that he understood what he was doing and he
was not under the influence).
Based on its observations and the testimony, the postconviction court found that Lee
failed to prove that his plea was unintelligent. Because th e record contains sufficient
evidence to support these conclusions, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Lee’s postconviction petition.
Affirmed.