In re the Marriage of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0148

In re the Marriage of:

Jacob Kanake M’mujuri, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Beatrice Kamathi Kanake,
Appellant.

Filed December 2, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-16-2565

Allison F. Eklund, Eklund Law, PC, Roseville, Minnesota (for respondent)

Carla C. Kjellberg, Kjellberg Law Office, PLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Ju dge; Jesson, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Beatrice Kamathi Kanake challenge s the district court’s denial of her
motion to withdraw from a pr operty settlement agreement— reached during a settlement
conference as part of an ongoing dissolution proceeding—and argues that the court failed
to find that the agreement was just and equitable. She also suggests that the subsequent
judgment and decree is not suppo rted by the record. Becaus e we are satisfied that the
district court did not err or abuse its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
In April 1991, appellant Beatrice Kamathi Kanake (wife) married respondent Jacob
Kanake M’mujuri (husband) in Kenya. Around 2002, wife joined husband in the United
States. The parties separated nearly eight years later, and in 20 16, husband filed for
divorce. In response, wife alleged that sh e left the marriage as a result of husband’s
domestic abuse. Because the parties’ three children are adults, the primary issue in the
divorce was property division.
But the property division was complicated by the fact that the parties own several
properties in Kenya. Hoping to reach a property division agreement, the parties agreed to
attend mediation. But mediation attempts failed.
In February 2018—almost 16 months af ter the dissolution proceeding began—the
parties attended a review hearing, informing th e court that they were unable to reach an
agreement through financial early neutral evalua tion. In an order issued following that
hearing, the district court stated that, off the record, the parties agreed to allow the district

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court to conduct a settlement conference. The district court also noted that both husband
and wife waived “any right to object to the undersigned judg e acting as the ultimate trier
of fact on the grounds that the undersigned judge also conducted a settlement conference.”1
At the subsequent conference, the distri ct court met with the parties and their
attorneys in separate rooms, and the par ties reached a property division agreement.
Pursuant to the agreement, husband and wife divided their bank and retirement accounts
and their property in Kenya. Wife agreed to keep one Kenyan property that was her
family’s, and husband received the several remaining properties.
Immediately following the settlement conferen ce, the district court held a hearing
to confirm the parties’ agreemen t. At the hearing, both hus band and wife conveyed that
they had no questions about the agreement and did not need additional time to discuss the
settlement with their respective counsel. The district court then walked through each aspect
of the settlement agreement, asking open-ended questions to husband and wife. Both
parties indicated that it was correct. Additionally, wife confirmed that she understood that
she did not have to agree to the settlement, that she agreed to give up her right to a trial by
agreeing to the settlement, and that she understood that the agreement was a “full and final”
settlement regarding the parties’ property. Wife’s attorney said that she would prepare a
final, stipulated dissolution for the parties to sign and for the district court to approve.

1 The record reflects that neith er party objected to the distri ct court’s characterization of
the agreement to a settlement conference at the time the order was issued or at the hearing
following the settlement conference.

4
But the parties did not submit a proposed or der to the district court by the deadline.
As a result, the district court scheduled a review hearing, and at that hearing, wife asked to
withdraw from the property division agreement because she was under duress at the time
of the settlement conference. According to wife, at the conference she felt like husband
was manipulating her, and she “shut down” when she realized that husband could
potentially receive her family’s property.
The district court denied wife’s request to withdraw from the agreement. In doing
so, the district court reasoned that counsel represented both parties, husband and wife each
engaged in settlement negotiations, and that husband ultimately agreed to wife’s proposal
regarding the property in Kenya. Based on thes e facts, the district court concluded that
there was no basis permitting wife to withdraw from the property se ttlement agreement.
The district court again directed the parties to file a stipulated dissolution judgment or, if
the parties could not agree, separate proposed orders ba sed on the property settlement
agreement.
Each party filed a proposed order, with on ly minor differences between the two. At
the subsequent hearing to finalize the dissolutio n, the district court noted that the parties
discovered two additional pieces of property in Kenya not included in their property
settlement agreement. In the interest of fi nalizing the divorce, hu sband agreed that the
district court could award wife both pieces of property. Wife agreed with the award of the
two additional propertie s to her, but reiterated her oppo sition to the property settlement
agreement as a whole. Adopting wife’s prop osed dissolution order, the district court
entered judgment divorcing the parties. Wife appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
We begin by noting that wife raises ar guments that can be divided into two
categories: those related to the settlement co nference and the resulting property division
agreement and those related to the following ju dgment and decree. With respect to the
settlement conference and resu lting agreement, wife conten ds that the district court
erroneously denied her motion to withdraw from the property division agreement and failed
to make a finding that the ag reement was fair and equitable. And wife argues that the
judgment and decree—adopted from her pr oposed judgment nearly identical to
husband’s—is not supported by the record. We review each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denying wife’s motion to
withdraw from the property settlement agreement.

Wife argues that when considering her request to withdraw from the property
settlement agreement, the district court applied the wrong standard and improperly denied
her request. But we will not disturb a distri ct court’s decision on whether to vacate a
dissolution stipulation unless the district court abused its discretion. Toughill v. Toughill,
609 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. App. 2000).
Courts favor the use of stipulations in dissolution proceedings because they often
simplify and expedite litigation. Shirk v. Shirk , 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997).
Therefore, stipulations are “accorded the sanctity of binding contracts.” Id. As such, a
party may not withdraw from a s tipulation without the consent of the other party, except
with the court’s permission for “cause shown.” Id. at 521-22. But sti pulations based on

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fraud or duress that prejudice the coerced party are “improvidently made” and “ought not
to stand.” Toughill, 609 N.W.2d at 639.2
Here, wife sought to withdraw from the property settlement agreement on the basis
that she was under duress. The district court concluded that wife did not establish any basis
warranting withdrawal from the settlement agreement. 3 In reaching this conclusion, the
district court noted that wife was represented by “well-prepared and attentive” counsel and
that both parties participated in “extensive, detailed, and fair negotiations.” Further, the
court explained that both parties acknowledge d their agreement in open court and that
nothing interfered with their ability to think clearly.4

2 By contrast, we note that once a district court enters judgment on the parties’ stipulation,
“different circumstances arise, as the dissolution is now complete and the need for finality
becomes of central importance.” Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522. Th us, once a district court
enters judgment on the parties’ stipulation, “[t]he sole relief from the judgment and decree
lies in meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.” Id. (footnote omitted).
3 Before arriving at its conclusion, the district court examined four factors: “whether (1) the
party was represented by competent counsel; (2) negotiations were extensive and detailed;
(3) the party agreed to the stipulation in open court; and (4) when questioned by the judge,
the party acknowledged understanding the terms and considering them fair and equitable.”
Toughill, 609 N.W.2d at 639. When reviewing a stipulation where a judgment has not yet
been entered, as is the case he re, it is not an abuse of discre tion for the district court to
consider these factors when ev aluating a party’s request to withdraw from a stipulation.
Id. at 640.
4 In cases where one party claims to be the victim of domestic abuse, “[t]he court shall not
require parties to participate in any facilita tive process . . . .” Minn. R. Gen. Prac.
310.01(b). But “[i]n circumstances where the c ourt is satisfied that the parties have been
advised by counsel and have agreed to an ADR process . . . that will not require face-to-face
meeting of the parties, the court may direct that the ADR process be used.” Id. We note,
here, that the district court stated in an orde r that both parties agreed to participate in a
settlement conference. And duri ng that conference, the parties were in separate rooms,
with counsel, and the district court shuttled back and forth between the parties, eliminating
any face-to-face interaction.

7
The district court’s findings are supported by the record. The record demonstrates
that both parties were represented by counsel, and nothing suggests that wife’s counsel was
not competent. Second, wife engaged in negotiations, which the district court found to be
extensive and detailed. Third, both husband and wife agre ed to each aspect of the
settlement in open court, and wife indicated that nothing was impairing her ability to reach
the agreement. Finally, although the district court never explicitly asked wife if she
believed the property settlement was fair, the district court did exte nsively question wife
about each aspect of the prope rty settlement agreement and wh ether she agreed to it, and
wife indicated that she did. And wife never informed the court that she thought the property
division was unfair at any point during th e hearing about the property settlement
agreement. Because the record supports the district court’s conclusion that wife did not
have a basis to withdraw from the property se ttlement agreement, it was not an abuse of
discretion to deny wife’s request.
Still, wife contends that the district c ourt should have first determined whether a
meeting of the minds occurred, citing Ryan v. Ryan , 193 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. 1971).
“Whether parties reach an obj ective meeting of the minds on the essential elements of a
contract is a question of fact , which this court reviews unde r the clear-error standard.”
Tornstrom v. Tornstrom , 887 N.W.2d 680, 686 (Minn. App. 2016), review denied
(Minn. Feb. 14, 2017). Here, while the di strict court did not explicitly use the phrase
“meeting of the minds,” the court implicitly determined that a m eeting of the minds
occurred. In its order denying wife’s request to withdraw from the settlement agreement,
the district court stated that “the [p]arties memorialized their binding property agreement,

8
under oath, before this [c]ourt.” And becaus e the record supports the conclusion that the
parties did reach an agreement on property division, it was not clearly erroneous for the
district court to implicitly determine that a meeting of the minds occurred.5
Additionally, in challenging the district court’s denial of her request to withdraw
from the property settlement agreement, wife contends that the district court judge
improperly conducted the settlement conference, citing the Code of Judicial Conduct. Rule
2.9 of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct states that “[a] judge shall not initiate,
permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to
the judge outside the presence of the parties or their la wyers, concerning a pending or
impending matter” unless an exception identified in the rules applie s. But one exception
to rule 2.9 permits a judge to “confer separately with the parties and their lawyers” when
attempting to settle pending matters before the judge, as long as both parties agree.
Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.9(4).
Here, in an order issued four days before the settlement conference, the district court
found that “[e]ach party specifically agreed, off the record, to allow the [c]ourt to conduct

5 Wife also alleges that the district court improperly relied on confidential settlement offers
as evidence in denying her mo tion to withdraw from the prop erty settlement agreement.
But we note that, before the settlement conf erence, the district c ourt found that wife
expressly agreed to waive any objection to the district court acting as the ultimate trier of
fact because the district court also conducted the settlement conference. And although wife
draws our attention to Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(m) (2018), which
provides that a party cannot be questioned about certain aspects of mediation, we note that
the statutory provision “does not apply to the parties in the dispute in an application to a
court by a party to have a mediated settl ement agreement or a stipulated agreement
resulting from the collaborative law process set aside or reformed.” Minn. Stat. § 595.02,
subd. 1(m).

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the settlement conference.” Additionally, each party waived “any right to object to the
undersigned judge acting as the ultimate trier of fact on the grounds that the undersigned
judge also conducted a settlement conference.” Although wife asserts that there is “no
evidence” that the parties agreed for “the [c]ourt to independently caucus with the parties,”
the district court made an explicit finding that both parties did consent to the district court
judge conducting the settlement conference. Nothing in the reco rd indicates that this is a
clearly erroneous finding.6
For these reasons, we are not persuaded by wife’s arguments and discern no abuse
of discretion in the district court’s denial of wife’s request to withdraw from the property
division agreement.
II. The district court did not erroneously fa il to find that the property division
agreement was just and equitable.

Wife also contends that the district c ourt did not make a re quired finding that the
division of the parties’ as sets and property—divided pursuant to the settlement
agreement—is fair and equitable. We review a district court’s division of property for an
abuse of discretion, and uphold related fact ual findings unless they are clearly erroneous .
Nolan v. Nolan , 354 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied
(Minn. Dec. 20, 1984).

6 Wife also suggests that an agreement allowing the district court to conduct the settlement
conference must be in writing, but no provis ion in statutes or caselaw establishes this
requirement. Moreover, wife never contested the propriety of the district court judge
conducting the settlement conference at any point before this appeal.

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The division of marital property must be “just and equitable.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58,
subd. 1 (2018). To determine what constitutes an appropriate distribution, “the court must
consider all relevant factors, including those listed in the statute.” Nolan, 354 N.W.2d at
512 (quotation omitted). And when reviewing stipulations, the district court “has a duty to
protect the interests of both pa rties and all the citizens of th e state to ensure that the
stipulation is fair and reasonable to all.” Karon v. Karon , 435 N.W.2d 501, 503
(Minn. 1989). But the statute does not require an equal division of marital property in
order to be just and equitable. See Ruzic v. Ruzic, 281 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Minn. 1979).
By adopting the settlement agreement, the district court implicitly concluded that
the division of marital proper ty was just and equitable. The language of the statute does
not require the district court to make an explicit finding that the division of property is just
and equitable, as long as th e district court considered re levant factors and the ultimate
property division is just and equitable. See Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (stating that “the
court shall make a just and equitable division of the marital property of the parties without
regard to marital misconduct, after making findings regarding the division of the property”
based on “all relevant factors”).
Assessment of the “just and equitable” division of property is complicated here by
the parties’ failure to su bmit documentation regarding the value of their numerous
properties in Kenya. Although the property division on its face may signal some concern,7

7 On its face, the property settlement agreement does not appear to divide the parties’ assets
equally. Based on the agreement, husband recei ved roughly 65% of the parties’ assets in
the United States, while wife re ceived 35%. And in terms of the parties’ properties in
Kenya, husband received 17 properties and wife received three.

11
the district court had only limited information with which to evaluate the property division
agreement. Without informatio n regarding the actual value of the parties’ properties in
Kenya, the district court relied on the parties’ knowledge of the properties and their consent
to the division of property in evaluating th e agreement. And here, based on the record
before the district court—which included numerous properties with unknown values—it
was not clearly erroneous for the district cour t to implicitly conclude that the property
settlement agreement was just and equitable.8
III. The record supports the judgment and decree.

Wife also contends that the judgment and decree is not supported by the record.
Specifically, wife asserts that the provisions about spousal maintenance, attorney fees, and
health insurance have no suppor t in the record. According to wife, she never agreed to
waive spousal maintenance or attorney fees, and the provisions stating otherwise in the
judgment and decree are incorrect.
In her answer to husband’s petition, wife sought spousal maintenance from husband
and requested that husband pay need-based attorney fees. But after the property settlement
agreement, wife never assert ed these claims again. A nd wife’s attorn ey submitted a
document entitled “stipulated findings of fact, conclusions of law, order for judgment and
judgment and decree.” In that document, wife (or wife’s attorney) conveyed that the parties
were able to reach a full and final agreem ent regarding “all issu es” relating to the

8 For instance, although wife only received three properties in Kenya, the district court
noted in a later order that the property wife received produced rental income. See Ruzic,
281 N.W.2d at 505 (concluding that division of property was equitable where wife received
a smaller share of assets but received a property that generated rental income).

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dissolution. Wife’s proposal included provisions which stated that the parties both agreed
that neither was awarded spousal maintenanc e and that each party would be solely
responsible for their own attorney’s fees. And the district court adopted the proposed
dissolution and findings of fact submitted by wife’s attorney.
Because the district court adopted wife’s proposed document—in which she stated
that the parties agreed that neither would receive spousal maintenance or attorney fees and
that each party would carry their own hea lth insurance—the judgment and decree is
supported by the record. See generally Bliss v. Bliss , 493 N.W.2d 583, 590 n.6
(Minn. App. 1992) (stating that “a party who submits proposed findings and conclusions
should also conscientiously review and revise this document prior to submission to the trial
court” to ensure that the proposed documents are sufficiently detailed), review denied
(Minn. Feb. 12, 1993). And although wife asserts that the district court made no findings
on the issues of spousal maintenance and attorney fees, it is unclear why the district court
would need to do so when wife ’s proposed stipulation stated that the parties agreed that
neither party would receive ma intenance and each party woul d pay their own fees. As
such, wife’s arguments that the judgment a nd decree is not supported by the record are
unavailing.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s motion to
withdraw from the property settlement agreement and did not erroneously fail to find that
the agreement was just and equitable. The judgment and decree is supported by the record.
We therefore conclude that there is no basis to reverse the district court’s decision.
Affirmed.