State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0149

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jose Eduardo Medina,
Appellant.

Filed December 30, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-17-4737

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney , Anna Light, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
On appeal from his convictions of two coun ts of first-degree controlled-substance
crimes, appellant Jose Eduardo Medina argues that there was insufficient evidence to show
that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
FACTS
On November 29, 2017, law enforcement searched the apartment in which Medina
was staying. Another man, G.E., was the sole person on the lease fo r the apartment, but
G.E. had agreed to let Medina stay there for monthly rent of $250. Two other men lived in
the apartment in addition to Medina and G.E. At the time of the search, Medina had spent
most of the previous month sleeping on the couch in the living room. G.E. slept in one of
the apartment’s bedrooms, and the two other men slept in a second bedroom.
During the search, law enforcement found Medina sleeping on the couch. Under the
couch cushion where Medina slept, officers found four small plastic bags of cocaine. Next
to the couch, they found Medina’s pants with over a thousand dollars in cash in a pocket.
They also found digital scales and inositol powder1 in the kitchen and the second bedroom.
Finally, they found a small amount of cocaine in G.E.’s wallet, which was in his bedroom.
The state charged Medina with two count s of first-degree controlled-substance
crimes (possession with intent to sell and posse ssion). Medina waived his right to a jury
trial. At the bench trial, Medi na testified that he had only been at the apartment for three

1 Inositol powder is commonly used by cocaine dealers to cut cocaine, increasing the
amount available for sale.

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days and that some of the cash in his pockets was from his r oommates to be used to get a
money order to pay rent. Medina claimed it was not from the sale of narcotics. He testified
that he does not sell drugs and did not know that the drugs were under the couch cushion.
The district court found Medina’s testimony not credible. G.E. also testified at the trial. He
testified that he bought the cocaine found in his wallet from Medina. The district court
found G.E.’s testimony credible.
The district court found Medi na guilty of both counts. It also convicted Medina of
both counts. The district court sentenced Medina on only the possession-with-intent-to-sell
count, imposing 80 months of imprisonment.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Medina argues that the state did not prov ide sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Medina knowingly possessed the cocaine. Possession is an element
of both counts with which Medina was charged. See Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subds. 1(1),
2(a)(1) (2016); see also Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a (2016) (defining “sell” to include
“possess[ing] with intent” to sell). In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, appellate
courts review the record “to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach their verdict.” State v.
Olhausen, 681 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 2004). This st andard of review applies to both jury
and bench trials. State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Minn. 2016).
Both parties agree that Medina’s convictions were obtained based on circumstantial
evidence. To review the sufficiency of circum stantial evidence, an appellate court uses a

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two-step process. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). First, the appellate
court identifies the circumstances that the state proved. Id. To do so, it “winnow[s] down”
the evidence “by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the . . . verdict” and disregarding
any evidence inconsistent with the verdict. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600 (Minn.
2017). Second, the appellate court determines “whether the circum stances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” State
v. Bahtuoh , 840 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. 2013). Th ere are two questions within this
inquiry: first, “whether the inferences that point to guilt are reasonable,” and, second,
whether the circumstances exclude any reasonable inference other than guilt. State v.
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (M inn. 2013) (quotation omitte d). The appellate court
evaluates the circumstances as a whole in determining whether an inference other than guilt
is reasonable. State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002). At this step, the court
does not give deference to the fact-finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599.
To prove that a defendant possessed a controlled substance, “the state must prove
that defendant consciously possessed . . . th e substance and that defendant had actual
knowledge of the nature of the substance.” State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn.
1975). Possession can take two forms: actual or constructive. State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d
156, 159 (Minn. 2015). Actual possession involves direct physical control. State v. Barker,
888 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. App. 2016). Constructive possession, on the other hand,
means either (1) “the prohibited item was fo und in a place under defendant’s exclusive
control to which other people did not normally have access,” or (2) “if the prohibited item

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was found in a place to which others had access, there is a strong probability (inferable
from other evidence) that defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion and
control over it.” Salyers, 858 N.W.2d at 159 (quota tion omitted). “A person may
constructively possess contraband jointly with another person.” State v. Ortega , 770
N.W.2d 145, 150 (Minn. 2009).
The district court did not explain whether it found possession of the cocaine based
on actual possession or constr uctive possession. Medina argues that only constructive
possession is at issue, while the state argues that it proved both actual and constructive
possession. Because guilt can be established by either, we begin with constructive
possession. And because the drugs were found in the common area of the living room, we
analyze the issue under the do minion-and-control standard fo r establishing constructive
possession.
We first identify the circumstances proved. Because Medina elected to waive his
right to a jury trial, we can draw the circumstances proved from the following facts found
by the district court. When executing a search warrant at an apartment, law enforcement
found Medina sleeping on the couch in the living room. Medina had spent the majority of
the previous month staying at the apartmen t, sleeping on the couc h. During the search,
officers found (1) cocaine with a street value of $1,800 to $2,600, packaged consistent with
sale, under one of the couch’s cushions; (2) over a thousand dollars in Medina’s pants
pocket; (3) scales and inositol powder in the k itchen, which was next to the living room,
and in one of the bedrooms; and (4) a small amount of cocaine in G.E.’s wallet, which had
been sold to him by Medina.

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Medina concedes that “it may [be] reas onable to infer from these circumstances”
that he constructively possessed the drugs foun d under the couch cushion. Given that the
drugs were found directly under him, in a place where he had been regularly sleeping for a
month, it is indeed reasonable to infer that Medina was “consciously exercising dominion
and control” over the drugs. But Medina claims that reasonable inferences other than guilt
exist—namely, that the drugs belonged to one or both of the other two roommates who
lived in the apartment with Medina and G.E. and that one of those roommates put the drugs
under the couch cushion without Medina’s knowledge.
Medina focuses his argument on the fact that a scale and inositol powder were found
in the bedroom and on the assertion that someone sleeping on a couch would not
necessarily know something was hidden under the cushions. It is true that the scale and
inositol powder found in the bedroom suppor t a reasonable inference that Medina’s
roommates constructively possessed the cocaine. But that inference does not exclude the
inference that Medina also constructively possessed the drugs, because multiple parties can
constructively possess prohibited items. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d at 150.
Moreover, it is unreasonable to infer from all the circumstances proved that Medina
was unaware of, and not consciously exercising dominion and control over, the drugs. First,
the drugs were found in very close proximity to Medina. See State v. Breaux, 620 N.W.2d
326, 334 (Minn. App. 2001) (“Proximity is an important factor in establishing constructive
possession.”). He was found sleeping directly on top of the drugs and had been sleeping on
the couch for the majority of the preceding month. The drugs had a street value of between
$1,800 and $2,600. It is unreasonable to infe r that the roommates would hide a stash of

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valuable drugs in a shared couch, particul arly when they knew someone else would
regularly be sleeping on it. This inference is particularly unreasonable considering that the
roommates in question had a separate space, in the form of their own bedroom, where they
could have hidden the drugs instead.
Second, Medina was found with a large am ount of cash in the pockets of his pants.
At trial, Medina testified that he had the ca sh because he was going to get a money order
to pay rent. Medina testified that he had obtained some of the money from a legitimate job,
which he claims is common in the immigr ant community. The district court found,
however, that Medina’s testimony was not cred ible. Based on testimony that the district
court did find credible, Medi na had previously sold co caine for cash. While these
circumstances do not contradict the possibility that one of Medina’s roommates also
constructively possessed the drugs, it is unreas onable to infer from th em that Medina did
not know about the drugs—on the contrary, the circumstances lead only to the reasonable
conclusion that he was reaping financial re wards from selling cocaine and that he knew
about the cocaine in the couch.
In evaluating the reasonableness of a hypo thesis of innocence, an appellate court
looks at the circumstances proved not as isolated facts but as “a complete chain that, in the
view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude
. . . any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473
(Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted ). Given the evidence as a w hole, Medina’s theory of
innocence is unreasonable.

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Medina argues that State v. Harris compels a different conclusion. 895 N.W.2d 592
(Minn. 2017). In Harris, the supreme court affirmed the court of appeal’s decision to
reverse the defendant’s conviction, which had been based on constructive possession of a
gun found in the headlining of the car that the defendant was driving. Id. at 602-03. Medina
argues that the holding in Harris was based on the lack of forensic evidence, the presence
of others in the car, and the defendant’s lack of movement toward the gun. We read the
supreme court’s decision in Harris to be based primarily on the facts that the defendant did
not own the car in question, the gun was not immediately vi sible to the driver or the
passengers, and the defendant did not make any movements toward the gun. Id.
Regarding forensic evidence, in Harris there was DNA evidence that showed that
roughly 25% of the population, including the defendant and the other occupants of the car,
could have handled the gun. Id. at 602. But Harris did not hold that forensic evidence was
required; instead, it decided that the DNA ev idence there did not preclude a reasonable
inference that the defendant did not know the gun was in the car. Id. at 603.
As for the facts we consider to have been key in Harris, here, while Medina
similarly may not have owned the couch, and the drugs were not immediately visible, there
are additional circumstances that connect Medina and the drugs. For most of the previous
month, Medina had slept on the couch where law enforcement found the cocaine. He had
previously sold cocaine to G. E. Medina was found with a large amount of cash. He was
found sleeping near the kitche n, which contained other ite ms commonly used by drug
dealers. These circumstances connect Medina to the drugs in a way that the defendant in
Harris was not connected to the gun.

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Medina also points to an unpub lished opinion to support his case.2 In State v. Knerr,
the driver of a vehicle was convicted of possessing drugs that were apparently thrown from
the vehicle. No. A17-0148, 20 18 WL 492621, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Jan. 22, 2018). We
reversed the conviction because there was a re asonable inference that the drugs were the
passenger’s and that the defendant did not know about them. Id. at *4. We noted that, while
the circumstances proved in that case made it perhaps unlikely that the passenger possessed
the drugs without the defendant’s knowledge, they did not make it unreasonable. Id.
As with Harris, however, the circumstances proved in Knerr lacked the connections
to the defendant that were proved in this case. In Knerr, while the drugs were found in a
location somewhat inconsistent with the passenger having disposed of the drugs, there was
no evidence that made it unreasonable to infer the passenger could have possessed the
drugs without the defendant’s knowledge. Id. In this case, in cont rast, the location and
value of the drugs, along with the context of how long Medina had been using the couch
as a bed, make it unreasonable to infer that someone else hid the drugs in the couch without
his knowledge.
Medina argues that courts generally have “upheld convictions based on
circumstantial evidence” only wh en there is “evidence tying a defendant directly to the
illegal items.” State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825, 835 (Minn. Ap p. 2015). He claims there is
no such evidence here because he has not been linked to the cocaine by forensic evidence
and there has been no testimony that he ac tually possessed the cocaine. Constructive

2 Although unpublished decisions are not prece dential, they may be of persuasive value.
Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800-01 (Minn. App. 1993).

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possession, however, does not require the state to show that he actually possessed the drugs,
and, as previously explained, the circumstances proved do tie Medina directly to the
cocaine.
In sum, when considered as a whole, the circumstances proved exclude any
reasonable inference other than Medina’s gu ilt of constructively possessing cocaine. We
need not reach the state’s alternative argument of actual possession.
Affirmed.